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INTRODUCTION

Volume I of the Traité described the conditions of time, place and individuals under which the Perfection of Wisdom was revealed. Volume II stated the spirit in which the bodhisattva should practice the virtues of his state. Volume III described the new concepts, in contrast to the old Abhidharma, in regard to that which concerns the practices auxiliary to enlightenment (bodhipaśikadharma) and the attributes of the Buddhas. Here in volume IV, the Great Sūtra of the Perfection of Wisdom and the Traité which comments on it, tackle a new section which could be entitled ‘the Ideal of the Bodhisattva’. It is concerned with the desires or aspirations of the bodhisattva which can be realized only by the practice (ṣikṣā) of Prajñāpāramitā. Here we will touch upon the very heart of the Middle Way (madhyamaka) as it was conceived by the first Mahāyānasūtras.

At the time of his ordination, the Bodhisattva ‘produced the mind of Bodhi’ (bodhicittam utpādayati) by forming the intention of some day arriving at supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhi) to save the infinite world of beings, to free them from the suffering of saṃsāra and establish them in the supreme knowledge of omniscience (anuttara sarvajñāna). Thus his objective is twofold: to acquire supreme wisdom himself and, at the same time, to assure the welfare and happiness of all beings.

In order to attain this end, the bodhisattva must travel a long career which, after a stage of preparation, extends over ten successive stages designated by the name ‘levels’ (bhūmi). It is only in the tenth level, that of Cloud of Dharma (dharmamegha), that he will accede to anuttarā samyaksambodhi, to the omniscience (sarvajñatā) belonging to the Buddhas involving the knowledge of things in all their aspects (sarvakārajñatā) and leading to the destruction of the disturbing emotions (kleśa) and their residues or ‘traces’ (vāsanā).

Having reached Buddhahood, the bodhisattva would be led straightaway to entering complete nirvāṇa (parinirvāṇa), without any residual conditioning, where he would be able to do nothing more for gods or for men. Realizing his own good, he would be sacrificing the second part <vi> of his ideal, that of working for the good and happiness of an infinite number of beings. This is why, relegating his access to anuttarā samyaksambodhi, he urgently seeks to acquire wisdom similar to but slightly inferior to that of the Buddhas, which allows him to remain for a long time in saṃsāra in order to dedicate himself to salvific activity by many and varied skillful means. Whereas the wisdom of the Buddhas is perfect omniscience (sarvajñatā) bearing upon all the aspects of things (sarvākārajñatā) and eliminating the disturbing emotions (kleśa) as well as their traces (vāsanā), the wisdom sought by the beginning bodhisattva is improperly called omniscience: it is concerned with the general characteristics of things without discerning all the particular aspects; it cuts the base of the passions and assures deliverance (vimukti), but leaves the traces of the passions intact, and it is as a result of the latter that the bodhisattva, abandoning his fleshly body (māṃsakāya), takes on a body arisen from the fundamental element (dharmadhūtajātā) and appears in the most varied forms in innumerable universes of the ten directions in order to ’ripen’ beings (sattvaparipācana).
Of all the wishes that the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra attributes to the bodhisattva, that of beneficial wisdom is incontestably the main one. Exactly what does it consist of and at what stage of his career does the bodhisattva take possession of it?

It is, in its most complete form, the anuttpattikadharmaṃkṣānti, a cryptic expression the exact meaning of which has long escaped western exegesis. This kṣānti is the conviction, the certitude, that dharmas do not arise, that things deprived of birth and, as a result, of destruction, are not subject to becoming. By means of this kṣānti, the bodhisattva penetrates the single nature of dharmas, namely, absence of natures (alakṣaṇa), the true nature of dharmas (dharmatā, bhūtalakṣaṇa) ‘unborn and unceasing, neither defiled nor purified, neither existent nor non-existent, neither accepted nor rejected, always pacified, completely pure, like space, undefinable, inexpressible; it is the disappearance of all paths of speech, it goes beyond the domain of all minds and mental events; it is like nirvāṇa: this is the Dharma of the Buddhas’ (Traité, p. 1501F).

The practitioner definitively acquires this kṣānti in the eighth level, the Unmoveable Stage (acalā). That is where he takes up the assured position of bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniyāma). Certain of his future buddhahood, for three more levels he will pursue his salvific activity, but spontaneously and effortlessly (anābhogena), for his mind will no longer be disturbed by objects <vii> or concepts. Quite rightly, the sūtra considers entry into niyāma (niyāmāvakrānti) as the great conquest of the bodhisattva: this position where wisdom (prajñā) and skillful means (upāyakauśalya) are perfectly balanced is the beginning of supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarā sanyaksambodhi) which makes the Buddhas (cf. p. 1787-88F). However, the zeal of the bodhisattva is insatiable and, although above all he seeks this state of perfection, he still makes other wishes. The seven chapters translated in the present volume include no less than twenty-four of these (see Table of Contents). All are not solely of Mahāyānist invention. Some are repeated from the old canons, such as the wish to become established in the six abhijñās (p. 1809F), to possess a body endowed with the marks (p. 1905F), to hold extensive magical powers (p. 1982F), or even to assure the continuity of the Buddha universes (p. 1988F). Others, by adapting them, take up the doctrines already formulated by the Hināyānist schools during the five centuries following the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. But in this area, the problem of the influences is especially delicate for it cannot be decided whether the Mahāyāna borrowed from the śrāvakas or vice versa. Whatever it may be, there are numerous points in common between the old schools and the teachings of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra. Some postcanonical biographies, some Vinayas, had already established a distinction between the disturbing emotions (kleśa) and the traces (vāsanā) of disturbing emotions which the Buddhas have eliminated but which still persist in the saints (p. 1756F). The Mahāsāṃghika canon includes a basket of magical spells (mantrapitaka), distant beginnings of the dhāraṇi of the Mahāyāna (p. 1862F) and the Dharmaguptakas used the magical syllabary of the Arapacana for didactic ends (p. 1868F). The Mahāsāṃghikas, Andhakas, Uttarapāthakas and Vātśīputrīyas accepted the existence of a sixth destiny, that of the asuras (p. 1956F). The Vibhajyavādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas believed in the possibility of preaching the Dharma by means of a single sound (p. 1380F, 1985F). The Prajñāaptivādins had drawn up a list of ten emptinesses which will appear, partially at least, in the list of eighteen emptinesses presented by the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (p. 2013F).
All considered, the wishes that the bodhisattva attempts to realize by practicing the Prajñāpāramitā make up a not quite coherent mixture of original ideas and borrowed pieces. It is incumbent on the Traité to put some order into this important section of the sūtra.

***

In my introduction to volume III of the Traité (p. viiiF-xlivF), I have dedicated a few pages to the author of this work. A learned monk, he knew the canonical scriptures thoroughly and specialized in the study of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma (Ṣaṭpādābhidharma and Mahāvibhāṣā); later, having become aware of the Mahāyānasūtras, in particular the Prajñā sūtras and the philosophical treatises composed by the first Mādhyamikas (Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhulabhadra), he became converted to the Mahāyāna without, however, renouncing his monastic role or even leaving his monastery. He then composed a long commentary on a great sūtra of the Perfection of Wisdom, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā.

He noted that the doctrines of this sūtra in no way contradicted the canonical sūtras of the Tripiṭaka and were limited to explaining them. This made him very happy because, since his entry into religion, he held the sūtras as the very expression of the infallible word of the Buddha. This is why, in his commentary, he calls upon endlessly it to show the complete orthodoxy of the Mahāyāna Prajñā.

On the other hand, he had to recognize that the sūtra teachings, for the most part, were incompatible with the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and, more particularly, with Kātyāyanūputra’s Jñānaprasthāna. We may guess that for him this was a disillusionment for he knew this system thoroughly and appreciated the clarity and coherence of its scholasticism. By comparison, the explanatory techniques adopted by the Mahāyāna sūtras presented a very sorry appearance: their disorder, their disjointedness, their innumerable enumerations and their incessant repetitions which end up by tiring the best disposed reader. But the author of the Traité had been won over to their doctrines and he found himself faced with the difficult and unrewarding task of commenting on a sūtra the ideas of which he accepted but the didactic methods of which he reproved. Having specialized in the study of the Ṣaṭpāda and the Vībhāṣā, he decided to teach the doctrines of the Prajñā according to the explanatory techniques customary in the Abhidharmas. But bound to the text on which he was commenting, he was prevented from presenting it as a coherent and structured synthesis in the manner of a Madhyamakaśāstra or an Abhisamayālaṃkāra. Tackling each subject in the order in which the sūtra presented them, he tried to schematize them in the old way and, each time the subject was approached, he contrasted this pattern with the corresponding Sarvāstivādin pattern.

The present volume abounds in antitheses of this kind: to the four roots of good ‘favorable to penetration’ (nirvedhabhāgīya kusalamāla) practiced by the śrāvaka in the course of the prayogamārga, there is the corresponding four preparatory practices required of the bodhisattva before his accession to the eighth bhūmi (p. 1795-98F); to the predestination to salvation (samyaktaniyāma) of the śrāvaka, there is the predestination to Dharma (dharaniyāma) of the bodhisattva; before their respective predestinations, both risk mūrdhabhyaḥ pāta, or ‘falling back from the summits’ (p. 1790-93F); by an act of taking pleasure
(anumodanā) in a good action, the bodhisattva gains merit infinitely superior to that of the śrāvaka who performs this good action (p. 1880F); the advised practice of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupathāṇa) leads favorably to meditation on the first three emptinesses (p.2047-55F).

We cannot avoid the impression that by writing his Traité, the author, an Abhidharmika who has gone over to the Mahāyāna, had set himself the main goal of converting the Sarvāstivādins.

Here, as in the preceding volumes, the Traité revives the world of the gods and men who moved around Śākyamuni from his first appearance on earth: king Ajātaśatru (p. 1767F), the brahmaṇa Ākrośaka-Bhāradvāja (p. 1762), the recluse Asita (p. 1915), the emperor Asoka in his previous lifetime (p. 1934F), Bakkula (p. 1984F), Bāvari (p. 1906F), the vaśyā Bindu (p. 1938F), Brahmā Devarāja (p. 2079F), the brāhmaṇa Ciṅcā (p. 1764F), Čudapanthaka (p. 1865), Devadatta (p. 1767F), the buddha Dīpankara (p. 1775, 17777, 1921, 1931F), Gavāmpati (p. 1761F), the buddha Kāśyapa (p. 1778F), the śramaṇa Koṭiśīla (p. 1894F), Lo p’in tcheou, perhaps Losaka-tiṣya (p. 1944F), Madhuvāsiṣṭha (p. 1761F), Mahākāśyapa (p. 1761F), the demon Māra (p. 1776, 1825, 1937F), Maudgalyāyana (p. 1944, 1985F), the buddha Nāgavaṃśāgra (p. 1907F), Nanda (p. 1760, 1905, 1910F), the Pāpiyaka bhikṣus (p. 1837F), Pilindavatsa (p. 1761F), king Prasenajit (p. 1774F), Rāhula (p. 2108, 2143F), Rāhu, king of the asuras (p. 2091F0), Śakra Devendra (p. 2090F), Śāriputra (p. 1746, 1760, 1849, 1944F), the parivrājaka Śrenika (p. 2141-42F), king Śuddhodana (p. 1826, 1915F), the bhikṣu Sumana or Karṇasumana (p. 1894-95F), Sumati alias Sumedha or Megha (p. 1775, n. 1; 1931F), Sundarī (p. 1764F), Sunetra (p. 2092F), the bhikṣu Uttara (p. 1778F), the brahmaṇa from Verañja (p. 1767F), the buddha Vipṣyin (p. 1894, 1895F). <x>

Among the rare bodhisattva appearing in the present volume, we may mention Samantapuṣpa (p. 1849-52F), Vimalakīrti (p. 1852F), Mañjuśrī (p. 1907F), Sadāpruddita (p. 1977F) and, mentioned together, Mañjuśrī, Vimalakīrti, Avalokiteśvara, Mahāsthāmaprāpta and Samantabhadra (p. 1982F).

Volume IV makes use of the same sources as the preceding volumes: the canonical Sūtrapitaka, the Mahāyānasūtras and especially the Mahāprajāpāramitāsūtra (Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā), the Abhidharmas of the various schools and the śāstras of the first Mādhyamika masters.

1. The canonical sūtras known by the author solely in their Sanskrit version, that of the Āgamacatuṣṭaya and the Kṣudrakapitaka, contain the teachings of the last Buddha Śākyamuni and, in this capacity, enjoy incontestable authority recognized by all Buddhists, whatever their Vehicle. It is to them that the author resorts preferentially in order to support his arguments. His work literally swarms with canonical logia and frequently cites whole sūtras, with greater or lesser accuracy.


2. A convinced and professed Mahāyānīst, the author of the *Traité* could not help but recognize the authenticity of the Mahāyānasūtras. There is frequent reference to them in his commentary. Nevertheless, even to his eyes, they do not enjoy the same credibility as the *Mahāsūtras*. The latter present themselves from the very beginning as great magical spells(*pāṭihokta*) of the Buddha during the forty-five years of his public ministry and were heard and collected by his immediate disciples: they were facts historically witnessed. The sūtras of the Mahāyāna, however, come from a meeting in samādhi between one or several clairvoyants and the Buddhas of the three times and ten directions; having come out of samādhi, the clairvoyant records, most often in writing, the conversations held with the Buddhas, but he knows perfectly well that the Buddhas come from nowhere and that he himself has gone nowhere, that the visions and things heard bestowed on him took place in his mind and that this mind itself does not exist, With a candor for which we will be grateful, the author will insist later (p. 1927-1930F) on the purely subjective nature of the appearance of Buddhas. Canonical sūtras and Mahāyānasūtras also differ in that the former, more or less, have only a didactic value whereas the latter present themselves from the very beginning as great magical spells (*mahāvīḍyā*) assuring their readers spiritual and material benefits (cf. 1862-1863F).

In the present volume, the author cites long extracts from the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, in this case the Pañcaviṣṭatisahāsrikā in order to expand his commentary and, in general, mentions the title of the chapter (*parivarta = p’ in*) from which the extract is taken: cf. p. 1759F, n. 1; 1793F, n. 2; 1800F, n. 3; 1807F, n. 1 and 2; 1817F, n. 1 and 2; 1818F; 1831F, n. 1; 1832F, n. 2; 1880F, n. 2; 1892F, n. 2; 1904F, n. 1; 1910F; 1975F, n. 1; 2046F, n. 3; 2060F, n. 1; 2102F, n. 1; 2146F, n. 2.

*Other Mahāyānasūtras cited by their titles.* - *Bhadraśīla* (p. 1892F), *Daśabhūmika*, the Chinese title of which is borrowed from Dharmaraka’s translation (p. 1897F), *Pratyutpanna-buddhasāṁskṛtasthitasamādhi* cited as *Pratyutpannasamādhi* (p. 1927F); see also p. 1789F, n. 1), *Ratnākāra* (p. 1843F), *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (p. 1957F), *Śūrangsasamādhi* cited as *Śūrangsasūtra* (p. 1907F), *Tathāgataśīntyaguhyānīrdeśa* cited as *Guhyakāśūtra* (p. 1985F),
3. As we have seen in the Introduction to volume III of the Traité <xii> (p. xix-xxii), the author had specialized in the study of the Sarvāstivādin scholasticism but, nevertheless, did not approve of it. However, although he energetically debated against the doctrines of Kātyāyaniputra and his disciples on many points (cf. p. 283F seq., 614F, 1383F, 1697F, 1905F), he did not entirely reject the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. In the present volume, he calls five times on the authority of an “Abhidharma” not otherwise specified and of which he quotes long extracts. In the five cases, it is a question of the Abhidharmaprabhāpada (cf. p. 1750F, n. 2: 1752F, n. 1; 1870F, n. 3; 2083F, n. 1). This work consists of eight chapters, the first four of which were the work of the bodhisattva Vasumitra and the last four that of the Kaśmir arhats (p. 111-112F). For E. Frauwallner (Abhidharma-Studien, WZKSO, VIII, 1964, p. 92-99), it would be the most recent and the best constructed pāda of the Śatpādābhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins, but earlier than the Jñānapraṣṭhāna of Kātyāyaniputra. Be that as it may, the Prakaraṇapāda always enjoyed a special esteem. It is the most frequently cited Abhidharma in the Saṃgītiparīṣaya (cf. Taisho Index, no. 15, p. 213c), the Mahāvibhāṣā (Taisho Index, no. 14, p. 313c), the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra (Taisho Index, no. 16, p. 174b; Kośa Index, p. 242 under Prakarana).

4. In the chapter dedicated to the eighteen emptinesses, the author is inspired mainly by Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakāśāstra. He even introduces into his prose two Mūlamadhyamakārikās without informing the reader of his borrowing (p. 2095F, n. 1). In several places, his argumentation closely follows that of Nāgārjuna (cf. p. 2057F, n. 1; 2058F, n. 1; 2062F, n. 1; 2063F note; 2075 note; 2076F n. 1; 2084F, n. 2; 2107F, n. 2; 2119F, n. 1).

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It would be rather naïve to accept that all the texts attributed by the Indian, Chinese and Tibetan traditions to Nāgārjuna come from one and the same hand, the well-known author of the Madhyamakāśāstra. This would be to forget that, in the matter of literary attribution, India is open only to the wealthy and that the worry of the old writers was not to keep their rights of authorship but to dissimulate modestly behind great names. In volume III (p. xxxix-xl F, 1370-1375F, note), I [Lamotte] expressed the opinion that the author of the Traité is not the Nāgārjuna of the Madhyamakāśāstra and that he was <xiii> significantly later than the first Madhyamika scholars, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhulabhadra. Without wishing to repeat myself [Lamotte], I would only comment that the Traité which calls upon a good thirty voluminous Mahāyānasūtras (cf. volume III, p. xxxivF-xxxviiF) cannot be placed at the very origins of the Buddhist Madhyamaka, that the Traité itself cites a mass of Nāgārjuniam kārikās and reproduces in full (p. 1060-1065F) the Prajñāparamitāstotra by Rāhulabhadra and therefore is later than them.

There remains Āryadeva. On p. 1370F, without mentioning a particular work, the Traité presents a chapter entitled P'o-wo-p'in ‘Chapter on the Refutation of the Self’. To what work should it be attributed? To a
Prajñāpārāmitā? But no chapter in the Tables Comparatives des versions des Prajñāpāramitā prepared by Professor Hikata in his edition of the Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā bears this name. Could it be a chapter of the Mūladhāramakārikā of Nāgārjuna? De Jong (Asia Major, XVII, 1972, p. 109): “It is certainly possible that P’o-wo-p’in refers to the eighteenth chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakārikā.” Alas, this eighteenth chapter bears the title Ātmapariśā ‘Examination of the Self’. I [Lamotte] accept and still believe that the P’o-wo-p’in in question designates the chapter of the Catuḥśatakata by Āryadeva entitled P’o-wo-p’in in the two Chinese versions (T 1570, k. 1, p. 182c18; T 1571, k. 2, p. 194a27), Bdag dgag par bsgom pa bstan pa in the Tibetan version (Tib. Trip., vol. 95, no. 5246, p. 137-1-5). According to the Chinese versions, the Sanskrit title would have been Ātmapariṣedhaprakaraṇaṃ ‘Chapter on the Refutation of the Self’.

A new piece of information may now be added to the file. From a letter dated May 14, 1976, two young Danish scholars, C. Lindtner and P. Sorensen inform me [Lamotte] that they have discovered two stanzas of the Āryadeva’s Catuḥśatakata in my [Lamotte] French translation of the Traité, p. 69F and 1686F.

1. On page 69F (cf. T 1509, k. 1, p. 64b11-18), the writer expresses himself as follows:

In the Tchong-louen (Madhyamakaśāstra) some stanzas say:

If there were something non-empty
There would have to be something empty.
But if the non-empty does not exist,
How would the empty exist?

The fools who see non-emptiness
Then also see emptiness.
Not having positive views (dṛṣṭi) or negative views (adrṣṭi),
That is truly nirvāṇa.

Non-duality, the door to bliss,
The destruction of wrong views,
The realm traveled by all the Buddhas
That is what is called Non-self.

Only the first two stanzas are taken from the Madhyamakaśāstra. The first is Madhyamakakārikā XIII, 7 (Madh. vr̥tti, p. 245):

\[ Yady aśīnyam bhavet kiṃcit \]

\[ syāc śūnyam iti kiṃcana/ \]
na kimcid asty aśūnyam ca
kutaḥ śūnyam bhaviṣyati//

The second may be compared to the Madhyamakakārikā V, 8 (Madh, vr̥tti, p. 135):

Astitvam ye tu paśyanti
nāstitvam cālpabuddhayah/
bhāvānaṁ te na paśyanti
draṣṭavyopaśamaṁ śivam//

“People of little intelligence who see the existence or also the non-existence of essences do not see the blessed peacefulness of the visible [peacefulness consisting of the cessation of knowledge and of the object to be known]”.

The third stanza cited does not come from the Madhyamakaśāstra but from Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, chap. XII, stanza 13 (ed. P. L. Vaidya, no. 288, p. 99; ed. V. Bhattacharya, no. 288, p. 151):

Advitīyaṁ śīadvāraṁ
kudṛṣṭīnāṁ bhayaṅkaram/
viṣayaṁ sarvabuddhānāṁ
iti nairātymyam ucyate//

“Non-duality, gateway to bliss, the scare-crow for wrong views, the domain of all the Buddhas: that is what is called Non-self”.

2. Having affirmed that the anātman (or the naiṛtmya) involves the rejection of all dharmas, the Traité, p.1686F (cf. T 1509, k. 26, p. 254a10-12) continues with the following citation:

This is what is said:

If a person knows the naiṛtmya well
He is thus advised
Not to be happy by hearing about existent things
Not to be sad by hearing about non-existent things.

This citation is borrowed from Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, chapter XII, stanza 17. Its original Sanskrit title has not come down to us, but the stanza is known by its Chinese translations (T 1570, p. 184b8-9; T 1571, k. 6, p. 220b14-15) and its Tibetan translation, much more faithful (ed. P. L. Vaidya, no. 292, p. 100; ed. V. Bhattacharya, no. 292, p. 156):

de īd du bdag sīnam du /
de ltar gails gnas pa //
V. Bhattacharya (l. c.) restores the Sanskrit as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
Tattvato nair\text{ā}tmyam iti \\
yasyaiva var\text{ā}te matîh \\
tasya bhāvā kutaḥ prītir \\
abhāvena kuto bhayam
\end{align*}
\]

“He who considers the non-self to be real, how could he experience joy in the face of existence, fear in the face of non-existence?”

Thus the discovery of Lindtner and Sorenson adds to and confirms our earlier conclusions. The author who cites Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakaśāstra, Aryadeva’s Catuḥsataka and Rāhula’s Stotra postdates the first line of great Maādhyaṃyaka scholars and cannot be identified with any of them. Indeed, he is considerably later than them for, by referring to a mass of Mahāyāna sūtras, he is from an epoch where the Madhyamaka had already undergone a long elaboration.

If, as its translator Kumārajīva would have it, the author of the Traité went under the name of Nāgārjuna, this was not the Nāgārjuna of the Madhyamakaśāstra, but one of the many other ‘Nāgārjunas’ known to the literary tradition. On this subject, see the comments of G. Tucci, in East and West, vol. 22 (1972), p. 366-367. <xvi>

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Professor Jacques May of the Université de Lausanne, a great specialist of the Madhyamaka, has dedicated an entire week of his precious time to rereading with me the translation of chapter XLVIII which deals with the eighteen emptinesses, and Professor Robert Shih of the Université de Louvain has made valuable suggestions in regard to the same chapter. My former pupil, Marcel Van Velthem, graduate in philology and eastern history, has spontaneously offered to help me in correcting the proofs and his assistance has been very efficient. I give my heartiest thanks to these friends, as devoted as they are wise.

For more than fifteen years, I benefited from the care and favors of the Fondation Universitaire de Belgique. After having subsidized most of my earlier publications, it has generously intervened in the fresh printings of the present volume. The debt of gratitude that I owe to the members of this great institution and to its distinguished Secretary General, Marcel Grosjean is great indeed.

My gratitude also goes to Emmanuel Peeters, director of the Imprimerie Orientaliste of Louvain whose judicious advice considerably facilitated the execution of the present work.

Étienne Lamotte

Louvain, August 15, 1976.
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First Section ACQUIRING THE KNOWLEDGES OF THE PATHS AND THE ASPECTS OF THE PATHS

At the end of the Sermon at Benares, the Buddha taught the fourth noble truth to his disciples: the way of the destruction of suffering (duḥkhiṇirodharāminī pratiṣṭhā) or the noble eightfold path (āryāṣṭāṅgikamārga) that leads to nirvāṇa. Later, on many occasions (Dīgha, II, p. 81, 84; Itivuttaka, p. 51) he defined its three elements, namely, morality (ślā), concentration (sāmādhi) and wisdom (prajñā). This supraworldly (lokottara) path is the only one able to assure the total liberation of the śrāvakas who aspire for their own benefit. They have the direct understanding of it at the end of the stage of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga), a vision which destroys any error they may have of the nature of things, especially of the existence of the ātman, and brings them the fruit of entry into the stream of nirvāṇa (srotāpattiphalas). From then on, the śrāvakas know the Path in its fourfold aspect of path (mārga), reasoning (nyāya), acquisition (prāpti) and exit from the world (nairūrika): cf. Saṃyuktābhidharmasūtra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 918a-b; Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 79, p. 408c; Kośa, VI, p. 163; VII, p. 30-34; Mahāvyut., no. 1190-1205).

A much vaster understanding is required of the bodhisattvas who want to assure the benefit and happiness of all beings. It is not enough for them to know the single path that leads to deliverance, but all the paths, good or bad, that beings are liable to take. But they cannot be taken in by this multiplicity of paths: they must understand that “all these paths end up in a single path”, that of the true nature which is none other than the absence of nature (alakṣaṇa).

Thus, at the stage of seeing the truths, the bodhisattva must hold a twofold knowledge which is absent in the śrāvaka, the knowledge of the paths and the knowledge of the aspect of the paths (mārgākmarajñatā), which is empty of any nature.

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21, l. 6-7; Śatasahasrikā, p. 67, l. 4-5). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to obtain the knowledge of the paths must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom; the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who, by means of the knowledge of the paths, wishes to fulfill completely the knowledge of the aspect of the paths must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom (Mārgajñatām anuprāptukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyām yogas karanīyah. Mārgajñatayā mārgākārajñatām <1736> paripūrayitukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyām yogas karanīyaḥ.)
I. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PATHS

[1. Simple Path]. – There is a simple path (ekayāna) to go directly to nirvāṇa: this is mindfulness (smṛti) and heedfulness (apramāda) applied to the good dhammas, the path conforming to mindfulness of body (kāyasmytayupasthāna).

[2. Twofold paths] – There are also twofold paths: 1) bad path (akuśalamārga) and good path (kuśalamārga); 2) worldly path (laukikamārga) and supraworldly path (lokottaramārga); 3) path of concentration (samādhimārga) and path of wisdom (prajñāmārga); 4) impure path (sāsravamārga) and pure path (anāsravamārga); 5) path of those who practice (śaikṣamārga) and path of those who no longer practice (aśaikṣamārga); 6) path of seeing (darśanamārga) and path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga); 7) path of those who seek the truth as a result of faith (śraddhānusārin); 8) path of those who are candidates for the fruit of the religious life (phalapatipannakamārga) and path of those who are in possession of these fruits (phalaprāptamārga); 9) path of expulsion of the conflicting emotions (ānantaryamārga) and path of deliverance from the conflicting emotions (vimuktimārga); 10) path of whose who are convinced by means of faith (śraddhādhimuktaṁmārga) and path of those who have the speculative view (dṛṣṭiprāptamārga); 11) path of those who are delivered by means of wisdom (prajñāvimuktaṁmārga) and path of those who are doubly delivered (ubhayatobhāgavimuktaṁmārga).

There are innumerable twofold paths of this kind.

[3. Threefold paths]. – There are also threefold paths:

1) path of the damned (nārakamārga), path of the animals (tīryaṁmārga) and path of the pretas.

The three kinds of hells are the hot hells, the cold hells and the dark hells. The three kinds of animals are those that live on the earth, those that live in the water and those that live in the air. The three kinds of pretas are the [258a] emaciated pretas, the pretas that eat filth and the divine pretas.

2) Three kinds of good paths (kuśalamārga): the path of humans (manusyaṁmārga), the path of the gods (devamārga) and the path of nirvāṇa.

There are three kinds of humans: those who commit wrong-doings (āpatti), those who earn merit (puṇya) and those who seek nirvāṇa. There are three other kinds of humans: those who taste the objects of desire

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2. For these various categories of saints, see above, p. 1389-1391F, n.

3. The hells have been described above, p. 955-968F.

4. For the pretas, see p. 954-955F.
(kāma) and do wrong; those who taste the objects of desire and do not do any wrong; those who do not
taste the objects of desire and do not do any wrong.

There are three kinds of gods: gods of the desire realm (kāmadeva), gods of the realm of subtle form
(rūpadeva) and gods of the formless realm (ārūpyadeva).

There are three kinds of paths of nirvāṇa: the path of the śrāvakas, the path of the pratyekabuddhas, and the
path of the Buddhas. The path of the śrāvakas is of three kinds: the path of those who practice
(śaikṣamārga), the path of those who no longer practice (aśaikṣamārga) and the path of those who are
neither the one nor the other (naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣamārga). It is the same for the path of the
pratyekabuddhas. The path of the Buddhas is of three kinds: the path of the perfections (pāramitāmārga),
the path of skillful means (upāyamārga) and the path of the pure lands (viśuddhakṣetramārga). The
Buddhas have three other paths: the path of the first production of the mind of awakening
(prahamacittotpādamārga), the path of the practice of benefit (kuśalacaryāmārga) and the path of
converting beings (sattvaparipācanamārga).

There are three other threefold paths: the path of morality (śīlamārga), the path of meditative stabiliza-
tion (samādhimārga) and the path of wisdom (prajñāmārga). There are innumerable threefold paths of this
kind.

[4. Fourfold paths]. – There are also fourfold paths: 1) the path of worldly people (prthagjanamārga),
the path of the śrāvakas, the path of the pratyekabuddhas and the path of the Buddhas; 2) the path of
the śrāvakas, the path of the pratyekabuddhas, the path of the bodhisattvas and the path of he Buddh
as; 3) the path of the śrāvakas is of four kinds: the path of suffering (duḥkhamārga), the path of the origin
(samudayamārga), the path of the cessation (nirodhamārga) and the path of the way (pratipanmārga);
<1738> 4) the paths of the four fruits of the religious life (catuhṣramanyaphalamārga); 5) the path
contemplating the true nature of the body (kāyadharmatāmupāsyamanamārga) and the paths contemplating the
true nature of feeling, the mind and things (vedānācittadhardharmatāmupāsyanāmārga); 6) the four
paths by means of which evil bad dharmas that have not yet arisen may not arise (anutpannānām
pāpakānām akuśalānām dharmānām anutpādaaya), so that the bad wicked dharmas already arisen may be
destroyed (utpannānām pāpakānām akuśalānām dharmānām prahānāya), so that good dharmas that have
not yet arisen may take birth (anutpannānām kusalaṇām dharmānām utpādaaya) and so that the good
dharmas that have already arisen may increase (utpannānām kusalaṇām dharmānām vaipulyāya); 7) the
four paths predominating respectively in zealouosity (chanda), exertion (vīrya), mind (citā) and
examination (mīmāṃsā); 8) the paths of the four lineages of saints (āryavamsa) consisting of losing
interest in clothing (cīvara), food (pinḍapāta), beds (śayanāsana) and medicines (bhāsiṣajya) and taking
enjoyment (rāmatā) in the cessation of suffering (duḥkhaprahāṇa) and the practice of the Path
(mārgabhāvanā); 9) the paths of the four ways (pratipad): the difficult way of slow understanding (duḥkhā

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5 The four smṛtyupasthāsa: cf. p. 1150-1176F, 1187-1194F.
6 The four samyakpradhāna: cf. p. 1176-1177F.
7 The four rddhipāda: cf. p. 1177-1179F.
pratipad dhandhābhījñā), the difficult way of quick understanding (duḥkhā pratipad kṣiprābhījñā), the easy way of slow understanding (sukhā pratipad dhandhābhījñā), the easy way of quick understanding (sukhā pratipad kṣiprābhījñā), 9 10 the four paths of meditation (bhāvanāmārga) aimed at happiness in the present lifetimes (īhasukhā), knowledge of births and deaths (cītyasaṭpādaajñāna), destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya) and analytical knowledge (vibhaṅgaajñāna) respectively; 11) the four divine paths (devamārga), namely, the four trances (dhāyānā); 12) the four kinds of paths: paths of the devas, the Brahmins, the āryas and the Buddhas. There are innumerable four paths of this type.

[5. Fivefold paths]. – There are also fivefold paths: 1) path of the damned (nārakāmārga), path of the animals (tīryaṅmārga), path of the pretas, path of humans (manusyaṃmārga) and <1739> path of the gods (devamārga); 2) paths of the five elements belonging to those who no longer practice (aśaikṣaskandhamārga), from the aśaikṣaskandha of morality (śīla) up to the aśaikṣaskandha of the cognition and vision of deliverance (vimuktiṣāna), 12) paths of the five objects of desire (kāmaguṇa); 5) five paths of words in harmony with the Dharma and five paths of words of adharma; 6) five paths: those of the prthagjanas, the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddhas, the bodhisattvas and the Buddhas; 7) paths of the five [258b] destinies (gati) 8) paths analyzing material things (rūpa), the mind (cītta), mental events (caitasika), dharmas disassociated from the mind (cīttaṃkriyākāsa) and the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta) respectively; 9) five paths concerning things to be destroyed (praheya) by the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya), the truth of the origin (saṃudayasatya), the truth of cessation (nīrodhasatya), the truth of the path (pratipatsatya) and meditation (bhāvanā) respectively. There are innumerable fivefold paths of this kind.

[6. Sixfold paths]. – There are also sixfold paths: 1) path of the damned (nārakāmārga), path of the animals (tīryaṅmārga), path of the pretas, path of humans (manusyaṃmārga), path of the gods (devamārga) and path of the arhats; 2) paths of abandonment of the six objects (saḍviṣayapaṛītya); 3) paths of the six comities (sārāyaṇī); 4) paths of the six superknowledges (abhijñā); 5) paths of the six kinds of arhats; 6) paths of development of the six stages (bhūmi); 7) paths of the six meditative stabilizations (samādhi); 8) paths of the six perfections (pāramitā), each of them including six paths in turn. There are innumerable sixfold paths of this kind.

[7. Sevenfold paths]. – There are also sevenfold paths: 1) paths of the seven factors of bodhi (saṃbodhīya); 2) pure paths (anāsravaṃmārga) of the seven stages (bhūmi); 3) meditation paths <1740>
of the seven notions (samjñā), 4) paths of the seven purities (viśuddhi); 5) paths of the seven virtuous people (satpuruṣa); 6) paths of the seven riches (dhanā); 7) paths of the seven riches of the Dharma (dharmandhana); 8) paths of the seven auxiliary meditative absorptions. There are innumerable sevenfold paths of this type.

[8. Eightfold paths]. – There are also eightfold paths: 1) noble eightfold path (āryāṣṭāṅgamārga); 2) paths of the eight liberations (vimokṣa). There are innumerable eightfold paths of this kind.

[9. Ninefold paths]. – There are also ninefold paths: 1) path of the nine successive absorptions (anupūrvasamāpatti); 2) pure paths (anāsravamārga) of the nine stages (bhūmi); 3) paths of cessation (prahāṇamārga) of the nine views (dṛṣṭi); 4) paths of the nine classes of arhat; 5) nine paths of the bodhisattvas, namely, the six perfections (pāramitā), skillful means (upāya), conversion of beings (sattvaparipācana) and the purification of the buddhafields (buddhaśetrapiṣodhāna). There are innumerable ninefold paths of this kind.

[10. Tenfold paths]. – There are also tenfold paths: 1) paths of the ten aśaikṣas; 2) paths of the ten notions (samjñā); 3) paths of the ten bases of the spheres of totality (kṛṣṇayatana); 4) the ten bad paths of action (akuśalakarmapatha), the ten good paths of action (kuśalakarmapatha) and so on <1741> up to 162 paths. These are the innumerable headings concerning the paths.

II. KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASPECT OF THE PATHS

16 On the group of the seven samjñā, see references above, p. 1311F.
17 The seven viśuddhi, śīla, etc.: cf. Majjhima, I, p. 148; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 2, p. 430b-c.
18 The sapta satpurusagatavyah: cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 70 seq; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 2, p. 427a; Kośavyākhyā, p. 270.
19 The sapta dhanāmi, śraddhā, etc.: f. Dīgha, III, p. 163, 251; Anguttara, IV, p. 4.; Mahāvyut., no. 1566-1572; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 35, p. 649c22-23.
20 Probably the sapta aupadhikāni punyakriyāvastāni, meritorious material works: cf. Tchong a han, T 26, k. 2, p. 428a-b; T 125, k. 35, p. 741b-c; Kośavyākhyā, p. 352-354.
21 Cf. p. 1181-1185F, 1203-1207F.
22 Cf. p. 1291-1299F.
23 Cf. p. 1308-1309F.
26 Cf. p. 1431-1463F.
27 Cf. p. 1474-1483F.
28 Cf. p. 501F.
29 The 162 mārga (81 prahāna or ānantaryamārga and 81 vimuktimārga) practiced in the course of the bhāvanāmārga to break the conflicting emotions: cf. p. 1104F.
The exhaustive knowledge, the complete knowledge of these various paths is the knowledge of the aspect of the paths (mārgakāraññatā).

1. The aspect of the paths is absence of nature

Question. – The Prajñāpāramitā is the single path of the bodhisattva: its sole nature is the absence of nature (ekalakṣaṇam yadutālakṣaṇam). Why then speak of the various paths?

Answer. – These paths all end up in a single path (ekayāna), namely, the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dhammas. At the beginning of the practice, they show many particularities, but at the end, they are all equal and alike and no longer show any differences (viśeṣa). In the same way, at the time of the final conflagration (kalpodāha), all existing things are gathered into empty space (ākāśa).

However, in order to convert beings (sattvaparipācanartha), the bodhisattva makes distinctions (vikalpa) and speaks of many paths, mainly the worldly path (laukikamārga) and the supraworldly path (lokottaramārga), etc.

2. Worldly path and supraworldly path are mingled into one single non-existence

Question. – Why does the bodhisattva established in the single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), i.e., in the absence of nature (alakṣaṇa), distinguish a worldly path and a supraworldly path?

Answer. – That which is called world (loka) comes from an erroneous thought (viparyastamanasikāra) and a deceptive duality; it is like a magic show (māyā), a dream (svapna), the circle of fire drawn by a fire-brand. Worldly people arbitrarily take it to be the world, but this world is false; false today, it has been false from the beginning. In reality, it does not arise, it does not act; it comes only from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) consisting of the coming together (saṃnipāta) between the six inner organs (adhyātmendriya) and the six outer objects (bahirdhāvīṣaya). But in order to conform to the prejudices (abhiniveśa) of worldly folk, we speak of the world. The many wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi) about the world are like tangled threads (jāla): whoever clings to them wanders in saṃsāra eternally. That is how to know the world.

What is the supraworldly path (lokottaramārga)? Knowing the world in conformity with reality is the supraworldly path. Why? The wise person has looked very hard for the world and the supraworld; these two things do not exist (nopalabhyante). Since they do not exist, we should know that the world and the supraworld are only denominations (prajñāpti).

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30 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 164, l. 8-9 (T 223, k. 4, p. 242c2-4; k. 8, p. 278c1-2). A pithy phrase often cited by the Traité (p. 676F, 938F, 1376F, 1621F, 1694F, 1703F, etc.).
We speak of the supraworld merely to destroy the world. The self-nature (lakṣaṇa) of the world is precisely the supraworld, and the latter is even more non-existent. Why is that? The nature of the world being non-existent, the supraworld is eternally empty (śūnya) of worldly nature, for any fixed nature (niyatalakṣaṇa) in things of this world is non-existent.

Thus the yogin does not find the world (lokaṃ nopalabhate) and does not cling to the supraworld either (lokottaraṃ nābhīniviśate). If he does not find the world, he is not attached to the supraworld. Having destroyed affection (amanava) and aversion (praśīgha), he does not debate with the world (na lokena sārdhaṃ vivadati). Why? Because, knowing for a long time that the world is empty (śūnya), non-existent (asat) and deceptive (mṛṣā), the yogin no longer has memory (anusmarana) or thought construction (vikalpa).

By world (loka) we mean the five aggregates (skandha). But even if the Buddhas of the ten directions looked for the nature (lakṣaṇa), they would not find it, for the aggregates are without a starting point (āgamasthāna), without a resting point (stitisthāna) and without a point of departure (nirgamasthāna). The impossibility of finding the natures of coming, staying and departing in the five aggregates constitutes the supraworld (lokottara). <1743>

From then on, the yogin considers the world and the supraworld as being really invisible. He does not see any connection (saṃyoga) between the world and the supraworld nor any connection between the supraworld and the world. Beyond the world, he sees no supraworld, and beyond the supraworld, he sees no world. Thus he does not produce the twofold idea of world and supraworld. Rejecting the world without adopting the supraworld, this is the supraworld.

But the bodhisattva who knows this can, in the interest of beings, make distinctions between worldly path and supraworldly path. Nevertheless, whether they are impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), the paths of all dharmas come together in a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), [namely, the absence of nature]: this is what is called the knowledge of the aspect of the paths (mārgakāraṇa).

Second Section WINNING OMNISCIENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THE ASPECTS

The bodhisattva aspires to omniscience (sarvajñatā), the knowledge of all dharmas, conditioned and unconditioned, isolated or grouped, existent or non-existent, true or false.

There are two kinds of omniscience, perfect or imperfect:

1. Perfect omniscience cognizes all dharmas under their general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and their specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). The general characteristics of dharmas are three or four in number: all dharmas are impermanent (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and selfless (anātman). The specific characteristics are

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infinite in number: these are, for example, the solidity (khakkhatva) of the earth element, the moistness (dravatva) of the water element, etc., etc.

Perfect omniscience belongs only to the Buddhas: it is called omniscience (sarvajñatā) in the full sense of the word or also knowledge of all the aspects (sarvakārañjñatā) to show that it extends to the specific characteristics of the dharmas.

2. As well, there are imperfect or incomplete omnisciences that bear upon only the general characteristics of the dharmas and a restricted number of the specific characteristics. They are the exploits of the first two Vehicles, the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas. It is wrong that they are sometimes called ‘omniscient’ (sarvajñā): the proof of this is that the wisest of them ere unable to answer all the difficult questions they were asked.

Buddha, arhat and pratyekabuddha have access to their respective omnisciences or bodhis by using the paths or Vehicles of their choice. Each having attained their final goal, they no longer use the knowledge of the paths (mārgajñatā) or the knowledge of the aspect of the paths (mārgākārañjñatā). Indeed, they say: “The path already practiced by me is no longer to be practiced” (mārgo me bhāvito na pounar bhavitavyah): cf. above, p. 1359F.

This is not the case for the bodhisattvas who, from their first cittotpāda until their arrival at buddhahood, are in the course of their career. <1744> The path or the paths that they have to travel, particularly the bodhipāksikadharmanas, the pāramitās, the balas, the vaiśāradhyas, etc., include all the good dharmas. They know them by practicing them, and this experimental science finally ends up in the perfect enlightenment which is that of the Buddhas.

Śastra.–

I. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OMNISCIENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THE ASPECTS

Question. – What are the differences between sarvajñatā ‘knowledge of everything’ and sarvakārañjñatā32 ‘knowledge of all the aspects’?

Answer. – Some say there is no difference and that [either] sarvajñatā or sarvakārañjñatā is said. [259a]

Others say that sarvajñatā is the knowledge of the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and sarvakārañjñatā is the knowledge of the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa).

Sarvajñatā is cause (hetu); sarvakārañjñatā is effect (phala).

Sarvajñatā is a concise expression (samkṣepenokti); sarvakārañjñatā is a verbose expression (vistareṇokti).

Sarvajñatā generally destroys the ignorances (avidyā) about all the dharmas; in regard to multiple statements of the Dharma (dharma paryāya), sarvakārañjñatā destroys the ignorances. Thus for example, there is sarvajñatā when one preaches the four truths (catuḥsatya); there is sarvakārañjñatā when one preaches the implications (artha) of the four truths. <1745>

32 Sarvakārañjñatā has already been defined above, p. 640-642F.
There is sarvajñatā when one preaches the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya); there is sarvākārajñatā when one preaches the eight characteristics of suffering (duḥkhalakṣaṇa).

There is sarvajñatā when one preaches the suffering of birth (jātīduḥkha); there is sarvākārajñatā when one preaches the various places of the birth (jātisthāna) of beings.

Furthermore, by ‘all dharmas’, [the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana)] from eye (cakṣus) and colors (rūpa) up to mind (manas) and things (dharma) is understood.

The arhats and pratyekabuddhas know the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa): impermanence (anityatā), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnya) and selflessness (anātman), and, since they know these twelve bases (āyatana), they are said to be ‘omniscient’.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not know the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) in an exhaustive manner; they do not know the place of birth (jātisthāna) of a given being, his beauties and his uglinesses, the exact number of his actions, [not only in the past] but also in the future (anāgata) and the present (pratyutpanna). How then would they not be ignorant of those of all beings?

They do not know the names used to designate gold (suvarna) in a single Jambudvīpa. How then would they know the many sounds used to designate a single thing in the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu, and in the languages of the gods, in the language of the nāgas, etc.? Not knowing the many sounds used to designate gold, how then would they know the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) of the various aspects of gold, the various deposits of gold, their qualities or their respective values? How would they know the causes required to gain merit (punya), commit sin (āpatti) or find the Path? Not being able to cognize things that are so obvious, how then would they cognize the minds (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma), such as the trances (dhyāna), absorptions (samāpatti), wisdom (prajñā) and the other [invisible] dharmas?

The Buddha, on the other hand, cognizes the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) of all <1746> the dharmas in an exhaustive manner. This is why he is called ‘knower of all the aspects’ (sarvākārajñatā).

Finally, in a later chapter [of the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra], the Buddha himself says: “Omniscience (sarvajñatā) is the concern of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; knowledge of the paths (mārgajñatā) is the concern of bodhisattvas; knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākārajñatā) is the concern of the Buddhas.”

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have general omniscience (sāmānyasarvajñatā) only and do not have the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākārajñatā).

Moreover, although they have a partial knowledge of specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa), śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not know them fully. It is because of their knowledge of the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) that they are called omniscient (sarvajña). In the Buddhas, sarvajñatā and sarvākārajñatā

33 The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know all the general characteristics plus some specific characteristics; only the Buddha knows all the specific characteristics.

are real knowledges, whereas in the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas they are just the name. Their omniscience is like a lamp drawn\(^{35}\) [on the wall]: it has the name only of a lamp but does not fulfill the function of a lamp. So it is for the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

When objections are put to them, often they are unable to reply and cannot cut through doubts. Thus, when the Buddha questioned Śāriputra three times, the latter was unable to answer.\(^{36}\) If he had had real omniscience, why did [259b] he not reply? It is because he had only the name of omniscient, as he did not surpass ordinary people (prthagjana),\(^{37}\) but he did not have true omniscience. Thus the Buddha [alone] has true omniscience and knowledge of all the aspects. He has innumerable epithets of this kind: sometimes he is called sarvajña and sometimes sarvākāraṇa,

In summary (ṣamkṣepeṇa), this sets forth sarvajñatā, sarvākāraṇatā and their many differences.

II. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PATHS LEADING TO OMNISCIENCE

Question. – The [Prajñāpāramitā]-sūtra has said that by practicing certain dharmas such as the six perfections (pāramitā), the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣika), the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaisāradya), etc., omniscience (sarvajñatā) is obtained.\(^{38}\) Why does it say here that it is only by using the knowledge of the aspect of the paths (mārgākāraṇatā) that [the bodhisattva] obtains omniscience?

Answer. – The six perfections, etc., of which you speak are precisely the Path. By knowing these paths, by practicing these paths, the bodhisattva obtains omniscience. Why do you doubt that?

Furthermore, all the good dharmas (kuśaladharma) included between the first production of the mind of awakening (prathamacittotpāda) and sitting on the seat of enlightenment (bodhimandaniṣadana) together comprise the Path. Practicing these Paths by distinguishing them and meditating on them constitutes the knowledge of the paths. The [Prajñāpāramitā]-sūtra will say later that this is the concern of the bodhisattva.

Question. – I understand that there is no question of knowledge of the paths in the Buddha where the business of the Path has already ended. But all the qualities are not yet complete among the arhats and pratyekabuddhas. Then why not recognize the knowledge of the paths in them?

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35 Adapting the variant houa teng.
36 Śāriputra was unable to reply to the Buddha’s question about the past and future existences of a pigeon found at the edge of a road: see above, p. 647-649F, the Avadāna of the pigeon.
37 Actually, in knowledge Śāriputra surpassed not only ordinary people but also all the arhats; only the Buddha was superior to him. Cf. Comm. on the Dhammapada, III, p. 228 seq., and Comm. on the Suttanipāta, II, p. 570 seq.
Answer. – The arhats and pratyekabuddhas have also completed the practice of their own paths. This is why for them there is no question of knowledge of the paths, for the nature of the Path (mārga) is practice (caryā).

Furthermore, the sūtra in question speaks of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas, and [the path] of the śrāvakas does not consist of three Vehicles. This is why [knowledge of the paths] is not their concern. Being great, the path of the Buddhas [and that of the bodhisattvas] includes the knowledge of the paths; those of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas, being small, does not include it.

Finally, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva himself practices the paths and also teaches beings the paths for each of them to practice. This is why the [Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] says here that by practicing the knowledge of the paths the bodhisattva obtains omniscience.

III. DHARMAS KNOWN BY OMNISCIENCE

Question. – What are all these dharmas cognized by omniscience?

Answer. –

1. The two bases of consciousness

[Sabbasutta]. – The Buddha said to the bhikṣus: “I will teach you ‘all dharmas’ (sarvam = sarve dharmāḥ). What are all these dharmas? The eye (cakṣus) and colors (rūpa); the ear (śrotra) and sounds (śabda); the nose (ghṛāṇa) and smells (gandha); the tongue (jihvā) and tastes (rasa); the body (kāya) and tangibles (sprāṣṭavya); the mind (manas) and things (dharma). These twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana) are all dharmas.”

39 By at least virtual possession of nirvāṇa, the arhat has nothing more to follow or to know.
40 The śrāvaka knows and practices only the path of his own Vehicle; the Buddhas and the great bodhisattvas know the three Vehicles experientially and use them to convert beings based on the needs and the dispositions of the latter.
41 Sabbasutta of the Samyutta, IV, p. 15, corresponds to the sūtra no. 319 of the Tsā han, T 99, k.13, p. 91a24-91b3. The latter may be restored by the citations of the Kośabhāṣya (p. 4, l. 2-3) and the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 271, l. 17-272, l. 2), but the individuals are different and the sūtra in entitled Hastatāḍipama.


Sanskrit: Sarvam astīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvāsaṣṭāyatānā. Etāvat sarvaṃ yaduta cakṣu rūpaṃ ... uttare vā sammoham āpādeta. Yathāpi tad avisayatvāt.

Transl. of the Pāli. – Monks, I will teach you ‘everything’. Listen then. What is everything? The eye and colors, the ear and sounds, the nose and odors, the tongue and tastes, the body and tangibles, the mind and dharmas. That, O monks, is called everything. Monks, the person who says: “Dismissing all that, I propose another
2. Names and forms (or five aggregates)

Furthermore, ‘all dharmas’ are names and forms (nāmarūpa).

[Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi] – Thus in the Li-tchong king

(Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi) the Buddha spoke these stanzas:

For the person who seeks right seeing

There are only names and forms.

The person who wants to consider and know truly

He too will know only names and forms.

everything”, that, on his part, would be a pointless statement; if he were to be questioned, he would be unable to stick to it and, furthermore, he would fall into confusion. Why? Because, O monks, it would not be objective.

In the expression nāmarūpa, nāman represents the four formless skandhas (vedanā, saṃjñā, sanskāra, viññāna), and rūpa represents the rūpaskandha: cf. Kośa, III, p. 94-95.

The expression ‘all dharmas’ designates that which has its own nature (svabhāva) and its own characteristics (svalakṣaṇa), whether these dharmas are classified into five skandhas, twelve āyatanas or eighteen dhātus. The Commentary on the Anguttara, II, p. 259, l. 4-5 says: Sabbadhammā vuccanti paṭicakkhandhā dvādasāyatatanāni aṭṭhārāsa dhātujo.

The Sanskrit sources place the Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi in the Kṣudrakāgama or Kṣudrapiṭaka “Minor Texts” (cf. Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 174-176); the Pāli sources incorporate the Aṭṭhākavagga in the Suttanipāta, the fifth book of the Khuddakanikāya.

In his translation of the Traité, Kumārajīva designates the Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi under various names: Tchong-yi king (see above, p. 39F), A t’a p’o k’i king (p. 65F), Yi-p’in (p. 1089F) and also here, Li-tchong king, a translation which will be adopted later (k. 31, p. 295c; k. 45, p. 389a, where Li-chong-chen king should be read as Li-tchong king).

Cf. Aṭṭhākavagga of the Suttanipāta, v. 909, p. 177 and Yi-tso king, T 198, k. 2, p. 183b3-4:

\[\text{Passaṃ naro daakkhiṇī nāmarūpaṃ,}\
\text{disvāna vānāssati tāni,-eva}\
\text{kāmaṃ bahum passatu appakaṃ vā,}\
\text{ma hi tena suddhiṃ kusalā vadanti.}\]

“The clear-sighted man sees names and forms and, having seen them, just recognizes them. Supposing he sees a very great number of them or a small number of them, no valid proof of them will happen: this is what the experts say.”

But this translation departs notably from the explanations given by the Mahānidesa, II, p. 325 and the Commentary on the Suttanipāta, II, p. 560. E. M. Hare, Woven Cadences of Early Buddhists, London, 1944, p. 133 translates it as:
When a foolish mind multiplies notions
And is attached to distinguishing many dharmas,
He will never have anything
But names and forms. <1750>

3. Groups of two dharmas

‘All dharmas’ is also dharmas with form (rūpin) and without form (arūpin); visible (sanidarśana) and invisible (anidarśana); resistant (sapratiṣṭha) and non-resistant (apratiṣṭha); impure (śārva) and pure (anāsrva); conditioned (samskṛta) and unconditioned (asamskṛta); mind (citta) and non-mind (nācitta); associated with mind (cittasamprayukta) and non-associated with mind (na cittasamprayukta); coexisting with mind (cittasaḥabhū) and non-coexisting with mind (na cittasaḥabhū); resulting from mind (cittānuparivartin) and not resulting from mind (na cittānuparivartin); taking its origin from mind (cittasaṃmutthana) and not taking its origin from mind (na cittasaṃmutthana). Numberless similar groupings of two dharmas contain all the dharmas. See the Abhidharma, in the Chō-fa p’ìn (Dharmasāngaḥaparivarta).46

4. Groups of three dharmas

‘All dharmas’ is also the good (kuśala), the bad (akuśala) and indeterminate (avyākṣata) dharmas; the dharmas to be destroyed by seeing <1751> the truths (satyarāsaḥanaheya), to be destroyed by meditation (bhāvanāheya) and not to be destroyed (ahēya); the dharmas with retribution (savipāka), without retribution (avipāka), neither with nor without retribution. Innumerable similar groups of three dharmas comprise all the dharmas.

The man with eyes will see both ‘name’ and ‘form’,
And having seen, will know them just as such:
Let him see much or little as he lists,
No cleansing comes by that the experts say.

45 These groups of two dharmas have been mentioned above, p. 644F, 1101F.
46 The Traité refers here to the Abhidharmapraṇaḥapāḍa, in the beginning of chapter VI, entitled Fen-pie-chō p’ìn in Guṇabhadra’s version (T 1541, k. 4, p. 644b5-644c23) and Pien-chō-teng p’ìn in Huan-tsang’s version (T 1542, k. 5, p. 711b6-711c26). A note added to Guṇabhadra’s translation (T 1541, k. 4, p. 644c23) mentions 216 groups of two dharmas (see above, p. 1101F). For the author of the Traité, chapters V to VIII of the Praṇaḥapāḍa were not the work of Vasumitra but that of the arhats of Kaśmir (cf. 0. 111-112F).
5. Groups of four dharmas

‘All dharmas’ is also dharmas past (atīta), future (anāgata), present (pratyutpanna), neither past, future nor present; dharmas belonging to the world of desire (kāmadhātvavacara), belonging to the world of form (rūpadhātvavacara), belonging to the formless world (ārūpyadhātvavacara), not having any membership (anavacara); dharmas coming from a good cause (kuśalahetusamutthāna), coming from a bad (akuṣala) cause, coming from an indeterminate (avyākṛta) cause, and coming from a cause that is neither good, bad nor indeterminate; dharmas that are object condition (ālambanapratyaya), that are non-object condition, that are both object and non-object condition, that are neither object nor non-object condition. Innumerable similar groups of four dharmas comprise all the dharmas.

6. Groups of five dharmas

‘All dharmas’ is also the dharmas that are material (rūpa), mind (citta), mental (caitasika), a formation dissociated from mind (cittaprayuktasamāskāra) or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta); the four truths (satya) and the indeterminate-unconditioned (avyākṛtasamāskṛta). Innumerable similar groups of five dharmas comprise all the dharmas.

7. Groups of six dharmas

‘All dharmas’ is also the five aggregates (skandha) and the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta); the dharmas to be destroyed by the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya), by the truth of the origin (samudayasatya), by the truth of cessation (nirodhasatya), by the truth of the path (mārgasatya), by meditation (bhāvanā), or not to be destroyed (aheya). Innumerable similar groups of six dharmas comprise all the dharmas. <1752>

8. Other groups of dharmas

Groups of seven, eight, nine, ten dharmas, etc., are analyzed in the Abhidharma in the chapter of the [Dharma]-vibhaṅga.47

‘All dharmas’ is thus all existing (sat) or non-existing (asat), empty (śūnya) or real (satya), objects (ālambana) or subjects (ālambaka), united or scattered, etc., dharmas.

47 Prakaraṇaṇāda, T 1541, k. 4, p. 645b28 seq.; T 1542, k. 5, p. 712c17 seq.
‘All dharmas’ is thus existent, non-existent, existent and non-existent; false, not false, false and not false; false, true, neither false nor true; arising, perishing, arising and perishing; neither arising nor perishing; and so on, dharmas.

‘All dharmas’ is also existent, non-existent, existent and non-existent, [260a] neither existent nor non-existent dharmas.

Apart from these tetralemmas (catsūkoti), such as ‘empty (śūnya), non-empty (aśūnya), arising and perishing, neither arising nor perishing’ dharmas, there are also pentalemmas of the same kind.48

All the dharmas are included in these innumerable and incalculable groupings. Knowing the said dharmas in an exhaustive and complete way with unhindered wisdom (apratihātaprajñā) is called omniscience and knowledge of all aspects (sarvākāraññatā).

IV. TRUE OMNISCIENCE BELONGS TO THE BUDDHA49

Question. – All beings seek wisdom (prajñā). Why is the Buddha the only one to attain sarvajñatā?

Answer. – Since the Buddha is foremost (agra) of all beings, he is the only one to obtain sarvajñatā.

[Pasādasutta.] – Thus the Buddha said: “Of all beings without legs, with two legs, with four legs, with many legs, with a body or without a body, conscious, unconscious, neither conscious nor unconscious, etc., the Buddha is the foremost of all.”50

Just as Mount Sumeru is foremost among the mountains, just as fire (tejas), of all the four great elements (mahābhūta) has the power to illuminate and to burn, so, of all beings, the Buddha is foremost. This is why he obtains sarvajñatā.

Question. – Why is the Buddha alone the foremost of beings?

Answer. – As I have just said, because he possesses sarvajñatā. But I must repeat myself here.

48 For the Madhyamaka method, which uses and abuses reduction to absurdity (prasāniga), the tetralemma (catsūkoti) and fivefold argumentation, see J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 16, 51 (n. 7), 66 (n. 68), 183 (n. 597), 221 (n. 761).

49 This subject has already been discussed above, p. 146-161F.

50 Beginning of the Pasādasutta of the Anguttara, II, p. 34 (Tseng-yi-a-han, T 125, k. 12, p. 602a1-3) often reproduced in other suttas (Anguttara, III, p. 35; V, p. 21; Itivuttaka, p. 87):

Yāvatā bhikkhave sattā apadā dipadā vā catuppadā vā bahuppadā vā rūpino vā arūpino vā saññino vā asaññino vā nevasaññināsaññino vā Tathāgato tesam aggam akkhāyati araham sammāsaṃbuddho.

The corresponding Sanskrit formula is in Divyāvadāna, p. 154, and Avadānaśataka, I, p. 49, 329:

Ye kecit sattvā vā dvipadā vā [catuppadā vā] bahuppadā vā rūpino vā arūpino vāsaññino vā asaññino vā naivasamjnino nāsasamjnino Tathāgato ‘rhan samyaksamuddhas teṣāṃ sattvānām agra akhyāyate.
The Buddha, who assures both his own good (svahita) and the good of others (parahita), is the foremost of beings.

Thus, the sun (āditya) is the foremost of all lights (prabhā); the noble cakravartin king is the foremost of all humans; the blue lotus (niłotpala) is the foremost of the lotuses; the jasmine (sumanā) is the foremost of all flowers growing on land; the ox-head sandalwood (gośīra candana) is the foremost of all perfumed wood; the wish-fulfilling pearl (cintāmanī) is the foremost of jewels (maṇi); the morality of the saints (āryaśīla) is the foremost of moralities; the indestructible deliverance (abhedyavimukti) is the foremost of the deliverances (vimukti); the liberations (vimokṣa) are the foremost of the purities (viśuddhi); the consideration of emptiness (śūnyatāpyāna) is the foremost of all considerations (anupaśyanā); 51

<1754> nirvāṇa is foremost of all dharmas. 52

Thus there are numberless primacies of all kinds, and as the Buddha also is the foremost of all beings, he is the only one to obtain sarvajñatā.

Furthermore, from his first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), the Buddha is adorned with great vows (mahāpraṇidhāna) and, in order to save all beings in decline, he has practiced all the good paths (kuśalamārga) in a complete and exhaustive way. There are no merits that he has not accumulated or sufferings that he has not undergone. He has gathered into himself all the qualities (guṇa) of the Buddhas. For these many and numberless reasons, the Buddha alone is the foremost of all beings.

Question. – But all the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions have the same qualities. Why do you say that the Buddha alone is foremost?

Answer. – I said that, among beings other than the Buddhas, the Buddha [260b] alone is supreme. The Buddhas have equal and identical qualities. 53

V. ETYMOLOGY OF SARVAJÑATĀ

In the expression ‘sarva-jña-tā’, sarva in the language of the Ts’in means ‘all’, jña in the language of the Ts’in means ‘to know’, and tā in the language of the Ts’in means ‘the fact of’. 54 As I have said above, sarva designates all dharmas, with form (rūpin), etc. The Buddha knows all these dharmas in their characteristics, single or diverse, impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), conditioned (saṃskṛta) or unconditioned (asamkṛta), etc.

Each of these dharmas has its characteristics (lakṣaṇa), their power (bala), their causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), their fruit of retribution (vipākaphala), their nature (prakṛti), their acquiring (prāpti) and

51 Adopting the variant kouan.
52 Similar lists of ‘statements of primacy’ (agraprajñapti) in Majjhima, III, p. 6-7; Saṃyutta, III, p. 156; Anguttara, III, p. 364-365; V, p. 21-22.
53 Adopting the variant teng-yi.
54 A Chinese gloss incorporated into the translation.
their loss (vināśa). It is by the power of sarvajñātā that one cognizes them in a full and exhaustive way, at all times and in all their aspects (ākāra). That is why [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] says here: “The bodhisattva who wants to fulfill omniscience completely by means of the knowledge of the aspect of the paths (mārgākāraajñatā) should exert himself in the Prajñāpāramitā. If he wants to fulfill completely the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākāraajñatā), he should exert himself in the Prajñāpāramitā.”

VI. THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THE ASPECTS IS PRACTICED AFTER OMNISCIENCE

Question. – But as soon as he acquires complete enlightenment (sambodhi), the Buddha completely fulfills both omniscience (sarvajñatā) and the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākāraajñatā) by means of his knowledge of the paths (mārgajñatā). Why does [the sūtra] say here that he uses omniscience to perfect the knowledge of all the aspects?

Answer. – It is true that, as soon as he attains enlightenment, the Buddha completely fulfills omniscience and completely fulfills the knowledge of all the aspects by means of his knowledge of the paths. He could be compared to the king of a great country: at the time when he ascends his throne, he enters into possession of his territories (vīṣaya) and his treasuries (koṣa), but he has not yet opened them and used them.

Third Section DESTROYING THE TRACES OF THE CONFLICTING EMOTIONS

Canonical Buddhism makes the destruction of the conflicting emotions (kleśaprahāna), the elimination of love, hate and ignorance (rāgadveśamohakṣaya), the final goal of the religious life. It constitutes arhattva, sainthood (S. IV, p. 252), amṛta, immortality (S. V, p. 8), Nirvāṇa (S. IV, p. 251, 261). The destruction of the conflicting emotions is the result of a certain supramundane prajñā which is not the same in all the saints, but it involves the disappearance of the conflicting emotions for all. The Buddha said: “In those who possess it, there is no difference between deliverance and deliverance” (Majjhima, II, p. 129; Saṃyutta, V, p.410; Anguttara, III, p. 34: Ettha kho nesaḥ na kiñci nānākaraṇam vadaṃ, yadiṃ vimoṭiyā vimuttim).

The enlightenment of the Buddha has been the object of many accounts (cf. E. Waldschmidt, Die Erleuchtung des Buddha, in Festscrift Krause, 1960, p. 214-229). They say that Śākyamuni attained anuttarā samyaksambodhi and broke through his last kleśa at the end of the third watch of the night. For the Sarvāstivādins who have carefully worked out the timing of the night of the enlightenment (Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 153, p. 780b29-c6; Kośa, II, p. 205-206; VI, p. 177; Traité, p. 1036), it was at the thirty-fourth mind-moment that the Sage acceded to sambodhi and detached himself from the ninth category of
conflicting emotions of the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*). For these early sources, one line was enough to define the succession to sainthood of a disciple of the Buddha: “While this religious instruction was being given, the Venerable One’s mind was liberated from impurities by means of detachment.”

At the beginnings of Buddhist speculation it is only a question of passions and destruction of the passions: this is the same in all the saints, arhat, pratyekabuddha and Buddha, and results immediately in enlightenment.

However, on simply reading the canonical and paracanonical texts, we notice that most of the disciples of the Buddha, even after having destroyed the conflicting emotions and attaining sainthood, often still acted as impassioned men subject to love, hate and ignorance. In this regard, the *Traité* has gathered together some rather significant anecdotes (cf. p. 117-123F, 1659-1661F) and will return to them later (k. 84, p. 649c). It must be noted that the saints who no longer have conflicting emotions still carry out apparently impassioned actions. These lapses of behavior do not constitute faults and do not involve their responsibility; they are the unfortunate consequence of inveterate habits. The saints retain the traces, the impregnations (*vāsanā*) of their emotions like sesame seeds retain the perfume of the flowers that perfumed them (*vāsita* or *bhāvīta*) long ago, long after the flowers have disappeared.

Anantavarman, a commentator on the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, defined the *kleśavāsanā* in these words: “In every śrāvaka who previously was subject to an emotion, a special potentiality is created by this emotion in his mind which is the cause of a distortion in his physical and vocal conduct: this potentiality is called ‘trace’ (*vāsanā*). The trace is a mind of a special kind, morally undefined (*avyākṛta*): (Kośavyākhyā, p. 647: *Śrāvakāṇāṃ yo hi yatkleśacaritāḥ pūrvaṃ tasya tatkṛtāḥ kāyavākeṣṭāvāraḥ hetusāmarthvaviśeṣaḥ citte vāsanet. avyākṛtaḥ cittaviśeṣo vāsaneti.

Innocent though they are, these actions are out of place in the saints and make them appear ridiculous. But there is something more serious. Some exegetists think they have found in the biographies of Śākyamuni a whole series of not very edifying episodes: an exaggerated kindness, insulting words, or even ignorance unworthy of the Great Sage. The authors of the *Vibhāṣa* (T 1545, k. 16, p. 77b4-c9) and the *Traité* (above, 1661F seq.) have not attempted to evade these “embarrassing” episodes, but have washed away any suspicion of the Teacher by justifying his somewhat bold initiatives by excellent reasons. Moreover, they have not failed to reveal irrefutable proof in the life of the Buddha of his unshakeable calmness in no matter what circumstance, pleasant or unpleasant (T 1509, k. 27, p. 260c27-261a22). The conviction spread that the śrāvakas do not eliminate the traces of the emotions whereas the Buddhas are easily freed of them. A stock phrase reproduced in some lives of the Buddha (T 156, k. 6, p. 155c13-17) or commentaries on the *Vinaya* (T 1440, k. 1, p. 504c3-7) says: “In the Buddhas, the *vāsanās* are destroyed; in the [adepts] of the two Vehicles, [śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha], they are not. Thus the bhikṣu Gāvāmpati was always chewing the cud because from existence to existence he had been a cow; although he had destroyed his impurities (*ksīṇāsṛava*) the bhikṣu (Nanda?) was always admiring himself in the mirror because from lifetime to lifetime he had been a courtesan; yet another bhikṣu (Madhuvāsiṣṭha?) leapt over walls and climbed up towers because he had been a monkey from lifetime to lifetime. Those are not called ‘Bhagavat’. “
On the other hand, the absence of vāsanās of emotions in the Buddhas, which the early biographies mention in passing, take on the weight of dogma in some Hīnayānist sects strongly marked by supernaturalistic and docetic tendencies. Here the evidence of Mahāvibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 173, p. 871c2-7; k. 44, p.229a17-20; k. 76, p. 391c27-392a3) may be called upon: “For the Vibhajyavādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas, the body of birth (jānakāya) of the Buddha is without impurities (anāsrava). Why do they say that? Because they depend on the sūtra (Samyutta, III, p. 140; Anguttara, II, p. 39) where it is said: ‘The Tathāgata, born into the world, having grown up in the world, transcends the world and is not defiled by the world’ (Tathāgato loke jāto saṃvadīaho lokam abhibhuyya viharati anupalitto lokena). In dependence on this text, they say that the body of birth of the Buddha is without impurity. These teachers also say: ‘The Buddha has completely and definitively destroyed all the kleśas and their traces (vāsanā); how then could his body of birth have impurities?’ ”

The Mahāyānists have resolutely adopted the lokottaravāda of the Vibhajyavādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas and try to define more precisely the relationship between the kleśas and the kleśavāsanas and the conditions of their respective eliminations.

The kleśas are bad dharmas that pollute the mind; the vāsanās are the natural results of emotional actions. Unpleasant or ridiculous though they may be, the vāsanās are morally undefined (avyākṛta) and do not involve any responsibility.

Affecting the mind, kleśa and vāsanā can be destroyed only by a wisdom (prajñā), a certain form of omniscience (sarvajñatā).

A wisdom of a lower class that is essentially concerned with the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of things and that belongs to the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas suffices to destroy the kleśas. A higher wisdom concerned with the specific characteristics (svalaṅkaṇa) as well and, for this reason, called ‘knowledge of all the aspects’, destroys the kleśas and the vāsanās. This wisdom is an attribute exclusive to the Buddha.

Finally, in contrast to what the early sources would have one believe, the destruction of the kleśas and the destruction of the vāsanās are not simultaneous but are separated in time by a rather long interval.

This system which the Traité will describe in detail in the following pages is directly inspired by concepts developed in the Mahāyānasūtras and especially in the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra of which some extracts are given here.

Vol. VI, no. 220, k. 363, p. 872a7-19; vol. VII, no. 220, k. 525, p. 695b27-c11: There is no difference between the different destructions of the conflicting emotions (kleśaprahāṇa). However, the Tathāgatas, arhats and samyaksambuddhas have entirely and definitively cut all the conflicting emotions (kleśa) and the traces that result from them (vāsanānusamādhī). The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas themselves have not yet definitively cut the vāsanānusamādhī… These vāsanās are not really kleśas. After having cut the kleśas, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas still retain a small part of them: semblances of love (rāga), hate (dveṣa) and ignorance (moha) still function in their body (kāya), speech (vāc) and mind (manas): this is what is called vāsanānusamādhī. In foolish worldly people (hālaprthagjana), the vāsanās call forth disadvantages
(anartha), whereas among <1758F> the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas they do not. The Buddhas do not have all these vāsanānusamdhī."

But where in the career of the bodhisattva is the destruction of the kleśas and the destruction of the vāsanās located? Are they simultaneous or consecutive? The question lends itself to controversy, but the Pañcaviṃsatisāhasrikā, as it appeared in the Chinese version by Kumārajīva (T 223, k. 6) gives a precise answer:

T 223, k. 6, p. 257b16-17 and 259a25: Twenty dharmas must be perfectly accomplished by the bodhisattva who is on the seventh level: … notably the 15th, the overcoming of the passions (kleśavivarta). – What is the overcoming of the passions by the bodhisattva? It is the destruction of all the passions (sarvakleśaprahāṇa).

T 223, k. 6, p. 259c8-10: The bodhisattva who completely fulfills the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākārajñatā) and has destroyed all the traces (sarvakleśavāsāṇā) is a bodhisattva-mahāsattva who is on the tenth bhūmi and should be considered simply as a Buddha (tathāgata eva veditavyah).

Śūtra (Pañcaviṃsati, p. 21, l. 9-11; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 67, l. 8-10). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wants to destroy the traces of all the conflicting emotions by means of knowledge should exert himself in the perfection of wisdom. It is thus, O Śāriputra, that the bodhisattva-mahāsattva should practice the perfection of wisdom (Sarvākārajñataye kleśavāsanāḥ prahātukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyām yogah karanīyah. Evam eva Śāriputra bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyām śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASPECTS LEADS IMMEDIATELY TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TRACES OF CONFLICTING EMOTIONS

Question. - The bodhisattva obtains omniscience (sarvajñatā), the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākārajñatā) and destroys all the traces of conflicting emotion (sarvakleśavāsāṇā) in one and the same moment of mind. Why does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] say here that he uses omniscience to completely fulfill the knowledge of all the aspects and that he uses the knowledge of all the aspects to destroy the traces of the passions?

Answer. – It is true that all these knowledges55 are acquired simultaneously, but here [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] expresses itself in this way in order to bring people to believe in the Prajñāpāramitā.

55 Adopting the variant yi ts’ie tche.
Besides, in a following chapter, the *Tch’a-pie p’in* (Viśeṣaparivarta), he wants beings to acquire pure mind (*viśuddhacitta*) and this is why he expresses himself in this way.

Moreover, although that is all acquired in a single mind-moment, there is, nevertheless, a succession with a beginning, a middle and an end, for every mind involves three characteristics: production (*utpāda*) which conditions duration (*sthiti*) and duration which conditions disappearance (*vyaya*). And this is so for the mind (*citta*), mental events (*caitasikadharma*), formations dissociated from the mind (*viprayktasamskāradharma*), physical actions (*kāyakarman*) and vocal actions (*vākkarman*).

By means of the knowledge of the paths (*mārgajñatā*), the bodhisattva completely fulfills (*paripūrayati*) omniscience (*sarvajñatā*); by means of omniscience, he completely fulfills the knowledge of all the aspects (*sarvākārajñatā*); by means of the knowledge of all the aspects, he destroys the traces of the passions (*kleśavāsanā pra jahāti*).

I said above (p. 1744F) that the knowledge of all the aspects (*sarvākārajñatā*) is the same as omniscience (*sarvajñatā*). The knowledge of the paths (*mārgajñatā*) is synonymous with the diamond concentration (*vajrasamādhi*). [In possession of the latter,] the Buddha first produces a mind which is none other than omniscience or the knowledge of all the aspects and immediately his traces of the passions (*kleśavāsanā*) are destroyed. <1760>

### II. CONFLICTING EMPTIONS AND THE TRACES OF CONFLICTING EMOTIONS

The characteristics of omniscience and the knowledge of all the aspects have been described above (p. 1744F). What is destroying the traces of all the conflicting emotions (*sarvakleśaprahāṇa*)? [260c]

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56 Adopting the variant *Tch’a-pie p’in*. This is the LXXXIVth chapter of the Chinese Pañcaviṃśati (T 223, k. 26, p. 411b15), the chapter entitled *Tch’a-pie p’in* (Viśeṣaparivarta) in the Korean edition adopted by the Taisho, *Sseu-ti p’in* (Catuḥsatyaparivarta) in the editions of the Yuan and the Ming. On pg. 411b19-25, the Buddha actually says to Subhūti: “The attributes of the bodhisattva are also the attributes of the Buddha. To know all the aspects is to acquire the knowledge of all the aspects (*sarvākārajñatā*) and to destroy all the traces of the passions (*kleśavāsanā*). The bodhisattva will attain this attribute whereas the Buddha, by means of a wisdom associated with a single moment of mind (*ekakṣaṇasamprayuktaprajñā*), already knows all the dharmas and has acquired anuttarā samyaksambodhi. This is the difference (*višeṣa*) between the bodhisattva and the Buddha. To know all the aspects is to acquire the knowledge of all the aspects (*sarvākārajñatā*) and to destroy all the traces of the passions (*kleśavāsanā*). The bodhisattva will attain this attribute whereas the Buddha, by means of a wisdom associated with a single moment of mind (*ekakṣaṇasamprayuktaprajñā*), already knows all the dharmas and has acquired anuttarā samyaksambodhi.

This is the difference (*višeṣa*) between the bodhisattva and the Buddha. It can be compared to the difference between the candidate for the [first] fruit of the Path (*phalapratipannaka*) and the holder of this same fruit (*phalaprāpta*): both are āryas, but there is a difference between the holder and the candidate.”

57 These are the characteristics of every conditioned dharma: cf. p. 1163F, n. 1.

58 Concentration also called vajropamasamādhi: cf. p. 242F, n. 1, 1068F, 1325F, 1341F, 1503F.

59 Adopting the variant *tch’ou fa*. 

1445
In brief, the passions (kleśa) are the three poisons (trīśa) – [desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), ignorance (moha)]; at length, these are the ninety-eight perverse tendencies (anuṣaya) of the three worlds. The traces of the passions (kleśavāsanā) are the residual emanations of passion.

If certain physical or vocal actions are not in accordance with wisdom (na jñānuparivartin), they seem to come from the passions (kleśa), and those who do not know the minds of others (paracitta) see them as such and experience a feeling of horror (aśuci). In reality, it is not truly a matter of passion, but those who have given themselves up to the passions for a long time carry out actions of this kind.

Thus a prisoner who has been laden with chains for a long time, once he is liberated, moves with a hesitant walk even though he no longer is in chains. A nurse’s clothes that have been stained for a long time, even though they are washed and scrubbed with pure ash, still remain impregnated with the smell of the stains. In the same way, the stains of the mind (cittamala) in the saint are like the passions and, even though he has washed his passions with the water of wisdom, the traces (vāsanā) remain in him.

III. THE TRACES OF PASSION PERSIST IN THE SAINTS

The saints (bhadrārya) other [than the Buddha] destroy the passions but do not destroy the traces.

Thus, although he had attained the bodhi of the arhats, Nan-t’o (Nanda),60 as a result of the traces of lust (rāgavāsanā), in the presence of a large assembly of men and women, first stared at the women and then, raising his voice, preached the Dharma.

Out of traces of anger (krodhavāsanā), when the Buddha accused him of eating impure food, Chō-li-fou (Śāriputra) spat out his food <1761> and never again accepted an invitation.61 Śāriputra then added this stanza:

It is a habitual offender, a false mind,
An ignorant and lazy person.
Never again will I allow him
To come in and stay near me.62

Out of traces of hatred (dveṣavāsanā), after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa when the Dharma was being compiled, Mo-ho-kia-chō (Mahākāśyapa) ordered Ānanda to confess six duṣkṛta misdeeds, then, taking him by the

60 Saundarananda: see p. 117-118F, 286-287F, 1545F.
61 This incident has been told in full above (p. 118-122F, 1632F) supported by a jātaka. See also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 16, p. 77b1-2.
62 This stanza concerns the vaisya who had inconsiderately reserved some fancy tidbits for Śāriputra.
hand, he expelled him from the assembly, saying: “We cannot compile the Dharma with you, unclean man, whose impurities have not been destroyed.”

Pilindavatsa was always insulting the deity of the Ganges treating her like a slave (vṛṣala).

Out of traces of monkey antics, Madhuvāsiṣṭha sometimes leapt from coat-rack to beam, from beam to shed and from shed to the tower.

Out of bovine traces (govāsanā), Gavāmpati was always spitting up his food and then swallowing it back again.

While having destroyed their impurities (kṣīṇāsrava), saints such as these still have the traces of passion.

Thus when [ordinary] fire has burned the fuel, there remain the ashes and charcoal, for the strength of the fire is so weak that it cannot consume them.

IV. THE TRACES OF PASSION ARE DESTROYED IN THE BUDDHA

At the end of the kalpa, the [cosmic] fire consumes the trisahasramahāsahasralokadhātu of which nothing remains, for the strength of this fire is very great. The fire of the Buddha’s omniscience is also very great: it consumes the passions without leaving any trace (vāsanā).

Thus, when a brāhman addressed five hundred harmful words (pāruṣyavāda) to the Buddha in the full assembly, the Buddha neither changed color nor feeling. And when the same brāhman, his mind having been tamed, retracted and praised the Buddha with five hundred eulogies, the Buddha manifested neither pleasure (prīti) nor satisfaction (āttamanas).

In blame (nindā) as in praise (praśamsā), his feelings and his color remain unchanged.

This concerns a young brāhman of the Bhāradvāja clan whose name was Pingika or Paingika in Sanskrit, Pingiyāin in Pāli and whose surname was Ākrośaka, the insulter. The Traité, which will speak of him again at k. 84, p. 649c18-21, tells that he spoke five hundred insults and five hundred praises to the Buddha in succession. It repeats the version of the Vībhāṣa (T 1545, k. 76, p. 392a28-b2) where it is said: “The Buddha was insulted directly in five hundred strophes by a Bhāradvāja brāhman: example of blame (nindā); and this same brāhman, at the same time, returned these five hundred strophes and directly praised the Buddha: example of praise (praśamsā).” But for the canonical sources, blame and praise were pronounced at two different occasions ans were the object of two distinct sūtras, the Akkossasutta of the Samyutta and the Pingiyānisutta of the Anguttara.

I. Akkossasutta of the Samyutta, I, p. 161-163:
The Buddha was dwelling at Rājagaha at the Veḷuvana in the Kalandakanivāpa. Akkosaka-Bhāradvāja came to find him and, furious to learn that his brother Samaṇa had just entered the bhikṣu community, he insulted and outraged the Blessed One with coarse and harmful words (bhagavatam asabhāhi pharusāhi vācāhi akkosati paribhāsati). The Buddha’s only response was to ask him if sometimes he welcomed friends and relatives at his home and if, in the affirmative, he offered them food. Akkosaka acknowledged that sometimes that happened. And if the guests refuse the food that you offer them, said the Buddha, to whom does this food belong? – It returns to me, answered the brāhmaṇa. In the same way, continued the Buddha, by not responding to your insults by means of insults, we let you take them into account: it is to you that they return, O brāhmaṇa (tav-ev-etam brāhmaṇa hoti).

Akkosaka thought that the Buddha would be angry with him, but the latter set him straight by addressing four stanzas to him (also mentioned in the Theragāthā, v. 441-444) which say in substance: From where would anger come to the man without anger? Not answering anger with counter-anger is to win a difficult victory.

At these words, Akkosaka expressed his admiration for the Buddha, took refuge in the Three Jewels and asked to leave the world (pabbajji) and for ordination (upasampadā). In a short while he reached the summit of religious life and attained arhathood.

For the Commentary to the Saṅguttara, III, p. 252, a bhikṣu who pronounces such insults would be guilty of the five heinous crimes.

The Pāli Akkosasutta has its Sanskrit correspondents in the Āgamas: Saṃyukta, T 99, no. 1152, k. 42, p. 307a10-b9, and T 100, no. 75, k. 4, p. 400b10-c10. Both Sanskrit sūtras differ considerably from the Pāli suttanta. They place the event not at Rājagaha, but at Śrāvastī in the Jetavana in the garden of Anāthapiṇḍada; they designate the brāhmaṇa not by the name Ākrośaṅka but under his personal name: the māṇava Pin-k’i-kia (Pīṅgika) or Pei-yi (Piṅgiya); finally and in particular, they are silent about the conversion of the brāhmaṇa, his entry into religion and his reaching arhathood. In T 99, l.c., the brāhmaṇa is pardoned only for his coarseness by the use of the commonplace phrase: atyayo Gotama yathā bālo yathā mūḍho, yatjāyvaktō yathākāsalo…

II. Piṅgiyānisutta of Snguttara, III, p. 239-240:

One day the Blessed One was dwelling at Vesālī at Mahāvana in the Kūṭāgārasālā and five hundred Licchavis came to pay their respects to him. Among them, the brāhmaṇa Piṅgiyānin (var. Piṅgiyāni) had a sudden illumination (patibhā) and the Buddha asked him to explain it. The brāhmaṇa then addressed a stanza of homage appropriate to the occasion to the Lord:

Padumaṃ yathā kokaṇadaṃ sugandhaṃ
pāto siyā phullam avītagandhaṃ /
aṅgīrasaṃ passa virocamānaṃ
tapantam ādiccam iv’ antalikkhe //
When the brāhmaṇa Tchan-tchö (Ciñcā) attached a wooden disk to her belly (udare dārumanḍalikāṁ baddvā), [pretending to be pregnant], and slandered the Buddha, the latter did not redden with shame (hrī) and, once the trick was revealed, did not redden with joy (prīti). 68

“As the red lotus flower with sweet perfume expands in the morning without having lost its perfume, see how the Aṅgīrasa shines and how he glows like the sun in the firmament.” [Stanza also cited in Samyutta, I, p. 81; Jātaka, I, p. 116; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 326.]

Then the Licchavis covered the brāhmaṇa Piṅgiyānin with their five hundred lower cloaks (uttarāsaṅgha) and the latter in turn covered the Buddha with them.

Finally, the Buddha revealed to the Licchavis the five jewels (ratana) rarely appearing in the world.

The episode told here by the Piṅgiyānisutta is reproduced with some variants in many Sanskrit-Chinese sources:

b. Dirghāgama, T 1, k. 2, p. 14a11-25.
c. Fo pan ni yuan king, T 5, k. 1, p. 164a13-20.
d. Pan ni yuan king, T 6, k. 1, p. 179b15-c2.
e. Mahīśasaka Vin., T 1421, k. 20, p. 135c18-136a2.
g. Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1448, k. 7, p. 28c14-29a2.
h. Ibid., T 1451, k. 36, p. 386b10-22.

In all these texts, the brāhmaṇa is called Paiṅgika or Piṅgika. Source a reproduces it literally; sources b to f designate it by transliteration by means of the Chinese characters Pin-ki, Pin-tseu, Pin-ki, Pin-k'i-ye, Pin-k'i-yang-t'ou; sources g and h translate it as Kouang-che ‘Vast ornament’ and Houang-fa ‘Yellow hair’ respectively.

In the same texts, Piṅgika addresses several stanzas to the Buddha whereas the Piṅgiyānisutta mentions only one.

III. Pañcarājājānosutta of the Samyutta, I, p. 79-81:

This sutta takes place in Sāvatthi. Five kings, led by Pasenadi, entered into a discussion in regard to the five objects of sense enjoyment (kāmaguna), viz., color, sound, smell, taste and touch, and they wondered which was the best. They went to consult the Buddha who told them that it was necessary to take into account the tastes and preferences of each one: the sense-object that called forth the most pleasure is the best.

The upāsaka Candanaṅgalika present in the assembly reproduces exactly the same words and gestures of Piṅgiyānin described in the preceding sutta: he pronounces the same stanza and covers the Buddha with five cloaks that had been offered to him by the five kings.

Two Sanskrit sūtras incorporated in the Samyuktagaṁa correspond to this Pāli sutta: i) T 99, no. 1149, k. 42, p. 306a21-c1; ii) T 100, no. 72, k. 4, p. 399b28-c29. But whereas the first sūtra also has the upāsaka Tchen-t’an (Candana), the second substitutes the brāhmaṇ Pei-yi, i.e., Piṅgiya.

In addition, the Ekottara (T 125, k. 25, p. 681c13-683a5) contains a developed version of the same sūtra of the five kings, but it has neither Candana nor Piṅgiya.

68 On the trick and punishment of Ciñcā, see p. 123F, 509F.
When the Buddha turned the Wheel of Dharma (dharmacakra) and a cry of admiration arose from the ten directions, the mind of the Buddha was not thrilled.  

At the death of Souen-t’o-li (Sundarī), when evil rumors were spread in regard to the Buddha, his mind knew no despondency.  

In the land of A-lo-p’i (Āḷavi), a cold wind (śītavāta) was blowing and there were many thorny broom plants, but the Buddha sat and lay down there without feeling any discomfort.

During the summer retreat (varṣa) when he was staying in the [Trāyastriṃśa] heaven in the Houan-hi-yuan (Nandanavana), he was seated on the Kien-p’o-che (Kambalāśilā), soft and pure like the gods’ silk ribbons, but he felt no pleasant sensation (sukhavedanā). And when the great devarājas, on their knees, offered him celestial foods (divyāni bhakṣyabhojyāni), he did not consider them to be exquisite.

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69 After the sermon at Benares, the terrestrial yakṣas uttered a cry of joy that was taken up by all the deities of the desire realm and the form realm, from the Caturmahārājikas up to the Brahmakāyikas: cf. Pāli Vin., p. 11-12; Mahāsasaka Vin., T 1421, k. 15, p. 104c; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 32, p. 788b-c; Mūlasarv. Vīm., T 1450, k. 6, p. 128a; Catsuśpariṣatsūtra, p. 154-156; Lalitavistara, p. 401; Mahāvastu, III, p. 334-335.

The Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 76, p. 392a23-26, also comments: At the moment of the Buddha’s birth, his name went up to the Paranirmitavāsavartins; at the moment of his enlightenment, up to the Akanisṭha gods; at the time of turning the Wheel, up to the palaces of the Mahābrāhmaṇas.

70 On the murder of Sundarī falsely imputed to the Buddha, cf. p. 507F, 1572-73F; later, k. 84, p. 649c23-25.


Transl. – Thus have I heard. Once the Blessed One was staying in Āḷavi at the Ox Path in the Śimśapa (Dalbergia sisu) forest, on the ground strewn with leaves.

Then Hastaka of Āḷavi who was walking about saw the Blessed One at the Ox Path in the Śimśapa forest seated on the ground strewn with leaves. Having seen him, he came near the Blessed One and, having approached, he bowed to the Blessed One and sat down to one side. Sitting down at one side, Hastaka of Āḷavi said to the Blessed One:

“Tell me, sir, is the Blessed One sitting comfortably?”

“Yes, my prince, I am sitting comfortably. I am one of those who are comfortable in this world.”

“Nevertheless, sir, the winter nights are cold; the fifteenth of the month is the time of snowfall; the ground trodden by the cows’ hoofs is hard; the layer of leaves is thin; the leaves of the trees are scattered; the saffron robes are cold and the Vairambhaka wind is blowing.”

Then the Blessed One answered: “Nevertheless, my prince, I am comfortable. I am one of those who, in this world, is comfortable.”

- At k. 84, p. 649c27-28, the Traité will come back to this episode. For Hastaka Āṭavika, see above, p. 562-565F and notes.

72 In the seventh year of his public ministry, the Buddha, who has just carried out the great miracle at Śrīvastī, following the example of his predecessors, went to preach the Dharma (some texts specify the Abhidharma) in the
Trāyastrīṃśa heaven where his mother Māyā had taken rebirth. In the shadow of a Pārikāta kovidāra tree (Erythrina indica), seated on Śakra’s throne, the Pāṇḍukambalasīlā (Stone of white wool), he prolonged his teaching for the three months of the summer season (varṣa). Seven days afterwards, escorted by Brahmā on his right and Śakra on his left, he descended from the heavens of the Trāyastrīṃśa by way of a wondrous triple staircase and set foot on earth at Sāṃkāśya, in the Āpajjura forest, at the foot of the Udumbara tree (Ficus glomerata).

All these details are summarized in the Avadānaśataka, II, p. 89, l. 4-6; 94, l. 15-16.

The second part of this miracle designated in the texts by the name Devāvatara “Descent from the gods” or Saṃkassanagare orohaṇaṃ “Descent into the city of Sāṃkāśya” has already been studied above (p. 634-636F and n.), but we should return to the first part, the Sermon to the Trāyastrīṃśa gods.

All these details are summarized in the Avadānaśataka, II, p. 89, l. 4-6; 94, l. 15-16: Buddho bhagavān...

devesu trayāstrīṃśesu varṣā upagataḥ pāṇḍukambalasilāyāṃ ...nagare Āpajjura dāve Udumbaramule.

The second part of this miracle designated in the texts under the name of Devāvatara ‘Descent from the gods’ has already been studied above (p. 634-636F and n.), but we should return to the first part, the Sermon to the Trāyastrīṃśa gods.

The suttas of the Pāli Vinaya do not mention it. The Samyutta, V, p. 367, mentions an appearance of the Buddha in the Trāyastrīṃśa heaven but without giving the circumstances. On the other hand, the Ekottarāgama (T125, k. 29, p. 346a14-347b26) dedicates lengthy pages to this miracle of which the Samyuktāgama also was aware. The Arthapadasūtra (T 198, k. 2, p. 184c24-186c26), which is part of the Basket of the Kaudrakas, has the nun Utpalavāma welcoming the Buddha on his descent from the heaven, and cites a few stanzas which have their correspondents in verses 955 to 964 of the Pāli Suttanipāta.

The postcanonical literature gives a prominent place to the occasion with which we are concerned. Among the Sanskrit-Chinese sources may be mentioned the Légendes d’Aśoka (Divyavadāna, p. 394, l. 3-5; T 99, k. 23, p. 169c22-24; T 2042, k. 2, p. 104a23-24; T 2043, k. 2, p. 138a9-10) and especially the Avadānaśataka, II, p. 89-97 and its abridged Chinese translation in T 200, k. 9, p. 247a-b. Among the Pāli sources may be mentioned the Mahāniddesa, II, p. 447-448; the commentaries of the Suttanipāta, p. 570, the Jātakas, IV, p. 265 and especially the Dhammapada, III, p. 216-223 (tr. Burlingame, III, p. 47-52).

Most of these sources insist on the enormous dimensions of the Pāṇḍukambakāśīla, Śakra’s throne, on which the Buddha was sitting. The Commentary of the Dhammapada (III, p. 217) attributes sixty leagues in length and fifty leagues in width, but when the Buddha occupied it, it was reduced to the size of a drum (nīcapiṇhaka). The unusual shape of this throne has permitted A. Foucher (Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhâra, I, p. 483-486) to recognize, on a bas-relief of the Sikri stūpa, a representation of the Sermon to the Trāyastrīṃśa gods: the Buddha, seated in padmāsana, his right hand raised in abhayamudrā, is sitting in the shade of the Pārijāta on the Kambalaśīla. He is surrounded by six individuals who may be recognized, from bottom to top, as two orants, Vajrapāṇi and Māyā, Brahmā and Śakra. Much more numerous are the representations of the Descent into Sāṃkāśya. A few have been noted above (p. 634F, n.): a sculpture at Butkara may be added (D. Facenna, II, 2, pl. CCXXXIII) reproducing the three staircases, the gods Brahmā and Śakra, the nun Utpalavāma and three leafy trees on three superimposed levels: the Pārijata nd the Kovidāda adorning the Trāyastrīṃśa heaven, and the Udumbara growing at Sāṃkāśya.
When he ate oats (yava) at P‘i-lan-jo (Vairambya, Venaṅja), he did not find that to be painful.\(^{73}\) And when the great kings presented him with superior food, he did not consider that to be a godsend.

Coming into the village of the brāhmans (brāhmaṇagārāma), he had to return with an empty bowl (dhautena pātreṇa), but he did not consider that to be a loss.\(^{74}\)

When T‘i-p‘o-to (Devadatta) pushed a rock down from the height of Gr̥ḍhrakūṭaparvata to crush the Buddha, he did not feel any hatred (pratigha).\(^{75}\) At that time, Lo-heou-lo (Rāhula) praised the Buddha with a mind of respect, but the Buddha felt no gratitude for it.

A-chō-che (Ajātaśatru) unleashed drunken elephants intending to kill the Buddha, but the latter was not afraid and tamed the mad elephants.\(^{76}\) Their respect doubled (gurukāra), the inhabitants came out with perfumed flowers and ornaments (ābharana) to offer to the Buddha, but the latter experienced no joy.

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\(^{73}\) To the references given above (P. 124F, n. 1), add the Mūlasaṅg. Vin. in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, part I, p. 24, l. 8-48, l. 4 and its Chinese version in T 1448, k. 10-11, p. 45a-48c9.

\(^{74}\) See above (p. 457-463) the detailed story of the Buddha’s alms-round at Śāla.

\(^{75}\) Cf. p. 874, n. 3.

\(^{76}\) A brief allusion to the miracle of the subjugation of the elephant Nālāgiri or Dhanapāla. The stories of this miracle can be arranged into three groups: 1) the sources that present it as a miracle of loving-kindness; 2) those that make it into a miracle of magic; 3) the late versions, somewhat aberrant, where the meaning of the miracle does not appear clearly.

I. The subjugation as a miracle of loving-kindness

The earliest sources have it that the Buddha converted the animal by means of the radiation of his loving-kindness (maitrī). There is an old belief that fierce animals, especially snakes, are sensitive to the good feelings expressed towards them.

1. Pāli Vinaya, II, p. 194-196:

   In Rājagṛha at that time there was the elephant Nālāgiri, fierce (candha) and a killer of men (manussaghātaka). Devadatta went to find its mahouts and, taking advantage of his influence over king Ajātaśatru, ordered them to loose the animal against the Buddha when the latter entered Rājagṛha. This was done. The next day, surrounded by many monks, the Buddha came to the city to beg his food. The elephant was unleashed and, with its trunk erect (saṇḍham uṣṣapetvā), ears and tail rigid (pahatthakampanṇavāla), rushed against the Teacher. The monks begged the Buddha to go back, but the latter reassured them that no aggression coming from the exterior could deprive him of his life.

   Frightened, the population of Rājagṛha took refuge on the roof-tops and made wagers as to who would win, the man-elephant (the Buddha) or the animal-elephant (Nālāgiri).
Then the Blessed One penetrated Nālāgiri with a mind of loving-kindness (Nālāgiriṃ mettena cittaṃ phari) and, lowering its trunk (sōndam oropetvā), the animal stopped in front of the Buddha who caressed its forehead with his right hand (dakkhinena hattihena hattissa kumbham parāmasanto), saying:

O elephant, do not attack the Elephant; this attack would be shameful.
There can be no good destiny in the beyond for the one who kills the Elephant.
Flee from drunkenness (mada) and laziness (pamāda); the lazy miss the good destinies.
Act in such a way as to attain a good destiny.

At these words, Nālāgiri gathered the sand-grains covering the feet of the Blessed One in his trunk and spread them on top of its head; then, still kneeling, it backed away, always keeping the Buddha in sight.

It was on this occasion that the people chanted the following stanza (see also Majjhima, II, p. 105; Theragāthā, v. 878):

Some tame them with blows of the stick, with pitchforks or with whips;
With neither stick nor weapon was the elephant tamed by the Great Sage.

2. Jātaka, V, p. 333-337:
The Cullahamsajātaka (no. 533) reproduces the preceding source, not without adding numerous details.

When the Buddha made his entry into Rājagṛhā, he was accompanied by many monks coming from the eighteen monasteries situated in the neighborhood of the city. Seeing the rush of the elephant, the eighteen great abbots, Śāriputra, etc., suggested that they would tame the animal, but the Buddha refused their offer and asked them to remain in their place. The good Ānanda insisted on staying beside the Blessed One in order to be killed before him, and the Blessed One had to use his magical powers to put him back beside his colleagues.

The sources that follow have it that, at the approach of the elephant, all the arhat monks except for Ānanda fled shamefully, and they will contrast their cowardice with the complete devotion of the preferred disciple. It is possible that this not very edifying incident was part of the original story but that the Pāli texts passed over it in silence so as not to cause any trouble in the Saṅgha. However, the Ceylonese Theravādins were aware of it by way of an indiscretion (?) of the Milindapañha, the Pāli version of an original Prakrit seemingly coming from the northwest of India. In this version (p. 207-208), king Milinda (Menander) asked Nāgasena how it was possible that arhats supposed to be free of all fear took flight before the elephant.

3. Mahāsakā Vinaya, T 1431, k. 3, p. 19b24-c26:
This source is very close to the Pāli Vinaya, but here it is King Ajātaśatru himself who urged the mahouts to loose the mad elephant after having made it drunk. All the disciples abandoned the Buddha with the exception of Ānanda.

4 and 5. Kaśmirian Vinaya, T 1464, k. 5, p. 871c20-872b17; Sarvāstivādin Vinaya, T 1435, k. 36, p. 262a11-263a6: A longer version than the preceding ones. Warned by Devadatta seven days in advance, the mahout watched for the Buddha’s coming and was warned of his approach by a series of wonders which are usual when the Blessed One enters the gates (indrakīla) of a city: the elephants trumpet (hastinah kroīcanti), the horses neigh (aśvā heṣante), the bulls bellow (ṛṣabhā garjanti), etc., etc. This is a stock phrase occurring frequently in the texts (Divyāvadāna, p. 250-251; 364-365; Avadānaśataka, I, p. 109; Mahāvastu, I, p. 308). To convert the elephant Dhanapāla, the Buddha entered into the concentration on loving-kindness (maitrīsamādhi), caressed its forehead and taught it the Dharma. Finally, for the edification of the crowd who were cheering him, he entered into the
concentration of the brilliance of fire (tejodhātusamādhi) and, emitting all kinds of rays, he accomplished the twin miracle (yamakaprāthārya) of water and fire. This miracle, accomplished by the Buddha in other circumstances, is described here in stereotyped terms: see, e.g., Catuspariṣāṭṣūtra, p. 318; Divyāvadāna, p. 161; Mahāvastu, III, p. 115-116; Sumangalavilāsinī, I, p. 57.

For the Theravādins, only the Buddhas are able to perform the yamakaprāthārya: it is a privilege they do not share with the śrāvakas: asāḍhāraṇaṃ sāvakehi (Comm. of the Dhammapada, III, p. 213, l. 18; Jātaka, IV, p. 265, l. 12-13; Visuddhimagga, p. 331, l. 14) and actually, in the Pāli sources, we never see a disciple accomplish this miracle. For the Sarvāstivādins, on the other hand, the yamakaprāthārya is common to the Tathāgata as well as all the śrāvakas: Tathāgatasya sarvasrāvakaśārdaṇā śṛddhiḥ (Divyāvadāna, p. 161, l. 13; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1451, k. 26, p. 332a27, and in the Sanskrit sources, many disciples accomplish it: Yaśas or Yaśodha (Mahāvastu, III, p. 410, l. 5-10), Kālodāyin (P’ou yao king, T 186, k. 8, p. 534a6-15), Urubilvākāśyapa (Samyukta, T 99, k. 38, p. 279b29-c5; Catuspariṣāṭṣūtra, p. 348), Panthaka (Divyāvadāna, p. 494, l. 18-23), the five hundred co-sisters of Mahāprajāpati (Ekottara, T 125, k. 50, p. 822a3-9).

- Returning to Dhanapāla, the Kaśmir Vinaya, i.e., has it that once it was converted, it abstained from eating grass for seven days and, after its death, it was reborn among the Cāturmahārājikas.


In their poetic tales of the deeds of the Buddha, these two authors, supposedly contemporaries of Kaniṣka, again insist on the miraculous power (prabhāva) of the Buddha’s loving-kindness.

II. The subjugation as a miracle of magic.

In his Vie du Buddha, 1949, p. 289, A. Foucher makes the following comment: “Count on the devotees to spoil all the charm (of this episode) while claiming to embellish it. According to the informants of Hiuan-tsang, as also according to the Nepali miniatures and the Chinese drawings, it was the five lions that sprang from the outstretched fingers of Śākyamuni that were charged with keeping the elephant at bay. Neither can the deeds and the mind of the Great Being be basely betrayed nor be exalted.”

I [Lamotte] share the indignation of my illustrious teacher, but I am somewhat less severe in respect to the humble cicerones of Rājagṛha who, by informing Hiuan-tsang in this way were only repeating a lesson based on a long literary tradition.

Indeed, there are numerous texts that have it that Śākyamuni tamed Dhanapāla, not so much by his spiritual power, but by the brute force of his magic. To support this new version of the facts, it sufficed for them to use a banal cliché in the words of which the Blessed One tamed wild animals “by making five hairy maned lions appear, with two masses of fire on the right and on the left and above a huge iron rock” or else a fiery ditch. The cliché often appears in the Sanskrit collections of tales such as the Avadānasataka, I, p. 331, l. 12-13: Tato bhagavatāt prastatt pañca kesariṇāṁ saṭadāriṇāṁ śimhā nirmitā vāme daksine ca pārśve dvāv agniskandhāv supariṣṭan mahaty āyomayā śīlā.

The sources that exploit this cliché - mostly Sarvāstivādin in origin - do not fail to insist on the flight of the arhats and on Ānanda’s devotion; they are also interested in the fate of the elephant after its conversion.
1) Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya. – The episode of Dhanapālaka in its original text appears in the manuscript of the Saṅghabhaddavastu (fol. 491b-493b) found by G. Tucci in Pakistan in 1957. He was kind enough to send me a copy prepared by the care of Prof. Raniero Gnoli, to both of whom I am indebted for their kindness. The essence of the story has been translated into Italian by G. Tucci, *Il trono di diamante*, 1967, p. 265-266. See also the Chinese translation by Yi-tsing in T 1450, k. 19, p. 197b28-198c6.

At the invitation of a wealthy householder, the Buddha accompanied by five hundred monks went to Rājagrha. He was challenged from the heights of the ramparts by Ajātaśatru and Devadatta who had plotted his death. The Teacher announced to them that he was going to manifest his marvelous power. When the elephant Dhanapālaka rushed against him, the Blessed One on the palm of his right hand created by magic five maned lions with ribbons on their heads; having smelled their scent, the elephant began to flee, releasing urine and excrement. By virtue of the Blessed One, all the directions in space began to flare up into one great mass of fire with the exception of the spot where the Blessed One was standing where there was perfect calm. After a moment of panic, Dhanapālaka approached the Blessed One slowly and the latter caressed his head with his hand marked with the marks of the wheel and the svastika, a hand resulting from many hundreds of merits and capable of reassuring the frightened. Speaking to the elephant in stanzas, the Buddha reproached him for his past behavior and taught him the three seals of Dharma, sarvasaṃskāra anityāḥ, etc.

The Buddha then entered into the house of the householder who had invited him. The elephant who was following him tried to enter as well but only succeeded in demolishing the house. The Blessed One changed the house into rock crystal so that the elephant could see him without difficulty.

When the meal was over, the Blessed One left the walls of Rājagrha to go back to his monastery. Dhanapālaka tried to follow him but was seized by the mahouts (bastidāmaka) and put into iron chains. Thus deprived of the sight of the Buddha, the animal crushed its trunk with its foreleg and died asphyxiated (sa bhagavantam upaśyam pādena sūndāṃ avaṣṭabhya kālaṅgataḥ).

Dhanapālaka was reborn among the Cāturmahārājika gods and, in this paradise, went to the Veṇuvana to meet the Buddha again and covered him with flowers. The Blessed One preached the Dharma to him and this ‘son of the gods who had been an elephant’ (nāgapūrī devaputraḥ) saw the noble Truths and obtained the srotāpattiphala.

2) Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 83, p. 429a12-b2:

On the invitation of a vaiśya, accompanied by a crowd of monks, the Blessed One came down from Grdhraukaṭaparvata and went to Rājagrha. King Ajātaśatru, instigated by Devadatta, loosed the mad drunken elephant Dhanapāla against him. The Tathāgata extended his right hand and, from the ends of his five fingers, there sprang forth five lions. At the sight of them, the elephant looked about, took fright and fled. At once the Buddha created magically a deep ditch five hundred cubits in width. Seeing this, the astonished elephant looked from right to left, but from right to left the Buddha magically created high walls ready to collapse. The panic-stricken elephant then looked upward, but the Buddha created magically in the air a huge flaming rock threatening to fall down. Seeing this, the terrified elephant looked everywhere, but the Buddha everywhere magically created burning fires. Only near the Buddha was there any coolness and calm. (tato bhagavatā daksine karate pañca simhaḥ kesarīnāḥ paṭṭadhāriṇo ... pādamālam śantam śanībhūtam adhiṣṭhitam). . The elephant awoke from its drunkenness, approached slowly and the Buddha made the five lions disappear. The elephant rubbed the Buddhas feet with its
trunk, the Buddha caressed its forehead and, borrowing the language of elephants, preached the Dharma to it: *sarvasamskārā anityāḥ*, etc.

Dhanapāla became disgusted with its animal destiny and abstained from eating and drinking. He died and was reborn among the Trāyāstipūrṇa gods. Remembering the benefits of the Buddha, he went to him: the Blessed One preached him the Dharma and the new god saw the four noble Truths.

[For the punishment of the flaming wheel of fire (*jvalitānalaṃ cakram āyasam*) armed with double-edged swords (*asidharam*) turning above the head of the guilty, see the legend of Maitrakanyaka (*Maitrāyaṇa*) in Divyāvadāna, p. 605; Mahākarmavibhanga, ed. S. Lévi, p. 54; Avadānasataka, I, p. 202, etc.]

3) Ekottarāgama, T 125, k. 9, p. 590a8-591a7:

The Buddha was at Rājagṛha in the Kalandaka Veṇuvana and was expecting to go the next day into the city on his begging-round. Devadatta proposed to king Ajātaśatru to loose the fierce elephant Nālāgiri against him. The king agreed and proclaimed that the animal would be loosed the next day and that consequently traffic in the city would be forbidden. Devadatta commented to the king that if the Buddha were truly omniscient he would be careful not to leave his monastery.

Buddhist sympathizers went in a crowd to the Veṇuvana; they warned the Buddha of the plot and begged him not to enter the city. The Teacher reassured them: “Let the upāsakas not be worried. The body of the Tathāgata is not an ordinary body. Nothing can harm him.” And the Buddha went into a long explanation of cosmography where he described the entire cosmic system from the Caturdvipa up to the Trisāhasramāsāhasralokadhātu. He concluded: “If the Airavatāna elephants, equal in number to that of all the plants and trees, filled all these universes and came to attack the Tathāgata, they would be unable to shake a single hair on his body. The magic power (*ṛddhibala*) of the Tathāgata is inconceivable.

The next day, accompanied by five hundred monks, the Buddha went on his alms-round to Rājagṛha. Thousands of myriads of deities came to join him: the four Caturmahārājakadevas (Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Virūdhaka, Virūpakṣa, Vaiśravana), Śakra and Brahmā Devarāja, accompanied by their respective entourages. The fourfold community of Rājagṛha went to welcome him and the sound of their shouts reached the king’s ears. When the Buddha entered the city gate, the heaven and the earth trembled and from the skies the deities threw flowers.

However, the elephant Nālāgiri, drunk on arak and holding a sword in its trunk, rushed against the Buddha. The five hundred monks fled headlong and the good Ānanda, not keeping to his place, took refuge behind the Buddha. To the left and right of Nālāgiri, the Buddha made lions appear by metamorphosis, (the number is not given) and behind him, a fiery pit. The animal urinated and dropped excrement, but not finding any way to escape, approached the Buddha who addressed a stanza to it. At once, Nālāgiri dropped the sword, bent its knees, prostrated on the ground and with its trunk, licked the Buddha’s feet.

Myriads of men and women were converted by this prodigy. As for the drunken elephant, it contracted the sickness of ’cutting winds’ (in Pāli, *satthakā vāṭā*), died and was reborn in the palaces of the Cāturmahārājakāyikas.

[In the present sūtra, the Ekottarāgama once again betrays its Mahāyāna attachments or interpolations by means of the dizzying perspectives of its cosmogony and the luxuriance of its theophanies.]

III. Late versions

It is not to the texts examined hitherto that the *Traité* seems to be referring in its brief allusion to the miracle of Rājagṛha, but to shorter and later sources where the original meaning of the miracle of maitrī seems to
have become blurred and where the rôle of the individuals is modified noticeably. Henceforth the responsibility for
the plot against the Buddha’s life rests mainly, no longer on Devadatta, but on king Ajātaśatru. He unleashes not just
one elephant (Nālāgiri or Dhanapāla) but a number of elephants, the number of which is usually given as five
hundred. In order to tame them, the Buddha magically creates five hundred lions. At the approach of the elephants,
the five hundred arhats accompanying the Buddha again take flight, but the good Ānanda, instead of exposing his
master, remains nailed in place by fear. Finally king Ajātaśatru, impressed by the magic miracle, excuses himself to
the Buddha by placing the blame onto Devadatta.

1) Ta feng pien fo pao ngen king (Chinese translation made under the Heou (Han), T 156, k. 4, p. 147b23-c7:
At that time, a messenger from king Ajātaśatru came to invite the Tathāgata. The Buddha and five hundred
arhats accepted the king’s invitation and entered the city of Rājagṛha. Then the king loosed five hundred drunken
elephants. They attacked savagely, breaking trees, upsetting walls and, with loud bellows, they rushed towards the
Tathāgata. Seized by great fear, the five hundred arhats flew up into the air and whirled about the Buddha. Ānanda,
who was accompanying the Buddha, was so frightened that he could not move. Then by the power of his loving-
kindness and compassion, the Buddha raised his right hand from the fingers of which sprang five lions that opened
their throats and roared. The five hundred elephants, panic-stricken, fell face down to the ground. Then surrounded
by the great assembly, the Tathāgata entered into the king’s palace. King Ajātaśatru came out respectfully to meet
him and begged the Buddha to be seated. When the Buddha sat down, the king asked for pardon and confessed his
wrong-doing, saying: Bhagavat, it is not my fault but that of Devadatta. The Buddha said to the king: I too know that
well. Devadatta has always wanted to harm me and not just today. Even before this he wanted to hurt me and I saved
him by the [power of my loving-kindness and compassion].

2) Fa kiu p’i yu king (Chinese translation mad between 290 and 306), T 211, k. 3, p. 596a5-27 (passage
reproduced by Pao-tch’eng of the Ming in the Che kia jou lai ying houa lou: cf. L Wieger, Les vies chinoises du
Buddha, Cathasia, 1913, p. 139):
This source reproduces the preceding one in substance, but here it is five hundred lions that the Buddha
makes appear ferom his finger-tips. Instigated by Devadatta, Ajātaśatru had prevented the inhabitanats of Rājagṛha
from offering anything at all to the Buddha and the Saṃgha. Not receiving anything, Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana,
Subhūti, Prajñāpati and their disciples had gone to foreign lands. But the Buddha and his five hundred arhats
remained on Grīdrakūṭaparvata.

3) Tsa pao tsang king, T 203, k. 8, p. 488c25-489a2: Speaks about the elephant Dhanapāla, but five
hundred lions were needed to tame it.

4-5) Fa hien tchouan, T 2085, p. 862c16, and Si-yu ki, T 2087, k. 9, p. 920c13-16. During their voyage to
Rājagṛha, at the beginning of the 5th and the first part of the 7th century respectively, the two Chinese masters, Fa-
hien and Hiuan-tsang, were able to visit the place where the miracle had taken place.

Figurative representations
At Gandhāra: A. Foucher, AgbG, I, p. 189, fig. 74; p. 543, fig. 267-269.
At Amarāvatī and at Andhradeśa: A. Foucher, AgbG, II, p. 571, fig. 510, or Revue des arts Asiatiques, V, no. 1, pl.
Ninety-six heretics (tīrthya) once came together, all claiming to be omniscient (sarvajñamānin). They came to Śrāvastī to debate with the Buddha. Then the Buddha, using the bases of his miraculous powers (ṛddhipāda), sent forth many rays (raśmi) from his navel (nābhi) on each of which there appeared an emanated buddha (nirmitabuddha). The king of the land, Po sseu-ni (Prasenajit), also ordered the heretics to go to the top [of a building] but they were unable to move and still less debate with the Buddha. Seeing the heretics coming as enemies, the Buddha made no movement to turn back and destroyed the heretics. The gods and men redoubled their respect (gurukāra) and veneration (satkāra), but the Buddha felt no attraction. 77

From all these stories (nidāna), it is evident that when someone wanted to harm him, the Buddha remained impassive. Just as the gold of the Jāmbhū river (jāmbhūnadasvarṇa) does not change when it is beaten, melted or broken, 78 so the Buddha undergoes criticism, derision, denigration, slander and debates without moving or changing. This is how we know that the traces of the emotions (kleśavāsanā) have been destroyed in him without residue.

V. WHY THE BUDDHA ELIMINATES THE TRACES

Question. – But the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas likewise, having at their disposal pure wisdom (anāsravajñāna), eliminate the traces of the passions. Is this completely or incompletely?

Answer. – Previously (p. 1761F) I said that the power of their knowledge (jñānabala) is weak and only like ordinary fire, whereas the power of the Buddhas is great and like the [cosmic] fire at the end of the kalpa (kañcañādha). Here I must repeat myself:

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have accumulated the qualities (guna) [261b] and the knowledges (jñāna) for a short time, one, two or three lifetimes. The Buddha, on the other hand, has cultivated the knowledges and practiced the qualities during innumerable incalculable periods (aśamkhyeyakalpa); long ago he vaporized the perfume of the good dharmas (kuśaladharma): this is why he no longer has even a trace of kleśavāsanā.
Moreover, the Buddha has accumulated and exhausted all the qualities to the extent that the traces of passion have been eliminated definitively without residue. Why? Because the good dharmas and qualities make the passions melt. The arhats who have not fully obtained these qualities eliminate only their desire for the world (lokatṛṣṇā) and enter directly into nirvāṇa.

Finally, the Buddha has cut the fetters (sanyojana) and the power of his knowledge (jīvānabala) is very sharp (tīkṣṇa). He utilizes the ten powers (daśabala) like a great knife and his unhindered knowledges (pratisamvid) are superior. This is why he cuts the fetters completely and without residue.

When a man has committed a serious wrong-doing, the king, who is very angry, massacres his descendants down to the seventh generation so that there is nobody left. In the same way, the Buddha tears up and eradicates these powerful enemies that are the conflicting emotions so that there is nothing left.

This is why [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] says here that [the bodhisattva] who wants to destroy the traces of passion by means of the knowledge of all the aspects should exert himself in the perfection of wisdom.

VI. WHERE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TRACES IS LOCATED

Question. – Is destroying the traces (vāsanāprahāṇa) also eliminating the passions (kleśacchedana)?

1. Report on and criticism of four wrong theories

[First theory: Destruction of the passions and destruction of the traces are simultaneous.] – Some say:
When the passions (kleśa) are cut, the traces (vāsanā) disappear at the same time and, as has been said above, the traces disappear without residue. But the arhats and pratyekabuddhas cut just the passions and do not cut the traces whereas the Bodhisattva cuts all the passions and their traces which are eliminated without residue.

[Second theory: The passions are cut at the time of the Bodhisattva’s meeting with the buddha Dipaṅkara, at the end of the second asaṃkhyeyakalpa.] – Others say: already, The Buddha has long ago withdrawn from the desires (rāga). Thus the Buddha said: “When I saw the buddha Ting-kouang (Dīpaṅkara), I had already eliminated the desires.” Therefore it was by the power of his salvific skillful means (upāya) that he pretended [later] to take births and deaths, a wife, children and slaves.

[Third theory: Passions and traces are destroyed when anuttapattiṅgkṣānti is obtained.] - Others say: Starting from the time when the Bodhisattva obtained the certainty that things do not arise

79 In the course of an earlier lifetime, when he was the young brahmācārin Sumedha, Megha or Sumati, the future buddha Śākyamuni met the Buddha Dipaṅkara and received from him the prediction that he would become buddha. This meeting took place at the end of the second asaṃkhyeyakalpa of his career: cf. p. 248F and n. 2.
(anupattikadharmaṃkṣānti)\textsuperscript{80} and he found the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of things, all his passions and all the traces were destroyed.

[Fourth theory: Passions and traces are destroyed the night of the enlightenment.] – Other say: When the [future] Buddha produced the mind of bodhi (prathama-cittotpāda) for the first time, he had passions, but when he sat down on the seat of enlightenment (bodhimāṇḍa) and during the last watch of the night (paścime yāme), he destroyed all his passions and all the traces.

Question. - Which is the correct theory?

Answer. – All having come from the mouth of the Buddha (kaṇṭhokta), none of them is incorrect. [But they must be interpreted.]

[Criticism of the first theory.] – In the śrāvaka system, the Buddha, by the power of his skillful means (upāya), pretends to assume human qualities: he undergoes birth (jāti), old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi), cold and heat (śītosṇa), hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsā), etc.\textsuperscript{81} As no human is born without passions, the Buddha must likewise conform to human qualities and [seem] to have passions. Under the king of trees, first outwardly, he crushed Māra’s armies (mārasenā); then inwardly, he destroyed his enemies that are the fetters (samyojana). Having destroyed his external and internal enemies, he realized supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhī). Everyone, seized by faith, [said to themselves]: “Here is a man who has accomplished great things; therefore we also should realize such things.”

[Criticism of the second and third theories.] – Some tell us: “For a long time already the Buddha is without passion. When he <1777> met the buddha Jan-teng (Dīpankara) or acquired the conviction that things do not arise (anupādakṣānti), he destroyed his passions completely.”\textsuperscript{82} But this is again skillful \textsuperscript{261c} means (upāya) to lead bodhisattvas to rejoice. If the bodhisattva (Śākyamuni) had long ago destroyed all his passions, what more did he need to do at the time of his enlightenment (saṃbodhī)?

Question. – But the Buddha has all kinds of things to do. Cutting the fetters (samyojanaprahāna) is only one. He still has to purify the buddhafields (buddha-ksetraparipāṇa), ripen beings (sattvaparipācaṇa), etc., all things that he has not yet done. When he has completely fulfilled all these things, he will be called Buddha.

Answer. – If that is so, why did the Buddha say [at the moment of his enlightenment]: “I have destroyed the fetters: this is my last existence”? How can a man who no longer has any fetters be reborn?

Question. – When he acquired the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmaṃkṣānti), he always acquires a body born of the fundamental element (dharmadhātu-jākāya)\textsuperscript{84} and becomes transformed.

\textsuperscript{80} This conviction is definitively acquired in the eighth bodhisattva bhūmi, the Acalā.

\textsuperscript{81} Docetic theory advocated by some Hīnayāna schools, especially the Mahāsāṃghikas and their subsects. See Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 690-692.

\textsuperscript{82} See above, p. 983F, the statements put into the mouth of the future Buddha Śākyamuni.

\textsuperscript{83} Ayāṃ antimā jāti, n’ athi dāni punabhavo: Vinaya, I, p. 11, etc.

\textsuperscript{84} On the dharmadhātu-jākāya as opposed to the māṃsakāya, see above, p. 392-393F, 711-712F and notes.
Answer. – As to transformation, it is the rule that first there is a master of emanstion (nirmāṇā) and only then an emanation. If [the future Buddha] cut all the fetters (saṃyojana) at the time when he acquires anuputtikadharmaṁkṣānti, he would be abandoning his fleshly body (māṇsakāya) at the moment of death and would no longer have a real body. Who then would be transforming? This is how we know that after having acquired anuputtikadharmaṁkṣānti, he has not eliminated the fetters.

[Criticism of the fourth theory]. – Furthermore, the śrāvakas say: “The Bodhisattva does not cut the fetters until after he has seated himself on the seat of enlightenment (bodhimaṇḍa). This is a serious error. Why? In your system, it is said that the Bodhisattva, after having traveled through the three asaṃkhyeyakalpas [of his career], must travel through a further [additional] hundred kalpas. However, ever in possession of the knowledge of his former abodes (pūrvanivāsa), he remembers that at the time of the buddha Kia-chö (Kāśyapa), he was the bhikṣu Yu-to-lo (Uttara) and was already practicing the attributes of the buddhas. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the career of the bodhisattva involves three asaṃkhyeyakalpas plus a hundred supplementary kalpas during which the bodhisattva accomplishes the acts that produce the thirty-two marks. This theory has been presented on pages 246-255F and refuted on pages 283-397F. This Uttara is none other than Śākyamuni himself in one of his earlier lifetimes where the Buddha Kāśyapa had made his prediction. Cf. Mūlasarv. Vin., in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, part 4, p. 47, l. 16-18 T 444, k. 2, p. 1030a5-7; Divyāvadāna, p. 347, l. 10-12, (the text of which is corrupt): Bhagavatā Kāśyapena samyaksambuddhenottaro nāma māṇavo vyākto bhavisyasi tvam mānavo varṣasatāyaṃjātra praṭāyāṃ Śākyamunir nāma tāthagato ‘rhan samyaksambuddha iti. – “The blessed perfectly and fully enlightened Kāśyapa made the prediction to a young Brāhmaṇ named Uttara: ‘Young man, when the life-span of creatures will be one hundred years, you, under the name of Śākyamuni, will be a tathāgata, saint, fully and completely enlightened’ “.

Here is his story as the Traité will tell it (k. 38, p. 340c23-341a26):

Why did the buddha Śākyamuni, while he was still a Bodhisattva, have criticism and abuse in regard to the buddha Kāśyapa? I have already spoken about this affair above. The dharmakāya bodhisattvas transform themselves in many ways to save beings and sometimes adopt human shapes. They undergo hunger and thirst, cold and heat, old age and death; they have likes and dislikes, anger and joy; they praise and they blame: except for the grave wrong-doings, they commit all the others.

At that time, the bodhisattva Śākyamuni was the younger brother of the buddha Kāśyapa and was called Uttara. The older brother, whose wisdom was ripened, hated chatter; the younger, whose wisdom was incomplete, loved to debate. The people at that time considered the younger brother to be superior.

Later, the older brother left home and attained complete enlightenment; he was called Kāśyapa. The younger brother was the teacher of Kr̥kin, king of Jambudvīpa. He had five hundred disciples. He taught the brāhmaṇical books to these brāhmins for the latter did not like the Buddhist doctrine.

There was at that time a master potter (kumbhakāra) named Nandapāla; he was a disciple of the buddha Kāśyapa; he was devoted to the fivefold discipline (pañcaśīla) and held the threefold path. He was the kalyāṇamitra of the chaplain Uttara for his mind was honest, pure and full of faith.

One day Uttara mounted a golden chariot drawn by four white horses and went out of the city with his disciples. Nandapāla met Uttara on the way, and asked him: “Where are you coming from?” Nandapāla replied
Now, during his practices of austerities (duṣkaracārya), why would he have followed the wrong path [of asceticism] for the duration of six years by eating only one sesame grain (tila) one single grain of rice "Your older brother has attained anuttarā samyaksambodhi and I have just come from paying homage to him. You ought to go to see him with me. Let’s go to meet him.”

Uttara said to himself: “If I go to the Buddha, my disciples will mistrust me and will say: ‘From the beginning, you have always been outstanding in your dialectic and your wisdom, and now you are going to pay homage out of family spirit. We certainly won’t follow you.’ ”

However, fearing to miss the chance to see the Buddha, Uttara settled himself in the wisdom bearing on the true nature of things (dharmāṇām dharmatā) and entered into the wisdom using supreme skilful means (anuttaropāya) in order to save his disciples. That is why, out of his mouth, he spoke an insult saying: “How could this man with the shaved head (muṇḍaka) be able to attain sambodhi?”

Immediately, Nandapāla, his kalyānamitra, pretending to be angry, seized him by the head and wrestled him down, saying: “It’s of no use for you to resist.” Then Uttara addressed his disciples, saying: “Things being as they are, I cannot resist.”

Upon this, teacher and disciples together went to the Buddha and, seeing his radiance (prabhālakaṇḍa), their minds were purified. Prostrating to the feet of the Buddha, they sat down to one side. The Buddha preached the Dharma to them as appropriate. Uttara attained innumerable dhāraṇīmukha, and all the samādhimukha opened up for him; the five hundred disciples produced the mind of anuttara samyaksambodhi. Uttara arose from his seat and said to the Buddha: “I would like the Buddha to permit me to leave home and become a bhikṣu.” The Buddha said to him: “That’s good. Come!”, and he became a śramaṇa,

Therefore it was out of skilful means (upāya) that Uttara hurled an insult, but it was not really true. Space may be broken, water may be changed into fire and fire into water, but an ekajātipratibaddha bodhisattva cannot be angry with a worldly person, still less with a Buddha.

- Elsewhere Uttara maṇavaka is designated by the name Jyotipāla or Jotispāla, while Nandapāla, the potter, is also called Ghaṭīkāra. In any case, it is the same jātaka, well known to the canonical and postcanonical sources.

Sanskrit-Chinese sources: Madyamāgama, T 26, k. 12, p. 499a-503a; Mahāvastu, I, p. 317-335; Mūlasarva. Vin., T 1450, k. 11, p. 157a-b; Hing-k’i-hing king, T 197, k. 2, p. 172c-174b.

Pāli sources: Majjhima, II, p. 45-54; Buddhavaṃsa, XXV, v. 10 seq.; Jātaka, I, p. 43; Milindapañha, p. 221-224.

The village where the buddha Kāśyapa gave the prediction to Uttara, alias Jyotipāla, was called Verudīṅga in Sanskrit, Veṭṭhalinga in Pāli, but was designated elsewhere as Mārakaranda. It was on the site of the present Sārnāth near Benares, and in the 7th century, Hiuang-tsang was still able to visit it. He was shown the exact spot on which the prediction had occurred (cf. Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 7, p. 905c14-18).

A bas-relief at Gandhāra shows Nandapāla (alias Ghāṭīkāra) pulling his childhood friend Uttara (alias Jyoyipāla) by the hair to lead him to the buddha Kāśyapa (cf. A. Foucher, AgbG, II, p. 327, fig. 458 above).
(tanḍula) every day? The Bodhisattva in his last lifetime (caramabhāvika) cannot be deceived even for a single day; then how would he be so for six years?

It is the same for his reactions of hatred (dveṣa). In times gone by, the Bodhisattva was a venomous snake (āśīvaṣa); hunters (vyādha, lubhaka) flayed him without him feeling the least hatred. How then would he have hated the group of five (pañcavargīya) in his last lifetime?

Thus we know that the śrāvakas interpret the mind of the Buddha wrongly. It is out of skillful means (upāya) that he wanted to destroy the heretics and that he gave himself up to austerities for six years. You claim that he was angry with the group of five: that too is skillful means; these were the traces of passions (kleśavāsanā) and not the passions (kleśa).

2. Report on the correct theory

Now we must speak truthfully. When the Bodhisattva attained the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣānti), his passions (kleśa) have already been exhausted, but his traces (vāsanā) have not yet been eliminated. It is as a result of these traces that he assumes [a birth]. Obtaining a body born of the fundamental element (dharmadhātujakāya), he can transform himself at will. Out of loving-kindness (maitrī) and compassion (karuṇā) for beings and also in order to fulfill his earlier vows (prāṇapradīvanā), he returns to this world to perfect or acquire yet other Buddha attributes. Once the tenth bhūmi has been completed (paripūrṇa), he sits on the seat of enlightenment (bodhimaṇḍa) and, by the power of his unhindered liberation (asaṅgavimokṣa), he attains omniscience (sarvajñatā), the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākārajñatā) and destroys the traces of the passions (kleśavāsanā).

3. Criticism of two Mahāyāna theories

87 As the Traité has explained above (p. 1512F), if for six years at Uruvilvā, Śākyamuni, in the course of his last existence, gave himself over to the practices of austerity, he did not, however, approve of the pernicious austerity practiced by the heretics. By giving himself over to the insane tortures of mortification, he was in a position to condemn with even more authority the excesses of asceticism as he did in the sermon at Benares.

At Uruvilvā, he began by stopping the inhalation and exhalation and fell into a state close to catalepsy. Then he gave himself over to the most severe fasting, going so far as to finally abstain from all food.

The detail of the grain of sesame seed and the grain of rice given here by the Traité appears in all the sources: see, e.g., Makkhima, I, p.245; Mahāvastu, II, p. 125-129; Lalitavistara, p. 254-255; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 5, p. 121a, etc.

88 See the Jātaka of the flayed naga above, p. 853-855F.

The text says simply: ‘the five men’. This concerns evidently the five mendicants, Ājīvaka-Kaunḍinya, etc., who had been present at the mortifications of Śākyamuni and who later became the listeners privileged to hear his first sermon. Nevertheless, the Buddha was never irritated with them, even though it were for skillful means.

89 The definitive attainment of this kṣānti is realized in the eighth bodhisattva bhūmi.
[First theory: Passions and traces are destroyed simultaneously on the obtaining of anutpattikakṣaṇī.] – Some Mahāyānists say: “At the moment when the Bodhisattva obtains the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmaśāntī), all his passions (kleśa) and traces of passion (kleśavāsanā) are destroyed.” This also is wrong. In fact, if were all destroyed, the Bodhisattva would not be different from the Buddha and, furthermore, would not assume a body born from the fundamental element (dharmaḥtāṭuṣakāya).

[262a] Why? Because it is at the moment when the Bodhisattva obtains the anutpattikadharmakṣaṇī that he abandons his body of birth (jannakāya) and obtains the body born of the fundamental element.

[Second theory: Passions and traces are destroyed simultaneously the night of enlightenment.] – If someone tells us: “The Bodhisattva should be seated on the seat of enlightenment (bodhipañcika) for all his passions (kleśa) and traces of passion (kleśavāsanā) to be destroyed”, this statement would be wrong as well. Why? If, [at the moment of his enlightenment], the Bodhisattva still retained the three passions (vyāhāra) [desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha)], how could he have [previously] gathered innumerable Buddha attributes (buddhaharman)? He would be like a poisonous pot from which nobody eats even if it is filled with nectar (amṛta). In fact, the Bodhisattva accumulates the very pure qualities (pariśuddhaguna) at the moment when he becomes Buddha. If, [at that moment], he were still mixed with the three passions, how would he be able to perfect the pure attributes of the Buddhas?

Question. – By contemplating the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of <1782> dharmas and by cultivating the mind of compassion (karunācitta), he ‘weakened’ the three poisons and then was able to accumulate the pure qualities.

Answer. – By weakening (tanuta) the three poisons, he could only obtain an existence (ātmabhāva) as a noble chakravartin king or king of the gods (devarāja), but that would be insufficient to acquire the mass of Buddha qualities. It is necessary to destroy the three poisons but not to have eliminated the traces, in order to be able to accumulate the qualities.

Moreover, there is a weakening [of the three poisons] in the person detached from desire (vyāhāra) who has destroyed the fetters related to the lower level (avarabhāgīya samyojana) but who still keeps the fetters relative to the higher levels (udrabhāgīya samyojana).90 There is also weakening [of the three poisons] in the srotāpañcanna who has suppressed the fetters to be destroyed by the seeing of the truths (satyadarsanaheya samyojana), but has not suppressed the fetters to be destroyed by meditation.

90 There are ten samyojana. Five are avarabhāgīya “favorable to the lower part”, i.e., to Kāmadhātu; these are: i) the belief in the individual (sakṣāyadṛṣṭi), ii) the unjustified belief in the efficacy of observances and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa), iii) doubt (vicikitsā), iv) love of pleasure (kāmacchanda), v) maliciousness (vyāpāda). Five are ārdhabhāgīya ‘favorable to the higher part’, i.e., to rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu; these are: i) desire for the form realm (rūparāga), ii) desire for the formless realm (arūparāga), iii) pride (māna), iv) excitement (auddhatya), v) ignorance (avidyā). See Saṁyutta, V, p. 61, 69; Anguttara, V, p. 17; Kośa, V, p. 84-87.

The saint who has destroyed the five avarabhāgīya has simply ‘weakened’ and not ‘destroyed’ the three poisons (viṣa) or the three bonds (bandha), namely, rāga, dveṣa and moha.
(bhāvanāheya saṃyojana).\textsuperscript{91} Finally, as the Buddha said: “One is sakṛdāgamin by means of the destruction of three fetters, desire, hatred and delusion (rāgadveśamohānāṃ ca tanuvāt).”\textsuperscript{92} But <1783> [in order to accumulate the Buddha attributes, it is not enough] to weaken [the three poisons] as you have said; they must be destroyed.

Thus, at the moment when the Bodhisattva obtains the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmaksānti), he destroys the passions (kleśān prajahāti), and at the moment when he becomes buddha, he destroys the traces of passion (kleśavāsanāḥ prajahāti): this is the correct theory.

**Fourth Section ENTERING INTO THE ASSURANCE OF BODHISATTVA**

As the Traité is going to explain, here the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra is trying to draw a parallel between the path of the bodhisattva and that of the śrāvaka of which the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika school had carefully laid out the stages. Once again we notice the considerable influence exerted by this school on the earliest Mahāyāna writers.

1. In the course of the preparatory path (prayogamārga), the śrāvaka, trained in the practice of the smṛtyupasthāna, cultivates the four wholesome roots favorable to penetration into the four noble Truths (nirvedhahāgya kusalamāla): these are the heats (ūṣmāgata), the summits (mūrdhan), the acquiescences (kṣānti) and the supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma). The old canonical texts make no mention of them, but the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma attaches great importance to them (Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 34, p. 175b7; k. 65, p. 338c3; k. 127, p. 662c13; k. 176, p. 884a16-17; Abhidharmasāra, T 1550, k. 2, p. 818b;

\textsuperscript{91} In possession of the first fruit of the Path, the srotāpanna has destroyed the first three avarabhāgya (satkāyadrṣti, śilavrataparāmarśa and vicikitsā), in the sense that during the Darśanamārga that he has just traversed, he has abandoned a certain type of kleśa – the kleśa of ‘wrong view’, called avastuka – plus certain rāga immediately related to wrong view. But he still has to traverse the Bhāvanāmārga and eliminate the fetters to be destroyed by meditation (bhāvanāheya). Therefore he has ‘weakened’ the three poisons but not eliminated them completely.

\textsuperscript{92} In possession of the second fruit of the Path, the sakṛdāgamin has made some progress over the preceding. By means of the Darśanamārga, he has destroyed the first three avarabhāgya; by means of the beginning of the Bhāvanāmārga, he has abandoned six categories of kleśa of kāmadhātu. He must still abandon three categories of kleśa of kāmadhātu plus all the kleśa that hold him tied to rūpa- and āruppyadhātu. He too is far from having destroyed the three poisons completely.

This is the meaning of the canonical formula cited here by the Traité: Tiṇṇaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā rāgadosamohānaṃ tanuttā sakadāgāmi hoti, sakid eva imaṃ lokam āgantvā dukass’ antam karoti. It occurs in Dīgha, I, p. 156; II, p. 92, 93, 200, 201, 252; III, p. 107, 132; Majjhima, I, p. 34, 226, 465; III, p. 80; Saṃyutta, V, p. 357, 378; Anguttara, I, p. 232; II, p. 89, 238; IV, p. 380. – Sanskrit formula in Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 166; Divyāvadāna, p. 533-534 (with a lacuna).
These four roots of good, each of which includes a weak, medium and strong degree, have as object the four noble truths and take their sixteen aspects (cf. p. 641F, 1179F). These are right views (samyakdrṣṭi), wisdoms (prajñā), in constant progression, but impure (sāsrava) wisdoms, of mundane order, which still involve traces of errors, e.g., the concept of self. The śrāvaka who practices them is still a worldly person (prthagjana).

The first two roots, heats and summits, are not fixed (cala) because the ascetic may fall back from them: there is falling from the summits (mūrdhhyāḥ pāta) when the śrāvaka becomes distracted from the contemplation of the truths by wrong judgments (Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 1, p. 918c25-919a1; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 6, p. 27a29-c4: passages translated in Hobogirin, IV, p.346, s.v. Chōda). <1784>

The śrāvaka goes through the supreme worldly dharmas in the Path of seeing (darśanamārga) of the four noble Truths: suffering (duḥkha), its origin (samudaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path (mārga) of its cessation. The full light rises up in him and he has the clear understanding of it (abhisamaya). It is now a matter of a pure (anāsrava) prajñā, supramundane (lokottara), free of any error (viparyāsa). Suddenly the ascetic sees purely the truth of suffering relative to dharmas of the desire realm (kāmadhātu). This first moment is followed by fifteen others which complete the pure seeing of the truths relative to the three realms of desire, subtle matter (rūpadhātu) and the formless (ārūpadhātu). The Traité has already alluded to these sixteen mind-moments (cf. p. 130F, n. 1; 214F; 1067F, n. 1; 1411F, n. 2; 1478-1480F). In the first one the śrāvaka ceases to be a worldly person (prthagjana) and becomes an ārya, a candidate for the first fruit of the religious life (prathamaphalapratipannaka). This first moment also constitutes entry into samyaktvaniyāma (in Pāli, sammattaniyāma), entry into the positions of salvation or, as L. de La Vallée Poussin translates it (Kośa, III, p. 137; VI, p. 181), entry into this ‘absolute determination of the acquisition of salvation’. In his introduction to the edition of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Leipzig, 1930, p. 28-31), U. Wogihara has dedicated a learned note to this expression to which de La Vallée Poussin has also added.

In the words of a canonical sūtra cited by the Kośabhāṣya, p. 157, samyakta is the cessation of all the passions (sarvakleśaprahāna), i.e., nirvāṇa; for the Commentary to the Saṃyutta, II, p. 346, it is ariyamagga, the path of the āryas, in this case the path of the pure seeing of the Buddhist Truths. Samyaktva, salvation, is opposed to mithyātva, perdition, the falling into the bad destinies. In principle, the āryas are destined to samyakta, whereas those guilty of misdeeds of immediate retribution (ānantaryakārin) are destined to mithyātva (Kośa, III, p. 137).

The term nīyāma is difficult because the Sanskrit and Pāli texts spell it is three different ways: nīyāma, niyama and nyāma, for which the Tibetan and Chinese versions propose distinct translations (cf. Mahāvyut., no. 6500-6502).

1. Nīyāma, position, determination, is a noun derived from the root ni-yam, and appears alone or in composition in many sources:

nīyāma in Suttanīpāta, p. 9. l. 14; Anguttara, I, p. 121, l. 27; Kathāvatthu, p. 317, l. 2; 480, l. 2; Daśabhūmika, p. 63, l. 14.

niyāmadassī in Suttanipāta, p. 65, l. 5.

niyāmāvakṛnti, in Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 75, l. 3; avakrāntaniyāma, in Śiksāsamuccaya, p. 270, l. 4.

bodhisattvaniyāma, in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 107, l. 8; Daśabhūmika, p. 11, l. 27.

samyaktvaniyāma, in Kośabhāṣya, p. 350, l. 6; Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 131, l. 10; samātaniyāma, in Saṃyutta, III, p. 225, l. 18.

Niyāma is given as ṇes par ḥgyur ba in Tibetan, as kiue-ting ‘determination, fixation’ in Chinese. Kumārajīva always gives samyaktvaniyāma – and undoubtedly also samyaktvanyāma – as tcheng-wei, ‘correct position’ (cf. T 223, p. 381a26; 405c24; T 1509, p. 192c12; 262c3), whereas Huan-tsang, who <1785> carefully distinguishes it from samyaktvanyāma, gives it as tcheng-kiue-ting ‘position in uprightness’ (cf. T 1558, p. 121b5; T 1562, p. 683a17).

2. Niyama, less frequent than niyāma, has exactly the same meaning and is also derived from the root ni-yam. It is usually rendered in Tibetan by ṇes pa, ‘determination’ and not by mi ḥgyur ba, ‘non-transformation’ as proposed by Mahāvyut, no. 6500. Niyama is just a grammatical variant of niyāma as Kośavyākyā, p. 541 explains it: Tatra niyamo niyāma iti. tatra samyaktve niyama ekāntibhāvaḥ. niyāmaṭi ghaṇi rūpam. api tu niyama iti yamaḥ samupaniṣu cety appratyayasya vibhāṣitvatvāt. – “Here, niyama is niyāma. The niyama of salvation is the absolute (ekāntibhāva) determination to salvation. To say niyāma is to apply [the suffix] ghaṇ, but we also say niyama when we opt for the rule [of Pāñini, III, 3, 63]: Yamāḥ samupaniṣu ca: [the suffix ap is in conjunction with ghaṇ] after the root yam preceded by the prefixes sam, upa, ni, vi.”

3. Nyāma (sometimes wrongly corrected to nyāya in the editions at our disposal) seems itself to be an erroneous spelling for niyāma or niyama. It occurs often in the Sanskrit texts: cf. Lalita, p. 31, l. 20; 34, l. 10; Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 679, l. 6; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21, l. 11; 66, l. 15; 119, l. 6; 182, l. 20; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 67, l. 11; 272, l. 8; 486, l. 4; 489, l. 3; Gaṇḍhavyūha, p. 320, l. 22; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 358, l. 2; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 171, l. 22.

An imaginary etymology proposed by the Indian writers themselves has modified the meaning profoundly. According to them, nyāma would come from ni-āma and would mean ‘absence of coarseness’ in the proper sense and ‘absence of error’ in the figurative sense. Hence the Tibetan translation skyon med pa ‘absence of error’ and the Chinese translation li cheng ‘absence of coarseness’. In the texts of the Greater and of the Lesser Vehicle as well, Huan-tsang often comes upon the expression samyaktvanyāma and translates it faithfully and invariably by tcheng song li cheng, ‘correctness abandonment of coarseness’ (cf. T 1545, p. 7a3, 8c27, 13a2; T 220, vol. VII, p. 7c26, 19a21, 44b3).

For the Sarvāstivādins, āma, ‘coarsenesses, defects’, are the passions to be abandoned by seeing (dārśanahayaklesa), the belief in the individuial (satkāyaadrṣṭī), the quality of the worldly person (prthagjana), etc.; ny-āma, ‘rejection of coarsenesses’, is the path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga) that makes one go beyond these coarsenesses, which transforms the the prthagjana śrāvaka into an ārya and destines him for nirvāṇa: see Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 3, p. 13; Kośa, VI, p. 181, note.
For the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the samyaktvaniyāmāvākrānti leading to nirvāṇa is exclusively the work of a prajñā - made possible by śīla and maintained by samādhi – bearing upon the four noble Truths. For the Mahāyānists, the bodhisattvaniyāmāvākrānti, as we will see, opens up perspectives far more vast.

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The śrāvaka aspires to arhathood, to nirvāṇa, in order to realize his own benefit (svahita); the bodhisattva aspires to supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksambodhi), to buddhahood, in order to assure his own benefit and that of others (parahita). The bodhisattva differs from the śrāvaka on two points: he tends toward a higher goal and is inspired by altruistic concerns.

To attain his ideal, he must practice the six perfections of his state (pāramitā) and convert beings (sattvakāma) over the course of a long career. The latter consists of ten stages or levels (bhūmi) to which the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra later will dedicate a lengthy section (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 214, l. 6 – 225, l. 19; Śatasāhasrika, p. 1454, l. 1 – 1473, l. 18). It is content to enumerate them; only later did other Mahāyānasūtras, notably the Daśabhūmika, give each a name.

The Mahāyānist thinkers tried very early to establish a parallel between the path of the śrāvakas and that of the bodhisattvas. After many attempts, they came to a coherent account where they distinguished five phases in the respective careers of the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas: 1) a path of accumulating of merit (samābhāramārga), 2) a preparatory path (prayogamārga), 3) a path of seeing (darsanamārga), 4) a path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), 5) a final path excluding any practice (aśaikṣamārga). A succinct account of this comparative study may be found in the remarkable paper of E. Obermiller, The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya, Acta Orientalia, XI, 1932, p. 1-133.

Here the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra envisages only the preparatory path and the path of seeing, the major importance of which has not escaped it.

1. The four wholesome roots favorable to penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya kuśalamūla), the heats, etc., constituting the preparatory path of the śrāvakas find their place in the preparatory path of the bodhisattvas as will clearly be shown in the subtitles introduced into the version of the Pañcaviṃśati intentionally revised to serve as commentary to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, ed. N. Dutt, p. 119, l. 11-145, l. 19). But whereas the śrāvaka concentrates on the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of the aggregates – impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnya) and non-self (anātman) – the bodhisattva disregards these distinctions and focuses on the true nature of dharmas (dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā) free of arising and cessation.

Every candidate who has attained the second of the four wholesome roots, namely, the summits (mūrdhan), can still retrogress from it. As we will see, the śrāvaka falls back from the summits when he ceases to contemplate the general characteristics of things and allows himself to be drawn into mental ranting (ayoniśo manaskāra). The bodhisattva falls from the summits when, hypnotized by the general characteristics of things, he loses the view of their true nature, non-arising and non-cessation. In this case,
he is not reduced to the level of the śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas but he cannot accede to the definitive position (niyāma) of the bodhisatta.

In the following pages, the Traité will compare with the four nirvedhabhāgīya kuśalamūla of the śrāvakas a fourfold practice (caryā): 1) the first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), 2) carrying out practices (caryābhāvanā or caryāpratipatti), i.e., the practice of the six perfections (pāramitā), 3) great compassion (mahākarunā), 4) skillful means (upāyakauśalya) to convert beings. Only the second of these four points constitutes a ‘practice’ in the proper sense of the word.

From other sources, we know that the bodhisatta who has produced the mind of awakening begins his career only on entering the preparatory path extending over the first seven bhumis.

During the first six, the bodhisatta simultaneously cultivates the six pāramitās but especially generosity (dāna) in the first, morality (śīla) in the second, patience (kṣānti) in the third, exertion (vīrya) in the fourth, meditation (dhyāna) in the fifth and wisdom (prajñā) in the sixth. But this wisdom is not that of the śrāvakas bearing upon the aspects of the noble Truths; it is a Mahāyānist wisdom for which the true nature of things is emptiness (śūnyatā), the non-arising (anutpāda) of dharmas. The bodhisatta who limits his efforts ceases to think, speak and act and is of no use to beings.

Thus, in the seventh bhūmi, animated by great compassion for beings, the bodhisatta resorts to skillful means to convert beings: this upāyakauśalya is the dominant quality of the seventh bhūmi (cf. Daśabhūmika, p. 69, l. 6-7; Śāṅgara, p. 207; Siddhi, p. 623).

In conclusion, the prajñā of the bodhisatta is necessarily increased by upāyakauśalya which is sorely lacking in the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha.

2. From the preparatory path, the śrāvaka penetrates into the path of pure seeing of the truths and at once is placed in the position of salvation (samyaktvaniyāma): he ceases to be an ordinary person (prthagjana) and becomes an ārya, with the certainty of some day reaching nirvāṇa. In a parallel manner, when the bodhisatta passes from the seventh to the eighth bhūmi, he enters into the ‘position of the bodhisatta’ (bodhisattvaniyāma) also called ‘rightful or legal position’ (dharmaniyāma). In his case and without exception, it is no longer a matter of position of salvation (samyaktva), for it is not nirvāṇa that is assured for him, but rather the state of Buddha, this supreme complete enlightenment that excludes the seeing of beings (sattva) and things (dharma) but at the same time being allied with great loving-kindness and great compassion.

In the pages that follow, the Traité sets forth up to seven definitions of the bodhisattvaniyāma, but it is far from exhausting the subject.

a. Primarily, this niyāma is characterized by the definitive attainment (pratilāba, pratilambha, pratilambatā) of the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmaksānti) or, as the Vajracchedikā explains, p. 58, l. 9, the conviction regarding dharmas without self and without birth (nirātmakesu anutpattikēsu dharmesu kṣāntih). Most texts place this final conviction in the eighth bhūmi, which later will be called Acalā (cf. Daśabhūmika, p. 64, l. 5; Sūtrakāra, p. 122, l. 2; 131, l. 17; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105, l. 11; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 350, l. 27; 351, l. 13-14).
b. The acquisition of this kṣānti is accompanied by the great prediction (mahāvyākaranā) about the final triumph of the bodhisattva: cf. Lalitavistara, p. 35, l. 21; Daśabhūmika, p. 71, l. 24; Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 266, l.1-2; Śūtrālaṃkāra, p. 20, l. 15; 141, l. 27; 166, l. 12; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 190, l. 18; 192, l. 1.

c. From now on, the bodhisattva is assured of his future buddhahood: niyatipatito bhavati buddhatve (Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 190, l. 20); niyato bhavaty anuttarāṃsāmyakṣambodhau (Śūtrālaṃkāra, p. 71, l. 12). – As a result, he is without regression (avaivartika), in possession of an irreversible conviction (avaivartikakṣaṃti-pratilabdha: Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 259, l. 13). Thus the eighth bhūmi, the Acalā, is also called Niyatabhūmi, ‘determined level’ (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 11), Avīvartyabhūmi, Avīvartanīyabhūmi, Avīvartikabhūmi, ‘Irreversible level’ (Daśabhūmika, p. 71, l. 12; Śūtrālaṃkāra, p. 176, l. 22; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 235, l. 18). It marks the beginning of the irreversible career (avaivartacarya, avivartacarya), which will be pursued in the last three bhūmis (cf. Mahāvastu, I, p. 1, l. 3; 63, l. 13-14; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 290, l. 21).

d. Starting from this eighth bhūmi, the bodhisattva’s activity is practiced spontaneously, effortlessly, for it is no longer disturbed by objects and notions: this is why it is called anabhisaṃskāraṇābhogavihāra or anabhoganirmittavihāra (Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105, l. 18-21; Śūtrālaṃkāra, p. 178, l. 3; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 11; Saṃgraha, p. 202).

e. The bodhisattva strips off his fleshly body of birth-death (cyutypapadamaṇya) and takes on a body born of the fundamental element (dharma-dhātu-jaya): under various transformations, he is established in the universes, travels in and adorns the buddhafields and converts beings (cf. p. 392-393F, 711-712F and notes).

f. As we have seen in the preceding section, it is at the moment when the bodhisattva, having entered into niyāma, when he makes the turn-about (vivarta) definitively acquires anuttapattikadharma-kṣānti, that he is already sambodhiprāpta “in possession of perfect enlightenment”. However, this enlightenment does not bring about the complete destruction of the traces of conflicting emotions (kleśavāsanā): this results from the knowledge of all the aspects (sarva-kāraṇajñātā) to which the bodhisattva accedes on the tenth level and which makes him like a Tathāgata (cf. p. 1780-1781F).

This brief summary far from exhausts all the virtues of the bodhisattvaniyāma coinciding with the bodhisattva’s entry into the eighth bhūmi. This, even more than the tenth level, constitutes the great victory of the bodhisattva where prajñā and upāya are perfectly balanced.

Śūtra (cf. Pañcavimśati, p. 21, l. 11-12; Śatasahasrikā, p. 67, l. 11-13).

- Moreover, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to enter into the position of bodhisattva must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom (punar aparāṇa Śāriputra bodhisattvena mahāsattvena bodhisattvaniyām avakramitukāmena prajñāpāramitāyām śikṣātavyam).
I. POSITION OF BODHISATTVA

1. The bodhisattvaniyāma ‘position of bodhisattva’ is the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmaśceta). Having obtained this conviction in regard to dharmas, the bodhisattva considers the whole world as empty (śūnya) and his mind has no longer any further attachment (abhiniveśa). Settled on the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of dharmas, the bodhisattva no longer loves the world.

2. Furthermore, the bodhisattvaniyāma is the concentration [visualizing the Buddhas] of the present (pratyutpannasamādhi). In possession of this concentration of the present, the bodhisattva sees all the

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93 From this equation it results that the bodhisattvaniyāma occurs in the eighth bhūmi. In fact, the anupattikadharmaśceta (cf. Vjaracchedikā, p. 58, l. 9: nirātmakesu anupattikadharmaśceto kṣāntiḥ) or the conviction that dharmas are without self and do not arise, occurs in three stages during the bodhisattva’s career: it may be a purely verbal conviction (ghośānuga), preparatory (anulomikē) and finally be definitively acquired (pratilabhā): cf. Samādhīrāja, ed. N. Dutt, I, p. 76-82; Avataṃsaka, T 279, k. 44, p. 232b9; Sukhāvativyūha, p. 112, l. 12-13; Dhyānasamādhisūtra, T 614, k. 2, p. 285a-b; Manusyendraprajñāpāramitā, T 245, k. l., p. 826b23-24.

1. At the beginning in the first five bhumis, the bodhisattva accepts the idea of the non-arising of dharmas, but it is only adhimukti, belief, agreement, verbal professing (ghośānuga): he is not in definitive possession of the conviction. Cf. Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 856, l. 25: bodhisattvāḥ prayājāpāramitāyām carantaḥ sarvadharmaḥ anupattikā ity adhimukanti na ca tāvad anupattikadharmaścāntipratilabhā bhavanti.

2. In the sixth bhūmi (Abhimukhi), examining emptiness of dharmas in every way, he possesses an intense preparatory conviction (anulomikē kṣānti), but has not yet made his entry into the real anupattikadharmaśceta. Cf. Daśabhūmika, p. 47, l. 17: sa evamsvabhāvān sarvadharmaṃ prayavekṣamāṇo ‘nusrjan anulomayān avilomayan śraddhadhān abhiyān prayāṇyān avikalpavān anuśaranaṃ vyavalokeyaṃ pratipadayaṃ, saṣṭhīṃ abhimukhim bodhisattvabhūmim anuprāṇnoti tiśayāvānulomikyā kṣāntyā. na ca tāvad anupattikadharmaścāntimukham anuprāṇnoti.

Finally, the bodhisattva ‘obtains’ (pratilabhāte: cf. Sad. puṇḍ., p. 266, l. 1; 437, l. 1; Lalitavistara, p. 36, l. 9; 440, l. 21) the anupattikadharmaśceta. This is what is called the definitive obtaining (pratilabdha, pratilambha, pratilambhā) of kṣānti.

According to most sources, this attainment is realized in the eighth bhūmi, the Acāla: cf. Daśabhūmika, p. 64, l. 5; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 122, l. 2; 131, l. 17; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 350, l. 27; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105, l. 11.

At this third stage of the kṣānti, the bodhisattva enters into ‘the position of bodhisattva’ (bodhisattvaniyāma).

94 Pratyutpannabuddhasamādhanavasthitasamādhi, ‘concentration where the Buddhas of the present appear face to face’. It is the object of a sātra of the same name (T 418), first translated in 179 by Tche Tch’an and Tchou Fo-cho. It has already been noted above, p. 245F, 425F, 430F, 526F, 1023F, and the Traité will return to it below, p. 276a. Although the great bodhisattva samādhis are located in the tenth bhūmi, the Traité here places the Pratyutpannasmādhi in the eighth; the Śūrangamasamādhi, transl. p. 163, does the same. On the other hand, the Daśabhūmika, p. 82, l. 14-15, assigns it to the tenth.
Buddhas of the ten directions of the present, hears the Dharma preached by these Buddhas and cuts the net of his doubts: henceforth the mind of the bodhisattva comes to a standstill. This is called bodhisattvaniyāma.

3. Furthermore, there is bodhisattvaniyāma when the bodhisattva, fully endowed with the six perfections (ṣaṭpāramitāsampanna), produces the knowledge of skillful means (upāyajñāna), but without becoming fixated on the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of dharmas. He knows it (jānīte) personally and attests it (sākṣātkaroti) personally without depending on the words of another. If Māra in the form of a buddha comes to him, his mind is not disturbed at all.

4. Furthermore, when he enters into the rightful position (dharmaniyāma) of bodhisattva, he takes the name of non-regressing bodhisattva (avaivartika or avinivartaniya).

5. Furthermore, the bodhisattva who has entered into this rightful position does not regress to the rank of ordinary person (prthagjana) and is said to be ‘in possession of complete enlightenment’ (saṁbodhiprāpta). All the mundane things that could destroy his mind [of bodhi] cannot disturb him.

[262b] He has closed the gates to the three unfortunate destinies (durgati); he is ranked among the bodhisattvas. For the first time he takes birth in the family of the bodhisattvas (bodhisattvakula).

His wisdom (prajñā) is pure (viśuddha) and ripe (vipaka).

95 The bodhisattva cultivates the six pāramitās in the course of the first six bhūmis, generosity predominating in the first, morality in the second, and so on. Cf. Madh. avalīra, p. 23 (transl. Le Muséon, 1907, p. 272); Samgraha, p. 207.

96 Upāyakausalya is the dominant virtue of the seventh bhūmi: cf. Daśabhūmika, p. 60, l. 6-7; Samgraha, p. 207; Siddhi, p. 623.

97 Dwelling on the true nature which is the non-arising of everything would be to interrupt the bodhisattva career and to enter nirvāṇa prematurely.

98 Here dharmaniyāma is synonymous with bodhisattvaniyāma. The expression has nothing in common, it would seem, with the dhammaniyāmatā, ‘the regularity of phenomena’ of which the canonical sources speak (Sāmyutta, II, p. 25; Anguttara, I, p. 286).

99 This is the avaivartika of the eighth bhūmi and not the first: see below, p. 1804F.

100 In the Vehicle of the śrāvakas, the ascetic who penetrates into the darśanamārga by eliminating all doubt regarding the suffering of kāmadhātu (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti) was qualified as ārya. Here, the bodhisattva who has entered the darśanamārga by being persuaded of the non-arising of dharmas is called saṁbodhiprāpta ‘in possession of complete enlightenment’. At this stage, śrāvaka and bodhisattva cease being ordinary persons (prthagjana).

101 See below, p. 1919F.
6. Furthermore, the fact of being established on the summits (mūrdhāvasthāna) and not falling from them\textsuperscript{102} is called bodhisattvadharmaniyāma. \textless 1791\textgreater  This is what is said in the \textit{Hiue p\'in} (Śīkṣapurāṇa).\textsuperscript{103}

“The bodhisattva who has entered niyāma does not fall into the evil destinies, is not reborn into lowly families, does not regress to the level of śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha and does not fall back from the summits either.”\textsuperscript{104}

Question. – What is falling back from the summits (mūrdhabhyah pāta)?

Answer. – As Subhūti said to Śāriputra: “When the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who is without skillful means (anupāyakusāla) but is practicing the six perfections has entered [the concentrations] of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, he cannot accede to bodhisattvaviyāma, but neither does he regress to the rank of śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha."\textsuperscript{105} \textless 1792\textgreater

\textsuperscript{102} In the śrāvaka system, the preparatory path (prayogamārga) consists of the practice of the four wholesome roots favorable to penetration of the four noble Truths (nirvedhabhāgāvikusalamūla): heats (āṣamagata), summits or heads (mūrdhan), convictions (ksanti) and supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma).

The ascetic is able to strip away the first two. The summits (mūrdhan) are the highest of the unfixed (cala) roots of good, i.e., from which one may still regress. \textless 1991\textgreater  Or else, one regresses from the summits (mūrdhabhyah pāta) or one is established on the summits (mūrdhāvasthāna) in order to pass over them by penetrating into the convictions (ksanti). The Kośabhāṣya, p. 343-344, explains it thus: Īśmabhya mūrdhāna utpadaye... yāḍrā āṣmāṇa cauḥsatyālambanāh śoḍaśākārāś ca. utkṛṣṭataratvāt nāmāntaraṃ ca kalakṣālamūrdhatvāt mūrdhānaḥ. ebhya hi pāto ‘tikramo vā. – Transl.: From the heats arise the summits. Like the heats, they have as object the four Truths of which they take the sixteen aspects. As a result of their superiority they receive another name and, as they are the summit of the unfixed roots of good, they are called summits. One can fall from these summits or one can also pass over them.

The \textit{Prajñāpāramitāsūtra} takes inspiration from this system to elaborate a bodhisattva Path. In his progress towards entering into possession (prāpti) of anutpadṭikadharmaśānti, the bodhisattva can attain certain summits close to this ksanti, but he may regress from them if he speculates about the nature and characteristics of dharmas: these are non-existent, without arising or ceasing, are not to be wished for. Only the niyāta “determined, predestined” bodhisattva is sheltered from regressing from the summits.


\textsuperscript{105} Here the \textit{Traité} is faithfully reproducing the Chinese translation of the \textit{Pañcavimśati} (T223m k. 3, p. 233a29-b3).

However, as I [Lamotte] have noted (p. 1785F), several Sanskrit versions, followed by the Chinese translators have here adopted the reading nyāma ‘absence of coarseness’ (in Chinese, \textit{li-cheng}) in preference to
He becomes attached (abhiniṣiṣate) to the qualities (guṇa) and the attributes; in the five aggregates (skandha) he grasps the characteristics (nimittāny uḍgṛṇāti) of impermanence (anitva), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnya), non-self (anatman) and attaches his mind to them; he says: “This is the Path, that is not the Path; this should be practiced, that should not be practiced.” When he grasps such characteristics in this way <1793> and makes such distinctions (vikalpa), the bodhisattva has “fallen from the summits” (mūrdhabhyah patitaḥ).

What is it to become established on the summits (mūrdhāvasthāṇa)? As is said in the passage mentioned above, it is to destroy the thirst for dharmas (dharmaṭṛṣṇāpṛahāṇa),106 and to no longer grasp these dharmas for which thirst has been destroyed.

Thus it is said in the explanation of mūrdhāvasthāṇa: “The bodhisattva-mahāsattva cultivating the perfection of wisdom does not see the emptiness of the external bases in the emptiness of the internal bases; he does not see the emptiness of the internal bases in the emptiness of the external bases; he does not see the emptiness of the internal and external bases in the emptiness of the external bases; he does not see the

106 See preceding note.
emptiness of the external bases in the emptiness of the internal and external bases. And so on up to the emptiness (no. 18) of non-being and being itself (abhinivāravāsānunyatā).”

7. Finally, the bodhisattva who accedes to niyāma attains the mind “equal to that which has no equal” (asamasamacitā) but does not take pride in it (nāmānam ukarṣati). When we know [as he does] that the nature of the mind is integral emptiness, all the futile proliferation (prapañca) about existence (astitā) and non-existence (nāstitā), etc. disappears.

II. ‘POSITION’ AND ‘POSITION OF SALVATION’

Question. – In the system of the śrāvakas, why do they speak of samyaktvaniyāma ‘position of salvation’, whereas in the system of the bodhisattvas they speak only of niyāma ‘position’?

Answer. – If the latter system spoke of samyaktvaniyāma, it would not be wrong (doṣa) either. Why? If it was a matter of a bodhisattva attribute, the latter would lead to salvation (samyaktva). But in the śrāvaka system, they speak only of ‘niyāma’ and not of ‘niyāma of the śrāvaka’. This is why [we specify] by saying samyaktvaniyāma, ‘position of salvation’.

Furthermore, the śrāvakas do not possess the mind of great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrīi) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā). Their wisdom (prajñā) not being sharp (tīkṣa), they have no feeling of disgust (nirvedacitta) [for the world]; they especially seek out dharmas and multiply wrong views (mityādrṣṭī), doubts (vicikitsā) and regrets (vipraśīrā). The bodhisattva-mahāsattva, however, full of loving-kindness and compassion for all, seeks especially to free beings from the sufferings of old age (jarā), sickness (vyāḍhī) and death (maraṇa); he does not try to imagine or increase futile proliferation (prapañca). Like the wealthy man (śreṣṭhin) who dearly loves his only son: when this son gets sick, his father looks for only the best remedies (bhaiṣajya) capable of curing the sickness; he does not seek to distinguish the names of the remedies and, as soon as he has found them, he mixes them and administers them.

107 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 120, l. 17-121, l. 3 (T 223, k. 3, p. 233b23-c15); Śatasāhasrikā, p. 489, l. 8-490, l. 12 (T 220, vol. V, k. 36, p. 201a22-b25):

Ihāyuṣman Śāriputra bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ praṇjīpāramitāyāṃ caran nādhīyātmasānunyatāyāṃ bahirdhāṣīyunatāṃ ... bodhisattvasa mahāsattvasa praṇjīpāramitāyāṃ carato bodhisattvanyāmāḥ.

108 The objection is valid if one considers the text of the Pañcaviṃśati translated by Kumārajīva, but in the translation made by Hsuan-tsang, often there is the expression bodhisattvasamyaktvanyāma (T 220, vol. VII, k. 402, p. 7c26; k. 404, p. 9a20-21; k. 408, p. 43c28).

The answer is simple: When the śrāvaka enters the darśanamārga, he is destined for samyaktva, viz., destruction of rāga, dveṣa and moha, or nirvāṇa. When the bodhisattva enters into his darśanamārga, he is assured of some day attaining the complete omniscience of the Buddhas consisting of the knowledge of all aspects (savākāraṇijñatā). The niyāma of the śrāvakas is a ‘position of salvation’; that of the bodhisattvas is a ‘position of future Buddha’; therefore it is simply said ‘bodhisattvaniyāma’ or else ‘dharmaniṇyāma’.

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Thus in order to consider the twelve-membered (dvādaśaniḍāṇa) [pratītyasamutpāda] the bodhisattvas start from the effects (phala); they do not start from the causes (hetu) in order to consider it. [The śrāvakas] assess according to the cause, whereas the bodhisattvas who are romantics (ṭṛṣṇābahula) assess according to the effect.109 In the śrāvakas, the cause is

[262c] niyāma: this is why they are in the position of salvation (samyaktvaniyāma); in the bodhisattvas where the position of perdition (mithyāṭvaniyāma)110 is minimal (tanu), we speak only of bodhisattvaniyāma. <1795>

III. PREPARATORY PRACTICES FOR THE BODHISATTVANIYĀMA

Question. – In the system of the śrāvakas, there is samyaktvaniyāma ‘position of salvation’ starting from the conviction producing a dharma concerning suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti) up to the conviction producing a subsequent dharma concerning the path (mārge ‘nvayadharmajñānakṣānti).111 As it is said in a sūtra: “In the three evil destinies (durgati) three things cannot be found: 1) the position of salvation (samyaktvaniyāma), 2) the fruits of the saints (āryaphala), 3) the destruction of the impurities (āśravakṣaya), just as they cannot be found in immoral beings (duḥśīla), blinded by wrong views (mithyāḍṛṣṭika) or guilty of the five wrongdoings of immediate retribution (ānantaryakārīn).”112 Then, [in the bodhisattva system], starting from which dharmas is it a question of the bodhisattvaniyāma?

109 The śrāvakas preoccupied with their personal salvation are rationalists by the stopping of pratītyasamutpāda; the bodhisattvas who aim above all for the benefit of others are the romantics.

110 The sources distinguish three categories of beings: 1) samyaktvaniyatārāsi, those who have netered into the path and will quickly reach nirvāṇa; 2) mithyāṭvaniyatārāsi, those who, having committed grave wrongdoings, will certainly go to the evil <1795> destinies and, havoing come out of them, will pass over I into the third rāsi; 3) aniyatarāsi, those who do not belong to either the first or the second rāsi and can enter into either of them. Cf. Dīgha, III, p. 217; Tseng-yi a-han, T 125, k.13, p. 614b23-24; k. 27, p. 698c; kathavatthu, p. 611; nettipakaraṇa, p. 96; Lalitavistara, p. 400, l. 2-3; Mahāvastu, III, p. 318, l. 5; Mahāvyut., no. 1737-39.

111 The sixteen moments of mind of the darśanamārga: see above, p. 130F, n. 1; 214F; 1067F, n. 1; 1411F, n. 2; 1478-80F. In the first moment, the ascetic becomes an ārya, destined for sainthood (samyaktvaniyata) and candidate for the first fruit of the Path (prathamapannaka). In the sixteenth moment, which coincides with the first moment of the bhāvanāmārga, the ascetic takes possession of the first fruit, the fruit of srotāpānna.

112 Unidentified sūtra, the essential ideas of which are expressed in the Samyutta, III, p. 225 foll. The Buddha declares that all the elements of existence, eye, colors, visual consciousness, etc., are transitory (anicca), changing (viparināmin) and destined to be altered (aṅñathābhāvīn). After which, he continues:

Yo bhikkhave ime evaṃ saddahati adhimuccati, avaṃ vicciati, saddhāmusārī, okkanto sammattaniyānam, sappurisabhūmin okkanto, vītivatto putthujanabhūmin, abhabbo taṃ kammaṃ kātuṃ yaṃ kammaṃ katvā nirayaṃ vā tiracchānayonī vā pettivāyaṃ vā uppajjeya, abhabbo ca tāva kālam kātuṃ yāva na sotāpattipahām sacchikaroti. – “He who believes in these teachings and adheres to them, O monks, is said to pursue [the truth] by

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Answer. – In order to enter into the bodhisattvaniyāma, it is necessary to cultivate completely four dharmas: 1) the first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda); 2) the practice of meditation (caryābhāvanā); 3) great compassion (mahākaruṇā); 4) skillful means (upāya).

Likewise, in the śrāvakā system, first the four roots of good (kuśalamūla) must be completely fulfilled, viz., i) heats (ṛṣa), ii) summits (mūrdhan), iii) patiences (kṣanti), iv) supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma), in order then to accede to duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣalī [constituting] the samyaktvaniyāma.

faith. He has acceded to the determination of salvation; he has acceded to the level of a virtuous man; he has escaped from the level of the ordinary man. It is impossible for him to do an action by virtue of which he would take rebirth in hell, in an animal destiny or in the world of the pretas; it is impossible for him to die without having realized the fruit of entering into the stream."

113 These four dharmas preliminary to the bodhisattvaniyāma are to be cultivated in the level of the practice of adhesion (adhimukticaryābhūmi) and in the first seven levels, the niyāma taking place only in the eighth. The four great Prajñās, which are also the earliest, distinguish four degrees and ten levels in the bodhisattva’s career:

1) The prathamayānasamprasthitā having just embarked in the Greater Vehicle by means of the first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda). He is also called prathamacittotpādika and is in the preparatory stage, the adhimukticaryābhūmi.

2) The caryāpratipanna, endowed with practices, who for a long time has cultivated the six perfections and, in a mind of great loving-kindness, skill in skillful means (upāyakauśalya). He is in grounds one to seven.

3) The avivarartaniya or irreversible bodhisattva established ‘in the position of bodhisattva’ (bodhisattvaniyāma). He is in the eighth and ninth grounds.

4) The ekajātipratibaddha, separated from Buddhahood by one lifetime only. He is on the tenth ground.

These four degrees in the bodhisattva career, prathamayānasamprasthita, etc., are mentioned in the Prajñāpāramitās:


d. Śatasākā, T 220 (vol. VI), k. 341, p. 752c28-753a2.

The four degrees are also cited and commented on in the Wen chou che li wen p’ou t’i king, T 464, p. 482b12-15; the Gayaśīrṣa, T 465, p. 485a5-7; T 466, p. 487c26-28; T 467, p. 490c1-4; and the Mahāsaṃnipātra, T 397, k. 10, p. 67a4-6.

The four caryā of the Mahāvastu, I, p. 46, l. 6-7.

For the correspondence between the four degrees and the six grounds, see the Āloka, p. 831,, l. 22-24:

Adhimukticaryābhūman prathamayānasamprasthitāḥ, Pramuditaśaptabhimūṣya caryāpratipannāḥ.

Acalādbhūmidvita ye vinivartaniyā. Daśamyāṃ bhūman ejaśajipratibaddhāḥ.

114 These are the four roots of good favorable to the penetration of the four noble Truths (nirvedhahāgīya kuśalamūla); cf. p. 395F, n. 1; 1067F, 1077F, 1411F, 1462F, 1485F.
Question. – But carrying out the practices (caryābhāvanā) includes (samgrhnāti) the four dharmas [you have just mentioned]. Why do you distinguish four of them?

Answer. - <1797>

1. Production of the mind of bodhi

The first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda) indeed involves carrying out a practice (caryābhāvanā), but as it is not practiced for a long time, I do not call it ‘carrying out a practice’. Thus, when a householder does not stay at home all day, he is not said, however, to be away on a journey (caratī).

2. Carrying out practices

Furthermore, while at the moment when he produces the mind of bodhi (cittotpāda), the bodhisattva is only formulating a vow (prāṇidhāna) in his mind, whereas at the time of the practices (caryā), he is really acting: he makes material gifts (āmiśa) to people, he engages in rituals (śīlāi samādadāti), etc. Thus practice of the six perfections (pāramitā) is called ‘carrying out the practices’ (caryābhāvanā).

3. Great compassion

Having carried out the practices, the bodhisattva, by means of the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), knows the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of dharmas, and with a feeling of great compassion (mahākarunā), he has pity for beings who do not know this true nature of dharmas and who become attached the deceiving systems of the world and thereby undergo all sorts of physical suffering (kāyika duḥkha) and mental suffering (caitasika duḥkha). This is called ‘experiencing great compassion’, but not ‘carrying out the practices’.

4. Skillful means

As for skillful means (upāya), here is the following. Completely fulfilling the perfection of wisdom, the bodhisattva knows the emptiness (śūnya) of dharmas, and with great compassion, he pities beings.

Here are two things to be considered: 1) By the power of his perfection of wisdom,115 the bodhisattva feels no attachment (abhiniveśa) for things; 2) although he knows the true nature of dharmas, <1798> the power of his skillful means (upāya) is such that he does not abandon beings. Without abandoning beings, he knows the true emptiness of dharmas. If the two things in him – prajñā and upāya – are balanced, then the bodhisattva can accede to bodhisattvaniyāma.

Similarly, the śrāvaka, in whom the two things – concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) – are balanced, accedes at this moment to the position of salvation (samyaktvaniyāma).

115 The text has: “by the power of means”, which is evidently a lapse.
Although they involve a [certain] ‘practice’ (caryā), these dharmas of the bodhisattva, [viz., production of the mind of bodhi, the carrying out of the practices, great compassion and skillful means] take on other names as well and, [except for the second], are not called ‘carrying out the practices’ (caryābhāvanā). All the practices carried out by the bodhisattva from his first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda) up to his sitting on the seat of enlightenment (bodhimaṇḍanīṣadana) are the carrying out of practice [under different names], but as there are a few slight differences, they are given different names to distinguish them more easily.

IV. SKILLFUL MEANS AND WISDOM

When someone produces the mind of supreme complete enlightenment for the first time, he wants to free all beings from physical and mental sufferings (kāyikacaitasikadukha): old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi), death, (marana), etc. He formulates great vows (mahāprāṇidhāna) and is adorned with two things, qualities (guna) and wisdom (prajñā), as a result of which his wishes will all be fulfilled.

These two things involve a sixfold ‘carrying out of practices’ (caryābhāvanā): these are the six perfections (pāramitā). Generosity (dāna), morality (śīla) and patience (ksānti) make up the guna part; exertion (vīrya), meditation [263a] (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā) make up the prajñā part. The bodhisattva practices these six perfections.

Knowing that the characteristics of these dharmas are very profound (gambhīra), subtle (sūkṣma), difficult to probe (durvigāya) and difficult to understand (duranubodha), he has the following thought:

“Beings are attached (abhiniviṣṭa) to the dharmas of the threefold world. By what means can I lead them to find the natures of these dharmas? For that I must fulfill completely the qualities (guna) and be endowed with pure wisdom (viśuddhaprajñā). <1799>

“The Buddha’s body has thirty-two primary marks (lakṣana) and eighty secondary marks (anuvyañjana); his radiance (prabhā) is perfect and his superknowledges (abhiñā) are immense, By means of his ten powers (bala), four fearlessnesses (vaiśāрадya), eighteen special attributes (ävenikadharma) and four unhindered knowledges (pratisamvid), he considers those who should be saved, preaches the Dharma to them and converts them.

“Thus [the garuḍa], the golden-winged king of the birds, when he finds some nāgas to be destroyed, strikes the sea with his wings and separates the waters; then he seizes them and devours them. 116 In the same way, the Buddha with his buddha-eye (buddhacakṣus) considers beings distributed in the universes of the ten directions and inhabiting the five destinies (gati), and he asks himself who should be saved. First he manifests the bases of his magical power (ṛddhipāda); then he uncovers the trains of thought of their minds (cittavisandita). Having removed the three obstacles (āvarana) by these two things, he preaches the

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116 This mythical bird called garuḍa or suparna has a wing-span of five hundred leagues and the beating of its wings brings on the tempests. It is the sworn enemy of the nāgas.
Dharma and saves beings of the threefold world. A being who thus holds the powers of the Buddha (buddhabala) and immense superknowledges (abhiñña) would merit belief even if he were lying, all the more so when he is speaking the truth. That is what is called skillful means (upāya).

Furthermore, the bodhisattva, knowing the [True] nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) and remembering his previous vows (pūrvapraṇidhāna) wants to save beings. He has the following reflection: In the True nature of dharman, there are no beings to be found (nopalabhante). Then how to save them?

He has the following thought: There are no beings to be found in the True nature of dharman but, nevertheless, they are ignorant of this nature of dharman. Therefore I wish that they should know this True nature.

Finally, this True nature of dharman does not harm beings for it is defined as being without harm and without activity.

That is what is meant by skillful means (upāya). <1800>

The bodhisattva who completely fulfills (paripūrayanti) these four dharman,117 accedes to the bodhisattvaniyāma.

Fifth Section SURPASSING THE LOWER VEHICLES AND ACCEDING TO THE IRREVERSIBLE GROUND

This section does not add anything to the preceding section, but insists on the close relationship between the bodhisattvaniyāma and the quality of irreversible (avaivartika) bodhisattva: the latter is not really acquired until the ninth bhūmi.

Śūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21, l. 12; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 67, l. 13-16). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to surpass the stages of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha and who wishes to take his place on the irreversible ground should exert himself in the perfection of wisdom (Śrāvakapratyekabuddhabhūmim atikramitukāmena, avaivartikabhūmau sthātukāmena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣatavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. SURPASSING THE STAGE OF ŚRĀVAKA AND PRATYEKABUDDHA

117 The four preparatory practices, prathamacittopāda, etc., that are the subject of the present section.
Question. – At the moment when the bodhisattva acceded to dharmaniyāma, he had already surpassed the stage of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and was settled in the irreversible ground. Why return to that here?

Answer. – Although these three events are simultaneous and linked one to the other, they must be praised in order (kramaṇa). Similarly, when in a single moment of mind, the ascetic simultaneously acquires the five pure faculties (anāsravendriya),

it is necessary to distinguish them and describe their characteristics each in turn.

When the bodhisattva accedes to dharmaniyāma, he destroys such and such fetters (samyojana), acquires such and such qualities (guna), surpasses such and such stages and becomes established on such and such a ground, but only the Buddha knows it. It is in order to guide (upanayana) the bodhisattvas that the Buddha celebrates all of that in many ways. Similarly, at the beginning of the present sūtra it was said: “The Buddha was on the Gṛḍhakūṭaparvata with an assembly of five thousand bhikṣus: all were ārhat, had destroyed their impurities (kṣīṇāsvra), were accomplished and perfect (krutakṛtya), etc. It was in order to guide other men and purify their minds that the Buddha multiplied these praises and there was no fault (doṣa) there. It is the same here: if the bodhisattva has acceded to dharmaniyāma, by that very fact he has “surpassed the stage of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha” and has “become established on the irreversible ground”. Furthermore, it is because he has acceded to the dharmaniyāma that the bodhisattva has surpassed the stage of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha and is established on the irreversible ground.

Question. – But in acceding to the dharmaniyāma, the bodhisattva also bypasses old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (marāṇa), he cuts through the fetters (samyojana) and suppresses the three evil destinies (durgati) as has been said above (p. 1790F). Why then does [the Prajñāparamitāsūtra] limit itself to saying that “he surpasses the stage of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha”? [By acceding to the dharmaniyāma] the bodhisattva is also established in many quakities (guna). Why does [the sūtra] say only that he ‘is established on the irreversible ground’?

Answer. – The bodhisattva abandons bad things and acquires the qualities. Later, the sūtra will describe successively the qualities in which he is established. When the Dharma is explained, it is necessary to proceed in an orderly fashion (krama); it is impossible to speak of everything at the same time.

Furthermore, when the bodhisattva produces the mind of bodhi (cittotpāda) for the first time, he is afraid above all of not bypassing the stage of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha. For him, to fall directly into hell (niraya) would be less formidable, for [such a fall] would not definitively cut the path of the Mahāyāna.

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118 Śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti and prajñā: see p. 1125-1127F.
119 Cf. p. 198F.
120 Since Burnouf, kṛtakṛtya has been translated as ‘having accomplished what they had to do’, but see above, p. 213-215F.
the other hand, [to remain at the stage] of śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha consitutes a definitive loss for the Mahāyāna.\footnote{The Vimalakīrtinirdēśa, transl. p. 292, puts the following thought into the mouth of the arhat Mahākāśyapa: “It would be better to become guilty of the five sins of immediate retribution (ānantarya) than to be completely liberated as arhat as we are. Why? Because those who are guilty of the five ānantaryas still have the power to destroy these ānantaryas, to produce the mind of supreme complete enlightenment and to gradually realize all the dharmas of the Buddha. Whereas we, the arhats, who have destroyed our impurities, we will never be capable of that.”}<\footnote{1802}

[The caution of the cotton-tree.] – Thus there once was a cotton-tree (śalmai\̣) in a desert land. Its fruits and its branches were great and broad and birds in large numbers would gather there to pass the night. There came a day when one single pigeon (kapota) sat on a branch; the branch and the fruits broke off instantaneously.

The deity of the marsh (kacchadevatā) asked the deity of the tree (vrkṣadevatā): When there are large numbers of birds, eagles (garutma\̣) or vultures (grdhra), you were able to sustain them; why could you not resist a little bird?

The deity of the tree answered: This bird was lately sitting on an enemy of mine, the banyan tree (nyagrodha) and, having eaten a seed of that tree, it came to perch on me. It will certainly let fall droppings and, from the seed that has fallen to the ground, there will grow another evil tree that will certainly do me a great wrong. Thus, with anger and fearful of this pigeon, I preferred to sacrifice one branch: that was better.

- The bodhisattva-mahāsattva does the same. He feels less afraid of the heretics (tīrthika), Māra’s troops, the fetters (samyojana) and evil actions (pāpakarman) than of the arhats and pratyekabuddhas. Why? For the bodhisattva, the arhats and pratyekabuddhas are like the pigeon of the story for they destroy the spirit of the Mahāyāna and definitively ruin the work of the Buddha (buddhakārya). This is why [the Prajñāparamitāsūtra] mentions, as the most important here, only the fact of “bypassing the stage of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha and becoming established on the irreversible ground”. <\footnote{1803}>

II. BECOMING ESTABLISHED ON THE IRREVERSIBLE GROUND

Question. – What is the irreversible ground (avaivartikabhūmi)?

Answer. – 1. The bodhisattva considers unborn (anutapanna), non-destroyed (aniruddha) neither unborn nor non-destroyed (naivānutpanna\̣nāniruddha), neither shared (sādīhāra\̣ṇa) nor unshared (asādīhāra\̣ṇa) dharmas. Considering things thus, he is freed from the threefold world. Utilizing neither the empty (śūnyā) nor the non-empty (aśūnyā), he believes whole-heartedly in the wisdom of the True nature (bhūtalaksāna) held by the Buddhas of the ten directions. Nothing can shake it or destroy it. It is called ‘conviction that dharmas do not arise’ (anutpattikadharmaksānti), and this conviction constitutes the irreversible ground.
2. Furthermore, access to the bodhisattvaniyāma is the irreversible ground and the surpassing of the stage of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha is also called irreversible ground.

3. Furthermore, the bodhisattva established on the irreversible ground obtains indestructible (asaṃhārya) and immutable (acyuta) superknowledges (abhiñā), from lifetime to lifetime as fruit of retribution (vipālaphala). Endowed with these two things and while grasping the True nature (būtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas, he uses his great compassion (mahākaruṇā) and does not abandon beings.

4. Furthermore, the bodhisattva possess two attributes: i) pure wisdom (viśuddhaprajñā); ii) the wisdom of skillful means (upāyajñā). He possesses two other attributes: iii) high resolve (adhyāśaya) directed toward nirvāṇa; iv) activity (kriyā) that does not neglect the world (loka).

He is like a great nāga whose tail is deep in the great sea but whose head is in the sky; he makes the lightning and the thunder but also makes the [beneficial] great rain to fall.

5. Finally, the irreversible bodhisattva who has acquired the wisdom of the True nature (būtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas retains it from one existence to the next without ever abandoning it, even temporarily. About the profound sūtras of the Buddha he never has any doubt or difficulty. Why? He says: “I myself do not have omniscience (sarvajñatā); that is why I do not know by what skillful means and for what reason the sūtras are expressed in this way.”

By virtue of his deep aspiration (abhyāśaya), the irreversible (avaivartika) bodhisattva never does any harm (pāpa). In his deep aspiration, he accumulates good things (kuśala); superficially, he may do bad (akuśala) things.

III. THE TWO KINDS OF IRREVERSIBLE BODHISATTVAS

Question. – In his avaivartika quality, the bodhisattva has the conviction that dharmas do not rise (anutpattikadharmakṣānti). Why does he still do bad things by means of a superficial mind?

Answer. – There are two kinds of avaivartika: 1) the one who has obtained anutpattiladharmakṣānti; 2) the one who has not obtained anutpattikadharmakṣānti [but who has received the prediction].

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122 The huge dimensions of the nāgas is well known. It is such that ‘the tail is still in Takṣašilā while the head is already in Benares’: cf. Abiniṣkramaṇaśītra, T 190, k. 37, p. 828b17.

123 By ‘profound sūtras’, the canonical sources already mean the sūtras associated with the teaching of emptiness. Cf. Anguttara, I, p. 72; III, p. 107; Saṃyutta, II, p. 267: Suttantā Tathāgataabhāsītā gambhirā gambhirāthī lokuttarā suññatāpaṭisamyuttā: ‘Sūtras preached by the Tathāgata, profound, of profound meaning, supramundane, associated with emptiness’. They are also called sūtras of precise meaning (nītārtha): cf. Akṣayamatinirdeśa in Madh. vr̥ti, p. 43, l. 4-9.

124 Interpreting the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras faithfully, the Traité distinguishes the two kinds of avaivartikas, i.e., with regression, or without regression in their progress toward supreme bodhi.
knows that <1805> because of his past (ātīta) and future (anāgata) karmic causes and conditions, this bodhisattva will necessarily become a buddha for the benefit and happiness of other beings (parasattvānāṁ hitāya sukhyāya) and gives him the prediction (vyākaraṇa). With his body of birth-death (cyutypapadamāṁsakāya or saṁsāramāṁsakāya), this bodhisattva has not yet cut the fetters (samyojana),

1. There is an avaiyavartika in deed and rightfully, showing all the characteristics of the avaiyavartika described by the Prajñāpāramitā (see above, p. 243-245F) and having notably the conviction that dharmas do not arise. This conviction, definitively realized in the eighth bhūmi, the Acalā, determines or predestines the bodhisattva to supreme bodi: he cannot fall back, and this is called the niyāma.

2. There is an avaiyavartika in deed only. He does not show the characteristics of an avaiyavartika and would be able, in principle, to fall back. In fact, he will go directly to supreme enlightenment of the Buddhhas, but only the Buddha knows this. This bodhisattva is avaiyavartika in the prescience of the Buddha and it happens that the Buddha gives him the prediction of it (vyākaraṇa). This is what is said in the Pañcalavāṁsati, p. 66, l. 15-16 and the Šatasāhasrikā, p. 272, l. 7-9: Sānti bodhisattvā mahāsattvā ye prathamacittotpādanaiva bodhisattvaniyānam avartanty avinivartaniyābhūnau vāvatiṣṭhante. – “There are bodhisattvas who, just through the first production of the mind of bodhi, enter into the determination of bodhisattva or become established in the irreversible ground.”

Here another passage of the Traité must be cited (k. 74, p. 579c21-580a11) already mentioned and translated by L. de La Vallée Poussin in Siddhi, p. 738-739:

“What must the bodhisattva obtain to receive the name of avaiyavartika?

“According to the Abhidharmavibhāṣā, when the bodhisattva, having crossed through three incalculable periods (asamkhyaeyakalpa), plants the causes that will produce the thirty-two marks, starting from this moment, he is called avaiyavartika (see above, p. 246-249F; Kośa, IV, p. 222-223).

“According to the Vinaya-Avadāna, since he saw the buddha Dipaṃkara, threw the five flowers, spread out his hair on the ground, received from the Buddha the ‘prediction of avaiyavartika’, rose up into the air and praised the Buddha: starting from that moment, he is called avaiyavartika.

“But in the Prajñāpāramitā, when the bodhisattva possesses the practice of the six pāramitās, obtains jñāna and upāya, is no longer attached to the pāramitās which are absolutely empty, sees that all dharmas are without birth-cessation-increase-decrease, defilement, purity, coming-going-unity-multiplicity-permanence-impermanence-existence-non-existence, without any dualities whatsoever; then, as a result of this jñāna, he sees and crushes any note of impermanence after having crushed any note of permanence; abandons the view of nonarising-cessation, the view of impermanence; is not attached to nonarising-cessation… he is called ‘bodhisattva who has obtained the anuttpattikadharmaksānti’, he enters into the determination of bodhisattva, he is called avaiyavartika.

“Undoubtedly, since the first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), the bodhisattva is called avaiyavartika; but he is not endowed with the avaiyavartika characteristics.”

125 The Śūrasamāsasamādhī (transl. p. 20-213) distinguishes four kinds of predictions (vyākaraṇa): (i) prediction concerning the one who has not yet produced the bodhi mind (anutpāditabodhicittavyākaraṇa), (ii) prediction conferred on the one who has just produced bodhi mind (utiṣṭhitabodhicittavyākaraṇa), (iii) prediction made secretly (rahoṣyākaraṇa), (iv) prediction made in the presence of the one who has obtained the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anuttpattikadharmaksāntilabhasmamukhayākaraṇa). – Here it is a matter of a bodhisattva who has not yet obtained the ksānti but whose progress toward bodhi will be irreversible. The Buddha knows it and predicts it.
but of all ordinary people (*prthagjana*), he is by far the foremost, and he too is described as *avaivartika*. When he obtains *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* and cuts all the fetters (*saṃyojana*), he will be purified (*parisuddha*). His last fleshly body (*paścima māṃsakāya*) having disappeared, he will obtain a body born of the fundamental element (<1806> (*dharmadhātujākāya*); rid of the fetters, he will no longer need a teacher. He will be like a ship (*nau*) on the great Ganges river that does not need a pilot and by itself ends up in the great ocean.

Furthermore, since his first production of the bodhi mind (*prathamacitotpāda*), he has made the great resolution of cutting all the conflicting emotiona (*kleśa*) and knowing the True nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas: then he will become [truly] *avaivartika*.

By practicing the perfection of generosity (*dānapāramitā*) alone, the bodhisattva perfects (*paripūrayati*) the six perfections; the same [by practicing the other perfections] up to and including the perfection of wisdom.126 But by practicing the six virtues, the bodhisattva does not yet become *avaivartika*: it is at the moment when he produces a feeling of great compassion (*mahākaruṇācitta*) toward beings that he becomes *avaivartika*.

Endowed with this feeling of compassion, he has the following thought: “Dharmas all being empty (*śūnya*), there are no beings (*sattva*); who then is there to be saved?” At that moment, his feeling of compassion weakens. But it happens that, in the face of the great misery of beings, the vision he has of the emptiness of dharmas (*dharmaśūnyatāsamupāsyanā*) weakens in turn. If he has the power of skillful means (*upāyabala*), the two things [viz., the feeling of compassion and the seeing of emptiness] are in balance, without struggling against each other. The feeling of great compassion does not hinder [the seeing] of the True nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas and [the seeing] of the True nature of dharmas does not prevent the arising of great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*).127 That is skillful means (*upāya*), Then the bodhisattva ‘accedes to the dharmaniyāma of the bodhisattva and is established on the irreversible ground’. <1807>

See what is said in the *Wang-cheng p‘in* (Upapadaparivarta)128, and in regard to the characteristics of the *avaivartika*, see later the two *A-pi-po-tehe p‘in* (Avaivartikaparivarta).129

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126 The bodhisattva cultivates the six pāramitās during the first six bhumi: generosity (*dāna*) in the first, morality (*śīla*) in the second, patience (*ksānti*) in the third, exertion (*vīrya*) in the fourth, meditation (*dhyāna*) in the fifth and wisdom (*prajñā*) in the sixth. Nevertheless, the fact of specially cultivating one pāramitā brings about the perfecting of the other five since the pāramitās are inseparable. Generosity, cultivated preferentially in the first ground, brings about morality, patience, exertion, meditation and wisdom: see above, p. 750-769F. For the mutual inclusion of the six pāramitās, cf. Sūtrañākāra, p. 115-116; Samgraha, p. 195; Siddhi, p. 630.

127 The *Vimalakīrtiniśāda* (transl., p. 233-234) makes the entire edifice of the bodhisattva rest on two pillars: the wisdom assumed by skillful means (*upāyapāttaprajñā*) and the skillful means assumed by wisdom (*prajñapāttapāya*).

128 Chapter IV of the Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 2, p. 225a-229c.

129 Chapter LV of the Pañcaviṃśati, also called *Pou-t’ouei p‘in*, T 223, k. 16, p. 239a-341b.
CHAPTER XLIII (p. 1809F) THE PURSUIT OF THE SIX SUPERKNOWLEDGES

First Section BECOMING ESTABLISHED IN THE SIX SUPERKNOWLEDGES

NOTE ON THE ABHIJÑĀS

The superknowledges (Sanskrit, abhiñā; Pāli, abhiñṇā; Chinese, t'ong or chen-t'ong; Tibetan, mñon par śes pa) are six in number and are usually presented in the following order:

1. Rddhividhijñāna (Pāli, iddhividha) or ṭrdhiviṣayajñāna, the knowledge of magical processes.
2. Divyasrotra (dibbasota), divine hearing.
3. Cetahparīyāvajñāna, also called paracittajñāna, the knowledge of another’s mind.
4. Pūrvanivāsmṛtijñāna, (pubbe nivāsānussatiñāṇa), the memory of [one’s] former abodes (or existences).
5. Cyutupāpādajñāna (sattānaṃ cutiūpāpātoñāṇa), the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings, also called divyaacakṣus (dibbacakkhu), the divine eye.
6. Āsravakṣayajñāna (āsavakkhayañāṇa), the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities.

1. Canonical definition of the abhiñās


Sanskrit recension. – Catusparisatsuṭra, p. 432-434; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 83-87; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 301-308; Daśabhūmika, p. 34-36; Kośavyākhya, p. 654. Among these various recensions there are numerous variations in detail, and here two of them will be reproduced.

Dīgha, I, p. 78-84:
I. so anekavihitaṃ iddhividham paṭcannubhoti.
   1) eko pi hutvā bahudhā hoti ...
   2) ... parimajjati yāva brahmaḷokā pi kāyena vasaṃ vatteti.
VI. … brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karanīyaṃ nāparaṃ ithattāyā ti pajānati /

Daśabhūmika, p. 34-36:

I. so 'nekavidhāṃ rddhividhiṃ (var. rddhiviṣayaṃ) pratyānubhavati /
   1. prthivīṃ api kampayati. ...
   8.…. brahma-lokam api kāyena vaśaṃ vartayati.

VI. (Kośavyākhya, p. 654) …kṛtaṃ karanīyaṃ nāparaṃ asmād bhavam iti praṇānāti /

Translation of the Sanskrit:

I. – He practices various magical processes: 1. he shakes the earth; 2. being one, he becomes many; 3. being many, he becomes one; 4. he manifests appearances and disappearances; 5. he passes through walls, ramparts and mountains unimpededly as though it were through space; 6. he moves through space with crossed legs like a bird with wings; 7. he dives into the earth and emerges from it as though it were water; 8. he walks on the water without sinking as though it were on the earth; 9. he smokes and flames like a great mass of fire; 10. he emits currents of water from his body, like a great cloud; 11. he strokes the sun and the moon, so prodigious and so powerful, touches them with his hand and exerts his will physically as far as the world of Brahmā.

II. By the faculty of the pure and superhuman divine hearing, he hears the two kinds of sounds, divine and human, subtle and coarse, distant or near, including those of horseflies, mosquitoes, insects and flies.

III. With his mind, he recognizes precisely the minds of other beings, of other people; he recognizes precisely a loving mind as a loving mind, a mind free of love as a mind free of love, a hateful mind as a hateful mind, a mind without hate as a mind without hate, a disturbed mind as a disturbed mind, a mind free of disturbance as a mind free of disturbance, an impassioned mind as an impassioned mind, a mind without passion as a mind without passion, a small mind as a small mind, a vast mind as a vast mind, an elevated mind as an elevated mind, an immense mind as an immense mind, a condensed mind as a condensed mind, a concentrated mind as a concentrated mind, an uncontrolled mind as an uncontrolled mind, a liberated mind as a liberated mind, a non-liberated mind as a non-liberated mind, a stained mind as a stained mind, a stainless mind as a stainless mind, a coarse mind as a coarse mind, a mind without coarseness as a mind without coarseness. This is how, by means of his mind, he recognizes precisely the mind of other beings, of other people.

IV. He remembers his many earlier abodes: one lifetime, two, three, four five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty lifetimes, several hundred lifetimes, several hundreds of thousand lifetimes, a period of disappearance (of the world), a period of creation, several periods of disappearance, a hundred periods, a thousand periods, a hundred thousand periods, a million periods, a hundred million periods, a thousand million periods, a hundred thousand million periods, up to many hundreds of thousands of millions of kotiniyuta of periods. He thinks: “At that time, I had such and such a name, such and such a clan, such and such a family,
such and such food, such and such a lifespan; I experienced such and such happiness and such and such suffering. When I left this place, I was reborn over there and from that place I was reborn here.” This is how he remembers his many earlier bodes with their aspects, their location and their details.

V. With his divine eye, purified, superhuman, he sees beings dying and being reborn and recognizes them according to reality, handsome or ugly, of good or bad destiny, excellent or vile, according to the consequences of their actions. He thinks: “These beings full of bodily misdeeds, full of vocal misdeeds, full of mental misdeeds, slandering the saints, having wrong views, acting badly as a result of their wrong views, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death, are born in a miserable state, in a bad destiny, in an abyss, in the hells. On the other hand, these beings endowed with good bodily actions, endowed with good vocal actions, endowed with good mental actions, not slandering the saints, having right views, acting well as a result of their right views, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death, are born in the good destinies, in the heavens, in the god realms. Thus with his divine eye, pure, superhuman, he sees, with their aspects, their location and their details, beings dying or being born, and he recognizes them in conformity with reality.

VI. He recognizes properly the noble truths: this is suffering, this is the origin of suffering, this is the destruction of suffering, this is the way leading to the destruction of suffering. While he knows this and sees this, his mind is liberated from the impurities [of the realm] of desire (kāmadhātu) is freed from the impurities of the two higher realms (bhavāsrava) and the impurities of ignorance (avidyāsrava). When he is liberated, the knowledge and the vision of being liberated arise in him. He recognizes: “Birth is exhausted for me; there is no further existence for me.”

- Whereas the Pāli Nikāyas remain faithful to the order followed in the wording of the abhijñās, the Sanskrit Āgamas depart from it frequently: as we will see later, they may place divyacakṣus or divyaśrota at the head of the list.

The first five abhijñās which occur among worldly people (prthagjana) as well as among the saints (arhat) are within the range of human powers and consequently are of mundane order (laukika). In contrast to the āsravaksayajñāna strictly reserved for the saints, they form a separate group: that of the five abhijñās often mentioned in the texts: cf. Saṃyutta, II, p. 121-122; mahāvastu, I, p. 284, l. 3; II, p. 33, l. 11; 96, l. 1; Divyāvadāna, p. 321, l. 3; Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 134, l. 11; 141, l. 9; 254, l. 14; Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 243, l. 13.

Abhijñā is rendered in French sometimes as ‘pouvoir naturel’ (supernatural power), sometimes as ‘supersavoir’ (superknowledge): the second translation seems preferable for abhijñā; as its name indicates, it is indeed an awareness of superior order which does not necessarily means an intuitive awareness. The earliest sources already insist on the fact that they are the fruit of samādhi: they appear only “in a concentrated mind, very pure, very clean, without fault, free of stains, supple, ready to act, stable, having reached impassivity.” (Dīgha, I, p. 77 seq.).
2. The Abhijñās in the Abhidharma

Pāli scholasticism (Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 111-118; Visuddhimagga, ed. H. C. Warren, p. 328-368) reproduces fully the canonical definition of the abhijñās cited at the beginning of the present note, comments on it word by word and illustrates it with numerous examples.

Scholars have taken into account that the canonical definition of rddyaabhijñā refers above all to miraculous movement and does not embrace the entire group of magical processes. They have, therefore, completed the list by distinguishing ten kinds of iddhi (Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 207-214; Visuddhimagga, p. 318-323; Atthasālini, p. 91; see also S. Z. Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 61):

1. Adhiṭṭhānā iddhi, magic by virtue of an act of will, to which the canonical formula exclusively refers: “Being one, he becomes many”, etc.
2. Vikubbanā iddhi, magic of bodily transformation.
3. Manomayā iddhi, creation of a physical body, the double of oneself.
4. Naṇavipphāra iddhi, magic resulting from an intervention of knowledge.
5. Samādhivipphāra iddhi, magic resulting from an intervention of the mind in concentration.
6. Ariyā iddhi, noble magic, permitting the seeing of pleasant things as unpleasant and vice versa. This was already discussed by the canonical sūtras (Dīgha, III, p. 112-113, etc.).
7. Kammavipkajā iddhi, magic resulting from the retribution of actions.
8. Puñnavato iddhi, magic belonging to the deserving person.
9. Vijjāmayā iddhi, magic of the scientific order, resulting from progress in the sciences.
10. Tattha tattha sammapayogapaccayā ijjhanatthaṇena iddhi, magic the success of which is assured by a correct undertaking in such and such a realm. Thus the destruction of the impurities has, as cause, the efforts employed in the course of the career of the arhats.

The abhijñās are placed neither among the dharmas of the Path studied in chapters XXXI to XXXVIII nor among the attributes of the Buddhas mentioned in chapters XXXIX to XLII, but they present many traits in common with them. They form a special category which fits into the Buddhist system poorly and whose job seems to have been done already. As the Traité has already commented (p. 1557F), there is only a difference of intensity of knowledge between abhijñā, vidyā and bala. All of this poses some difficult problems over which the Abhidharmas and the śāstras of the Sarvāstivādins have struggled for a long time: cf. Saṃgītiparyayā, T 1536, k.15, p.432b17-c8; Mahāvibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 102, p. 530; k. 141, p. 727b22-728c1: T 1546, K. 53, p. 383b-c; Abhidharmasāra, T 1550 k. 3, p. 824a27-28; Abhidharmāṁtarasa, T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c22-976a17.
Kośa, VII, p. 98-112, comes to the following conclusions:

In their nature (svabhāva), the abhijñās are wisdoms of the path of deliverance (vimuktimārgaprajñā).

Abhijñās 1, 2, 4 and 6 are samvṛtijñāna; abhijñā 3 involves jñānas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 (see above, p. 1472F); abhijñā 6 is similar to bala 10 and like it, involves six or ten jñānas (cf. p. 1508F).

Abhijñās 1 to 5 have as their support (āśraya) the four dhyānas but not the four ārupyasamāpattis. As domain or object (viṣaya), they have their level (bhūmi) or a lower level. Already cultivated in an earlier existence, they are acquired by detachment (vairāgya); if not, by effort (prayoga).

Abhijñās 1, 2, 4 and 6 are samvṛtijñāna; abhijñā 3 involves jñānas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 (see above, p. 1472F); abhijñās 6 is similar to bala 10 and like it, involves six or ten jñānas (cf. p. 1508F).

Abhijñā 3 includes the smṛtyupasthānas 2, 3 and 4 (cf. p. 1121-1122F); abhijñās 1, 2 and 5 are the kāyasmrtyupasthāna; abhijñās 4 and 6 have as nature the four smṛtyupasthānas.

Abhijñās 2 and 5 and indeterminate (avyākta); the others are good (śubha).

Abhijñās 4 to 6 are knowledges (vidyā) because they cause the non-knowledge relating to the past, future and present to cease. Abhijñā 6 belongs to the arhat alone.

Abhijñā 1 corresponds to the magical miracle (ṛddhiprātiḥārya) that converts beings; abhijñā 3 corresponds to the miracle of the statement (ādesanāprātiḥārya) that reads minds; abhijñā 6 corresponds to the miracle of the correct teaching (anuśāsanāprātiḥārya) that confers the fruits of salvation and happiness. We may remember that these pratihāryas are listed in the canonical texts: Dīgha, I, p. 212; III, p. 220, Anguttara, I, p. 170.

3. The Abhijñās in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras

In the present passage, the sūtra envisages the case of a bodhisattva who, already possessing the first five abhijñās, “wishes to be established in the six abhijñās”. But if he obtains the sixth abhijñā, he destroys his impurities (kṣīnasrava) and enters into nirvāṇa. In this case, it is hard to see how he could pursue his ideal of bodhisattva and still dedicate himself to the welfare and happiness of beings.

This leads the Traité to distinguish two kinds of destruction of the impurities (āsravākṣaya):

1. Complete āsravākṣaya involving both the elimination of the afflictive emotions (kleśa) and the elimination of their traces (kleśavāsanā). It belongs to the fully and completely enlightened Buddhas alone, and the bodhisattva attains it only at the end of his career in the tenth bhūmi.

2. Incomplete āsravākṣaya, eliminating the afflictive emotions without eliminating their traces. As we have seen above (p. 1761F), it is characteristic of the śrāvakas who have reached the state of arhat as well as the bodhisattvas of the eighth bhūmi. But the results are quite different according to whether it is a matter of an arhat or a bodhisattva.

The kṣīnasrava arhat, aspiring only to his personal deliverance, puts an end to suffering and escapes from saṃsāra.
The kṣīnāsraṇa bodhisattva, animated by great loving-kindness and great compassion, uses his traces of afflictive emotions to pursue his work of salvation and, without taking rebirth in the threefold world, assumes a body of the dharmadhātu for the service of beings.

Thus the bodhisattva “who wishes to become established in the six abhijñās” aspires above all to this incomplete āsravākṣaya where he retains the traces of emotions in a purely altruistic end.

If the sūtra submits to these subtleties, it is in order to maintain in its system the role of the abhijñās to which the canonical scriptures grant such an important place. Nonetheless, the practice of the abhijñās comes within conventional truth and loses any significance from the point of view of universal emptiness.

Coming back to the subject later, the sūtra (Pañcaviṃśati, p.83-33; Śatasahasrikā, p. 301-306) will comment that by using the six abhijñās, the bodhisattva is under no illusion: he does not grasp them (nopalabhāte), has no thought of either possessing them or knowing their object, because he is based on the emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-existence (anupalabdhitā) of their self-nature; he doe not seek to produce them or to realize them if this is not in the spirit of omniscience.

[264b] Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21, l. 13; Śatasahasrikā, p. 67, l. 16). – The bodhisattva-mahātta who wishes to become established in the six superknowledges should practice the perfection of wisdom (Ṣaḍabhijñatāyāṃ sthātukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. QUALITIES OF THE SIXTH SUPERKNOWLEDGE

In the Tsan-p’ou-sa p’in (Bodhisattvastutiparivarta) [above, p. 328-333F], the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra spoke of the ‘bodhisattva possessing five abhijñās’ (bodhisattvāh pañcābhijñāh). Why does it speak here of the ‘bodhisattva wishing to become established in the six abhijñās’ (bodhisattvāḥ šaḍabhijñatāyāṃ sthātukāmah)?

Answer. – The [first] five Abhijñās are possessed by the bodhisattva, but here the six abhijñās in which the bodhisattva wants to be established are possessed by the Buddha. If the bodhisattva possessed the six abhijñās, he would be a Tathāgata.

Question. – However, in the Wang-cheng p’in (Upapadaparivarta),130 the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra will say: “There are bodhisattvas established in the six abhijñās who go [from buddhafiel]d to buddhafiel” (santi bodhisattvā mahāsattvāḥ saṃñām abhijñānām lābhino ye buddhakṣetrena buddhakṣetram saṃkrāmante).131 Why then do you say that the bodhisattvas possess only five abhijñās?

131 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 63, l. 7-9; Śatasahasrikā, p. 271, l. 4-6.
Answer. – The sixth abhijñā, or knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñāna), is of two kinds: i) simultaneous elimination of the impurities (āsrava) and their traces (vāsanā); ii) elimination of the impurities but not of the traces. The traces not being eliminated, we say that the bodhisattvas ‘possess’ five abhijñās; the traces being eliminated, we say that they are established in the six abhijñās.\footnote{132}

Question. – How can the bodhisattva whose impurities are eliminated (kṣīṇāsrava) be reborn and assume a birth (upapatti)? Any taking of birth (upapattiparigraha) results from the flow of desires (trṣṇāpravāha). Just as rice (dhyāna), even though it is planted in good soil, does not germinate when moisture is lacking, so the saints (āryapudgala), once liberated from the husk of desire (trṣṇātuṣa), although still in possession of defiled actions (sāsravakarman), causes and conditions of birth (upapattiheṭupratyaya), cannot return to existence.

Answer. – As I have said earlier (p. 1801F), the bodhisattva reaches dharmaniyāma and becomes established in the avaivartikabhūmi. When his last fleshly body (paścima māṃsakāya) has disappeared, he obtains a body born of the fundamental element (dharmadhūtajāya). Although he has cut the passions (kleśa), he still retains their residues (vāsanā) and because of them, he takes on a body born of the fundamental element, not a birth in the threefold world (traidhātuka).

Question. – Among the arhats as well the passions are cut while the traces are not. Why are they not reborn?

Answer. – [Contrary to the bodhisattva], the arhats have neither great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) nor great compassion (mahākarunā), and they have not made the earlier vow (pūrvapraṇidhāna) to save all beings. Having realized the culminating point of reality (bhūtaṅkotin śākṣākṛtvā), they abandon saṃsāra [definitively].

Furthermore, I said previously (p. 1817F) that there are two kinds of destructions of the impurities (āsravakṣaya). Here it is not a question of a bodhisattva possessing the abhijñā of the destruction of the impurities but of a bodhisattva ‘wishing to become established in the six abhijñās’ and, to this end, to practice the perfection of wisdom.

On the meaning (artha) of the six abhijñās, see what the Buddha will say in the following chapters.\footnote{133}

Above (p. 328-333F), in the Tsan-p’ou p’in chapter (Bodhisattvavastutiparivarta), I have also explained the meaning of the five abhijñās of the bodhisattva.

II. ORDER OF THE SUPERKNOWLEDGES

\footnote{132} For a bodhisattva to be truly established in the six abhijñās in the example of the Buddha, it is necessary that all his impurities (āsrava) be destroyed, not just the afflictive emotions (kleśa) that make up the āsrava proper, but also the traces (vāsanā) that are the result of them.

\footnote{133} See especially Pañcavimśati, p. 83, l. 7 - 88, l. 16; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 301, l. 11 – 306, l. 9.
Question. – What is the order (krama) of the abhijñās?

Answer. –

1. Order generally accepted by the canonical sūtras

A. Abhijñā of magical power

[a. Gamanaruddhi]. – The bodhisattva detached from the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguna), possessing the trances (dhyāna), endowed with loving-kindness (maitrī) and compassion (karunā), takes the abhijñā in the interest of beings and manifests wondrous (adbhuta) and marvelous (āścarya) things so

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134 Namely, 1) ṛddhidvīdhi, 2) divyairōtra, 3) cetaḥparyāya or paracitta, 4) pūrvanivāsa, 5) cyutapapāda or divyacakṣus, 6) āśravakṣaya. This order is followed scrupulously by the Nikāyas and the Pāli Abhidhammas and a significant portion of the Sanskrit Āgamas: cf. Dīrgha, T 1, k. 9, p. 54b9-11; 58a24-26; Samyukta, T 99, k. 29, p. 209c27-28; k. 41, p. 302a25-26.

135 As has already been noted, the canonical definition of ṛddhidvīdhi of magical power is concerned with a part only of magical operations. Later sources tried to complete it. Pāli scholasticism distinguishes ten magical operations (cf. p. 1815F) whereas the Sarvāstivādain Abhidharma speaks of several kinds of magic:

Vibhāṣ. T 1545, k. 141, p. 725b23-c4: There are three types of ṛddhi: 1) that which moves the body (sariravāhinī), 2) that which comes from a volition (ādhimoksīkī), 3) that which is fast like the mind (manojavā).

The sariravāhinī raises the body up and moves it in the air like a bird flying or a flying ṛṣi painted on the wall.

The adhimoksīkī makes what is far becomes near (dūrasyāsannādīmokṣena). By the power of this volition, one can touch the sun and the moon while staying on this very continent. Or, as well, one can reach the Akaniṣṭha heaven in the time it takes to bend or stretch one’s arm.

The manojavā is the visual consciousness (caksuraviṇāna) reaching the summit of rūpadhātu; or else it is reaching the Akaniṣṭha heaven or also traveling through infinite universes.

How many people realize these three ṛddhis? The śrāvakas realize the first one; the pratyekabuddhas realize two with the exception of manojavā; only the Buddha Bhagavats realize all three.

The Abhidharmāmṛtarasā, T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c24-25 speaks of three ṛddhipāda (taken in the sense here of ṛddhidvīdhi or ṛddhivīṣaya): 1) displacement by flying (upatanaganmana), 2) creation (nirmāna), 3) the abhijñā of the saints (ārya).

This classification is retained by the Traité which, here and in other places, (cf. p. 329-330) also mentions three kinds of ṛddhi: gamana-, nirmāna-, āryaṛddhi.

For the Kośa, VII, p. 113-114, and the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 400, ṛddhi is displacement (gati) and creation (nirmāna). Displacement itself is of three kinds: sarīravāhinī, adhimoksīkī and manojavā. Creation is of two types: of the realm of kāma and of the realm of rūpa.

For the abhijñās in the Vījnānavāda system, see especially Bodh. bhūmi, p. 58-71; Sūtrakāra, p. 185; Samgraha, p. 294-295; Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. Pradhan, p. 97.
that the minds of beings may be purified. Why? If he did not perform miraculous things, he would not be able to lead many beings to find salvation.

Having thought thus, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva fixes his mind on [the element] of space (ākāśadātu) inherent in his own body and eliminates the idea of coarse-heavy (audārikarūpa) matter. Constantly noting [within himself] the nature of emptiness-lightness (laghutanimitta), he produces great minds of vigorousness (chanda), energy (vīrya), wisdom (prajñā) and examination (mīmāṃsa) which have the power to raise the body. Before any examination, he knows himself that the power of his mind is so great that it can raise up his body as one does when walking. Destroying any idea of the heaviness of matter and always cultivating the notion of lightness, he then can fly.

[b. Nirmānāyddhi]. - Secondly, the bodhisattva can also transform things. He makes the earth (prthivi) become water (ap) and water become earth, wind (vāyu) become fire (tejas) and fire become wind: he is able to transform all the great elements (mahābhūta). He makes gold (suvarṇa) change into gravel (kathalla) and gravel change into gold: he can transform all these things. To change earth (prthivi) into water (ap), he thinks of water unceasingly and increases it until he no longer thinks of earth. At that moment, the earth becomes water in accordance with his mind, The bodhisattva can transform all these kinds of things.

Question. – If that is so, how are the superknowledges different from the spheres of totality (kṛtsnāyatanas)?

Answer. – The kṛtsnāyatanas are the first path of the abhijñās. Preliminary [264c] to the kṛtsnāyatanas, the vimokṣas and the abhībhvāyatanas make the mind flexible; then it is easy to enter the abhijñās. Moreover, in the kṛtsnāyatanas, there is only a single person to notice that the earth has been changed into water; other people do not see it at all. This is not so in the abhijñās: the ascetic himself really sees water and other people really see the water as well.

Question. – However, the kṛtsnāyatanas are great concentrations (samādhi) also. Why are they unable to give real water, seen by both the ascetic and other people as well?

Answer. – The kṛtsnāyatanas have a very vast field of vision. What happens is that everything takes on just the characteristics of water but does not truly become water. The abhijñās, on the other hand, do not include everything, but what happens is that the earth changes into water and that is real water. The result is that these two concentrations (samādhi) each have their own special power.

Question. – [One of two things]: the things transformed (nirmita) by these two samādhis are either true or false. If they are true, how does stone (śilā) become gold (suvarṇa) and how does earth become water? If they are false, how can the āryas become free of these fallacious practices?

Answer. – All these practices are true and the āryas are not in error for they have eliminated the threefold poison (visatraya). No dharma has a fixed nature (niyatalaksana): each of them can be changed into earth or become water.

136 These are the four rddhipāda, bases of magical power (cf. p. 1124F).

137 The Traité has commented above (p. 1305F) that the kṛtsnāyatanas are subjective seeing.
Thus, [as as result of their solidity (khakkhaṭatva)], cheese (dadhi), glue [bird-lime] (gavyadṛḍha) and leather (lāksā) belong to the type earth (prthivī), but if they are brought near fire, they melt, become water (ap) and take on a moist nature (dravatva). Water, exposed to the cold, solidifies, becomes ice and takes on a solid nature (khakkhaṭatva). Stone when compressed becomes gold, gold when decompressed changes into copper (tāmra) or returns to stone. For beings (sattva), it is the same: the bad (pāpa) can become good (kuśala) and the good can become bad. This is why we know that no dharma has a fixed nature. The transformations (nirmāṇa) brought about by the power of the abhijñās are real and not false. If each thing had a fixed nature originally, it could never be transformed.

[c. Āryarddhi]. – Thirdly, the noble magical power (āryarddhi) is to have domination dependent on good pleasure (yathākāmavaśīta) over the six sense objects (viṣaya):

“1) Faced with a pleasant object, to produce a notion of unpleasantness; 2) faced with an unpleasant object, to produce a notion of pleasantness; 3) eliminating both the notions of pleasantness and unpleasantness, to become established in a mind of indifference: this is the threefold abhijñā [of noble magical power].”

The Buddha alone possesses this abhijñā of domination (vaśītvābhijñā).

B. Abhijñā of divine hearing

The bodhisattva in possession of this abhijñā [of magical power] moves through the buddhafields (buddhakṣetra) but, in these various fields, the languages are not the same, and the bodhisattva, not understanding the small beings located afar, seeks the abhijñā of divine hearing (divyaśrötra). Remembering always the great sounds (śabda) pronounced in many audiences, he grasps their characteristics (nimittāny udgrhnāti) and cultivates the practice of them. As a result of this continuous practice, his ear (śrotra) contacts a subtle matter (ṛūpaprasāda) derived from the four great elements of the world of form (ṛūpadhātucaturmahābhūtabautika) and, possessing this matter, he succeeds in hearing at a distance. Without any difficulty, the bodhisattva penetrates articulated sounds (śabda), divine (divya) and human (mānuṣa), whether coarse (audārika) or subtle (sūkṣma) distant or close (ye vā dūre ye vāntika).

2. Order proposed by the Dhyānasūtra

138 Noble magic, belonging to the saint whose spiritual faculties have been developed (bhāvītiendriya): it is holy (āryā), free of āśrava and upadhi, in contrast to the rddhi of miracles (eko ‘pi bhūtvā bahudhā bhavati, etc.) which, having āśrava and upadhi, is not holy (anārya),.

Here the Traité reproduces the canonical definition: Digha, III, p. 112-113; Majjhima, III, p. 301; Samyutta, V, p. 119, 295, 317-318; Anguttara, III, p. 169-170; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 212:

So sace ākāṅkhati: Paṭikkule appaṭikkūlasaññī vihareyyan ti, appaṭikkūlasaññī tattha viharati … upekhako tattha viharati sato sampajāno.

139 Kośa, VII, p. 123, explains the rūpa derived from the four great elements entering into the formation of the divine eye and the divine ear in the same way.
Question. – See what is said in the Tch’an king (Dhyānasūtra):¹⁴⁰

“1) First the ascetic obtains the divine eye (divyacakṣus). – 2) Having seen beings but not hearing their sounds, he seeks the abhijñā of divine hearing (divyaśrotra). – 3) Possessing the divine sight and divine hearing, he perceives the bodily shape (saṃsthāna) of beings as well as their articulated sounds (ghoṣa), but he does not understand their language (vāc, adhivacana) or their various expressions (nirukti) of sadness (daurmanasya) or joy (muditā), of suffering (duḥkha) or happiness (sukha). This is why he seeks the unhindered knowledge of expression (niruktipratisamvid). But then he only knows the expressions (nirukti) of beings and does not know their minds (citta); this is why he seeks the knowledge of another’s mind (paracittajñāna). – 4) Knowing the minds of other beings, he still does not know where they originally came from. This is why he seeks the abhijñā of remembering former abodes (pūrvanivāsanusmṛti). – 5) Knowing their origin now, he wants to cure their mental illness (cittavyādhi). This is why he seeks the abhijñā of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya). – 6) Thus furnished with the five abhijñās, he cannot yet perform transformations (nirmanakṣaṇa); consequently, the beings saved by him are not numerous, for he is unable to subdue people of great merit contaminated by wrong views (mithyādṛśṭi). This is why he seeks the abhijñā of magical power (ṛddhyabhijñā).

Since this is the order to be followed, why would the bodhisattva first seek the abhijñā of magical power?¹⁴¹

Answer. – Among beings, the coarse (audārika) ones are numerous, the subtle ones (sūkṣma) are rare. This is why the yogin first uses the abhijñā of magical power. Actually, the abhijñā of miraculous power saves many people, coarse as well as subtle; this is why the sūtra mentions it first.

Moreover, the abhijñās differ as to the mode of their acquisition and as to their number (saṃkhya). As for their mode of acquisition, many yogins first seek the divine eye (divyacakṣus) because it is easy to obtain. He uses the sun (śūrya), the moon (candra), stars (nakṣatra), pearls (maṇi) and fire (tejas), by grasping the common characteristic (nimitta) which is the light (āloka). He cultivates it so well, with so much diligence and exertion that day and night no longer make any difference. Above, below, in front, behind, this unique single light rises up before him without obstacle.¹⁴² This is how he acquires the abhijñā of the divine eye first. As for the other abhijñās, he acquires them in the order described above.

¹⁴⁰ This sūtra, which is often referred to by the Traité (cf. P. 1025F, 1422F, 1547F and later, k. 91, p. 705b6) places the divyacakṣus at the head of the abhijñās and ṛddhi at the end. This rather unusual order, is that of the Dharmasamgraha, § 20 and the Mahāvyutpatti, no. 202-208.

¹⁴¹ According to the most commonly accepted order, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras place the ṛddhi at the head of the abhijñās.

¹⁴² This way of acquiring the divine eye, known in Pāli as ālokakasino, is fully described in Visuddhimagga, ed. H. C. Warren, p. 361-362.
3. Order followed by the Buddha on the night of bodhi.\textsuperscript{143}

Finally, the Buddha taught the order of the abhijñ\(ā\)s in accord with the way he had acquired them:

1. During the first watch (\textit{prathame yāme}) the Buddha obtained one ‘superknowledge’ abhijñ\(ā\) and one ‘knowledge’ (F: science) vidyā, viz., the abhijñ\(ā\) of magical power (\textit{ṛddhi}) and the vidyā of former abodes (\textit{pūrvanivāsa}).

2. During the middle watch (\textit{madhyame yāme}), he obtained the abhijñ\(ā\) of divine hearing (\textit{divyaśrotra}) and the vidya of the divine eye (\textit{divyacakṣus}).

3. During the last watch (\textit{paścime yāme}), he obtained the abhijñ\(ā\) of the awareness of others’ minds (\textit{paracittajñāna}) and the vidya of the destruction of the impurities (\textit{āsravakṣaya}).

Here, since the search for the vidyās consists of the harder effort (\textit{vyāpāna}), they are placed second.

Abhijñ\(ā\) and vidyā are acquired in an order comparable to that of the four fruits of the religious life (\textit{catuḥśrāmaṇayaphala}) where the greatest are placed second.\textsuperscript{144}

Question. – If the divine eye (\textit{divyacakṣus}), being easy to obtain (\textit{sulabha}), is placed first, why does the bodhisattva not obtain the divine eye first?

\textsuperscript{143} Here the \textit{Traité} takes its inspiration from relatively late sources in the words of which, during the night at Bodh-Gayā, the Buddha conquered the six abhijñ\(ā\)s.

1. During the first watch of the night, \textit{ṛddhiviṣayajñāna} and \textit{pūrvanivāsanusmrṭijñāna}; during the middle watch, \textit{divyaśrotrajñāna} and \textit{divyacakṣurjñāna}; during the last watch, \textit{cetāḥparyājñāna} and \textit{āsravakṣayajñāna}, either in the order: no. 1, 4, 2, 5, 3, 6. Cf. Catuspariṣatsūtra, p. 432, l. 4 – 434, l. 13; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, K. 4, p. 123c14-124b8 (cf. G. Tucci, \textit{Il trono di diamante}, p. 207-210, where the order is slightly different).

2. During the first watch, \textit{kāyābhijñā} (= \textit{ṛddhyabhijñā} ?) and \textit{pūrvanivāsanasmrtyabhijñā}; during the middle watch, \textit{divyaśrotra} and \textit{divyacakṣus}; during the last watch, \textit{paracittajñāna} and \textit{āsravakṣayajñāna}, either in the order abhijñ\(ā\) no. 1, 4, 2, 5, 3, 6. Cf. Abhiniśkramaṇasūtra, T 190, k. 30, p. 793a-794c3.

But according to the old canonical sources, the Buddha attained only three \textit{jñānas} in the course of the three watches of the night: \textit{pūrvanivāsānusmrṭijñāna}, \textit{cyutupādajñāna} and \textit{āsravāṇāṃ kṣayajñāna}, i.e., abhijñ\(ā\)s 4, 5 and 6, forming altogether the threefold knowledge (\textit{vidyatrāya}). Cf. Vinaya, III, p. 4, l. 17 – 5, l. 38; Majhima, I, p. 22, l. 9-23, l. 28-117; 247, l. 36 – 249, l. 22; Anguttara, IV, p. 177, l. 9 – 179, l. 13; Madhya, T 26, k. 40, p. 680a1-b7; Ekottara, T 125, k. 23, p. 666b24-c20; Dharmagupt. Vin., T 1428, k. 31, p. 781b5-c10; Mahiśasaka Vin. T 1421, k 15, p. 102c19-20 (contrary to usage, the latter has the second vidyā as \textit{paracittajñāna} but claims to follow the T’ai tseu jouei ying pen k’i king, T 185, k. 2, p. 478a5-9 in doing so).

\textsuperscript{144} To enter into the fruits of the religious life, the ascetic must pass through two stages each time: that of candidate for the fruit (\textit{phalapratipanna}) and that of abiding in the fruit (\textit{phalastha}). This is why the texts distinguish eight kinds of \textit{āryapudgala} (cf. Kośa, VI, p. 232; \textit{Traité}, p. 1390F).
Answer. – All dharmas are easy for the bodhisattva to obtain and do not present any difficulty; for other people who are of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya), some are hard to obtain, others are easy.

Moreover, during the first watch of the night (prathame yāme), when king Māra came to fight against the Buddha, the Bodhisattva, by the power of his abhijñā [of magical power], performed various transformations (nirmāṇa) that changed the weapons of Māra’s warriors into necklaces (keyūra, niṣka). Having vanquished Māra’s army, the Bodhisattva began to think about [this] abhijñā and wanted to fulfill it completely (paripūrana). He formulated the thought of it and immediately found the position of attack (avatāralābha). Completely fulfilling the abhijñā, he conquered Māra.145 - Then he wondered why he alone could possess such a great power, and by investigating the vidyā of former abodes (pūrvanivāsa), he understood that it was by accumulating the power of merit (punyabala) lifetime after lifetime.

During the middle watch (madhyame yāme), Māra having retreated, calm and tranquility reigned and there was no more noise (ghoṣa). Out of loving-kindness and pity for all beings, the Bodhisattva thought about the cries uttered by Māra’s troops and gave rise to the abhijñā of divine hearing (divyaśrōtra) and the vidyā of the divine eye (divyacakṣus). Using this divine hearing, he heard the cries of suffering and happiness uttered by beings of the ten directions and the five destinies (pañcagati). Hearing their cries, he wanted to see their shapes (saṃsthāna) as well and, since the veils (antarāyika) prevented his seeing them, he sought the divine eye (divyacakṣus).

During the last watch (paścime yāme), when he saw the shapes of beings, he wanted to understand their minds (citta) and thus, by seeking the knowledge of others’ minds (paracittajñāna), he knew the thoughts of beings. – Everybody wants to avoid suffering and to look for happiness. This is why the Bodhisattva sought the abhijñā of the destruction of impurities (āsravaksaya). And since, of all happiness, that of the destruction of impurities is the highest, the Bodhisattva causes others attain it.

Question. – The bodhisattva who has acquired the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmakṣānti) has, from one lifetime to the next, always obtained the abhijñās as fruit of retribution (vipākaphala). At the time [of his enlightenment] why does he have doubts about himself and does not know the minds of beings when he sees them?

Answer. – There are two kinds of bodhisattvas: i) the bodhisattva with body born of the fundamental element (dharmanadhūjakāya); ii) the bodhisattva who, in order to save beings, assumes human qualities (manusyadhharma) out of skillful means in order to save beings: he is born into the family of king Tsing-fan (Śuddhodana); he makes a trip to the four gates of the city and asks questions about an old man, a sick man and death.146 This bodhisattva is in possession of the six abhijñās when he is seated under the king of the trees. Moreover, the abhijñās previously held by this bodhisattva were not yet perfected (paripūrṇa) and it is now, during the three watches of the night that they are [really] acquired.147 That this Buddha who exercises human qualities still has doubts of himself does not constitute a fault (dosā).

145 See p. 339-346F.
146 See p. 22F, n. 2.
147 See p. 1556-57F
Question. – Concerning the order of the six abhijñās, the divine eye (divyacakṣus) always comes first, whereas the abhijñā of the destruction of the impurities comes last. But is it always so?

Answer. – Most often, the divine eye comes first and the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities comes last. However, sometimes, in consideration of the easiest method, either the divine hearing (divyaśrotra) or the bases of magical power (ṛddhipāda) is placed first.¹⁴⁸

Some say: The divine hearing (divyaśrotra) is easy to obtain in the first dhyāna because this dhyāna involves enquiry (vitarka), analysis (vicāra) and four (?; sic) minds (citta).

The divine eye (divyacakṣus) is easy to obtain in the second dhyāna because the visual consciousness being absent there, the mind is concentrated (samāhita) and free of distraction (aviksipta).

The abhijñā of magical power (ṛddhi) is easy to obtain in the third dhyāna because in this dhyāna “one experiences bliss physically” (sukham kāyena pratisaṃvedayati).

All the abhijñās are easy to obtain in the fourth dhyāna because this dhyāna is the place of all security (sarvayogakṣemasthāna).

On the meaning of the three abhijñās:¹⁴⁹ memory of former abodes (pūrvanivāsa), etc., see [above, p. 1555-1563F] what was said about the ten powers (bala).

Second Section DISTINGUISHING THE MOVEMENTS OF MIND OF ALL BEINGS

Like all the abhijñās, the third abhijñā or knowledge of others’ minds (cetāhpuryāyajñāna = paracittajñāna) concerns the thoughts of beings occupying the same ‘level’ as that in which the abhijñā has been obtained or a lower level. Thus, if he so wishes, an ascetic in the fourth dhyāna can examine the minds of beings in kāmadhātu and the four dhyānas, but not of formless beings. He knows only the minds of present beings but not those of future or past beings.

Furthermore, an ascetic of dull faculties (mṛdvindriya) cannot take hold of the minds of a being of sharp faculties (tiṣṇendriya) abiding on the same level as himself. Finally, a worldly person (prthaghana) cannot know the minds of a śrāvaka, a śrāvaka is ignorant of those of a pratyekabuddha, and a prateyakabuddha knows nothing of those of a Buddha. Thus, effective though it may be, an abhijñā is restricted to one realm and does not attain the totality of beings.

However, in order to fulfill his ideal and assure the benefit and happiness of all creatures, the bodhisattva must know beforehand the minds of all the beings of the threefold world, past, future and present. This is why he aspires to a

¹⁴⁸ The divine eye (divyacakṣus) or cyutupādājñāna is placed at the head of the abhijñās in Saṃyukta, T 99, k. 34, p. 247b23; Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 134, l. 11; Mahāvyut., np, 202; Dharmasamgraha, § 20; Dhyānasūtra, cited above. – The divine hearing (divyaśrūtra) occupies first place in Saṃyukta, T 99, k. 29, p. 209b10; k. 41, p. 302a25; 303c12. – According to the most commonly used (cf. p. 1809F), rddhiṣaya appears first and āsravakṣaya last.

¹⁴⁹ More correctly, the three vidyās.
paracittajñāṇa higher than that of the third abhijñā. He understands, so the Prajñāpāramitā tells us, how to distinguish the “movements of mind of all beings” (sarvasattvacittacaritavispandita).

Although the text does not say it explicitly, this universal awareness, in space as well as in time, is the prerogative of the Buddhas and the great bodhisattvas of the tenth bhūmi and is only an aspect of omniscience par excellence, i.e., sarvākārajñāṇā.

But, someone will say, “the world of beings is infinite” (anantaḥ sattvalokaḥ) and, infinity being without beginning or end, will never be known to the very end, from A to Z. But that is just a specious objection which the Traité, once again, will refute victoriously.

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21, l. 13-14; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 67, l. 17–68, l. 1). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to know the movements of mind of all beings must practice the perfection of wisdom (Sarvasattvacittacaritavispanditāni vijñātukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṁ śiksātavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE KNOWLEDGE OF ANOTHER’S MIND AND THE AWARENESS OF THE MOVEMENTS OF MIND OF ALL BEINGS

Question - In regard to the six abhijñās, we have just spoken about the abhijñā of knowing another’s mind (paracittajñāna). Why does the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra repeat it here?

Answer. – The abhijñā of knowing the mind of another (paracittajña) has a restricted range (viśaya, gocara); it knows only the minds (citta) and mental events (caitasika dharma) of presently existing (pratyutpanna) beings belonging to the desire realm (kāmadhātu) and the form realm (rūpadhātu), but it does not know the minds and mental events of past (aṛīta) and future (anāgata) beings or beings belonging to the formless realm (āṛūpyadhātu).

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150 The third abhijñā of the sūtras, also called cetahparyājñāṇa, in Pāli cetopariyaṇāṇa.

151 The awareness of the mind of others works by deduction: it considers the rūpa of beings, their color-shape, and from that deduces that such and such a being having such and such rūpa must have such and such a mind: Ėdrēśe rūpa āṛīscam cittam bhavati. It reveals only the minds of beings belonging to the two form realms (kāma- and rūpadhātu) and who are presently existing. The minds of formless beings escapes it, for these beings, by definition, have no rūpa. Neither do they do know the minds of past beings who no longer have rūpa, nor of future beings, who do not yet have it. See Kośa, VIII, p. 102.
Among ordinary people (*prthagjana*), the abhijñās that depend on the four higher dhyānas (*mauladhyāna*) have as their realm (*viṣaya*) the level on which the abhijñā has been acquired or a lower level (*adhobhūmi*).

They are fully cognizant of the minds and mental events of the beings situated in the four continents (*caturdvōpaka*).

Among the śrāvakas, the abhijñās that depend on the four higher dhyānas have as their domain the level on which the abhijñā has been acquired or a lower level. They are fully aware of the minds and mental events of beings occupying a thousand universes (*lokadhātu*).

Among the pratyekabuddhas, the abhijñās that depend on the four higher dhyānas have as their domain the level on which the abhijñā has been acquired or a lower level. They are fully cognizant of the minds and mental events of beings occupying a hundred thousand universes (*lokadhātu*).

Ascetics of dull faculties (*mṛdvindriya*) of a higher level cannot cognize the minds and mental events of ascetics of sharp faculties (*tiśnendriya*) of a lower level. Worldly people (*prthagjana*) cannot cognize the minds and mental events of śrāvakas. Śrāvakas cannot cognize the minds and mental events of pratyekabuddhas. Prateykabuddhas cannot cognize the minds and mental events of the Buddhas.

This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says that the ‘bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wants to know the movements of the mind of all beings’ should practice the perfection of wisdom.'

### II. THE MOVEMENTS OF MIND ARE COGNIZED BY AN INFALLIBLE LIBERATION

**Question.** – By what knowledge (*jñāna*) can one cognize the minds and mental events of all beings?

**Answer.** – The Buddhas possess an unhindered liberation (*asaṅgavimokṣa*) and, having entered into this liberation, they cognize the minds and mental events of all beings. The great bodhisattvas, having a ‘semblance’ of unhindered liberation, can also cognize the minds and mental events of all beings.

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152 The first five abhijñā, of which the awareness of the minds of others, are obtained by an ascetic in dhyāna (cf. Kośa, VII, p. 101) and have as their realm (*viṣaya*) the level of the dhyāna on which they have been acquired or a lower level (cf. Kośa, VII, p. 104). Therefore the abhijñā of paracittajñāna does not know the mind of another when the latter is of a level higher than that of the abhijñā.

153 By ‘higher dhyānas’ the Traité means the four basic dhyānas (*mauladhyāna*) that have been discussed above, p. 1027-1032F; 1233-1238F.

154 Wou-ngai-kuai-t’ouo, ‘unhindered liberation or deliverance’ probably renders an original Sanskrit *asaṅgavimokṣa* or *apratihatavimokṣa*. It belongs to the Buddhas and great bodhisattvas who, thanks to it, cognize
Thus the beginning (ādikarmika) bodhisattvas would like to obtain this unhindered liberation of the great bodhisattvas and this unhindered liberation of the Buddhas and, by means of this unhindered liberation, cognize the minds and mental events of all beings. The great bodhisattvas would like to obtain the unhindered liberation of the Buddhas.

This is why [the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra], although it has already (p. 1824F) spoken of the abhijñā of knowing the minds of others (paracittajñā) speaks again of the bodhisattva who, “wanting to cognize the movements of mind of all beings, should practice the perfection of wisdom”.

Question. – When ‘movements of mind’ (cittacaritavispandita) are spoken of here, either the mind has gone (gata) or the mind has not yet gone (agata).

If it has gone, “one is without mind (acetana), like a dead man.”

If the mind has not gone, how would one cognize it? Actually, the Buddha said: “It is in dependence on the mind (manas) [as antecedent organ] and on the dharma as object (ālambana) that the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) arises.” If the mind (manas) has not gone, there is no meeting (saṃgati) between the manas-organ and the dharma-object].


155 A ‘semblance’ of an unhindered liberation, i.e., a liberation similar to that of the Buddhas assuring a complete dominance over objects.

156 By mind, here we should understand the manus (in Chinese, yi) also called mana-indriya, mana-āyatana, manodhātu, organ and support of the mental consciousness (manovijñāna).

157 Conforming to a canonical topic (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 58, p. 789a4-5; Saṃyutta, III, p. 143, l. 4-5; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 21, p. 150b9-10) cited in Sanskrit in Kośabhāṣya, p. 73, 243:

Āyur āśmātha vijñānam yadā kāyaṃ jahaty amī //

apaviddhas tadā sā vijñānam acetanaḥ //

“When life, heat and consciousness leave the body, it lies there abandoned, like a piece of wood, without intellection.

158 Majjhima, I, p. 112; III, p. 281; Saṃyutta, II, p. 72, 73, 74, 75; Mahāniddesa, II, p. 276: Manaṅ ca paticcā dhamma ca uppaṭṭhati manovijñānaṃ.

The punctuation in Taisho should be corrected: the period should be placed after yi che cheng.

159 According to the Sarvāstivādin interpretation: the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) is the result of two conditions (pratyaya): 1) an immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) that serves a point of support (āśraya), namely, the manas, and by manas is meant that one of the six consciousnesses that has just passed (saṃñām ananantarātītāṃ vijñānam yad dhi taṃ manah);

2) an object condition (ālambanapratyaya), namely, the six things (dharma).

The result is that if the manas has gone (nirgata), i.e., has left the body, the body is without intellection like a piece of wood. If, on the other hand, the manas has not yet gone, the manovijñāna that should immediately
sensations (minds and mental events of all beings). But because the minds and mental events of all beings existed essentially and in reality (kuta), the six consciousnesses (viññāna) arise together with the six volitions (samatā), and the six external objects (ādhyātmikas) arise together with the six sensations (vedanā), the six concepts (sahajā) and the six volitions (samatā). Therefore, the mind being like a magic show (māyā), one can “cognize the minds and mental events of all beings”, but there is no subject that cognizes (jānaka) nor any subject that sees (paśyaka).

It is said in the T’an-mo-ho-yen p’in (Mahāyānastutiparivarta): “If the minds and mental events of all beings existed essentially and in reality (tattvatas) and were not false, the Buddha could not know the minds and mental events of all beings. But because the minds and mental events of all beings are

follow it cannot arise. Thus there is no meeting (samgati) between organ, object of consciousness and viññāna, and the process of consciousness is blocked. See Kośa, I, p. 31-32, 95; III, p. 85.

Cf. Pañcaviṃśati, ed. Dutta, p. 239, l. 12-15 (T 223, k. 6, p. 264b22-26; T 220, vol. VII, k. 419, p. 102c25-103a1); Śatasāhasrikā, ed. Ghosa, p. 1586, l. 4-8 (T220, vol. V, k. 58 p. 39b16-20): Yad api Subhūti evam āha. nāpi tasya mahāyānasya āgatir drṣṭe nāpi gatīr na sthānaṃ drṣṭe iti. evam etat Subhūte tasya mahāyānasya āgatir na drṣṭe nāpi gatīr na sthānaṃ drṣṭe. tat kasya hetoh. acalā hi Subhūte darvadharmās te na kvaicī gacchanti na kutaścīd āgacchanī na kvacī tiṣṭhanti. – Subhūti said: “In this Mahāyāna, neither coming nor going nor staying is noticed.” That is good, O Subhūti: in this Mahāyāna, no coming nor going nor staying are noticed. Why? Immobile, O Subhūti, are all dharmas; they do not go anywhere, they do not come from anywhere, and they do not stay anywhere.

This Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra, the original Sanskrit text of which will be found below (p. 2135F), states that the five skandhas – and consequently all conditioned dharmas – do not come from anywhere and do not go anywhere: Cakṣur bhīṣaya utpadyamānam na kutaścīd āgacchati, niruddhyamānamca na kvaicī sthānaṃ gacchati.

Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 293: Yā ca vedanā yā ca saññā yaḥ ca viññānaḥ ime dharmāmaṃ samāsṭhā no vaśīmaṃ, na ca labhā ime saññāḥ dharmāmaṃ viṁabhujitvā viṁabhujitvā nānākaranāḥ paññāpetuḥ. Yāṃ hi vedeti tāṃ saññāḥ, yāṃ saññāḥ na tāṃ viññāṇāḥ. – All sensations, notions and consciousnesses are things associated and non-dissociated; it is impossible to separate them one from another and to show their differences, for whatever one feels, that one conceives, and whatever one conceives, that one cognizes.

In other words, knowing the movements of mind of all beings does not consist of detailing them one by one, but of penetrating their true nature (dharmatā), characterless like a magic show. Only the Buddhas and the great bodhisattvas possess such an overall view.
essentially and really false, without coming (āgati) or going (gati), the Buddha knows the minds and mental events of all beings.\textsuperscript{164}

To take an example: if the bhikṣu is greedy (adhyavasita), he does not receive offerings (pūjā), but if he has no ulterior motive, he lacks for nothing. It is the same for the mind (citta). If it imagines (vikalpayati) and grasps at characteristics (nimittāny udraḥṭāti), it does not find the truth and, not finding the truth, it cannot penetrate or know the minds and mental events of all beings. On the other hand, if it does not grasp at characteristics and does not imagine anything, it finds the truth and, finding the truth, it penetrates and knows the minds and mental events of all beings without encountering any obstacles.

III. ARE THE BEINGS TO BE KNOWN INFINITE IN NUMBER?\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{164} The Mahāyāna-stutiparivarta, abbreviated to Stutiparivarta, is the XLIVth chapter of the Pañcaviṃśati (T 223, k. 12, p. 311c5-313a25). There it says (p. 311c28-29) that the Prajñāparamitā is a perfection without going because all dharmas are without coming (agamanapramitaye Bhagavan sarvadharmāgamānatiṃ upādāya).

This total immobility is also applied to citta and the caitasika dharmas. In the Pañcaviṃśati, ed. Dutt, p. 116, l. 5-7, Subhūti asks the Buddha: Kena kāraṇena, Bhagavan, bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya cittaṃ nāvalyate na saṃlīyate. The Lord replies: Tathāhi, subhūte, bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ cittacaitasikān dharmān nopalabhate na saṃmupasyati.

This problem has already been studied (p. 146-161F, 529-530F, 1682F): how to reconcile the omniscience of the Buddha with the existence of an infinite number of beings? Infinity is unknowable for, by definition, one never finishes traveling through it (p. 153F). Therefore the Buddha cannot know all the minds of an infinite number of beings and he is not omniscient.

Encountering this objection, the Traité first shows its faithfulness to the canonical texts and states: "Beings are infinite in number and the wisdom (knowledge) of the Buddha is infinite: that is the truth."

On the one hand, the Buddha is proclaimed to be omniscient, and the Buddha cannot lie; on the other hand, the canonical texts seem to accept the existence of infinite realities, in space as well as in time:

1. In the Anamataggasutta (Samyutta, II, p. 178-193), the Buddha himself spoke of beings the beginning of which is unknown and that are led into a saṃsāra without beginning or end.

2. Atthasāliṇī, p. 160, l. 26-28, posits four infinities (cattāri anantāni): i) space (ākāśa), ii) the circles around the world (cakkavāḷa), iii) the world of beings (sattakāya), iv) the knowledge of the Buddha (buddhañāna).

3. Kośabhāṣya (p. 113, l. 21-22) will in turn recognize: "There is no production of new beings. Although [innumerable] Buddhas appear and incalculable beings reach parinirvāṇa, there is no final exhaustion of beings" (nāsty apūrvasattvapradūbhāvah, pratibuddhiḥ pāde cāsaṃkhyeyasattvaparinirvāṇe ‘pi nāsti sattvānāṃ parikṣayaḥ).

But this does not answer the objection in the words of which, infinite realities not being knowable to the very end, there is no omniscience to cognize them, and the Buddha himself does not know them.

Thus, examining the problem more deeply, the Traité finally adopts a more radical position. While the sūtras and the śāstras tell us about infinite beings and universes, those are statements of a practical order (upāyokti) and not true doctrine (cf. p. 529F). If the Buddha teaches us about the infinity of suffering, the eternity of saṃsāra, it
Question. – But can all the minds of beings (sattva) be known completely? If they can all be known completely, then beings are limited in number (antavat). If they [266a] cannot be known completely, why does the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speak here about “the bodhisattva wishing to know the movements of the mind of all beings” and how would the Buddha really have the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākārajñatā)?

Answer. – All the minds (citta) and mental events (caitasika dharma) of beings can be known completely. Why is that?

1. Because [the Buddha claims to know them completely] and it is said in the sūtras that, among all those who speak truthfully (satyavādin), the Buddha is foremost. 166 If it were impossible to know completely all the minds of beings and if one came up against the limits, how could the Buddha say that he knows them completely and how could he call himself omniscient (sarvajña)? But since the words of the Buddha are truthful, there must necessarily be an omniscient one.

2. Furthermore, although beings may be infinite in number (ananta), omniscience (sarvajñatā) itself is infinite. When a letter (lekha) is big, the envelope containing it is also big. 167 If the wisdom of the Buddha were limited (antavat) and if the number of beings were limitless (ananta), the objection [that you have raised against the omniscience of the Buddha] would be pertinent. But in the present case, the wisdom of the Buddha and the number of beings are both limitless: therefore your objection does not hold.

3. Finally, when it is a question of finite (antavat) and infinite (ananta), it is customary in the Buddhadharma to reply by not responding (sthāpanīya vyākaraṇam). The fourteen difficult questions is in order to detach us from the world and to save us. He forbids speculation on the finite and the infinite, the eternal and the transitory, the grasping of characteristics and freeing oneself from vain proliferation. These metaphysical problems are absurd and dangerous. Why debate on the infinite number of beings when the being (sattva) does not exist? Why discuss the eternity of samsāra when the latter is, from the beginning, confused with nirvāṇa?

Thus the Buddha declined to pronounce on the question of whether the world and the self are eternal or non-eternal, finite or infinite, etc. (cf. p. 155F); those are unanswerable questions (avyākrtavastu), because any answer, affirmative or negative, would be a wrong view (p. 423F). Far from being a confession of ignorance, the Buddha’s silence on this subject indicates his complete wisdom (p. 1682F).

166 Cf. Dīgha, I, p. 4; III, p. 170; Anguttara, II, p. 209; IV, p. 249. 389: Musāvādaṃ pahāya musāvādā paṭivirato samano Gotamo saccavādī saccasandho theto paccayiko avisamvādakpo lokassa. – He avoids falsehood, he abstains from lying, the monk Gotama; he speaks the truth, he has set off bound for the truth; worthy of faith, he is certain of not betraying his word towards people.

We have seen above (p. 146-152F) how the Buddha’s contemporaries down to the most humble cowherds recognized his omniscience.

167 The comparison of the letter and the envelope has already been used above (p. 153F, 530F, 646F).
[among which are the finite and the infinite] being unreal (abhūta), false (asat) and useless (vyartha),

you cannot make any objection [to the omniscience of the Buddha].

Question. – If the finite and the infinite are both false, why did the Buddha speak of ‘infinities’ in several places? Thus he said: “Beings who, full of error (mohā) and desire (trṣṇā), have come [into saṃsāra] have neither beginning nor end”,

and also: “The ten directions (daśadiśi) also are limitless.”

Answer. – Beings are infinite in number (ananta) and the wisdom of the Buddha is infinite: that is the truth. But if a person is attached to infinity (anantam abhiniviśate), grasps at the characteristic (nimittam udgrhaṇāti) and gives himself over to idle discursiveness (prapañca), the Buddha says that infinity is wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

It is the same [with infinity] as for the eternity (śāśvata) and non-eternity (aśāśvata) of the world (loka): both are deceptions and come within the fourteen difficult questions. However, the Buddha has often spoken of non-eternity in order to save beings, whereas he did not speak much of eternity. If someone is attached to non-eternity (aśāśvatam abhiniviśate), grasps at the characteristic (nimittam udgrhaṇāti) and gives himself up to futile discursiveness, the Buddha says that he acts from wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) and error. But if someone, without being attached to non-eternity, simply recognizes: “That which is non-self is empty,”

this person, thus being based on the vision of non-eternity (aśāśvatavipasyanāśrita), enters into the emptiness of things (dharmasaṁyatyā) and is in the truth. This is why we know that non-eternity introduces one into the real truth, but also makes up part of the fourteen difficult questions for, by [hypostatizing it], by becoming attached to its causes and conditions (hetupratyayābhiniśā), that is a wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

168 Once again the Traité returns to the fourteen difficult questions on which the Buddha declined to comment (cf. P. 154-158F, 421F, 423F, 529-530F, 1589F, 1682F). In the questions about the infinity and eternity of he world and of beings, the four envisaged alternatives are incorrect and no categorical response is acceptable. Cf. Kośa, IX, p. 267.

169 A free citation of a well-known stock phrase which has given its name to a section of the Samyutta, the Anamataggasamyutta. At first sight, it concerns the eternity of saṃsāra rather than the infinity of the world of beings, but the two notions are connected.

The Pāli wording appears in Samyutta, II, p. 178-193; III, p. 149-151; V, p. 226, 441; Cullaniddesa, p. 273; Kathāvatthu, I, p. 29: Anamatagg 'ayaṁ bhikkhave saṁsāro pubbakoti na paññāyati avijjāniśvaraṇānam sattānaṁ tamahāsamyojanaṇānam sandhāvatam saṁsāratam. – Of unknown beginning, O monks, is this saṁsāra: one does not know the beginning of beings who, obstructed by ignorance and fettered by desire, run about and wander [from birth to birth].

For this ‘logion’ which shows many variations, see below, p. 2096F.

170 The Mahāyānasūtras endlessly speak of universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges and of innumerable and incalculable buddhafields.

171 Brahmajīlasutta of Dīgha, I, p. 23-24: Ye pi te sampaṭabrāhmaṇā evam āhaṃsu anato ayaṃ loko aparīyanto ti, tesaṁ pi musā. – “The monks and brāhmaṇas who say that this world is infinite, that it is without limit, they too are in error.”

172 Samyutta, III, p. 22, 82, 84; IV, p. 1: yad aniccam taṃ dukkhāṃ, yaṃ dukkhāṃ tad anattā...
Here I have spoken about non-eternity (aśāśvata) in order to clarify [the question] of infinity (ananta): it is as a result of the infinity [of suffering] that beings conceive distaste (nirveda) for the length of saṃsāra, [but the infinity of suffering is not a thing in itself: suffering is simply very long].

[Lohita or Timsamattā sutta]\(^{173}\) – Thus forty bhikṣus from the land of Po-li\(^{174}\) who observed fully the twelve pure practices (dhūtaguṇa) came to the Buddha who taught them the practice of disgust (nirveda, saṃvega).

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One day the Blessed One was staying at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Forest.

Then some monks from Pāvā, thirty in number, all dwelling in the forest, living on alms, clothed in rags, wearing the three robes only but still victims of the fetters, came to where the Blessed One was. Having come near him and having saluted the Blessed One, they sat down at one side.

The Blessed One had this thought: These monks from Pāvā, thirty in number, all dwelling in the forest… are still victims of the fetters. What if I preached the Dharma to them in such a way that even here on their very seats, their minds could be liberated from the impurities by means of detachment?

The Blessed One said: Of unknown beginning, O monks, is this saṃsāra: the very beginning is unknown of beings who, obstructed by ignorance and fettered by desire, run around and wander (from birth to birth).

What do you think, O monks? Which is greater: the blood that has been spilled and spread about by you when your heads have been cut off while you were running around and wandering (in saṃsāra) for so long, or the water in the four great oceans?

-Lord, as we understand the Dharma preached by the Blessed One, it is the blood spilled out and spread around when our heads have been cut off while we were running around and wandering (in saṃsāra) for so long, or the water in the four great oceans?

-Good, good, O monks! You understand well, O monks, the Dharma preached by me…

Thus spoke the Blessed One. With joyful minds, the monks were pleased with what the Buddha had said. When this statement had been made, the minds of the thirty monks from Pāvā were freed from the impurities by means of detachment.

174 The Chinese translations mentioned at the beginning of the previous note speak of forty bhikṣus from the village of Po-li-ye or forty Po-li-chō-kia bhikṣus; the Pāli version speaks of thirty Pāveyyakā bhikṣus (variant Pāthyyaka). The commentary to Saṃyutta (II, p. 159) explains Pāveyyakā as Pāveyyadesavāsino “inhabitant of the region of Pāvā”. Pāvā (in Sanskrit, Pāpā) is the actual Kasia, situated 56 kilometers east of Gorakhpur. At the time of the Buddha, this city was the Malla capital. The early sources (Dīgha, II, p. 165; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 252, 432, etc.) distinguish the Mallas of Pāpā (in Sanskrit, Pāpiyaka or Pāpeya, in Pāli, Pāpeyyeka) from the Mallas of Kuśināgari (in Sanskrit, Kauśināgara, in Pāli, Kosināraka). The Pātheyyakas played an important part at the time of the Buddhas funeral rituals and in the council of Vaiśālī (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 253).
The Buddha asked them: The five rivers, Heng-k’ie (Gaṅgā), Lan-meou-na (Yamunā), Sa-lo-yeou (Sarayū), A-tche-lo-p’o-t’i (Aciravati) and Mo-hi (Mahī) arise and empty into the great ocean (mahāsamudra). Is the mass of water contained in this ocean great or small?

The bhikṣus answered: It is very great.

The Buddha continued: In the course of a single kalpa, during his animal existences, a single man has been cut up and flayed. In yet other circumstances when he committed a wrong-doing, his hands and feet have been cut off and his head has been has been cut off. Well then! His blood (lohitā) that has been spilled surpasses the amount of water in the ocean.

Likewise, the blood that he has spilled during his lifetimes (ātmalābha) in the course of great kalpas infinite in number (anantamahākalpa) is incalculable, and it is the same for the tears (āśru) that he has wept and the mothers’ milk (mātrastana) that he has sucked.

The bones (asthī) that a single man leaves during a single kalpa surpasses in height the great mountain Pi-feou-lo (Vaipulya). – [A note in the K’i-tan says: This is an Indian mountain and as the natives see it constantly, it is easy to believe it.] Thus, the man undergoes the sufferings of saṃsāra during innumerable kalpas.

175 The other versions of the sūtra do not mention these five rivers.

176 Here and in the following paragraph, the Traité inserts into its Lohitasūtra three comparisons borrowed from other sūtras of the Saṃyukta.

1) The comparison of the tears is taken from the Assu-suttanta of Saṃyutta, II, p. 179-180 (T 99, no. 938, k. 33, p. 240c250241a17; T 100, no. 331, k. 16, p. 486a18-b23): Etad eva bhikkhave bahutaram yam vo iminā dīghena addhunā ... paggharitaṃ na tveva catūṣu mahāsamuddesu udakam. – Transl.: More abundant than the water of the four great seas are the tears that you have wept, during the very long time that you have wandered in saṃsāra, moaning and crying at being united with what you do not like and being separated from what you like.

2. The comparison of the mothers’ milk is taken from the Kśīra-suttanta in Saṃyutta, II, p. 180-181 (T 99, no. 939, k. 33, p. 241a18-b8; T 100, no. 332, k. 16, p. 486b24-c6): Etad eva bhikkhave kappam bahutaram yam vo iminā dīghena addhunāna tveva catūṣu mahāsamuddesu udakam. – Transl.: More plentiful than the water of the four great seas is the maternal milk that you have sucked during the very long time that you were wandering in saṃsāra.

3) The compassion of the bone piles is taken from the Puggala-suttanta of Daṃyutta, II, p. 185-186 (T 99, no. 947, k. 34, p. 242a28-b15; T 100, no. 340, k. 16, p. 487b17-c3): Ekapuggalassa bhikkhave kappam sandhāvato saṃsārato sīyā ... sace samhārako asa saṃbhatai ca na vinesseyya. – Transl.: From a single man wandering in saṃsāra for a kalpa there would come bone skeletons, a pile of bones, a mass of bones as high as mount Vaipulya, supposing there were someone to gather up these bones and the pile would not be destroyed.

As we have seen above (p. 457F), the author of the Traité likes to construct composite sūtras.

177 Edition of the Chinese Canon printed under the K‘i-tan (Tartars), beginning in 1059 and included, in 1068, 579 volumes. See P. Demiéville, Sur les editions imprimées du Canon chinois, BEFEO, XXIV, 1924, p. 207-212.
Having heard this discourse, the bhikṣus were disgusted with the world and obtained bodhi. Furthermore, learning that the beings of the ten directions are infinite in number, they felt joy, busied themselves in not destroying life (prāṇātipāta) and won infinite merit (anantapuṇya).

For these reasons, the beings of all the universes should pay homage (pujā) to the bodhisattva who produces the mind of bodhi for the first time (prathamacittotpāda). Why? Because, in order to save the beings of universes infinite in number, he himself uses infinite qualities (anantaguna). As they present such benefits, they are called ‘infinite’.

This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says here that the bodhisattva ‘knows the movements of mind of all beings completely’. Thus, when the sun illumines a continent (dvīpaka), it goes everywhere simultaneously and there is no place that is not illumined.

Third Section OUTSHINING THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THE ŚRĀVAKAS AND PRATYEKABUDDHAS

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21, l. 14-15; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 68, l. 1-2). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to outshine the knowledge of all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas must practice the perfection of wisdom (Sarvasravakapratyekabuddhānāṃ jñānam abhibhīvitakāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. – Question. – What is the knowledge of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas?

I. KNOWLEDGE OIF THE ŚRĀVAKAS

Answer. – 1. Considering the true nature of dharmas under its general characteristic (sāmaṇyalakṣaṇa) and its specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) is the knowledge of the śrāvakas.179

[Susīmasutta.] – Thus it is said in a sūtra: “First one must use the analytical knowledge of the dharmas (dharma-pravicayajñāna?) and then apply the knowledge concerning nirvāṇa (nirvāṇe jñānam).”180 The

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178 This subject has been discussed already, p. 1067-1068F.
179 To be more precise and as has been said above (p. 1745F), the śrāvakas know the general characteristics of conditioned dharmas, impermanence, suffering, emptiness and non-self, but they know only a restricted number of specific characteristics, solidity of earth, etc.
analytical knowledge of dhammas concerns the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa); the knowledge of nirvāṇa concerns the general characteristic (sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇa).

2. Furthermore, the śrāvakas know the dhammas that are, respectively, deliverance (mokṣa) or bondage (bandhāna); progression (pravṛtti) or regression (nivṛtti); production (upādā) or cessation (nirrodha); benefit (āsvāda) or defect (ādīnava); in the opposite sense (pratilomā) or in the natural sense (anulomā); the near shore (apāra) or the opposite shore (pāra);¹⁸¹ of mundane order (laukika) or supramundane order (lokottara), and other knowledges of the same type analyzing dhammas grouped into twos. They are called knowledges of the śrāvaka.

3. There are also threefold knowledges: the knowledges bearing upon the the five aggregates of attachment (upādānakṣandha) concerning their origin (samudaya), their breaking up (vikṣepa) and their disappearance (astamgama) or concerning their benefits (āsvāda), their faults (ādīnava) and their deliverance (niḥsaraṇa);¹⁸² the knowledges associated with the three gates of deliverance (vimokṣaṃukhasamprajyta) and other knowledges analyzing the dhammas grouped into threes.

4. There are also fourfold knowledges: the knowledges consisting of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna); - the knowledges of phenomena (dharma-jñāna), the subsequent knowledge (anuvajjāna), the knowledge of another’s mind (paracittajñāna) and conventional knowledge (saṃvṛiti-jñāna); - the knowledges of suffering (duḥkha), its origin (samudaya) its cessation (nirodha) and the path to its cessation (mārga);¹⁸³ - the knowledges of impurity (aśuci), impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha) and non-self (anatman);¹⁸⁴ - the knowledges of impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnya) and non-self (anatman);¹⁸⁵ the knowledge of phenomena (dharma-jñāna), the subsequent knowledge (anuvajjāna), the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āśravakaṣayajñāna) and the knowledge of their non-reoccurence (anupāda-jñāna) and other knowledges of the same type analyzing dhammas grouped by fours.¹⁸⁶

But the ‘analytical knowledge’ spoken of here in the Traité does not quite give the dhammaṭṭhitiṇāṇa of the Pāli, which W. Geiger, in his translation of Saṃyutta, II, p. 172, translates as “das Wissen von der Gesetzmässigkeit”. In his Pāli Dhamma, p. 12 he explains: Das Wissen von der Kausalität wird hier bestimmt als eine Vorstufe des Wissens vom Nirvāṇa.

¹⁸¹ Time-honored expressions designating saṃsāra and nirvāṇa respectively.

¹⁸² Compare the Arahasutta of Saṃyutta, III, p. 161: Yato ca kho bhikkhave bhikkhu imesaṃ pañcannya upādānakhandhānaṃ samudgayañca atthagamañca assasañca ādīnavañca nissarañca yathābhūtaṃ viditvā anupāda vimutto hoti. See also Saṃyutta, III, p. 28, l. 26-29.

¹⁸³ Four knowledges concerned with the four āryasaṭyas respectively.

¹⁸⁴ Knowledges counteracting the four viparyūsas.

¹⁸⁵ Knowledges bearing upon the four ākāras of the truth of suffering.

¹⁸⁶ All these other knowledges have been defined in chap. XXXVIII, p. 1465-1486F.
5. Finally, from the knowledge of duḥkhe dharmajānānakāṇṭi\textsuperscript{187} up to the knowledges of śānyatāśūnyatāsamādhi, ānimittānimittasamādhi and apraṇihitāpraṇihitasamādhi,\textsuperscript{188} all the knowledges included in that interval are all śrāvaka knowledges. In summary, this is disgust for the world.

[266c] Thinking of nirvāṇa, rejecting the threefold world (traidhātuka), cutting the conflicting emotions (kleśaprahāṇa), obtaining the supreme dharma (agradharma), i.e., nirvāṇa: all of that is called the knowledge of the śrāvaka.

Furthermore, it is said in the Pan-jo-po-lo-mi-yi p‘in (Prajñāpāramitāparivarta),\textsuperscript{189} «The knowledge of the bodhisattva and the knowledge of the śrāvaka are one and the same knowledge, the difference being that the śrāvakas do not have skillful means (upāya), are not [clothed] in the great armor (na mahāsaṃnākasamānaddha),\textsuperscript{190} have neither great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) nor great compassion (mahākarunā), do not seek all the attributes of the Buddha, do not seek the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvakārājñatā) or omniscience (sarvadharmaśatā). They are disgusted only with old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (marāṇa), cut the bonds of thirst (ṭṛṣṇābandhana) and go straightway to nirvāṇa: this is the difference.

\textsuperscript{187} First moment of the darśanamārga.

\textsuperscript{188} Concentrations by means of which one wards off the dangers of the absorptions having as their objects emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apranihita): cf. p. 1094F; Kośa, VIII, p. 187-190.

\textsuperscript{189} Unidentified chapter and citation.

\textsuperscript{190} The texts of the Greater Vehicle often speak of bodhisattva mahāsaṃnākasamānaddha (in Tibetan, go cha chen po bsogs pa), i.e., ‘clothed in the great armour’. This is mentioned in Pañcaviṃśati, ed. Ditt, p. 175, l. 6; Kumārajīva renders the expression by ta-che-tchouang-yen or ta-tchouang-yen, ‘adorned by great vows’ or ‘greatly adorned’, whereas Hiuan-tsang (T 220, vol. VII, p. 62a12) translates it as pei-ta-kong-tö-k’ai, ‘clothed in the great armour of the qualities’.

The Prajñāpāramitā (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 175, l. 3 – 179, l. 21; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1298, l. 12 – 1313, l. 18) dedicates an entire section to the Great Armor. The bodhisattva, it explains, puts on the great armor when he decides to fulfill the six pāramitās, not for a limited number of beings but for all beings without exception (sarvasattvānāṁ kṛtana), and this for the purpose of introducing them into the perfections and leading them to supreme compete enlightenment. He practices the six perfections without objectifying them or seizing them (saṭ pāramitā na nimittikaroti nopalabhate).

The Abhisamayālaṃkāra, I, v. 43, condenses this section into the following stanza:

\begin{align*}
& \text{Dānāsau sadvidhe teśāṁ pratyekam samgrahena yā /} \\
& \text{sanmāhāpratipattīḥ sa śadbhiḥ śaṭkair yathoditaḥ //}
\end{align*}

“The action [consisting of] putting on the armor is represented by six sextads, the six [pāramitās], generosity, etc., combined one with the others respectively.”

The sanmāhāpratipatti thus consists of six sextads [combinations of generosity with the other five pāramitās, of morality with the other five pāramitās, etc.]: which makes a total of thirty-six aspects.

For the ‘great armor’ see also Āloka, p. 84-85.
II. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRATYEKABUDDHAS

Question. – This, then, is the knowledge of the śrāvakas. Now what is the knowledge of the pratyekabuddhas?

Answer. – The knowledge of the pratyekabuddhas is the same as the knowledge of the śrāvakas with the exception of time (kāla), sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya) and merits (puṇya).

1. Time (kāla). – When there is no Buddha in the world or, as well, when the Buddhadharma does not exist, the ascetic who, after a minor occurrence (nidaṇa), leaves home and obtains bodhi, is called pratyekabuddha.

2. Sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya). – Pratyekabuddhas differ [from śrāvakas] by their keen faculties, but their manner of being (dharmatā) is similar (tulya). It is thanks to the depth of their knowledge (jñānagambhiratā) alone that the ascetic obtains the bodhi of the pratyekabuddha.

3. Merits (puṇya). – This is a matter of merits bringing the physical marks (lakṣaṇa): one mark, two marks, or up to thirty-one marks.

If, when the Buddhadharma is still in existence, an ascetic has first of all obtained the quality of an ārya and then becomes arhat after the disappearance of the holy Dharma (saddharmavipralopa), he is also called pratyekabuddha but his body does not possess the physical marks.

If the pratyekabuddha is very quick (ksipra), his career (caryā) is four lifetimes; if he is slow (manda), it is prolonged even for as long as one hundred kalpas. Like the śrāvaka: if he is fast, three lifetimes; if he is slow, sixty kalpas.

191 This subject has already been treated above, p. 1068-1069F
192 Such as the king who, seeing the wreckage of his garden, understood the futility of things and attained the state of pratyekabuddha: see p. 1068F.
193 Sharp faculties and physical marks are characteristic of the pratyekabuddhas living alone, like rhinoceroses (kadgavīnānakalpa): see p. 1069F and n.
194 This is a question of the pratyekabuddha living in a group (vargacīrin). These are former śrāvakas who entered the Path during the reign of a Buddha, but only accede to bodhi during a time when the Buddha and his Dharma have disappeared: cf. Kośa, III, p. 195.

Conversely, there are bodhisattvas who withdraw and become either śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas: cf. Śūramgamasamādhi, transl., p. 240-241.

195 For the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 83, p. 428b27-28), usually sixty kalpas are necessary in order to acquire the bodhi of the śrāvakas, one hundred kalpas to acquire that of the pratyekabuddhas, three incalculable periods to acquire that of the Buddhas. But there are exceptions.

On the lineage (gotra), the realizations (samudāgama), the abodes (vihāra) and the conduct (caritra) of pratyekabuddhas, see Asanga’s Yogācarabhūmi, Pratyekabuddhabhūmi, ed. A. Wayman, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, VIII, 1960, p. 376-377 (T 1579, k. 34, 477c-478a).
III. EMINENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE BODHISATTVAV

Question. – According to the Buddha’s words, there are four kinds of fruit of the religious life (śrāmanyaphala), four kinds of ārya from the srotaāpanna to the arhat, five kinds of sons of the Buddha (buddhaputra) from the srotaāpanna up to the pratyekabuddha, and three kinds of bodhi: the bodhi of the arhats, the bodhi of the pratyekabuddhas and the bodhi of the Buddhas. The bodhisattva does not appear anywhere among these arhats, these sons of the Buddha and these bodhis. Why then does the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speak here of the bodhisattva “outshining the knowledge of all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas”?

Answer. – The Dharma of the Buddha is of two kinds: i) the Dharma of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, and ii) the Dharma of the Mahāyāna. The Dharma of the śrāvakas is small (hīna) and praises the things concerning the śrāvakas alone; it does not speak of things that concern the bodhisattva. The Dharma of the Mahāyāna is vast (mahat) and deals with things relative to the bodhisattva-mahāsattva: the production of the mind of awakening (cittotpāda), the development of the ten levels (daśabhūmihāvanā), the access to certainty (niyāmāvakrānti), the purification of the Buddha fields (buddhakṣetrapariśodhana), the maturation of beings (sattvaparipācana) and the attainment of supreme enlightenment (abhīsambodhi). In this Dharma, it is said that the bodhisattva follows on from the Buddha and should be honored as he is: he contemplates the [true] nature of dharmas (bhūtalaksana) in a similar way, he is a field of merit (punyakṣetra) and he dominates the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

In many places, the Mahāyānasūtras praise the knowledge of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva which prevails over that of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.
In the Pao-ting-king, (Ratnakūṭasūtra) it is said:

The noble cakravartin king who

The Traité, under the title of Ratnakūṭasūtra, rendered in Chinese by Kumārajīva as Pao-ting king, is referring here to the Kāśyapaparivarta which has come down to us in a somewhat mutilated Indian version (ed. A. von Staël-Holstein, Chang-hai, 1926), one Tibetan translation (Tib. Trip., vol. 24, no. 760, 43) and four Chinese translations made under the Han between 178 and 184, under the Tsin between 265 and 420 (T 351), under the Ts’in between 350 and 431 (T 310, k. 112, p. 631-638) and by Che-hou under the Song, about 982 (T 352). All these sources are reproduced in von Staël-Holstein which I [Lamotte] will designate as KP (Kāśyapaparivarta). F. Weller has dedicated an important series of works to them and has proposed a number of amendments to the Sanskrit text. I will cite here only the following: Zum Kāśyapaparivarta, Verdeutschung des sanskrit-tibetischen Textes, Leipzig, 1965; Kāśyapaparivarta nach des Han-Fassung verdeutscht, Buddhist Yearly, 1986-70, Halle, 1970, p. 57-221; Kāśyapaparivarta nach der Djin-Fassung verdeutscht, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung, XII, 1966, p. 379-462; Die Sung-Fassung des Kāśyapaparivarta, Monumenta Serica, XXV, 1966, p. 207-362.

At some undetermined date, the Kāśyapaparivarta was incorporated into a vast collection of about fifty Mahāyāna sūtras, a collection known under the name of Ratnakūṭa in Sanskrit, Pao tsi king (less often, Pao ting king) in Chinese, dkon-brtseg in Tibetan. The Chinese Ta pao tsi king (T 310) in 120 kiuan, was compiled at Loyang, under the T’ang, between 706 and 713, by Bodhiruci, a brahmin from southern India converted to Buddhism. To this purpose, Bodhiruci resorted to some earlier Chinese translations: “He used as many as 23 sūtras; 15 other sūtras of which translations also existed, were re-translated by him, either because the translations of his predecessors were not satisfactory or because the Sanskrit version that he was using differed from those previously translated; finally, he gave a new translation of 11 sūtras.” (P. Demiéville, Inde Classique, II, p. 434). In this Ta pao tsi king, the version of the Kāśyapaparivarta is in the 43rd place: this is the version entitled P’ou ming p’ou sa, done at the time of the Ts’in by a translator whose name has been lost. – The Tibetan dkon-brtseg (Tib. Trip., vol. 22-24, no. 760) which includes 49 sūtras was translated at the beginning of the 9th century by Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi and Ye-šes sde (cf. Lalou, La version tibétaine du Ratnakūṭa, JA, Oct.-Dec., 1927, p. 233-259).

The history of the Sanskrit Ratnakūṭa as a collection of sūtras still remains obscure. The Chinese, followed later by the Tibetans, are almost the only ones to affirm its existence. In the K’ai yuan (T 2154, k. 9, p. 570b4-12) we read: “In the past, during the Techeng-kouan period (627-649), the Dharma teacher Hui-an-tsang traveled to India and returned with Sanskrit texts. In the Hong fou sseu, he translated the Mahābodhisattvavipākasūtra, the twelfth ‘assemblage’ of the Ratnakūṭa. Later, when at Yu houa kong sseu he had finished translating the Mahāprajñā (T 220), the monks invited him to translate the Ratnakūṭa immediately. The Dharma teacher Hui-an-tsang said: “The merit in translating the Ratnakūṭa is not inferior to that of translating the Prajñā. The time remaining in my life is brief; I am afraid that I cannot finish the work.” As the requests addressed to him did not stop, he began to translate the text hastily. He was able to make only a few lines, and he said, sighing: “This sūtra does not show favorable signs for the people of this country. My strength is exhausted; I cannot finish it.” This is why he stopped translating. The day that Bodhiruci arrived (about 706?), he again presented a Sanskrit text of this [Ratnakūṭa]. The emperor Hōti ordered Bodhiruci to continue the remainder of the work begun by Hui-an-tsang.”

Late though it is, the Chinese evidence is no less categorical. On the other hand, when the Indian authors and commentators refer to the sūtras contained in the Chinese and Tibetan Ratnakūṭas, they cite them under their
specific names as independent works and if they do mention a Ratnakūṭa, it is almost always to refer it as Kāśyapaparīvarta.

To complete the work of my [Lamotte’s] predecessors, here is a list of citations of the texts in question with references, wherever possible, to the corresponding paragraphs of the edition of the Kāśyapaparīvarta (KP) by Staël-Holstein.


This is not a reference to the Kātyāyānavāḍa as I [Lamotte] proposed above, p. 1684F, n. 4. - k. 28, p. 266c28: Ratnakūṭa (Pao ting king) = KP, § 83 (same comparison but applied otherwise), and 84.

2. Daśabhūmikāvibhāṣā, T 1521 (translated by Kumārajīva): - k. 16, p. 109c12: Ratnakūṭasūtra (Pao ting king), in the chapter on the combined Buddhas (Houo ho a pa p’in). The quotation that follows portrays the bodhisattva Akṣayamati. - k. 17, p. 118c3: Ratnakūṭasūtra (Pao ting king), in the Kāśyapaparīvarta (Kia chō p’ìn) = KP, § 134. This reference is interesting. It proves that the author of this Vibhāṣā, presumably Nāgārjuna, held the Kāśyapaparīvarta to be a section of the Ratnakūṭa.

3. Che mo ho yen louen, T 1668 (author Nāgārjuna; translator Fa-t’i-mo-to in 401). - k. 4, p. 625a16: Ratnakūṭasūtra = ?


11): In the Ratnakūṭasūtra, the Buddha says to Kāśyapa = KP, § 64.


The work cites five passages from a Ratnakūṭasūtra (K. 2, p. 52b19; 53a18; k. 5, p. 61b19; 62b6; k. 6, p. 63a22) but these do not seem to be in the Kāśyapaparīvarta.
lacks one son, [viz., the thousandth and last], does not have in full the thousand sons [necessary to constitute his lineage]. Even [267a] though he possesses great power already, his [first 999 sons] are not honored either by the gods or by humans; but the true offshoot of the noble cakravartin king, [viz., his thousandth

13. Tsi tchou fa pao tsouei yi louen, T 1638 (author: an Indian whose name is given in Chinese as Chantsi; translator: Che-hou, under the Song, about 982). - k. 1, p. 150b24 = KP, § 60.

- In summary, it is likely that at the time of the Traité, at the beginning of the 4th century (cf. vol. III, p. ixF), already there existed a Sanskrit collection of Mahāyāna texts of varying dates and provenances. Until then, these texts had had a separate existence. We know little about the Sanskrit collection except that it included at least two questionnaires: one from the disciple Kāśyapa (Kāśyapaparipṛcchā) and on from the bodhisattva Aksayamati (Aksayamatiparipṛcchā). The first, judging from the botanical information that it furnishes, came from eastern India (cf. H. Nakamura, A critical survey of Mahāyāna and Esoteric Buddhism, Acta Asiatica, 7, 1964, p. 48). It enjoyed exceptional prestige and was named Ratnakūṭa ‘Summit of Jewels’ translated correctly by Pao-ting in Kumārajīva’s versions. This explains why the Traité designates it equally as Kāśyapaparipṛcchā and Ratnakūṭaśūtra. Incorporated into the Sankrit collection, it also takes the name of ‘Chapter of Kāśyapa’ (Kāśyapaparivarīta).

The Sankrit collection grew in the course of time and, towards the end of the 5th century it included about fifty sūtras, some of which had already been translated into Chinese. This collection also took the name Ratnakūṭa, not as ‘Summit of Jewels’ (Pao ting) but as ‘Heap of Jewels’ (Pao tsì). Brought to China by Huien-tsang in 649, it was completely translated between 706 and 713 by Bodhiruci who, for a good part of it, used the earlier Chinese translations. The Tibetan version occurred only after Tibet’s conversion to Buddhism. A first version is already mentioned in the Index of the translations of the Āgamas and Śāstras existing in the palace of Ldan-kar, in the Stod-thāṅ, an index prepared by Dpal-brtsegs and Nam-mkaḥ-sin-po: it appears under the category no. III of this index, and this category is entitled “Sūtra of the Greater Vehicle arranged in chapters (lehu) of the eleven hundred dharmaprayāyas of the Mahāratnakūṭa, up to forty-nine chapters” (cf. M. Lalou, Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khīr-sron-bde-btsan, JA, 1953, p. 320-321). The second version was made by Jinamitra, as has been said above: it is preserved in the Tib. Trip., vol. 22-24, no. 760.

Apart from the author of the Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā, the Indian scholars and commentators make no mention of a Sanskrit Ratnakūṭa as a collection of texts and everything leads one to think that they were unaware of its existence. In any case, when Śāramati, Asāṅga, Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva and Prajñākaramati cite the Ratnakūṭasūtra, it is always to refer to it only as Kāśyapaparivarīta.

197 Citation to be compared with the Kāśyapaparivarīta, ed. von Staël-Holstein, § 83, where the theme is presented in a different way: If he is endowed with the marks of a cakravartin (cakravartilaksanaśasamanvāgata), the prince, even though he exists only in the embryonic state in his mother’s womb, is more greatly honored by the gods than by his already grown-up brothers who are without the marks of a cakravartin. Here, it is a matter for the Traité of the thousandth and last son of a cakravartin king preferentially honored over all his brothers because he has the full number necessary to form the lineage (vamsa) of a universal king. The latter, in order to fulfill his role, must not only possess the seven jewels (saptaratna) of a cakravartin, but must also have “a full thousand heroic sons, virile, with excellent bodies, destroyers of the enemies’ armies”. This is expressed in a frequently repeated stock phrase (Dīghā, I, p. 88-89; Catusparṣātśūtra, p. 235; Vivyāvadāna, p. 548-549): Pūrṇaṁ cāsyā bhaivisyati aharaṁ putrāṇāṁ ṣūrāṇāṁ virāṇāṁ varāṅgarūpiṇāṁ parasainyapramardakāṁ.
and last son], although he is still in his mother’s womb (kukṣī) and starting from the first seven days after his conception (saptarātropapanna), is honored by the gods. Why? The first 999 sons do not guarantee the lineage (vamśa) of the noble caṇkaraṅtaka king permitting people to enjoy happiness for only two generations; on the other hand the last son, even though he is still in the womb, definitively completes the descent of the noble caṇkaraṅtaka king. This is why he is honored.

Similarly, even though the arhats and pratyekabuddhas have spiritual faculties (indriya), the powers (bala), the factors of enlightenment (sāmbodhyāṅga), the members of the Path (mārgaṅga), the six superknowledges (saḍabhijñā), the power of the trances (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā), even though they realize the highest point of the truth (bhūtakoṣī) and are a field of merit (puṇyakṣetra) for beings, they are not honored by the Buddhas of the ten directions. On the other hand, in the womb of the feters (saṃyojana), the passions (kleśa), the bonds of desire (kāmabandhāna) and the threefold poison (viṣatraya), the bodhisattva who has just produced the mind of peerless bodhi (prathamānuttarabodhicittotpāda) is honored by the Buddhas before having done what had to be done (akṛtakṛtya). It is only gradually that he will cultivate the six perfections (pāramitā), acquire the power of skillful means (upāyabala), enter into the position of Bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniyāna) and succeed in obtaining the knowledge of all the aspects (sarvākārajñātā) and save innumerable beings. But [from his first production of the bodhi mind] he prevents the rupture (anupacchedāya sthāsyati) of the Buddha lineage (buddhavāṃśa), of the lineage of the Dharma (dharma vāṃśa) and the lineage of the Community (saṃghavāṃśa); he prevents the rupture of the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) assuring pure happiness (viśuddhasukha) in the heavens (svarga) and in this world (iha-loka). [This is why he is honored by the Buddhas as soon as he is conceived].

Thus the Kia-lo-p’in-k’ie (kalaviṅka) bird, when it is still within the egg (aṇḍakaśā), surpasses all other birds (saṃvapaksigamuḥ abhibhavati) by the melody of its songs (rutaraṇītena). Similarly the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, even before leaving the shell of ignorance (avidyāaṇḍakaśa), surpasses the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and heretics by the sound of his preaching (dharma deśana) and his teachings (upadeśa).  

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198 Cf. Kāśyapaparivarta, § 83 which is expressed more consisely: *Evam eva kāśyapa prathamacittotpādiko bodhisattvah aparipakvendriya kalamaḥūbhiṣagata eva samānodatha ca punar balavantarā tatra pūrvadarśano devā sprhām utpādayanti, na tv evaśāvāmokṣadhyāyīṣv arhatsu, tat kasmād hetoh. sa hi buddhavaṃśasyāṇupacchedāya sthāsyati.*

199 Adopting the variant *kio tao*.

200 Kāśyapaparivarta, § 84: *Tad yathāpī nāma kāśyapa karaviṅkapataka aṇḍaḥaṣapraṣitaḥ anirbhinnena nayane sarvapaksigamam abhib, yad uta gambhīrāmādhunirghosarutaravite[na] evam eva kāśyapaḥ prathamacittotpādiko bodhisattvo avidyāaṇḍakoṣapraṣita karmakleṣatamastimirapajalaparyavanaddhāḥ nayano pi sarvasrāvakapratyekabuddhān abhibhavati yad uta kuśalamūlapiṇāmanāprayoga-nirhārutaravietna.*

The kalaviṅka, sparrow or cuckoo, has already been mentioned, p. 279F, 1587F.
Viśeṣacintibrahmapariprechā" – It is said in the Ming-wang king (Jālinīprabhasūtra): The sthāvīra Śāriputra said to the Buddha: O Bhagavat, those who are able to understand the words of these bodhisattvas gain great merit (bahuṃ punyaskandham prasunvante). Why? If those who succeed merely in hearing the name (nāman) of these bodhisattvas already derive great benefit, what can be said of those who also understand their words?

O Bhagavat, if a man were to plant a tree (vrksa) without stamping down the ground around it and this tree produced roots (mula), a trunk (skandha), branches (sākhā), leaves (parṇa), and even gave fruit (phala), that would be a rare thing (durlabha). Well, the activity (caryālaksana) of these bodhisattvas is just as extraordinary. Indeed, without relying on any dharma whatsoever, they manifest births (jāti) and deaths (marāṇa) in the buddhafields (buddhakṣetra) and there, as if at play, they display at will the talents of their eloquence (pratibhāna) and their wisdom (prajñā). Then, hearing these great sages displaying this talent of eloquence playfully and at will, who would not produce the mind of supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksbodhicitta)?

At that time there was in the assembly the bodhisattva P’ou-houa (Samanta puṣpa). He said to Śāriputra: The Buddha has said that the sthavīra Śāriputra is the foremost of the sages (prajñāvatīm agryaḥ) among all the disciples (śrāvaka). Today, O sthāvīra, have you not discovered (upagata) the dharma, the fundamental element of the dharma? Then why not use your great wisdom to discourse on this dharma as you will?

Śāriputra. – The disciples of the Buddha (buddhaśrāvaka) only speak of its domain (yathāviṣayam).

Samantapuṣpa. – Does the dharmadhātu have a domain?

Śāriputra. – No.

Samantapuṣpa. – If the dharmadhātu has no domain, how can you claim, O sthāvīra, to speak according to this domain?

Śāriputra. – I speak of it according to the degree it has been understood (adhigata) by me.

Samantapuṣpa. – O sthāvīra, have you understood that the dharmadhātu is without measure (apramāṇa)?

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201 In Tibetan, gnas brtan corresponding to the Sanskrit sthavīra which Kumārajīva renders equally as houei-ming or k’i-nien. In the Sanskrit texts, the names of the disciples are usually preceded by the adjective āyuṣmat (in Chinese tch’ang-tche, kiu-cheou; in Tibetan, tshes dav ldan pa) the translation of which Kumārajīva and even Hiuan-tsang most frequently omit. All these epithets of respect have the sense almost of the Greek ‘presbyter’, elder, worthy of consideration. Another honorific appellation of Buddhist and Jain monks is bhadanta (in Chinese, tsuantsche; in Tibetan, bstun pa).


203 In Tibetan, Kun-tu me-tog.

204 In Tibetan, chos kyi dbyiṅs.
Śāriputra. – Yes.

Samantapuspa. – Then why did you just say: “I speak to the measure that it has been understood by me”? If the dharmadhātu such as it is understood by you is immeasurable, the words [spoken about it] are also immeasurable. The dharmadhātu is immeasurable and is not measurable.

Śāriputra. – The dharmadhātu is ungraspable (anadhigamyalakṣaṇa).

Samantapuspa. – If the dharmadhātu is ungraspable, do you find deliverance (vimukti) outside the dharmadhātu?

Śāriputra. – No.

Samantapuspa. – Why?

Śāriputra. – Because the dharmadhātu is inseparable (avyatirikta) from it.

Samantapuspa. – Is the knowledge of the saints (āryajñāna) that you understand like the dharmadhātu?

Śāriputra. – As for me, I want to hear the Dharma; this is not the time to preach.

Samantapuspa. – All dharmas being fixed (niyata) in the dharmadhātu, is there something to hear (śrotavya) or something to say (vaktavya)?

Śāriputra. – No.

Samantapuspa. – Then why did you just say: “I want to hear the Dharma; this is not the time to preach”?

Śāriputra. – Nevertheless, the Buddha said: “Two people gain immeasurable merit: i) the one who preaches carefully; ii) the one who listens attentively.”

Samantapuspa. – When you enter into the absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti),205 can you hear the Dharma?

Śāriputra. – O son of noble family (kulaputra), in the absorption of cessation one does not hear the Dharma.

Samantapuspa. – Do you think that all the dharmas are eternally ceased (nityaniruddha)?

Śāriputra. – Yes, I think so.

Samantapuspa. – The dharmadhātu being eternally ceased, it is impossible to hear the Dharma. Why? Because all the dharmas are eternally ceased.

Śāriputra. – Without coming out of concentration (samādhi), can you preach the Dharma?

Samantapuspa. – There is no dharma that is not concentrated (samāhita).

Śāriputra. – If that is so, all worldly people (prthajana) are also concentrated.

205 The samjñāveditianirdhasamāpatti, the concentration of the cessation of concept and feeling, which by definition has no object: cf. p. 1299F, 1307F.
Samantapuṣpa. – Of course, all worldly people are concentrated.

Śāriputra. – In what concentration are all worldly people concentrated?

Samantapuṣpa. – It is in the unshakeable concentration of the dharmadhātu (akṣobhyadharmaḥsamādhi) that all worldly people are concentrated.

Śāriputra. – If that is so, there is no difference (viśeṣa) between worldly people (prthagjana) and saints (ārya).

Samantapuṣpa. – I do not accept that there is a difference between worldly people and saints. Why? Because among saints, there is no dharma that is ceased (niruddha) and, among worldly people, there is no dharma that is produced (utpanna). Neither of them escape the sameness (samatā) of the dharmadhātu.

Śāriputra. – O son of noble family (kulaputra), what is the sameness of the dharmadhātu?

Samantapuṣpa. – It is what was cognized (jñatā) and seen (dṛṣṭa) by you, O sthavira, when you attained bodhi. Did you then produce the attributes of the saint (āryadharma)?

Śāriputra. – No.

Samantapuṣpa. – Did you destroy the attributes of the worldly person (prthagjanadharma)?

Śāriputra. – No.

Samantapuṣpa. – Did you acquire the attributes of the saint?

Śāriputra. – No.

Samantapuṣpa. – Did you see and cognize the attributes of the worldly person?

Śāriputra. – No.

Samantapuṣpa. – O sthavira, what then did you cognize and see in order to acquire the bodhi of the saints?

Śāriputra. – The way of existence (tathatā) of the worldly person, the way of existence of the bhikṣu who has just attained deliverance (vimukti), the way of existence of the bhikṣu entered into nirvāṇa without residue (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa). This way of existence is a single way of existence; it does not involve any differentiation.

Samantapuṣpa. – O Śāriputra, it is the way of existence characteristic of the dharmadhātu, the unshakeable way of existence (akṣobhyatathatā) and, by this way of existence, one will know the way of existence of all dharmas.

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206 In Tibetan, chos kyi dbyiṅs Ḥkhrugs paḥi tin ṅe Ḥdzin.

207 The identity of worldly people and the saints is one of the favorite themes of the Mahāyānasūtras: cf. Vimalakīrtinirdesa, transl., p. 143, note 5; 156-157; 235; Śūraṃgamasamādhi, transl. p. 184.

208 In the Tibetan version, Samantapuṣpa says to Śāriputra: de bĕṅ ṇid de ni ma log pa de bĕṅ ṇid daṅ / gĕan ma yin pa de bĕṅ ṇid daṅ / mi hgyur ba de bĕṅ ṇid daṅ / mi Ḥkhrugs pa de bĕṅ ṇid de / bisun pa Šarliṅ bu de bĕṅ ṇid chos thams cad kyi de bĕṅ ṇid rjes su rig par byaḥo /
Then Śāriputra said to the Buddha: Bhagavat, there is no object (vastu) that the great mass of fire (agniskandha) does not consume. It is the same for the words spoken by those individuals who affirm that all dharmas enter into the dharmadhātu.

[Vimalākītinirdesā.] – Finally, as is said in the Wei-mo-kie king (Vimalakīrtisūtra), Śāriputra and other śrāvakas said that they themselves were incapable of going to visit Vimalākīrti in order to ask him about his sickness and each of them told how, at another time, they had been greeted with derision by Vimalākīrti.\(^{209}\)

Thus, in many sūtras, it is said that “the knowledge of the bodhisattva outshines that of the śrāvakas and pratykebuddhas.”

IV. OUTSTANDING QUALITIES OF THE BODHISATTVA

Question. – For what reasons does the knowledge of the bodhisattva outshine that of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha?

Answer. – As is said in the Pen-cheng king (Jātakasūtra), the bodhisattva has accumulated the knowledges for innumerable incalculable kalpas (aprameyāsamkhyaikalpa). For innumerable kalpas, there is no suffering that he has not undergone, no deed that he has not accomplished.

In search of the Dharma, he has gone into the fire;\(^ {210}\) he has thrown himself down [from the top of a mountain];\(^ {211}\) his skin was flayed;\(^ {212}\) with one of his bones as pen, his blood as ink and his skin as paper, he transcribed a sūtra.\(^ {213}\) It was out of love for the Dharma that he suffered these enormous torments.

In order to acquire knowledge, from lifetime to lifetime he venerated his teachers, looking upon them as Buddhas. He recited, studied and penetrated all the existing sūtras.\(^ {214}\) For innumerable incalculable kalpas

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\(^{210}\) Avadāna of Dharmagaveśin or Subhāṣitagaveśin: cf. p. 690F, note.

\(^{211}\) Jātaka of the ṛṣi who threw himself down at the feet of the Buddha Kaṇḍinya from the summit of a high mountain (cf. p. 751F); story to be compared with the story of the young brāhmin in search of a stanza (p. 689F, note).

\(^{212}\) Jātaka of the flayed nāga (cf. p. 853-855F).

\(^{213}\) Jātaka of Dharmarakta or Dharmarat (cf. p. 975-976F; below, k. 49, p. 412a).

\(^{214}\) Adopting the variant kiai-t’a.
he ceaselessly reflected and thought. He investigated everything, beautiful and ugly, profound and superficial, good and bad, pure and impure, eternal and transitory, existent and non-existent, etc. He meditated, analyzed and questioned. In view of knowledge, he venerated the Buddhas, bodhisattvas and śrāvakas. He heard the Dharma, questioned, trusted, reflected properly and acted in conformity with the Dharma.

Completely fulfilling such causes and conditions of knowledge, how could he not outshine the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas?

Finally, the wisdom (prajñā) of the bodhisattva is assisted and adorned by the first five perfections (pāramitā). He possesses the power of skillful means (upāyabala); he has thoughts of loving-kindness (maitrī) and compassion (karuṇā) for all beings; he is not obstructed by wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi); he dwells in the ten levels (bhūmi); his knowledge (jñāna) is profound (gambhīra) and his strength (prabhāva) is great. For these great reasons, he outshines the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; for these great reasons, the lesser ones disappear by themselves. The arhats and pratyekabuddhas do not have these prerogatives. This is why the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra says here: “The bodhisattva who wants to outshine the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas should practice the perfection of wisdom.”

Fourth Section OBTAINING THE GATES OF RECOLLECTION AND CONCENTRATION

NOTE ON DHĀRAṆĪ

Here the Traité returns to the dhāraṇī studied above (p. 317-321F, 328F). It is not correctly called a mantra, a magical formula as is usually translated; it is first and foremost the memorizing of the teachings of all the Buddhas. This is indeed how the Tibetans and Chinese understood the term; the former render it as gzuis ‘holder’, related to the perfect of the root ḡzin pa ‘to lay hold of, to seize’; the latter transcribe it by the characters t’o-lo-ni or t’o-lien-ni, or translate it as tsong-tch’e, ‘completely retaining’.

Already in the canonical sūtras (Majjhima, I, p. 480; II, p. 173), Śākyamuni applied it to the operations required of the bhikṣu who seeks the truth:

1. He lends ear and listens to the teaching (ohitasoto dhammaduṇāti).
2. Having listened to the teaching, he keeps it in his memory (satvā dhammaduṇātuḥareti).
3. He examines the meaning of the teachings that he keeps in his memory (dhāritānāṃ dhammadūṇānāṃ upaparikkhāti).
4. While he is examining the meaning, the teachings become imprinted in him (attāmaṃ upaparikkhato dhammaduṇā niṇjhānāṃ khamanti).
Hearing (śrāvana), memorizing (dhāraṇā), examining (upaparīkṣaṇa) and strong adherence to the teachings (dharmarāṇidhyānaksanti) summarize the spiritual program of the Buddha’s disciples, learned (bahuṣruta), endowed with memory (smṛta) and clear (samprajñāt).

According to the Anguttara, II, p. 178, the disciple who memorizes the entirety of the Buddhist scriptures, nine-membered according to the Pāli tradition, twelve-membered according to the Sanskrit tradition, is described as learned (bahuṣṣuta) and a holder of the Dharma (dhammadhara). The enterprise, arduous though it may be, was not beyond the capacities of the prodigious memory of the Indians. However, so as not to impose an unsupportable burden, the Anguttara adds that it is enough to understand the meaning and though it may be, was not beyond the capacities of the prodigious memory of the Indians. However, so as not to impose an unsupportable burden, the Anguttara adds that it is enough to understand the meaning and the letter of a single stanza of four feet and to live according to the Dharma in order to merit the title of bahuṣṣuta and dhammadhara (Catuppādāya ce pi bhikkhu gāhāya atthaṁ aṇāya dharmam aṇāya dhammānudhammapatipanno hoti bahuṣsuto dhammadharo ti alaṁ vacanāya ti). This was to open the door a crack to compromises which later Buddhists took part in broadly.

Memorization of the Dharma gained even more importance in the Mahāyāna from the point of view of requiring the use of a new vocabulary. To the ‘learned’ śrāvaka (bahuṣruta, mahābāhuśrutiaprāpta) there succeeded the bodhisattva ‘in possession of recollections’ (dhāraṇīpratilabdhha, dhāraṇīprāpta) who, not content with memorizing the nine-membered or twelve-membered scriptures, is going to keep in memory the teachings of the innumerable Buddhas of the three times and ten directions, and to preach them to beings.

Pañcaviṃśatika, p. 219, l. 12-14; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1461, l. 19-20. – Yat kincid buddhāir bhagavadbhir bhāṣitam iha lokadhātau samantād daśasau dīkṣu lokadhātusu tat sarvam ādhārayisyami. “All that has been said by the blessed buddhas in the present universe and in the universes of the ten directions, I will retain all that.”

Daśabhūmika, p. 79. – Sa evam apramāṇair dhāraṇīṃukhāṃśamkhyeyasatasahasraśrēṣṭhā sa deva dīkṣaḥ aprameyānāṃ buddhānāṃ bhagavantān sakāśād dharmāṃ śrṇotī śrutāṃ vismārayati, yathāśrūtām cāpamāṇavabhaktita evaṃ nirdiṣṭati: “[The Bodhisattva], by means of innumerable hundreds of thousands of incalculable dhāraṇīṃukhas, heard the Dharma of the innumerable blessed Buddhas of the ten directions and, having heard, he taught what he had heard with incalculable details.”

Lalitavistara, p. 35, l. 18. – Dhāraṇīpratilambhāḥ sarvabuddhabhāṣitāśrūṣāḥ dhāraṇatāyai pravartate. “The acquisition of the dhāraṇī leads to the memorization of the words of all the Buddhas.”

Āloka, p. 98, l. 3-4. – Smṛtī hi granthāsthadhāraṇena dhārayatīti kṛtvā dhāraṇīṃukhāḥ iti. “Insofar as memory ‘retains’ by retaining books and their meanings, we speak of ‘accumulation of dhāraṇī’. “

Just as the three higher samādhis – śūnyatā, ānīmitta and apraṇihita – are called vimokṣamukha ‘gateways to deliverance’ because they lead to liberation (cf. p. 1221F), so the dhāraṇīs are often called dhāraṇīṃukhas because they all open the door to memorization of the Dharma of the Buddhas and because, by engendering one another, they are in ‘communication’.

The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, p. 147, distinguishes three kinds of dhāraṇīs according to whether they result from retribution of earlier actions (pūrvakarmavipāka), from the effort of listening (śrutābhyaśa) in order
to grasp (grahana) and retain (dhāraṇa) the teachings, or whether they are dependent on mental concentration (samādhisamniśraya).

The first two are within the range of humans: cakravartin kings, ṛṣis and śrāvakas have a certain number of them (cf. 328F). These are the lesser (parīta) dhāraṇīs.

The dhāraṇī that depends on mental concentration is the greater dhāraṇī and is the prerogative of the bodhisattvas. It can be weak (mṛdu), middling (madhya) or superior (adhimātra).

1. Weak dhāraṇī

This belongs to the bodhisattvas who have not yet entered into the bhumis (abhūmipraviṣṭa) and are still at the stage of practicing conviction (adhimukticaryābhūmi).

Still affected by a fleshly body, the bodhisattva searches for, writes, recites, studies and meditates on all the teachings of the Buddha of his period.

According to the Traité (k. 49, p. 412a7-10), this is a matter of the 84,000 articles of the Dharma (dhammaskandha), or else the twelve-membered teaching (dvādaśāṅgapravacana), or else the Four Baskets (catuspīṭaka), namely the four Āgamas (Ekottara, Madhyama, Dīrgha and Saṃyukta), the Abhidharmapiṭaka, the Vinayaṭīka, the Kṣudraṭīka (minor texts) and also all the Mahāyānasūtras such as the Mahāprajñāpāramitā, etc.

According to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 96, the bodhisattva must know: 1) that which is ‘developed’ in the twelve-membered scripture (dvādaśāṅgād vacogatād yad vaipulyam), namely, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, in other words, the Mahāyānasūtras; 2) all the rest of the other members, namely, the Śrāvakapīṭaka; 3) the three outer treatises (bāhyakāṇi śāstrāṇi), namely, logic (hetu), grammar (śabda) and medicine (vyādhivicikitsā); 4) the profane sciences of the arts and crafts (laukikāṇi śilpakarmasthānāni).

The bodhisattva retains these teachings (srutadhāraṇī), considers their meaning (arthopaparīṣā), penetrates the correct value of the articulated sounds and phonemes that expresses them (ghoṣākṣarapraveśa), grants well-considered acquiescence to the teachings (nidhyānakṣānti) and, out of compassion, preaches them to all beings (nirdeśa).

From the viewpoint of the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka, the meaning or the object of the Buddha’s speech and primarily of the Mahāyānasūtras, is the true nature of things (dharmatā), namely, the absence of nature. Without production or destruction, things are merged in primordial non-existence. The only way of conceiving them is not to think of them; the only way of speaking of them is to be silent. Avoiding the two fundamental approaches of the mind, affirmation and negation, they are inconceivable and inexpressible. The true nature of things being the absence of nature, all that one can say about them is insignificant (nirarthaka), whether it is a voluminous sūtra of a hundred thousand ślokas, a simple stanza of four feet (catuspādika gāthā) or a single phoneme (aṅkara).

For this purpose and even before his entry into the bhūmis, the bodhisattva must accumulate the dhāraṇīs.
Above (p. 317-321F) and in the pages that follow, the Traité furnishes precious information on these dhāraṇīs, but the interpretation is not always easy. The bodhisattva strengthens his memory by means of mental exercises or even magical formulas (mantra) in order to succeed in retaining what he has heard just once and to keep the memory throughout all his lifetimes: this is śrutadhāraṇī.

He grasps the discontinuous nature of spoken language which removes from it any expressive value. Such a discovery makes the bodhisattva equally indifferent to blame and to praise: this is ghoṣapraveśadhāraṇī.

He has recourse to mnemonic techniques (dhāraṇīmukha) in order to grasp the true nature of dharmas. Thus, starting with the forty-two phonemes comprising the arapacana syllabary, he constructs phrases showing that things are not. Thus he throws light on both the inexpressibility of the dharmatā and the identity of the phonemes (akṣarasamatā): “The forty-two phonemes are all included in each of them and each of them is included in the forty-two phonemes. This is how the Tathāgata, skilled in Dharma and in phonemes, preaches in phonemes a Dharma which is not included in them.” (Aṣṭādaśa, II, p. 54-55; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 24, p. 396b): this is the akṣarapraveśadhāraṇī.

There is also a vibhajyajñānadhāraṇī by means of which the bodhisattva distinguishes the respective qualities of the beings to be converted and regulates his sermons accordingly. This dhāraṇī undoubtedly is to be compared with the indriyaparāparajñānakāla, the power by which the Buddhas know the degrees of the moral faculties of beings.

Always according to the Traité (p. 317F), the dhāraṇī, as its name indicates, ‘retains’ (dhārayati) the good dharmas and ‘avoids’ (vidhārayati) the bad ones. By good dharmas we should understand primarily the good teachings of the Buddha and, by bad dharmas, the harmful teachings polluted by the unwholesome roots (akuśala) that are passion, aggression and ignorance. By keeping the former and turning away from the latter, the dhāraṇī builds a defence against the pernicious consequences of the passions and repulses the onslaughts of Māra and his cohorts. It is mindfulness (smṛti) and, at the same time, protection (rakṣā, paritrā).

In the same place, the Traité presents a learned definition taken from an Abhidharma which, however, cannot be either that of the Theravādins or the Sarvāstivādins where there is no question of the dhāraṇīs.

“Dhāraṇī is associated with the mind (cittasamprayukta) or dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayukta); impure (sāsraya) or pure (anidāraya); invisible (anidarśana) and without resistance (apratiṅgha); it is included in one element (dhātu), one base of consciousness (āyatana) and one aggregate (skandha), namely, the dharmadhātu, the dharmāyatana and the saṃskāraskandha; it is cognized by all the knowledges (jñāna) except the āsravakṣayajñāna; it is understood only by the mental consciousness (manovijñāna).”

Hence the differences between samādhi and dhāraṇī:

1. Samādhi as concentrated mind is always associated with the mind, whereas dhāraṇī may either be associated with or dissociated from mind.

2. Samādhi disappears when a distraction arises and at the changing of existence; dhāraṇī, once acquired, persists throughout successive states and successive rebirths: it follows its holder like the shadow follows the body or like strong fever follows the sick man. It may be compared to the religious discipline
(śaṃvara) resulting from the taking of vows: it continues to exist in the monastic whose mind is bad or indeterminate or who is unconscious.

3. The prolonged exercise of samādhi is necessary to create dhāraṇī.

Very clear information on the elementary dhāraṇīs to be cultivated by the bodhisattva on the stage of conviction will be found in the Yogācāra treatises, especially in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 272-274 which I [Lamotte] translate with the help of the Chinese versions (T 1579, k. 45, p. 542c16 – 543a24; T 1581, k. 8, p. 934a3-29; T 1582, k. 7, p. 996b20-c18:

Tatra katamā bodhisattvānāṃ dhāraṇī / samsataḥ caturvidhā draṣṭavyā / dharmadhāraṇī, arthadhāraṇī, mantradhāraṇī, bodhisattvakṣāntilābbhāya ca dhāraṇī // 1. tatra dharmadhāraṇī katamā / iha ... adhimuktīcaryābhūmikṣāntau vartate / iyaṃ bodhisattvasya bodhisattvakṣāntilābbhāya dhāraṇī veditavyā /

Translation. – What is the dhāraṇī of the bodhisattva? In brief, it should be considered as being fourfold: i) dhāraṇī of the teachings, ii) dhāraṇī of meaning, iii) dhāraṇī of mantra and iv) dhāraṇī leading to the conviction of the bodhisattva.

1. What is the dhāraṇī of the teachings? The bodhisattva concentrates such power of memory and wisdom that, thanks to it and merely by hearing, he retains for an immense length of time immense works not yet formulated verbally, not yet practiced, formed by collections of names, phrases and phonemes, symmetrically composed and symmetrically arranged.

2. What is the dhāraṇī of meaning? Like the preceding one but with the following difference: The bodhisattva, for an immense length of time, retains the immense meaning of these same teachings, a meaning not yet formulated nor practiced mentally.

3. What is the dhāraṇī of mantra? The bodhisattva gains such mastery of concentration that by means of it he consecrates magical syllables destined to pacify the scourges of all beings, and thus these syllables become effective, supremely effective and infallible in pacifying many scourges. In the bodhisattva, this is the dhāraṇī of mantra.

4. In the bodhisattva, what is the dhāraṇī leading to the conviction of the bodhisattva? A bodhisattva who is personally devoted to solid [?, sic] causes, who holds wisdom, lives in solitude, eats moderately, eats nothing impure, does not enter into anyone’s field of vision, eats only one kind of food, devotes himself completely to ecstasy, sleeps little and is awake most of the night: this bodhisattva considers, weighs and examines the meaning of the magical syllables offered by the Tathāgatas allowing the acquisition of the conviction of the bodhisattva. For example, the formula iti miṣṭi kiṣṭi bhīkṣānti padāni svāhā. Thus familiarized with these magical syllables, he discovers the meaning in the following way by himself without learning it from anyone else: “In these magical syllables, there is no significant value; they are purely and simply without significance; their meaning is insignificance.” And he does not look for any other meaning than that. In this way, the meaning of these magical syllables is well penetrated by this bodhisattva. Having properly penetrated the meaning of these magical syllables, he also accordingly penetrates the meaning of all dharmas and he does that by himself without learning it from anyone else.
Furthermore, he penetrates the meaning in the following way: “The meaning of intrinsic nature of dharmas, enunciated in all kinds of expressions, is without real value, and moreover it is their inexpressible intrinsic nature that constitutes the [true] meaning of their intrinsic natures.” Having thus correctly penetrated the meaning of the intrinsic natures of dharmas, the bodhisattva does not seek any other meaning than that and, by the penetration of this noble meaning, he conquers supreme joy and satisfaction. The [conviction] thus conquered by this bodhisattva on the basis of magical syllables should be called the conviction of the bodhisattva. By taking hold of it, this bodhisattva acquires the purity of high resolution in a short time and finally finds himself in the higher conviction belonging to the stage of the practice of conviction (adhimukticaryābhubhumi: cf. Siddhi, p. 731). This is, in the bodhisattva, the dhāraṇī leading to the conviction of the bodhisattva.

- The canonical sūtras mentioned at the beginning of this note had already defined the steps required in order to accede to the truth: hearing the teachings (dharmaśravaṇa), memorization (dhārayati), examination (upaparīkṣa) and acquiescence (kṣānti). While following the same framework, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, a work of Yogācāra origin, introduces a new element by bringing in magical formulas (mantrapada). In the mantradhāraṇī, they serve to pacify the scourges (īti) of beings, not by themselves but insofar as they are blessed or consecrated (adhiṣṭhita) by the bodhisattva. In the kṣāntilabhāya dhāraṇī, they show the inadequacy of language to express the absolute. In the Yogācāra view, the absolute is the true manner of existence (bhūtatathāta) of things or their absolute intrinsic nature (parinīpannasvabhāva), but from the Madhyamaka point of view, the only one of interest to us here, the absolute is the absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā) of beings and of things which in no way can be hypostatized.

- For the Buddhabhūmisūtropadeśa, T 1530, k. 5, p. 315cc23-28, which frequently cites the Yogācārabhūmi, the miraculous pratavekṣanajñāna of the Tathāgatas contains (dhārayati) all the dhāraṇīmukhas and, in general, up to the miraculous attributes of the Buddha that it can bring associated with these dhāraṇīmukhas. Dhāraṇī is a higher memory and wisdom (adhimātrasmurtiprjñā) capable of retaining in its entirety the immense teachings of the Buddhas without forgetting them. In a single dharma, dhāraṇī bears upon all the dharmas; in a single vyañjana, it is concerned with all the vyañjanas; in a single artha, it is concerned with all the arthas. Adding up innumerable qualities (guna), it is called an inexhaustible treasury (akṣayakośa).

2. Middling dhāraṇī

According to the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, p. 147, the middling or intermediate (madhyā) dhāraṇī belongs to the bodhisattva who is still on the impure bhumis (aśuddhabhūmika), in other words, the first seven bhumis.

There he is still afflicted with a fleshly body that limits his movements. However, listening respectfully to the collected teachings of the Buddhas, he enters into religion and becomes, from the fifth bhūmi onward,
an excellent preacher of the Dharma, endowed with the dhāraṇīs of recollection and practice (śrutācāradhāraṇīpratilabda dharmabhāṇaka): cf. Daśabhūmika, p. 46.

3. Higher Dhāraṇī

This is the prerogative of the bodhisattvas on the pure bhumis (pariśuddhabhūmika), i.e., the last three bhumis. From the eighth bhumī onward, the bodhisattva, rid of his fleshly body, assumes a body born of the fundamental element (dharmadhātujākaγā), travels through the ten directions of universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, worships the Buddhas, collects their words and communicates them to beings. On the ninth bhumī, he utilizes an infinite number of dhāraṇīs: cf. Daśabhūmika, p. 71, 79.

This higher (adhimātra) dhāraṇī described by the Prajñās (cf. p. 328F) as asaṅgadhāraṇī, is beyond the range of the heretics, śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and even beginning (ādikarmika) bodhisattvas. Only bodhisattvas endowed with immense merit, great wisdom and great power can possess it.

It is not questionable that the earliest Mahāyānasūtras and the great scholars may have wished to see, in the dhāraṇīs, a memory (smṛti) increased twofold by wisdom (prajñā), capable of retaining the immense teachings of the Buddhas but still contained in the texts.

In early Buddhism, the word of the Buddha, good in meaning (svārtha), good in the letter (svuvañjan), distinguishes itself by numerous qualities, but is, first of all and above all, true. It derives its efficacy from truth alone; it has nothing magical about it. It does not act mechanically like a mantra and asks only to be heard (śruta), thought about (cintita) and meditated on or practiced (bhāvita). It teaches deliverance and the path leading to it, but it does not depend on the Buddha whether the traveler follows his indications or not. Among his disciples, only a few will attain the supreme goal, nirvāṇa. The Buddha can do nothing about it: he is only the mārgakhyāvin ‘the one who shows the Path’ (Majjhima, III, p. 6).


It is only half-heartedly and rather belatedly that the Theras of Ceylon attributed a magical value to some suttas, used them as ‘protections’ (paritta, pirit) and arranged collections of them (cf. Milinda, p. 150-151; Khuddakapāṭha, Catubhāṇvāra). In the reign of Goṭhabhaya (309-322) the science of exorcism (bhūtavijjā) was introduced into Ceylon by Saṃghamitta, a Cola sectarian monk of the Vettulavāda, and welcomed favorably by the Dhammarucika monks of the Abhayagiri (Mahāvaṃsa, XXXVI, v. 113). A great festival with recitation of a paritta, the Ratanasutta (Suttanipāta, v. 222-238; Mahāvastu, I, p. 290-295) was institutionalized at Poḷonnaruva by king Sena II (Cūḷavaṃsa, LI, v. 79-82).
In our own times in Ceylon and Burma, a Book of Paritta (pirit-pota) is found in all Buddhist households; paritta ceremonies are held regularly according to the norms of a strictly regulated ritual (cf. E. Waldschmidt, *Das Paritta, eine magische Zeremonie der buddhistischen Proster auf Ceylon*, Baessler-Archiv, 17, 1934, p. 139-150); a mass of paritta, partly non-canonical, circulates among the public. These magical practices, along with the cult of popular gods, constitutes what H. Bechert calls ‘the ‘Little Tradition’ in contrast to the traditional Buddhist teaching (sāsana), the ‘Great Tradition’ directly oriented towards detachment from the world and nibbāna. The interface between the two tendencies has been masterfully described by Bechert in a work recommended both for its precision and extent of its information as well as the soundness of his judgment: *Buddhismus, Staat und gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravāda-Buddhismus*, 3 vols., Frankfurt und Wiesbaden, 1966-1967-1973. We may mention as well the following articles: *Einige Fragen der Religionssoziologie und Struktur des südasiatischen Buddhismus*, in Beitraäge zur religionsoziologischen Forschung, 4, 1968, p. 251-295; *Eine alte Gottheit in Ceylon und Süddindien*, in WZKSOA, 12-13. 1968-69, p. 33-42; *Theravāda Buddhist Sangha: Some General Observations on Historical and Political Factors in its Deverlopment*, in Asian Studies, 29, 1969-70, p. 761-778; *Sangha, State, Society, ‘Nation’: Persistence of traditions in ‘post-traditional’ Buddhist Societies*, in Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Winter, 1973, p. 85-95.

It is more difficult to detect the importance of this ‘Small Vehicle’ on the Indian subcontinent. Acceptance of the Holy Dharma has never involved renunciation of ancestral beliefs, local cults or even popular superstitions. The Buddha did not favor them; he condemned as vulgar and unworthy all the forms of charlatanism by which some śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas derived their subsistence (Dīgha, I, p. 9-12); he condemned monks who unjustifiably attributed to themselves superhuman powers (Vinaya, III, p. 90-91); he forbade his monks to show their miraculous powers in public (Vinaya, II, p. 110-112); he hated, detested and abhorred feats of magic and clairvoyance: ṛddhi and ādešanāprātiḥārya (Dīgha, I, p. 213-214); he placed among wrong views śīlavataparāmarśa, the blind belief in the efficacy of ascetic practices and rituals (Vinaya, I, p. 184; Majjhima, I, p. 433; Anguttara, III, p. 377; IV,p. 144 seq.) and if he was forced to recognize a certain efficacy of formulas (mantra), mumbling (japa), medicinal plants (ausadha), illusionists (māyākarma), therapeutic practices (cikitsā), clairvoyance (divyacakṣus) and magicians (ṛddhi), he did not fail to emphasize that all this had nothing to do with the Path to nirvāṇa and did not lead to pacification of suffering (Vidyāsthānopamasūtra, in E. Waldschmidt, *Kleine Brāhmī-Schriftrolle*. NAWG, 1959, p. 1-25).

The warnings of the Master were not always taken into consideration. The śrāmaṇa Śrīmitra, from a princely family and native of the Western lands, came to China in the yong-kia period (307-313), introduced the science of incantation in the Kiang-tong (lower Yang-tseu) region. When his friend Tcheou Yi was executed, he paid a visit to his orphaned children and, in the presence of the body, recited three prayers in Sanskrit and then pronounced mantras of several thousands of words. He remembered well mantras that were efficient in all situations (Kao seng tchouan, T 2059, k. 1, p. 328a; transl. R. Shih, *Biographie des moines éminents*, 1968, p. 44; E. Zürcher, *Buddhist Conquest of China*, I, p. 103, where Śrīmitra is presented as a specialist of dhāranī, whereas it probably was mantra; the two words are not exactly synonymous). According to the evidence, unfortunately late, of Hiuang-tsang, the Mahāsāṃghikas
had a canon of five baskets including, apart from the four traditional baskets – Sūtra, Vinaya, Abhidharma and Kṣudraka – a Kin-tcheou-tsan or mantrapitaka and not a dhāranipitaka as is generally translated (Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 9, p. 923a7-9).

By contrast, still on the subcontinent, the powerful learned sect of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika was careful not to allow magical practices to occur in the economy of the Path and if, by chance it makes mention of mantra and vidyā in its Abhidharmas (Ṣatpāda and Vibhāṣā), this is at a purely documentary level: it ignores or pretends to ignore even the name of dhāraṇī. Its most illustrious spokesman, Vasubandhu, denies any value to magical syllables. He states: “In the curative action of medicinal herbs, the Phat svāhā muttered by the charlatan (kuhakavaidyā) has no efficacy whatsoever” (Kośabhāṣya, p. 475; Kośavyākhya, p. 716).

One should not look for an unconditional restoration of charlatanism and magic in the Mahāyāna. Like the Buddha, it condemns blind belief in the efficacy of rituals and practices (śīlavrataparāmarśa, Pañcaviṃśati, p. 79, l. 9; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 296, l. 12; as example, it proposes the avaivartika bodhisattva of the eighth bhūmi who definitively renounces the magical arts using mantra, japa and vidyā (Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 83; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 17, p. 342b; T 220, vol. VII, k. 449, p. 266a).

On the other hand, its great heroes, the bodhisattvas, are holders of dhāraṇī (dhāranipratilabdha) insofar as they hold the teachings of all the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions, and its adepts are all also thus favored who hold, in the form of books (grantha), the sūtras, voluminous or brief, where these teachings are recorded.

There are great differences between the sūtras of the canonical Tripiṭaka and the Mahāyānasūtras the sermons of which constitute the first and the second turnings, respectively, of the wheel of the Dharma, dharmacakrapravartana (Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 442; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 12, p. 311b; T 220, vol. VII, k. 437, p. 201b; Traité, T 1509, k. 65, p. 517a-b).

The sūtras of the Tripiṭaka are concerned primarily with renunciants ‘who have gone forth to lead the homeless life’. After the death of the Buddha, these bhikṣus recited them together and transmitted them orally to their successors. At the beginning, these recitations, accessible to all, appeared as the spiritual heritage of the Buddha and the very expression of the truth, but nobody thought to attribute to them any occult or mysterious power.

The Mahāyānasūtras, on the other hand, were addressed originally only to the great bodhisattva assemblies and to a few chosen śrāvakas; they remained unknown to ordinary people who were incapable of understanding them. Written down, entrusted to the care of the great bodhisattvas, they remained hidden for centuries in mysterious inaccessible places. It was only five centuries after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, when the Holy Dharma was in danger of being extinguished, that they were discovered and began to circulate in Jambudvīpa (cf. vol. II, p. 933-941F; vol. III, Introduction, p. xxxii-xxxviiF). There then developed in India a bibliolatry, unknown in the first centuries, but which has many parallels in other religious systems, the Bible, the Koran, etc.
In the very origins of the Mahāyāna, the first Prajñāpāramitāsūtras appeared as a mahāvidyā (in the Chinese versions, ta ming tcheou), i.e., a great magical science (cf. Aṣṭāsāhasrikā, p. 203, l. 10; 233, l. 7; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 9, p. 283b9; T 220, vol. VII, k. 429, p. 156a18; Aṣṭādaśa, T 220, vol. VII, k. 502, p. 556a24; Śatasāhasrikā, T 220, vol. V, k. 102, p. 568b19; k. 105, p. 580b27). The sons and daughters of good family who take, keep, recite, study and propagate these sūtras, who write them down and make them into a book (pustaka), and pay homage to them (pūjā) by offering flowers, perfume, cloth, banners, bells and lamps, these sons and daughters of good family gain immense merit which brings them, before long, to supreme complete enlightenment, but – and this is essential – assures them in this very lifetime of considerable material benefit (drṣṭadhārmika guṇa). Māra and evil spirits have no hold (avatāra) on them; enemies who try to fight them, quarrel with them and contradict them vanish by themselves; the four gods, Śakra, Brahmā and all the Buddhas guarantee them safekeeping, defense and protection (rakṣavaranaguptī); anger and madness give place in them to loving-kindness and presence of mind; no weapon can attack them; they are invulnerable in battle, etc. (cf. Aṣṭāsāhasrikā, p. 187-203; E. Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in eight thousand lines, 1973, p. 102-119; The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, 1975).

What has been said here about the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras is equally valid for all the other Mahāyānasūtras as is well expressed in the dedications (pariṇāṇā) that end them. Different from the sūtras of the Tripitaka which originally have only didactic value, the Mahāyānasūtras do not merely contain the teachings of the Buddhas but also have innumerable magical virtues that assure their adherents spiritual and immediate material benefits. These are correctly called ‘protections’ (parirā), ‘safeguards’ (rakṣā), dharanīs. By a quite natural shift in meaning, the word dhāraṇī, originally conceived of by the bodhisattvas as the memorizing of the Buddhas’ teachings, here comes to mean the sacred texts in which they are written down and which become, in regard to their wondrous effects, a cult (pūjā) object.

Aṣṭādaśa, I, p. 84 and Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 20, p. 364a, transl. – This profound perfection of Wisdom, O Ānanda, is the entry into all the phonemes; it is the doorway of all the dhāraṇīs in which the bodhisattva-mahāsattva must exert himself. All the unhindered knowledges, eloquence, etc., appear in the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas bearing these dhāraṇīs. I have said, O Ānanda, that this Perfection of Wisdom is the inexhaustible treasure of the Holy Dharma in the blessed Buddhas, future and past. This is why, O Ānanda, I declare this to you: He who will take, retain, recite and penetrate this profound Perfection of Wisdom will carry the bodhi of the blessed Buddhas, past, present and future. This Perfection of Wisdom, O Ānanda, is called dhāraṇī by me, and by carrying these dhāraṇīs of the Perfection of Wisdom, you will retain all these teachings.

- The miraculous action that produces the bodhi of the Buddhas and brings innumerable benefits in this very lifetime (drṣṭadhārmika guṇa) is characteristic of the Mahāyānasūtras in general and of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras in particular. It does not reside in the total of the ślokas, 8,000, 18,000, 25,000 100,000, that make up these sūtras of lengthy development, but is found complete in each of these ślokas and, what is more, in each of the phonemes (aṣṭara) of which they are constituted, for, as we have seen, the forty-two phonemes of human language are interpenetrating and it is enough to pronounce one of them to
express them all. And just as the Buddha can preach the Dharma in its entirety by means of a single sound (cf. p. 1380F, n. 1), so his disciples can reproduce it by a single vocalization and derive all the benefit.

One of the major characteristics of Tantrism is to have condensed the thaumaturgic power of the sūtras into short mantras, bringing together understandable words, transparent expressions, more or less justifiable, with bizarre incoherent phonemes, hrīṃ, hrāṃ, hrūṃ, phat, the ancient sound Oṃ, often written with the anusāsika, the svāha of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. These unintelligible sounds constitute an important element of mantra: in many cases, the bija, the seed, the nucleus of the formula and its thaumaturgical power, resides in it. They incarnate the deity, the person who possesses the bija, the hrdaya, the mysterious name, possesses the deity. The tantric liturgy rests on this principle as ancient as the Vedas and the abhicāra rituals: pūja, offering, sādhanā, etc. (L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bouddhisme, Étude et Matériaux, London, 1898, p. 121).

For the rôle of dhāraṇī in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, we should mention the works of E. Conze: The Prajñāpāramitā Literature, 1960, p. 79-90; various articles in Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, 1967; The Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts, 1973. – Tantric definitions of mantra (gsaṅsṅags), vidyā (rig sṅags) and of dhāraṇī (gzuṅsṅags) in A. Wayman, The Buddhist Tantras, 1973, p. 64-65).

[268a] Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21, l. 15; Ėatasāhasrikā, p. 68, l. 3-4). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to acquire the gates of remembrance and the gates of concentration should exert himself in the perfection of wisdom (Dhāraṇīṃukhasamādhisāmakāni pratilabdhukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyām sīkṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. GATES OF REMEMBRANCE (DHĀRAṆĪMUKHA)

In regard to dhāraṇīs, refer (p. 317-321F) to the Tsan-p’ou-sa (Bodhisattvastutiparivarta). The ‘gates’ (mukha) of the dhāraṇīs are preparatory practices (prāyogikadharma) to obtaining the dhāraṇīs. In a similar way, the three ‘concentrations’, samādhis, are called ‘gates of deliverance’ (vimokṣamukha).215 What are these preparatory practices?

1. Śrutadharadhāraṇī ‘dhāraṇī for retaining what one has heard216

215 The three higher samādhis, śānyatāsamādhi, etc., are commonly designated by the name of vimokṣamukha: see p. 1213F.
216 See above, p. 318F, 328F; and later, k. 49, p. 415a8; k. 69, p. 540b5-9; k. 74, p. 579c10-12; k. 85, p. 657a15-19.
- See also Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, T VII, no. 220, k. 515, p. 634b27-c1.
1) Whoever wishes to retain that which he has heard must think of it attentively so as to develop his memory (smṛti). First he should think of an analogous thing (already familiar to him) and to join that to his mind so as to discover a thing that he has not yet seen. Thus Tcheou-li-p’an-t’o-kia (Cūdapanthaka) paid so much attention to cleaning leather shoes that his mind (manas) became concentrated and he eliminated the stains of his mind (cittamala). In the beginner (ādikarmika), this is the dhāraṇī of retaining what one has heard.

When one is able to retain what one has heard three times, the faculty of the mind is developed and sharpened; when one can retain what one has heard twice, it is strengthened; when one can retain what one has heard once, it is acquired (prāpta) and one does not forget anything; that is the first exercise (prayoga) of the dhāraṇī of retaining what one has heard.

2) Sometimes the bodhisattva who has entered into concentration (samadhi) obtains the liberation free of forgetfulness (asampramāsāvimokṣa) and by its power he retains, without forgetting, all the words (vacana) and sermons (dharmedeśana) down to the smallest syllable and the smallest phoneme (aṅgara): that is the second practice.

3) Sometimes by the power of a magical phrase (mantra), the bodhisattva obtains the dhāraṇī of retaining what he has heard.

4) Finally, sometimes on assuming a rebirth (upapatti) as a result of actions of his previous lifetimes (pūrvajanman), he retains all that he has heard and does not forget.

That is what is called the gate of remembrance of retaining what one has heard.

2. Ghoṣapraṣādhaṇāṇī

‘The dhāraṇī of entering into the true nature of articulated sounds’

Furthermore, the bodhisattva, hearing articulated sounds (ghoṣa), words (vacana), distinguishes their beginning and end (pūrvaparānta) and considers their true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa); he knows that these words arise and perish from moment to moment.

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217 Adopting the variant yi.
218 The bhikṣu Cūdapanthaka was known for his stupidity. The Buddha gave him two sentences to meditate on: “I am removing the dust, I am removing the stain” and sent him to clean the monks’ shoes. While performing this humble task, Cūdapanthaka meditated on the Buddha’s words. He finally understood that removing the dust consisted not only of brushing the shoes but also and above all of eliminating the threefold poison of desire, hatred and stupidity. His conflicting emotions were immediately cut and he attained arhathood. See references given above, p. 1543-1544F.
219 Cf. the Asaṅghadhāraṇī referred to above, p. 328F.
220 Cf. p. 319-321F.
[Normally], when articulated sounds have just perished, beings recall them (anusmaranti) and grasp their characteristics (nimittāny udgṛhṇaṇi). Thinking of these words that have just perished, they say to themselves: “This man has insulted me”, and they feel hatred (dveṣa). [Mutatis mutandis], if it is a matter of praise (varṇa), it is the same.

The bodhisattva, however, considers beings (sattva) in such a way that, although they may have insulted him for a hundred thousand kalpas, he has no hatred (dveṣa); they may have praised him for a hundred thousand kalpas, he has no joy (muditā). He knows indeed that articulated sounds (ghoṣa) arise and perish like an echo (pratiśrutkā) and, like the sound of a drum (dundubhisvara), they are without an agent (kāraka). Without an agent, they are without stability (asthitika) and, being absolutely empty (atyantaśūnya), they deceive only the ears of fools (mūḍha).

That is what is called the dhāraṇī of entering into [the true nature] of articulated sounds (ghoṣapraveśadhāraṇī).

3. Akṣarapraveśadhāraṇī ‘the dhāraṇī of penetrating the phonemes’

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221 The inexpressibility of language is a favorite theme of the Mahāyānasūtras: see Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, tr., p. 148-149; Śūrangamasamādhi, tr., p. 188-189.

222 Dhāraṇī based on the Arapacana alphabet of which the forty-two letters are supposed to represent all the phonemes of the spoken language. It notes some sounds that are not of Indian origin but belong rightly to Iranian languages; it was a matter of a Scythian alphabet introduced into India by the Śāka about the time of the Christian era (cf. Mémorial Sylvain Lévi, Ysa, Paris, p. 355-363).

In the viewpoint of the Prajñāpāramitā, the forty-two phonemes noted in this alphabet are not yet of magical worth; they are simply mnemotechniques (dhāraṇīmukha) recalling the essential points of the Buddhadharma. They appear in turn at the beginning of a phrase used to define the true nature of dhrmas.

This very simple catechism is reproduced fully in the various versions of the large Prajñāpāramitāsūtras:


Here are translations of several extracts from the original Sanskrit restored according to the editions of N. Dutt and P. Ghosa: Punar apraṃ Subhute bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya mahāyānaṃ yaduta dhāraṇīmukhāni/katamāni dhāraṇāīmukhāni/akṣarasamataḥ bhāsyasamatā ... tasya viṃśatir anuṣaṃsāḥ pratikāṅśaśaivāyaḥ .../

Transl. – Furthermore, O Subhūti, the Great Vehicle of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva is the gates of dhāraṇī. What are these gates of dhāraṇī? The similarity of phonemes, the similarity of utterances, the gate of entry into the phonemes. What is this gate of entry into the phonemes? The letter A is gate because all dharmas are, from the beginning, without birth (an-utpanna). The letter RA is gate because all dharmas are rid of dust (ra-jaś). The latter PA is gate because all dharmas are signs of the absolute (pa-ramārtha). The letter CA is gate because all dharmas are
Furthermore, there is a dhāraṇī that, by using the forty-two phonemes (dvācatvārīṃśad aksara), includes (saṃgrhaṅāti) all words (vacana) and names (nāman).

What are these forty-two phonemes? A, LO, PO, TCHÖ, NA (A, RA, PA, CA, NA), etc.

[The first phoneme A condenses the phrase A-t’i-a-neou-po-nai (ādy-anutpanna)]. A-t’, in the language of the Ts’in, means ‘beginning’; a-neou-po-nai, in the language of the Ts’in, means ‘unborn’. 223

As soon as the bodhisattva who is practicing this dhāraṇī hears the phoneme A, at once he penetrates that fact that ‘all dharmas are unborn from the beginning’ (sarvadharmāṇām ādyanuttanātvaṃ). And so on for the other phonemes [LO PO TCHÖ NA], etc.: to the extent that they hear them, the bodhisattva penetrates [even further] into the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas.

This is called the dhāraṇī of penetrating the phonemes (aṃṣaramukhapraveśadhāraṇī). In the Mo-ho-yen p‘in (Mahāyānaparivarta), these aṃṣaramukhas will be discussed. 224 [268b]

The bodhisattva who acquires all the concentrations of the three times (tryadhvasamādhi) – concentration of unhindered brilliance (ānantaryaprabhā), etc., - acquires each of these innumerable incalculable

free of death (cyā-vana) and birth. The letter NA is gate because all dharmas are without name (nā-man). [And so on for the other 37 letters of the alphabet].

Apart from these [forty-two letters], there is no other usage of phonemes. Why? Because there is no other name that can be used thanks to which it could be expressed, designated, characterized, perceived. All dharmas, O Subhūti, should be understood to be like space. This is called the entry into the gates of dhāraṇī, the entry into the phonmes, beginning with the letter A.

Every bodhisattva-mahāsattva who manifests this skill in the phonemes beginning with the letter A will not fail in any of his utterances…

Every bodhisattva-mahāsattva who will hear this seal of the phonemes beginning with the latter A and having heard it, will study it, retain it, recite it and teach it to others, can attain twenty benefits…

- In the Avatāṃsaka, a young scholar named Viśvāmitra informs Sudhana that by pronouncing the phonemes listed in the Arapacana alphabet, he broke through each of the forty-two gates (mukha) of the Prajñāpāramitā in turn. See the section of the Gaṇḍavyūha, ed. Suzuki, p. 448, l. 21 – 450, l. 21, and the various Chinese translations, complete or partial (T 278, k. 57, p. 765b-766a; T 279, k. 76, p. 418a-c; T 293, k. 31, p. 804a-805a; T 295, p. 876c-877b; T 1019, p. 707c-709a; T 1020, p. 709b-c.

- The Mahāyānists were not alone in using the alphabet in question. The Dharmaguptakas, a Hīnayānist sect, recited it as well but we do not know what meaning they attributed to it. It was forbidden for the monks to pronounce the phonemes at the same time, similar to the brāhmaṇas; the phoneme intoned by the leader of the ritual was to be repeated in chorus by the monks. This, at least, seems to be what the sixth pāyantika of the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya says, T 1428, k. 11, p. 638c21-639a28.

- The Arapacana formula was called on to play an important part in the cabbala of tantric Buddhism. On this subject, see Hībbgirin, s.v. Arahashana, p. 34; Ceylon Encyclopedia, II, p. 67-70.

223 This paragraph is evidently a Chinese gloss introduced into the text.

224 See references on p. 1867F.
dhāraṇīs. Together, they are given the name of pañcaśatadhāraṇīmukha, ‘the five hundred means of memorizing’ and constitute the treasury of the good attributes and qualities of the bodhisattva (bodhisattvakaśaladharmanugānaśa).\textsuperscript{225}

That is what is called the dhāraṇīmukhas.

**II. GATES OF CONCENTRATION (SAMĀDHIMUKHA)**

The samādhis ‘concentrations’ are of two kinds: \(i\) samadhi belonging to the śrāvaka system; \(ii\) samādhi belonging to the Mahāyāna system.

1. Śrāvaka concentrations

The samādhis belonging to the śrāvaka system are the three samādhis: \(i\) [samādhi of emptiness (śūnyatā), \(ii\) of signlessness (ānimitta) and \(iii\) of wishlessness (apranihita)].

There are also three samādhis: \(i\) śūnyatāśūnyatāsamādhi, \(ii\) ānimittānimittasamādhi, \(iii\) apranihitāpranihitasamādhi.\textsuperscript{226}

There are also three other samādhis: \(i\) with examination and analysis (savātārasavācāra), \(ii\) without examination and with analysis only (avātāravācāramātra), \(iii\) with neither examination nor analysis (avātāra-vācāra).\textsuperscript{227}

There is also the five-membered (pañcāṅga) samādhi,\textsuperscript{228} the innate samādhi of five knowledges (pañcajñāna); all are called samādhi.

Moreover, all the absorptions are sometimes called samāpatti and sometimes samādhi. The four trances are sometimes called dhyāna, sometimes samāpatti and sometimes samādhi. The other absorptions with the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[225] As far as I [Lamotte] can tell, this is not a matter of a Basket (pīṭaka) of texts – dhāraṇī-pīṭaka or bodhisattvapiṭaka – but a group of attributes belonging to the bodhisattvas. In the large Prajñāpāramitāsūtra (T VI, no. 220, k. 378, p. 952a26-27; T VII, no. 220, k. 467, p. 364b14; k. 529, p. 717b25; T VIII, no. 223,k. 24, p. 394c-9), the five hundred dhāraṇīmukhas are part of a long series of supramundane (lokottara) attributes belonging only to the bodhisattvas and distinguishing them from worldly people.
\item[227] Cf. p. 1487F.
\item[228] Cf. p. 1028F, n. 1.
\end{footnotes}
exception of the four trances are sometimes called samāpatti amid sometimes samādhi, but not dhyāna. The absorptions coming under the ten levels [of the śrāvaka] are called samādhi.

Some say that the stage of the desire realm (kāmadhātu) possesses samādhis as well. Why? Since in the realm of desire there are twenty-two auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipāśika), we know that this realm possesses samādhis. If there were no samādhis there, one would not find these profound and wondrous qualities (guṇa) [which are the auxiliaries] there. Moreover, in the Ts’ien-wen ‘Thousand Aporias’, it is a question of the four families of saints (āryavamsa): how many belong to the desire realm (kāmadhātvacara), how many to the form realm (rūpadhātvacara), how many to the formless realm (ārūpyadhātvacara) and how many to no realm (anavacara)? The answer is that distinctions (vibhaṅga) are obvious concerning them: sometimes they belong to the desire realm, sometimes to the form realm, sometimes to the formless realm and sometimes to no realm. It is the same for the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna) and the four foundations of magical power (ṛddhipāda). Consequently, we should know that the desire realm has samādhis. If it were [exclusively] distracted mind (vikṣiptacitta), how would the wonderful dharmas just mentioned occur there? Therefore the samādhis occur in the eleven levels [of the śrāvaka]. These samādhis are fully analyzed in the Abhidharma.

2. Mahāyāna concentrations

[a. Lists of Mahāyānist concentrations.]

The Mahāyānist samādhis go from the concentration of the Heroic Progress (śūramgamasamādhi) up to the detached liberated unstained concentration like space (ākāśasāṅgavimuktinirupalepasamādhi), or the concentration of seeing all the Buddhas (sarvabuddhadarśanasamādhi), up to the contemplation of

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229 These ten levels are the anāgamyas, the four dhyānas, the dhyānāntara and the four ārūpyas: cf. p. 1185F.

230 See p. 1186F.

231 The eleven levels of the śrāvaka are the kāmadhātu, the four dhyānas, the dhyānāntara and the four ārūpyas.

232 Classic list of the 108 or 118 bodhisattva samādhis, enumerated and defined in the large Prajñā:

Pañcaviṃśati, ed. Dutt, p. 142, l. 6-144, l. 7; T 221, k. 3, p. 16b; T 222, k. 4, p. 172b-173a; T 223, k. 3, p. 237c-238a; T 220, vol. VII, k. 409, p. 50c-51b.

Pañcaviṃśati, ed. Dutt, p. 108, l. 11-203, l. 21; T 221, k. 4, p. 23b-24c; T 222, k. 6, p. 190a-193a; T 223, k. 5, p. 251a-253b; T 220, vol. VII, k. 414, p. 74a-77c.


Mahāvyut., no. 506-623

233 Mentioned in Aṣṭasahasrikā, p. 942, l. 5.
the deliverance of all the Tathāgatas (sarvatathāgatavimuktisanupasyāna), the stretching of the lion’s spine (sinhavijrímbhita)\(^{234}\) and the innumerable incalculable samādhis of the bodhisattva.

[b. Examples of bodhisattva concentrations.\(^{235}\)]

1) There is a samādhi called ‘immense purity’ (apramāṇaviśuddhi): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi can manifest pure bodies.

2) There is a samādhi called ‘mark of power’ (anubhāvanimitta): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi can eclipse the power of the sun (sūrya) and the moon (candra).

3) There is a samādhi called ‘burning mountain’ (ādīptagiri): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi eclipses the power of Śakra and Brahmā.

4) There is a samadhi called ‘removing the dust’ (rajohārin): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi destroys the three poisons (visātraya) of all the great assemblies. \(^{[268c]}\)

5) There is a samādhi called ‘unhindered brilliance’ (ānantaryaprabhā): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi can illumine all the buddhafields (buddhakṣetra).

6) There is a samādhi called ‘not forgetting any dharma’ (sarvadharmāsampramoṣa): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi remembers the teachings preached by all the Buddhas; moreover, he communicates the Buddha’s words to other people.

7) There is a samadhi called ‘sound like the noise of thunder’ (meghasvaraghoṣa):\(^{236}\) the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi can fill the buddhafields (buddhakṣetra) of the ten directions with brahmic sounds (brahmasvara).\(^{237}\)

8) There is a samadhi called ‘rejoicing all beings’ (sarvasattvasaṃtoṣanin): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi makes all beings take pleasure in their high aspirations (adhyāśaya).

9) There is a samādhi called ‘tirelessly pleasant to see’ (priyadarśa): when the bodhisattva acquires this samādhi, all beings rejoice in seeing him and hearing him, without ever getting tired.

10) There is a samādhi called ‘inconceivable reward of qualities (acintyagunacipāka), fortunate in every object’: the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi realizes all the supraknowledges (abhijñā).

11) There is a samādhi called ‘knowledge of all articulated sounds and all languages’ (sarvaghoṣabhāsyajñāna): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi can produce all articulated sounds and speak all languages; in one single phoneme (akṣara) he produces all the phonemes and in all these phonemes he produces only one.\(^{238}\)

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\(^{234}\) A samādhi already appearing in the list of the 108 samādhis; it can also mean ‘concentration of the lion’s yawn’.

\(^{235}\) Unidentified list; the restoration of the proposed Sanskrit terms is purely conjectural.

\(^{236}\) Cf. Mahāvyut. no. 478.

\(^{237}\) See p. 279F.

\(^{238}\) On the single and multiple sound, see p. 1380F, n. 1.
12) There is a samādhi called ‘accumulation of the fruits of retribution of all meritorious actions’ (sarvapunya-karmaṃānāṃ vipākaphalasamuccayah): when he acquires this samādhi, the bodhisattva, although remaining silent (tuṣṇī bhūta), penetrates into the trances (dhyāna) and absorptions (samāpatti) and makes all beings hear the Buddhadharmā, hear the sounds of the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddhas and the six pāramitās, whereas he himself utters not a single word.

13) There is a samādhi called ‘surpassing the king of all the dhāraṇīs’ (sarvadhāraṇīrājājāntikarānta): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi penetrates innumerable infinite dhāraṇīs.

14) There is a samādhi called ‘universal eloquence’ (samantapratibhāna): the bodhisattva who acquires this samādhi is happy to utter all the phonemes (aṅgama), all the articulated sounds (ghoṣa), as well as the languages (bhāṣya), the deeds (avādaṇa) and the stories of events (nidāna). There are innumerable powerful samādhis of this kind.

[c. Concentrations and ‘gates’ of concentration.]

Question. – Are these samādhis the samādhimukhas?

Answer. – Yes. These samādhis are the samādhimukhas.

Question. – If that is so, why not simply say samādhi, without adding mukha?

Answer. – The samādhis of the Buddhas are numberless, incalculable and infinite like space (ākāśa). Therefore how could the bodhisattva acquire them in full? Knowing this, the bodhisattva falls back and becomes discouraged. This is why the Buddha here speaks about the ‘gates’ (mukha) of samādhi. By passing through one single gate, one captures innumerable samādhis, just as when one pulls on the corner of a robe the whole robe is pulled off, or when one captures the queen bee (bhrṅgādhīpa) all the other bees are taken as well.

Furthermore, as uninterrupted series (pāramparya), the samādhis are gates. Thus, by maintaining pure morality (śīlaviṣuddhi), by being mindful (smṛtimata) and energetic (vīryavat), by diligently reflecting from the first to the last watch (yāma), by abandoning the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa), by concentrating the mind one-pointedly, in brief, by using all these practices (prayoga), one acquires these samādhis: these are what is called the gates of samādhi. [269a]

Furthermore, the samādhis belonging to the desire realm (kāmadhātvavacara) are the gate of samādhi of the anāgamaṇya ‘vestibule of the first dhyāna’, the samādhis of the anāgamaṇya are the gate of the first dhyāna, the samādhis of the first dhyāna and the second sāmantaka are the gate of the samādhis of the second dhyāna, and so on up to the samādhis of the sphere of neither-awareness-nor-nonawareness (naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana).240

The samādhis of the heats (ūṣmagata) are the gate of the samādhis of the summits (mūrdhan), the summits are the gate of the samādhis of the acquiesences (kṣānti), the acquiesences are the gate of the samādhis of

239 Adopting the variant fou-tō-ye.

240 For details, see p. 1027-1034F.
the supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma), the supreme worldly dharmas are the gate of the samādhi of the duḥkhe dharmaṇaṁśaṁti, and the duḥkhe dharmaṇaṁśaṁti is the gate of the samādhi leading finally to the diamond-like concentration (vajropamasamādhi).

In brief (samākṣepena), all the samādhis have three characteristics: they are characterized by i) an entrance (praveśa), ii) a duration (sthiti) and iii) an exit (vyuṭṭhāna). The entry and the exit are the gates (mukha); the duration is the body of the samādhi.

In the śrāvakā system, these things are the gates of concentration (samādhimukha). As for the gates of concentration in the Mahāyāna system, see (p. 1043-1057F) the explanations relative to dhyānapāramitā where the concentrations are fully analyzed and described.

[d. The perfections are also gates of concentration.]

1) The perfection of morality (śīlapāramiṇī) is a gate of concentration. Why? Three elements make up the Buddhist path (mārga): the morality element (śīlayānanda), the concentration element (samādhiyānanda) and the wisdom element (prajñāyānanda). The element of pure morality (viśuddhāśīlayānanda) is the gate of the concentration element (samādiyānanda) and produces samādhi. The concentration element produces the wisdom element. These three elements destroy the conflicting emotions (kleśa) and give nirvāṇa.

This is why the perfection of morality (śīlapāramiṇī) and wisdom (prajñā) are called gates close to (saṃnikṛṣṭamukha) samādhi.

2) The other three perfections, while being gates, are called distant gates (viprakṛṣṭamukha) of samādhi.

Thus, as a result of generosity (dāna), one gains merit (puṇya); as a result of merit, vows (prāṇidhāna) are realized; as a result of vows, the mind becomes gentle (mṛduka); by thoughts of loving-kindness and compassion, one fears wrong-doing (āpatti) and one thinks of other beings.

Having determined that the world is empty (śūnya) and impermanent (anitya), one concentrates one’s mind and practices patience (ksānti). Thus patience also is a gate of samādhi.

Exertion (vīrya) in the face of the five objects of enjoyment (pañca-kāmaguṇa) controls the mind, removes the five obstacles (nīvaraṇa), concentrates the mind and prevents distractions (vikṣepa). When the mind wanders off, exertion brings it back and prevents it from scattering. It also is a gate of samādhi.

[c. The bodhisattva levels are also gates of concentration.]

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241 These are the four nirvedhabhāgyas of the prayogamārga.
242 The first moment of the darśanamārga.
243 Before the first moment of the bhāvanamārga.
244 Cf. p. 1183-1184F.
245 Cf. p. 1013-1020F.
Finally, the first bhūmi [of the bodhisattva is the gate of concentration of the second bhūmi, and so on up to the ninth bhūmi which is the gate of concentration of the tenth. The tenth bhūmi is the gate of the innumerable samādhis of the Buddha. This is how the bhūmis are samādhimukhas.

III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DHĀRAṆĪMUKHA AND SAMĀDHIMUKHA

Question. – The dhāraṇīmukhas ‘gates of remembrance’ and the samādhimukhas ‘gates of concentration’ are either identical or different. If they are identical, why repeat them? If they are different, what is the difference?

Answer. – Above, I spoke of the differences between samādhimukha and dhāraṇīmukha, but I must repeat myself here. The samādhis are associated with the mind only (cittasamprayukta-dharma), whereas the dhāraṇīs are sometimes associated with (samprayukta) and sometimes dissociated from (viprayukta) the mind.

Question. – How do you know that the dhāraṇīs can be dissociated from the mind?

Answer. – If a person who has the dhāraṇī of retaining what one has heard (śrutadharadhāraṇī) conceives wickedness (vyāpāda), the dhāraṇī does not leave him: it always follows this person like the shadow (chāyā) follows the body. [269b] The practice of samādhi (samādhibhāvanā), by being prolonged, ends up by realizing a dhāraṇī. Just as a person who has cultivated pleasures (kāma) for a long time ends up by entering into their nature (svabhāva), so the samādhis joined with the wisdom of the true nature of dharmas (bhūtalakṣaṇa) gives rise to the dhāraṇīs.

On the condition that it is baked in the fire, a vessel of unbaked clay (mṛdghata) can contain water without letting it leak out and can even help a man cross a river. The samādhi lacking wisdom is like the unbaked vessel, but if it obtains the wisdom of the true nature, it is like the baked clay vessel: it can contain the numberless qualities (guna), past and present, of the bodhisattva; thanks to that, the bodhisattva can effect the crossing and arrive at buddhahood.

Such are the many differences between samādhi and dhāraṇī.

IV. SILENCE OF THE ŚRĀVAKAS ON THE DHĀRAṆĪS

Question. – There is no mention of dhāraṇīs in the śrāvaka system. Why is it that only the Mahāyāna speaks of them?

Answer. – Do not ask why a small thing is not contained in a big thing; rather, ask why a big thing does not contain small things. We do not wonder why a humble house contains neither gold nor silver!
Furthermore, the śrāvakas do not try hard to accumulate qualities (guna); they only try, by means of wisdom (prajñā) to try to free themselves from old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhī) and death (marāṇa). This is why the śrāvakas do not use dhāraṇīs to maintain the qualities. They are like a thirsty man who is content with a little water in his two hands and has no need of a pitcher (bhājana) to hold water. But if one must provide water for a large crowd of people, a jar is needed to hold the water. In the interest of beings, the bodhisattva must have the dhāraṇīs to maintain the qualities.

Furthermore, in the śrāvaka system, it is above all a matter of the [three] characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of conditioned dharmas: i) production (utpāda), ii) disappearance (vyaya) and iii) impermanence (anityatā).246 Their scholars (upadeśācārya) say: “Dharmas are impermanent (anitya) and since they are impermanent, there is no need of dhāraṇīs. Why? Because things of impermanent nature are not to be retained (na dhārayitavya). Only the cause and conditions (hetupratyaya) that constitute past actions (atītakarman) do not perish; similarly also the fruits of retribution in the future (anāgatavipākaphala) which, although not yet born, are conditioned by past actions.”247

According to the Mahāyāna system, the characteristics of production and disappearance (utpādavyayalakṣaṇa) are not real, neither are the characteristics of non-production and non-disappearance; the complete removal of views (vipaśyanā) and characteristics (lakṣaṇa), that is what is real. If therefore the bodhisattva remembers (dhārayati) past dharmas, that is not a mistake (doṣa). In order to retain good dharmas, good faculties (kuśalendriya) and other good qualities (guna) of the past, the dhāraṇīs are necessary. The dhāraṇīs always follow the bodhisattva from lifetime to lifetime. This is not the case for the samādhis: sometimes they disappear at the changing of the lifetime.

Such are the many distinctions to be made in regard to the dhāraṇīs and the samādhis. This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says here: “The bodhisattva who wishes to acquire the dhāraṇīmukhas and the samādhimukhas must practice the perfection of wisdom.”

246 Cf. p. 36F, n. 3; 1163F, n. 1.
247 The scholars who express themselves in this way are not the Sarvāstivādins but the Vibhajyavādins. See Kośabhāṣya, p. 296: “Those who affirm the existence of everything, past, future and present, are Sarvāstivādins. On the other hand, those who are the Vibhajyavādins make distinctions and say: ‘The present and the past action that has not yet given its fruit exist; the past that has already produced its fruit and the future do not exist.’”
CHAPTER XLIV SYMPATHETIC JOY AND TRANSFER OF MERIT

By means of a simple mind of sympathetic joy in regard to the qualities of another, the bodhisattva gains merit (puṇyakriyāvastu) infinitely superior to the merit of all other beings, for he applies this merit to supreme complete enlightenment. Taking delight in the qualities of another (anumodanā, souei-hi, rjes su yi raṅ bu) and applying the merit to anuttara samyaksaṃbodhi (pariṇāmanā, houei-hiang, yoins su bsno ba) place the bodhisattva in the first rank of the Buddha’s disciples.

Chapter VI of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā entitled Anumodanāpariṇāmanā (p. 325F) begins as follows: Yac ca khalu puṇaḥ ārya Subhūte bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasyānumodanāpariṇāmanāśahagataṃ puṇyakriyāvastu yac ca sarvasattvānāṃ dānamayaṃ puṇyakriyāvastu śīlamayaṃ puṇyakriyāvastu bhūvanāmayaṃ puṇyakriyāvaste idam eva tato bodhisattvavāya mahāsattvavyānumodanāpariṇāmanāśahagataṃ puṇyakriyāvaste agrāṃ ākhyāyate.

Free translation. – There is in the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, O noble Subhūti, a merit accompanied by sympathetic joy and transfer, and in all beings there are merits consisting of generosity, morality and meditation (cf. Kośa, IV, p. 231) respectively. The first is placed ahead of the following ones.

In the following pages, the Traité will explain how, by a simple thought of sympathetic joy, the bodhisattva surpasses the highest and most meritorious qualities of the śrāvakas and pratykeuddhas, namely:

1. the generosity manifesting by way of material gifts (āmisadāna).

2. the five pure elements (anāsravaskandha) turned directly toward detachment from the world, nirvāṇa, characterizing the arhat ‘delivered by means of wisdom’ (prajñāvimukta). These five elements are: śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti and vimuktijñanadarśana.

3. the very profound concentrations (distinct from samādhi included here among the five pure elements), not directly turned toward nirvāṇa and characterizing the ‘doubly delivered’ arhat (ubhayatobhāgavimukta).

The first two points will be dealt with in section I of the present chapter; the third, in section II.

It should be noted that anumodanā is taken here in the strict sense of sympathetic joy toward the qualities of another, as in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, III, v. 1-3. There are, however, other anumodanās, e.g., on a given exposition of the Dharma (dharmaṇāyāya): cf. Saddharmapuṇḍ. p. 349, l. 6, and they too are very meritorious.

the Triskandhas which the bodhisattva performs three times each day and three times each night (Traité, above, p. 415F, n. 1; 421F; Bodhicaryāvatāra, V, v. 98; Pañjikā, p. 152, l. 11-13; Śikṣaśamuccaya, p. 171, l. 5-6; 290, l. 1-3). Finally, they are classified among the seven higher forms of worship: saptadhānuttarapūjā (Dharmasāṅgagraha, § 14).

First Section SURPASSING THE HIGH QUALITIES OF THE ŚRĀVAKAS

Śūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 21. l. 17-20; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 68, l. 4-69, l. 8). - The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who, by a thought of sympathetic joy, wishes to surpass the generosity of all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, must practice the perfection of wisdom. The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who, by a thought of [269c] sympathetic joy, wishes to surpass the morality of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas must practice the perfection of wisdom.248 The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who, by a thought of sympathetic joy, wishes to surpass the concentration, wisdom, deliverance, knowledge and vision of deliverance of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas must practice the perfection of wisdom (Śarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānām dānam anumodanācittenaḥbhibhavānāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitātiyāṃ śikṣitavyam. sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānām śīlam anumodanācittenāḥbhibhavānāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitātiyāṃ śikṣitavyam. sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānām samādhiprajñāpāramitātivimuktivimuktijñānadarśanam anumodhanācittenāḥbhibhavānāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitātiyāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. DEFINITION OF SYMPATHETIC JOY

For the mind of sympathetic joy (anumodanācitta), see the Souei-hi p‘in (Anumodanāparivarta).249

Here is an example of sympathetic joy. Someone is practicing the qualities [in question, viz., generosity, morality, etc.]; a spectator rejoices in it (anumodate) and congratulates him, saying: “That is good; in this impermanent world (anityalokadhātu) enveloped in the shadows of ignorance (avidyāndhakāra), you are strengthening the great mind [of bodhi] and you are planting this merit (puṇya).”

248 In the Taishō edition, this phrase is repeated.
Imagine there is a seller (vikṛṛ) and a purchaser (kṛṛ) of all sorts of wonderful perfumes (gandha); a third person comes near and stands to one side. He also breathes the perfumed air; the perfume, nevertheless, does not diminish at all and the two people doing business lose nothing.

Imagine also a donor (dāya) and a beneficiary (pratigrāhaka); a third person, standing beside them, is joyful in the good action. He rejoices with them, but the other two lose nothing.

Such is the characteristic of sympathetic joy (anumodanā).

Thus, just by a mind of sympathetic joy, the bodhisattva surpasses the practitioners of the two Vehicles.

What more could be said (kaḥ punarvādah) if he himself practices [the qualities in which he is rejoicing]?

II. SUPERIORITY OF SYMPATHETIC JOY OVER GOOD ACTION

Question. – How can the bodhisattva, by means of a mind of sympathetic joy, surpass the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who, themselves, give in kind (āmīśa)?

Answer. – While the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are making such gifts, the bodhisattva who is standing by, notices them. He thinks about it carefully, is pleased thereby and congratulates the authors. Taking the merit (puṇya) resulting from this sympathetic joy (anumodanā), he applies it (parināmayati) to supreme and perfect enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksambodhi) to save all beings. Thus he gains immense Buddha attributes. By means of the twofold merit [of sympathetic joy (anumodanā) and the application of merit (puṇyaparināmanā)], he surpasses the generosity carried out by the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

Furthermore, by means of his knowledge of the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas and his sympathetic joy, the bodhisattva surpasses the generosity of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

Moreover, by means of his thought of sympathetic joy, the bodhisattva gains a merit (puṇya) the fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) of which he applies to veneration (satkartum) of the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions. Thus he surpasses the generosity of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. This is like a man who, having made a small offering to the king, derives a great reward from it. Or it is like a man who, by blowing gently into a conch (śaṅkha), produces a very powerful sound.

Finally, by the quality (guṇa) of his sympathetic joy, the bodhisattva brings together numberless other qualities that, until the end of things (dharma), will not disappear (akṣaya). In the same way, if one pours a little bit of water into the ocean (mahāsamudra), it will not disappear until the end of the kalpa.250

[What has been said here about generosity] is also true [for the other qualities of the śrāvaka, viz., morality (śīla), concentrations (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā), deliverance (vimukti), knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana): [By means of a single thought of sympathetic joy, the bodhisattva surpasses all these qualities].

250 At the end of the kalpa of disappearance (saṃvartakalpa) involving the disappearance of beings (sattvasaṃvartani) and the disappearance of the receptacles (bhājanasaṃvartani): cf. Kośa, III, p. 184, n. 4.
After the Buddhas come the bodhisattvas, and after the bodhisattvas come the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. However, here [the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra] speaks of the “bodhisattva who wishes to surpass the [270a] generosity, etc., of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.” What is there to be astonished at [in the fact that the bodhisattva surpasses the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who are hierarchically lower than he is]?

Answer. – It is not a matter here of comparing the merits (puṇya) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas – generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), etc. – with the qualities of the bodhisattva. The bodhisattva surpasses them only by means of a mind of sympathetic joy (anumodanācitta); what more could be said (kaḥ punarvādah) when he himself is practicing the qualities [that he is admiring in others]?

The śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha adepts are diligent and struggle to practice the qualities; the bodhisattva, on the other hand, is silent, but by his sympathetic joy (anumodana) and the strength of his wisdom (prajñābala), his merits surpass those of the former. He is like a foreman (śilpin) who uses only his knowledge and goes away after having given instructions, whereas the unskilled workman wearsies himself using the axe (kuthāra); at the end of the day, when the work is examined and the wages are paid, the foreman gets three times as much as the workman. In the same way also, in wartime, the soldiers risk death but it is the general (senāni) who wins the victory.

Question. – Since the mind of sympathetic joy surpasses generosity (dāna) and morality (śīla), why do you speak only of the superiority of the bodhisattva’s mind of [without mentioning others’ sympathetic joy]?

Answer. – Worldly people in whom the afflictive emotions (kleśa) cover over the mind and who have not eliminated egotism (ahamkāra) are attached to the happiness of this world (laukikasukha); how then would they surpass the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas?

In the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the strong (tīkṣṇa) surpass the weak (mṛdotu), but all remain at the śrāvaka stage (śrāvakabhūmi). This is why, [for them] there is no question [of the mind of sympathetic joy].

Question. -The qualities (guna) and attributes (dharma) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are very numerous. Why does the Prajñāpāramitā mention only six here, [generosity, morality, etc.]?

251 Usually worldly people and śrāvakas do not take delight in the qualities of others, the former because they are exclusively preoccupied with the happiness of this world, the latter because they seek their own personal salvation without being concerned about others. The śrāvakas excel in the degree of their spiritual faculties (indriya), weak among some, strong among others, but they all remain at the stage of śrāvaka, caring little about the qualities of others.
Among the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the strong (tīkṣna) surpass the weak (mṛdu), but all are at the stage of śrāvaka (śrāvakabhumi). This is why there is no question [in them] of the thought of sympathetic joy.\textsuperscript{252}

Answer. – All the attributes of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are contained (samgrhiṭa) within those six.

1. To speak of generosity (dāna) already presupposes the qualities (guṇa) faith (śraddhā), erudition (śruta), etc. Why? Because it is necessary to have heard in order to believe and it is necessary to have believed in order to give. This generosity is of two types: material generosity (āmisadāna) and generosity of the Dharma (dharmadāna).

2. Morality (śīla) contains three kinds of morality: morality of discipline (saṃvaraśīla), morality of meditation (dhyānaśīla) and pure morality (anāsravaśīla).

3. Concentration contains the concentrations of meditation (dhyāna), absorption (samāpatti) and liberation (vimokṣa).

4. Wisdom (prajñā) contains the wisdom resulting from hearing (śrutamayī), the wisdom resulting from reflecting (cintāmayī) and the wisdom resulting from meditation (bhāvanamayī).

5. Deliverance (vimukti) contains two kinds of deliverance: impure (sāsrava) and pure (anāsrava).

6. The knowledge and the vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana) contains the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (kṣayajñāna). When one knows that the impurities are destroyed, one attains deliverance (vimukti) with respect to the threefold world and one knows and sees this clearly. I have already spoken about the auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipāṣika dharma) and the dharmas of the noble Path (āryamārga).

Finally, as for the qualities of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas not turned toward nirvāṇa, the sūtra does not say here that [the bodhisattva] surpasses them because these qualities are too slim (tanu).

Question. – ‘Surpassing’ (abhibhavitum) means to take away by force. But here the bodhisattva is not struggling against the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Why is it said that he ‘surpasses’ them?

Answer. – He surpasses them only in the sense that, by means of his wisdom (prajñā), his skillful means (upāya) and the strength of his mind (cittabala), he obtains an increase of merit (puṇyabāhulya) on a given point. Thus, in respect to a given flower (puspa), a person grasps only the color and the fragrance (gandha) whereas the bee (ali) grasps the juice (rasa) and makes honey (madhu) out of it. In the same way also, in order to draw water (vāri), if the vessel (bhājana) is big, one gets a lot; if it is small, one gets only a little. By means of these comparisons (upāna), we can know that, by means of a mind of sympathetic joy (anumodanācitta) associated with profound and keen wisdom (gambhiratvaprajñā), the bodhisattva

\textsuperscript{252} Usually, worldly people and śrāvakas do not take delight in the qualities of others, the former because they are preoccupied with worldly enjoyments exclusively, the latter because they seek their own personal salvation without caring for others. The śrāvakas excel by the degree of their spiritual faculties (indriya), weak in some, strong in others, but they all remain at the śrāvaka stage, caring little about the qualities of others.
surpasses \( (abhibhavati) \) all the qualities \( (guṇa) \), generosity \( (dāna) \), etc., of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

[The bodhisattvas surpass them] in six things \( (dharma) \). For the first, [270a] generosity \( (dāna) \), see my explanations on the perfection of generosity (chapter XX, [p. 692-769F) where I defined this attribute of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. [For the second], morality \( (śīla) \), see the chapter explaining the perfection of morality (Chapter XXIII, p. 853-864F) where I defined this attribute of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. [For the other four], concentrations \( (samadhi) \), wisdom \( (prajñā) \), deliverance \( (vimukti) \), the knowledge and vision of deliverance \( (vimuktiṃnadarśana) \), see my explanations on the recollection of the Buddha (chapter XXXVI, p. 1349-1359F) where I defined these attributes of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

Second Section SURPASSING THE HIGH CONCENTRATIONS OF THE ŚRĀVAKAS

Śūtra (cf. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 69, l. 6-8). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes, by means of a mind of sympathetic joy, to surpass the meditations, absorptions and concentrations of liberation of all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, must practice the perfection of wisdom \( (Sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānāṃ dhyānasamāpattivimokṣasamādhiḥ anumodanācittenābhivahitukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvenaprajñāpāramitaṃ śikṣitavyam) \).

Śāstra. –

Surpassing the high concentrations of the śrāvakas

Śūtra (cf. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 69, l. 6-8). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to surpass the trances, absorptions and concentrations of liberation of all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas by means of a mind of sympathetic joy, must practice the perfection of wisdom \( (Sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānāṃ dhyānasamāpattivimokṣasamādhiḥ anumodanācittenābhivahitukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam) \).

Śāstra. -

I. HIGHER CONCENTRATIONS

1. By meditations \( (dhyāna) \) and absorptions \( (samāpatti) \), we mean the four trances and the nine successive absorptions \( (anupūrvaammapatti) \).
2. By concentrations of liberation (vimokṣasamādhi), we mean the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the three gates of deliverance (vimokṣamukha), the deliverance by means of wisdom (prajñāvimukti), the twofold deliverance (ubhayatobhāgamavimukti), the occasional deliverance (samayavimukti), the non-occasional deliverance (asamayavimukti), the conditioned deliverance (samukṣravimukti), the unconditioned deliverance (asamskṛtasamādhi), etc., the concentration with examination and with analysis (savītarkah savicāraḥ samādhi), the concentration without examination but with analysis only (avītarko vicāramātṛaḥ samādhi), the concentration without either examination or analysis (avītarko vicāraḥ samādhi), the concentration of emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi), the concentration of signlessness (ānimittasamādhi), the concentration of wishlessness (aprāṇihitasamādhi) and other concentrations of the same kind.

II. CONCENTRATION OF THE DOUBLY LIBERATED SAINT

Question. – Of the six meditations (dhyāna), the absorptions (samāpatti) and concentrations of liberation (vimokṣasamādhi) have already been represented. Why speak of them again?

Answer. – There are two types of samādhi: i) those that are the prerogative (bhāga) of the saint delivered by means of wisdom (prajñāvumukta); ii) those that are the prerogative of the doubly delivered saint (ubhayatobhāgamavimukta).

The preceding section dealt with the prerogative of the prajñāvimukta and, since the latter does not penetrate into the trances (dhyāna) and the absorptions, it spoke only of the concentration belonging to the anāgamyas, ‘the absorption preliminary to the first dhyāna’. But here we are talking about the prerogative of the ubhayatobhāgamavimukta who has the dhyānas, samāpattis and vimokṣasamādhis all together.253

253 By the mind of sympathetic joy, the bodhisattva surpasses not only the generosity and the five anāsravaskandhas present in all the arhats but also the eight vimokṣas present in the doubly delivered arhat.

The prajñāvimukta and the ubhayatobhāgamavimukta are included among the seven or ten types of persons worthy of veneration and offerings (Dīgha, III, p. 105, 253-254; Anguttara, IV, p. 10; V, p. 23). Both are arhats, aśaiṣas, having destroyed their impurities (ksīnārava), but the latter has in addition the eight profound liberations of vimokṣas (cf. p. 1282). Majjhima, I, p. 477 defines them as follows: Katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo ubhatobhāgamavimutto: Idha bhikkhave ekacca puggalo ye te santā vimokhā atikamma rupe āruppā te kāyena phassitvā viharati, paññāya c’assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti. Ayam vuccati bhikkhave puggalo ubhatobhāgamavimutto. – Katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo paññāvimutto. Idha bhikkhave ekacca puggalo ye te santā vimokhā atikamma rupe āruppā te na kāyena phassitvā viharati, paññāya c’assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti. Ayam vuccati bhikkhave puggalo paññāvimutto.

Transl. - O monks, what is a person doubly delivered? There is, O monks, a certain person who, having physically touched the peaceful liberations of the formless realm transcending form, remains there, and whose impurities are completely destroyed, for that person has been seen by means of wisdom. That person, O monk, is called one who is doubly delivered. – O monks, what is a person liberated by means of wisdom? There is, O monks, a certain person who, without having physically touched the peaceful liberations [of the formless] realm transcending
Sometimes it is a question of a short explanation (saṃkṣepeṇoktī); here it is a question of a developed explanation (visatarenaṇoktī).

Sometimes just the name (nāman) samādhi is mentioned; here the meaning (artha) of it is explained.

Furthermore, earlier it was a question of ‘mastering the samādhis [of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha]’ and, according to some, this would be one or two samādhis only and not the profound samādhis (gambhīrasamādhi). Here we are speaking of the group of the very profound samādhis, viz., the dhyāna, samāpatti and vimokṣasamādhi.

Furthermore, the dhyānas, samāpattis and vimokṣasamādhis are of two types: i) those that are acquired by means of detachment (vairāgyalabhika); ii) those that are acquired by means of effort (prāyogika). Those that are acquired by means of detachment have been treated previously; those that are acquired by effort are treated here. 254

Finally, the dhyānas, samāpattis and vimokṣasamādhis are very difficult to obtain (sudurlabha): it is necessary to seek them energetically and diligently in [270c] order to obtain them. Only by a mind of sympathetic joy (anumodnācitta) will the bodhisattva succeed in surpassing them, but he does not yet possess these qualities. This is why we speak about them again here.

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254 With the exception of the Buddha, the other āryas attain these high qualities only by effort (prayoga) and not by detachment (vairāgya), since they all do not have them. Only the Buddha obtains them by detachment, for the Buddha obtains all the qualities at once from the beginning, at the moment of kṣayaajñāna, by means of detachment: cf. Kośa, VII, p. 97.
Question. – But the concentrations (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā), deliverance (vimukti), knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana) that you spoke of previously, they too are difficult to obtain. Why then do you say that these you are speaking of now are difficult to obtain?

Answer. – I have already said that the preceding ones – concentration, wisdom, deliverance, knowledge and the vision of knowledge – were the prerogative of the saint delivered by wisdom (prajñāvimukta) and did not add up to the profound meaning (gambhirārtha) of samādhi. On the other hand, the doubly delivered arhat (ubhayatobhāgavimukta) possessing the threefold knowledge (vidyātraya) – who holds dhyāna, samāpatti and vimokṣasamādhi – is rare and that is why it is necessary to speak of him again.

Furthermore, the concentrations (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā), deliverance (vimukti), knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana) – of which the previous section spoke – although they are hard to attain, are not widely extensive, for they aim directly at nirvāṇa. On the other hand, the dhyānas, samāpattis and vimokṣasamādhis of the present passage concern the arhat who wants to obtain the bliss (sukha) of the dhyānas and samāpattis during the present lifetime (dṛṣṭa eva dharme), i.e., the absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), the dhyāna attaining the summit (prāntakoṭika), the knowledge resulting from vows (prāṇidhijñāna), the concentration that prevents the arising of another’s passions (aranāsamadhi), etc. These do not lead directly to nirvāṇa; this is why it is necessary to return to them at length.

How do we know that the samadhi of the previous section leads directly to nirvāṇa? In that passage, the author mentioned in turn deliverance (vimukti), the knowledge and the vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana); therefore we know that that samādhi leads exclusively and directly to nirvāṇa.

III. WISDOM, INSEPARABLE FROM CONCENTRATION

Question. – Given that the dhyānas, samāpattis and vimokṣasamādhis are hard to obtain (durlabha), they are spoken of again here. But of all the dharmas, wisdom (prajñā) is the most difficult and most subtle. Then why does the Prajñāparamitāsūtra not return to it at all?

Answer. – It spoke of it above (p. 1839F) by saying: “The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to control the knowledge of all the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas must practice the perfection of wisdom.” Up until now it has not spoken of the [higher] dhyānas and samāpattis; this is why it stresses it here.

Dhyāna and samāpatti on the one hand, prajñā on the other hand, are both wonderful dharmas. Those who practice these two things see their vows (prāṇidhāna) realized. They are like a bird (pakṣa) that, having two wings (pakṣa), reaches its destination. Deliverance (vimukti) results from these two things; the knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana) are prajñā.

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As for generosity (dāna) and morality (śīla) – [of which it was a question in the preceding section, (p. 1880F)], these are physical (kāyika) and vocal (vācika) actions. Since they are coarse (stūlākāra) in nature and easy to obtain (sulabha), the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra does not speak of them again.

IV. THE MIND OF SYMPATHETIC JOY CAN BE DIRECTED TO THE CONCENTRATIONS

Question – It is possible for the bodhisattva to surpass the generosity (dāna), morality (śīla) and wisdom (prajñā) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas by means of a mind of sympathetic joy (anumodanācitta). Why? Generosity and morality are visible to the eye and audible to the ear. Wisdom also is something audible; therefore it is possible to produce a mind of sympathetic joy towards it. On the other hand, the dhīyānas, samāpattis and vimokṣasamādhis can neither be seen nor heard.256 Then how could the bodhisattva rejoice in them?

Answer. – The bodhisattva rejoices in them by using his knowledge of another’s mind (paracittajñāna).

Question. – But if the mind of another is impure (sāsrava), he cognizes the impure minds (sāsravacitta) of others; if it is pure (anāsrava), he cognizes the pure minds (anāsravacitta) of others. But not yet being Buddha, the bodhisattva [does not possess a pure paracittajñāna]. How then could he cognize the pure minds of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas?

Answer. – In the system of the śrāvakas, you would be correct, but according to the Mahāyāna system, the bodhisattva has acquired the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣanti), has cut all the fetters (samyojana) and, from one lifetime to the next, never loses the six superknowledges (abhijñā). Therefore he can, by means of an impure cognition of another’s mind (sāsravaparacittajñāna), know pure minds and, a fortiori, by means of a pure cognition, know the mind of another (anāsravaparacittajñāna).

Furthermore, some say: Take a bodhisattva who is about to produce for the first time the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpādika) and who does not yet have the body born of the fundamental element (dhammadhānjakāya). If he sees or hears that a śrāvaka is giving gifts or observing the discipline, this bodhisattva knows perfectly well that the man in question will become arhat and he rejoices in it (anumodate). He says: “That is a man who has found the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas and will escape from the threefold world. My own wish is to save all beings from birth (jāti), old age (jarā) sickness (vyādhi) and death (maraṇa). That this man may find deliverance, that’s up to me!”

For many reasons of this kind the bodhisattva rejoices (anumodate) and his sympathetic joy (anumodanā) is faultless (nirdoṣa).

CHAPTER XLV (p. 1891F) APPLICATION OF MERIT

First Section OBTAINING EASILY AN IMMENSE QUALIFICATION

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 22, l. 13-17; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 69, l. 8-70. l. 4). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who, practicing minor generosity, minor discipline, minor patience, minor exertion, minor meditation and minor wisdom, wishes to obtain an immense and infinite qualification by means of skilful application of merit, must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom (Alpaṃ dānam dadaṭā, alpaṃ śīlam rakṣatā, alpaṃ kṣāntim bhāvayatā, alpaṃ víryam ārabhamānena, alpaṃ dhvānam samāpadyamānena, alpaṃ prajñām bhāvayatā, upāyakausalyapariṇāmanayāprameyam aparyantam guṇam pratilabdhumānena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitātām śikṣitavyām).

Śāstra. –

I. THE ESSENCE OF THE PERFECTIONS RESIDES IN THE MIND

Previously (chapters XVII-XXX), the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra has spoken of the six perfections (pāramitā). Why return to them here?

Answer. – Above it spoke about their general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣana): here it wants to talk about their specific characteristics (svalakṣana). Above it spoke about their causes and conditions (hetupratyaya); here it will talk about their fruits of retribution (vipākaphala).

Question. – That is not so. Above it spoke about the six perfections in their extension and fullness; here it is talking about ‘minor generosity’ and so on up to ‘minor wisdom’; these minor perfections are similar to but not identical with the six perfections treated above.

Answer. – Nothing of the sort! It is a matter of the same perfections. Why? Because the essence (artha) of the six perfections resides in the mind (citta) and not in the greater or lesser quantity of the things. Whether the bodhisattva practices them to a greater or a lesser extent, they are always the same perfections.

Thus the Hien-kie king (Bhdrakalpikasūtra) talks about eighty-four thousand perfections (pāramitā), and the present sūtra also says: “There is a mundane (laukikī) perfection of generosity (dānapāramitā) and

257 The Hien-kie king which the Traité will cite later (k. 62, p. 498a17) under the title Hien-kie-san-mei (Bhdrakalpikasamādhi) was translated into Chinese at Tch’ang-ngan by Dharmarakṣa, under the title of Hien-kie king (T 425) and others as well; according to the K’ai-yuan (T 2154, k. 2, p. 494c12), this translation was made on the 21st day of the 7th moon of the first year of the yong-k’ang period (August 22, 300). It also exists in a Tibetan
a supramundane (lokottara) perfection of generosity, and so on up to the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), it too being mundane or supramundane.”

Pariṇāmanā

II. THE PRACTICE OF THE ‘MINOR’ PERFECTIONS

1. Lesser practice of generosity

Question. – Why does the bodhisattva [sometimes] practice minor generosity (alpaṃ dānam)?

Answer. – There are many reasons for minor generosity:

1. There are some bodhisattvas who have just produced the bodhi mind for the first time (prathamacittotpāda) and who, not yet having accumulated merit (puṇya), are poor and can give only a little.

2. There also are some bodhisattvas who have learned that generosity is not measured by the amount of things given but that its virtue (guṇa) resides in the mind. This is why they do not seek to give a lot of things but seek only for good intention.

3. There are some bodhisattvas who have the following thought: “If I seek to accumulate a lot of wealth (vasu), I will violate the discipline (śīla), I will lose my good intention, I will be distracted (vīśiptacittā) and I will torment many beings. Tormenting beings in order to pay homage to the Buddha has been condemned by the Buddha, for that is to violate the Dharma and seek wealth. If by giving to one worldly person I dispossess another, that is not equanimity (samatā). For a bodhisattva, it is the rule to love all beings equally like one’s own child.” That is why these bodhisattvas give only a little.

4. Furthermore, there are two kinds of bodhisattvas: i) the debased bodhisattva (vināṣṭa); ii) the accomplished bodhisattva (saṃpanna).

version entitled Bskal pa bzaṅ po pa (Tib. Trip., vol. 27, no. 762). In this text the names of the thousand Buddhas of the fortunate period appear (T 425, k. 6, p. 46a-50a) to which F. Weller has dedicated an important work: Tausend Buddhanamen des Bhadrakalpa nach einer fünfsprachigen Polyglotte, Leipzig, 1928.

The Hien-kie king, as the Traité names it, mentions the 84,000 pāramiṭās (T 425, k. 6, p. 44c25). See also the Fo ming king, T 441, k. 21, p. 270c25.

258 Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 263, l. 20-21: āstī dānapmaramitā laukikī, āstī lokottarā / evaṃ śīlapāramitā yāvad āstī prajñāpāramitā laukikī, āstī lokottara /

The debased bodhisattva had at first produced the mind of complete perfect enlightenment \(\text{(anuttarasamyakṣaṃ bodhi)}\); then, not coming upon favorable conditions and his mind being clouded by the five obstacles \(\text{(nīvaraṇa)}\), he lived a life of mixed conduct \(\text{(miśracarita)}\) and has been reborn into a wealthy noble family \(\text{(ksatriyamahāśilakula)}\) or has even become the king of a country or a great yakṣa king, etc.,. As a result of the bad physical, vocal or mental actions that he previously committed, he is not pure and consequently, he is not reborn in the presence of the Buddhas \(\text{(buddhām antike)}\) or among gods and men in faultless places \(\text{(anavadyasthāna)}\). This bodhisattva is called a debased bodhisattva. Although he has lost the bodhi mind, by virtue of \(\text{his actions} \) in previous existences \(\text{(pūrvajanman)}\), this person still likes to give. [To this end], he torments many people, he pillages, he robs and unjustly takes over wealth which he uses, nevertheless, to gain merit \(\text{(puṇya)}\).

The accomplished \(\text{(sampanna)}\) bodhisattvas do not lose the mind of complete perfect enlightenment. Out of loving kindness and compassion for beings, some remain at home and take on the fivefold discipline \(\text{(pañcaśīla)}\); others go forth from home and take up the \[tenfold\] discipline \(\text{(daśśīla)}\).

\text{a. The lay bodhisattva \(\text{(grhaṣṭha)}\) is actually of perfect conduct \(\text{(sampannakarmānta)}\), but as a result of actions of his previous lives \(\text{(pūrvajanman)}\), he is poor \(\text{(daridra)}\). Learning that there are two kinds of generosity in the Buddhadharma, the gift of the Dharma \(\text{(dharmadāna)}\) and the material gift \(\text{(āmiṣadāna)}\), that the monastic \(\text{(pravrajita)}\) practices especially the gift of the Dharma and that the lay person \(\text{(grhaṣṭa)}\) practices especially the material gift, the bodhisattva says to himself: “As for myself, because of my previous actions, I do not belong to a wealthy family.” Then, determining that debased \(\text{(vinaṣṭa)}\) bodhisattvas commit wrongdoing \(\text{(āpatti)}\) in order to give gifts, this pleases him not at all. He finally learns that the Buddha has not praised copious material gifts but praises only the gift given out of purity of mind \(\text{(cittaviśuddhi)}\). This is why the bodhisattva gives only according to his means.}

\text{b. As for the monastic \(\text{(pravrajita)}\) bodhisattva, wanting above all to protect discipline \(\text{(śīla)}\), he does not pursue material goods \(\text{(vasu)}\). He thinks only of the virtues of the one single discipline that surpasses all gifts. This is why he gives only according to his means.}

\text{5. Furthermore, the bodhisattva has learned from the Jātakas and Niḍānas of the Buddhist literature that a small gift gives a large fruit of ripening \(\text{(vipākaphala)}\).}

\text{[Avadāna of Bakkula.]}^{259} – Thus the arhat Po-kiu-lo (Bakkula), who had given a single \text{(a-li-lō) fruit \(\text{(harītaki)}\)}, did not fall into the lower realms \(\text{(durgati)}\) for ninety-one kalpas; he enjoyed happiness among gods and men; he was never sick and, in his last lifetimes \(\text{(paścime janmani)}\), he obtained the bodhi of the arhat.

\text{[Avadāna of Koṭūṃśa.]}^{260} – Thus the śrāmaṇa Eul-che-yi (Koṭūṃśa), at the time of the Buddha Vipaśyin, built a house \(\text{(layana)}\) and gave it to the community of bhikṣus; he laid down a sheepskin for the community to walk on. For this reason, for ninety-one kalpas, his feet did not touch the ground; among gods and men, he enjoyed immense happiness; in his last lifetime, he was born into the house of a great

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\(^{259}\) References, p. 1386-1387F.

\(^{260}\) References, p. 1388-1389F, n.
man (śreṣṭhin), had a splendid body (abhirūpakāya), and, on the soles of his feet (pādata), there grew hair two inches long, the color of pure beryl and curling toward the right (romāṇi dvyaṅgulani vaidūryasadrśāṇi pradakṣiṇāvartāṇi). When he was born, his father gave him twenty koṭi ounces of gold. Later, disenchanted with the five objects of worldly enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa), he went forth from home and obtained bodhi. The Buddha proclaimed him as the foremost of the energetic bhikṣus (ārabdhavīrṇāṇāṃ agrahā).

[Avadāna of Sumana.][261] – Thus in a previous life, the bhikṣu Siu-man-eul (Karṇāsumana) saw the stūpa of the Buddha Vipaśyin and gave the sumanā flower that he was wearing behind his ear to it. As a result of this, for ninety-one kalpas, he never fell into the bad destinies (durgati), he enjoyed happiness among gods [271c] and men, and in his last lifetime, he had, on his ear, a sumanā flower the perfume of which filled the whole house; this is why he was called Karṇāsumana. Later, disenchanted with the world, he went forth from home and obtained the bodhi of the arhats.

With the example of these Jātakas and Nidānas, the bodhisattva who gives only a small amount obtains a great reward (vipāka). Therefore, according to his means, he gives a lot or a little.

6. Moreover, the bodhisattva is not compelled (niyata) always to give only a small gift. According to his fortune, he gives a lot when he has a lot, and he gives a little when he has but little.

7. Finally, it is in order to praise virtues and the greatness of the Prajñāpāramitā that the Buddha said that a small gift gives a big reward and that its qualities are immense.

2. Efficacy of the application of merit

Question. – But the arhats, Bakkula, etc., they too, by giving only small gifts, obtained a great reward (mahāvipāka). Why then introduce the Prajñāpāramitā here?

Answer. – Bakkula and others indeed obtained a fruit of retribution, but it was limited to a certain number of kalpas and, having found the lesser bodhi (hīnabodhi), they entered into nirvāṇa. By contrast, the bodhisattva, ‘by skilful application of merit’ (upāyakauśalyaparīṇāmanayā)[262] as a result of Prajñāpāramitā, by giving only a little, wins immense, infinite, incalculable merit (aprameyam anantam asaṃkhyaeyam punyam).

Question. – What is this skilful application by means of which, by giving only a little, he wins an immense infinite qualification?

Answer. – 1. Although it is a matter of small gifts, all are applied (parināta) to supreme perfect enlightenment. The bodhisattva thinks as follows: “As for myself, by means of this merit (punya), I have no ambition for royalty among gods or men or for happiness in this world; I seek only supreme complete

[261] References, p. 1426F, n. 3.

[262] [Translator’s note (Migme): Parinānamanā = ripening, maturing: Monier-Williams Dictionary.]
enlightenment. And since this supreme complete enlightenment is immense and infinite, my merit also will be immense and infinite. Furthermore, by means of this merit, I wish to save all beings and, as beings are immense and infinite in number, my merit also will be immense and infinite. Finally, this merit utilizes great loving-kindness (*mah āmaitrī*) and great compassion (*mah ākarunā*) and, as this great loving-kindness and great compassion are immense and infinite, my merit too will be immense and infinite.”

2. Moreover, since it is associated with the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas, the merit of the bodhisattva is triply pure (*trimaṇḍakaṇḍa*) because the beneficiary (*pratigrāhaka*), the donor (*dāyaka*) and the thing given (*deya*) do not exist (*nopalabhyante*). Thus, at the beginning of the present Prajñāpāramitāsūtra (cf. p. 650F), the Buddha said to Śāriputra: “When the bodhisattva gives without distinguishing donor or beneficiary or thing given, he fulfils the Prajñāpāramitā fully.” The bodhisattva gains immense and infinite merit by implementing the knowledge of the true nature of dharmas and the gift.

3. Finally, the bodhisattva thinks that the merits he possesses have as their nature (*lakṣaṇa*) suchness (*tathātā*), the fundamental element (*dharmanada*), the limit of the truth (*bhūtakoṭi*); and since suchness, the fundamental element and the limit of the truth are immense and infinite, his merits also are immense and infinite.

Question. – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who considers the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas knows that suchness, the fundamental element, the limit of the truth are in their nature unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) and cessation (*niruddha*).263 How can he still have a mind and create merit? [272a]

Answer. – The bodhisattva has, for a long time, practiced the mind of great compassion (*mahākarunācitta*). At the very moment when this mind of great compassion arises, he says to himself: “Beings do not know this true nature of dharmas and I must help them find it.” By the power of the perfection of exertion (*vīryapāramitā*), he returns to practicing the causes and conditions of meritorious action (*punyakarman*) and, by means of this perfection of exertion, he maintains the mind of great compassion. Thus when a fire (*agni*) on the point of being extinguished encounters the support of wind (*anila*) and fuel (*indhana*), it is revived.

Moreover, the bodhisattva recalls his previous vows (*puṇvapraṇidhāna*) and, as well, the Buddhas of the ten directions come and say to him: “Remember the moment when you first produced the mind of bodhi (*prathamacittotpāda*). You had at that time received only a single talk on the Dharma (*dharmanāyana*) but there are still innumerable sermons of the same kind that you have not yet heard. Therefore go back and accumulate the qualities (*guna*).” On this account, see what is said in the Tsien-pei king (Daśabhūmikasūtra) on the seventh bhūmi.264

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263 *Tathātā, dharmanada, bhūtakoṭi* are synonyms of *asaṃskṛta*: cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 168, l. 14-17, and the explanations in the *Traité*, k. 44, p. 380c20 seq.

264 Section of the Avaṭāmsaka, the Daśabhūmikasūtra designated here under the abridged title of the Chinese version (T 285) composed at Tch’ang-ngan by Dharmarakṣa, on the 21st day of the 11th month of the 7th year of the yuan-k’ang, or December 21, 297 (K’ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 2, p. 494a3). Later (k. 49, p. 411a29:, k. 93, p. 712c17), it
3. Minor practice of the other perfections

Question. – That generosity has degrees is correct; that morality (śīla), of which the fivefold discipline (pañcaśīla), the discipline of one day and one night (rātridivāśīla) and the tenfold discipline (daśaśīla) make up a part, also is composed of degrees is evident. These are material things (rūpidharma) where it is possible to establish differences. But as for the other perfections [patience (kṣānti), exertion (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā)], how can degrees be distinguished there?

Answer. – We may know that all involve degrees.

a. Minor practice of patience.

Thus, patience (kṣānti) is of two types: i) physical patience (kāyikī kṣānti); ii) mental patience (caitāsikī kṣānti).

Even though the body (kāya) and the voice (vāc) remain motionless (acala), physical patience cannot prevent the mind (citta) from becoming agitated, for it is a minor patience, incapable of controlling the mind. In mental patience, on the other hand, body and mind both remain ‘patient’ like a piece of wood.

Furthermore, an individual who has minor patience does not react if someone strikes him or insults him. An individual who has major patience makes no distinction between the insulter, the one who is being insulted and the thing to endure.

Finally, patience with regard to beings (sattvakṣānti) is minor patience; patience with regard to things (dharmakṣānti) is major patience.

These are the distinctions to be made concerning patience.

b. Minor practice of exertion.

Exertion is of two types: i) physical exertion (kāyika vīrya) and ii) mental exertion (caitasika vīrya).

Physical exertion is minor; mental exertion is major. External (bāhya) exertion is minor; internal

will be cited under the name of Che-ti king ‘The ten bhūmis’ or again (k. 33, p. 308a6; k. 100, p. 756b8) under the name of Fa yun king (Dharmameghasūtra), the name of the tenth bhūmi.

In the early references, the eighth bhūmi overlaps the seventh. In going back here to the seventh bhūmi, the Traité undoubtedly has in mind a short passage of the eighth bhūmi, ed. J. Rahder, p. 66: Api tu khalu punaḥ kulaputraikas tavaśa āloko yo 'yam sarvadhamanirvikapālokaḥ / īdṛṣās tu kulaśutra dharmālokās tathāgatānām paryantarāgata aparyantarāgata aparyantarāddhā yeṣāṁ samkhyāh nāsti ganañām upaniṣad aupamyāṁ nāśa / tesāṁ adhigamāyābhinirhāram upādaya /

These three kinds of discipline have been studied in chapter XXII, p. 818-852F.

Cf. p. 903-904F.

Patience with regard to beings has been defined, p. 867-898F; patience with regard to things, p. 902-926F.

Cf. p. 870-972F
(ādhyatmika) is major. Exertion of the body (kāya) and voice (vāc) is minor; exertion of the mind (manas) is major. Thus the Buddha said that mental action (manaskarman) is very strong and this is how the angry great ṛṣis were able to destroy entire kingdoms [by a mental act].

Furthermore, it is by means of the body (kāya) and the voice (vāc) that the five sins of immediate retribution (pañcānantarya) involving a very serious fruit of retribution (vipākaphala), viz., remaining in Avici hell for a kalpa. Mental action is even more powerful for by it one succeeds in being reborn in the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception (naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana) with a lifespan of eighty-four great kalpas or also in remaining in the buddhafields (buddhakṣetra) of the ten directions with an unlimited lifespan. This is why we know that physical and vocal exertion are minor whereas mental exertion is major.

Finally, a sūtra says: “Destruction of physical, vocal and mental actions (kāyavācmanaskarmanirodha), the unmovable (aniñjita)” is the major exertion, whereas the movable (iñjita) is the minor exertion.”

This is what is called minor exertion.

c. Practice of minor trance.

The concentrations of the desire realm (kāmadhātusamādhi) and those of the ānantarya ‘preliminary absorption of the first dhyāna’, not being liberated from desire (avirakta), are described as minor. Compared with the second dhyāna, the first dhyāna is minor and so on up to the absorption of cessation

269 Allusion to the Upālisutta of Majjhima, I, p. 371-387, where the Buddha said to the Nigaṇṭha Dīghatapassin that, of the three actions, bodily (kāyakamma), vocal (vacīkamma) and mental (manokamma), mental action is by far the most formidable when it is a matter of doing or accomplishing a bad action (mahāsāvajjataram pāpam pāpam pāpam pavattiyā). The Buddha wanted to show (ibid., p. 378) the vengeance of the ṛṣis who, without making any motion or pronouncing any word, with a mental act of malice (manopadosa) alone, destroyed entire forests. The episode has already been told above, p. 894F seq. To the references listed there, we should add Milindapañha, p. 130; Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 118, p. 617c28; Kośabhāṣya, p. 246, l. 12.

270 See Kośa, III, p. 41.

271 See Kośa, III, p. 174; IV, p. 218.

272 In the Latukikopamasutta of Majjhima, I, p. 454-455, the Buddha explains to Upāli that the first three jhānas are in restlessness (iñjitasmiṃ): in the first, examination and analysis have not been destroyed (vitakkavicārā aniruddhā honti); in the second, joy and happiness have not been destroyed (pītisukkham aniruddhā honti); in the third, equanimity and happiness have not been destroyed (upekhāsukham aniruddhā hoti). – On the other hand, the fourth jhāna is in the non-restlessness (aniñjitasmin) due to the destruction of happiness, the destruction of suffering, etc. (sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pajāna –pe-).

Dīgha, III, p. 217 and Samyutta, II, p. 82 distinguish three kinds of activities (abhissamkhāra): meritorious (puñña), demeritorious (apuñña) and unmoving (āneñja). For Kośa, IV, p. 107, meritorious action is good (śubha) action of the desire realm; unmoving action is good action of the two higher (ūrdhvaja) realms.

That being the case, I (Lamotte) do not see how the Traité presents the aniñjita here as being the pacification and stopping (tsi-mie) of physical, vocal and mental actions. For this difficult problem, see notes of L. de La Vallée Poussin in Kośa, IV, p. 106-107.
(nirodhasamāpatti). The impure (sāsrava) dhyānas are lesser whereas the pure (anāsrava) dhyānas are greater.

While the bodhisattva has not become irreversible (avaivartika) and has not obtained the acquiescence that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣānti), his dhyānas are minor; when he has become irreversible and has obtained the acquiescence that dharmas do not arise, his dhyānas are major. [272b]

When the Bodhisattva was sitting on the seat of enlightenment (bodhimaṇḍa), the concentrations associated with the first sixteen liberations (vimukti) were minor but, at the seventeenth moment, the diamond-like concentration (vajropamasādhi) was major. [273]

Finally, when the bodhisattva considers (samanupāsyati) all the dharmas as being eternally concentrated (satatasamāhita) and free of distraction (avikṣipta), when he does not rely on them and does not distinguish them, it is a matter of major considerations. The others are minor.

d. Lesser practice of wisdom.

Wisdom is of two kinds: i) mundane (laukikī); ii) supramundane (lokottara). The mundane wisdom is lesser; the supramundane wisdom is greater.

In the same way [contrasting in the order of greatness] pure (viśuddha) wisdom and mixed (miśra) wisdom, characterized (sanīmitta) wisdom and non-characterized (nirnīmitta) wisdom, speculative wisdom and non-speculative wisdom, the wisdom in accordance with the Dharma and the wisdom contrary to the Dharma, the wisdom turned toward samsāra and the wisdom turned toward nirvāṇa, the wisdom directed toward one’s own good (svārtha) and the wisdom directed toward the good of all beings (sarvastvārtha), etc.

Furthermore, the wisdom coming from hearing (śrutamayī) is lesser in comparison to the wisdom coming from reflection (cintamayī) which is greater. The wisdom coming from reflection is lesser in comparison to the wisdom coming from meditation (bhāvanāmayī) which is greater.

The wisdom which produces the mind of supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarasamāyaksaṃbodhi) is lesser in comparison to the wisdom utilizing the six perfections (pāramitā) which is greater. The wisdom of practice (bhāvanāprajñā) is lesser in comparison to the wisdom of skillful means (upāyaprajñā) which is greater. In the course of the ten bodhisattva bhumis, skillful means is always being developed up to the tenth bhūmi.

These are the degrees to be distinguished [in the various pāramitās]. The Buddha praises the deeds of the bodhisattva who, by accomplishing lesser things, “obtains an immense and infinite qualification”. What then can be said (kaḥ punarvīdaḥ) when the bodhisattva accomplishes greater things? Other people who

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273 When the Bodhisattva was sitting under the bodhi tree, he was still tied to the bhavāgra by nine categories of passions (klesa). He became detached from them by eighteen mind moments: nine moments of abandoning or expulsion (prahāna or ānantaryamārga) and nine moments of deliverance (vimuktimārga). At the seventeenth moment, he abandons the ninth category of passion by a path of abandoning called Vajropamasamādhī; the eighteenth moment is a path of deliverance in which the ascetic takes possession of the cessation of all the passions (klesa) or impurities (āsrava).
give up their wealth (vasu) and try very hard by means of their body (kāya), speech (vāc) and mind (manas), painfully gain a small amount of merit (puṇya). It is the same when they practice discipline, patience, exertion, meditation and wisdom: they do not reach the bodhisattva who, by means of lesser efforts, gains a great retribution, as we have said above.

The air that escapes from the mouth produces an articulated sound (ghoṣa) but this sound does not reach very far; by contrast, the sound that comes from a horn (śṛṇga) has a long range. It is the same for [the perfections] of generosity, etc., practiced to a lesser degree [by the bodhisattva]. Whereas among other people who practice these virtues, the merits gained are little rewarded, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, by means of Prajñāpāramitā and skillful application of his merits (upāyakauśalapariṇāmanā), obtains an immense and infinite merit.

This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here of the bodhisattva “who wishes to practice a lesser generosity, a lesser discipline, a lesser patience, a lesser exertion, a lesser trance and a lesser wisdom.”

Pāramitācarana

Second Section PRACTICING THE SIX PERFECTIONS

Sūtra (cf. Pañcavimśati, p. 22, l. 17-20; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 70, l. 4-17). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to practice the perfection of generosity, the perfection of discipline, the perfection of patience, the perfection of exertion and the perfection of meditation, must practice the perfection of wisdom (Bodhisattvena mahāsattvena dānapāramitāṁ śīlapāramitāṁ kṣāntipāramitāṁ vīryapāramitāṁ dhyānapāramitāṁ caritukāmena prajñāpāramitāyāṁ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. – For the meaning of ‘perfection’ (pāramitā), see what has been said above (p. 701-702F).

I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRAJÑĀ AND THE OTHER PERFECTIONS

Question. – Either the first five perfections are the same as prajñāpāramitā or they are not. If they are the same as prajñāpāramitā, there is no need to posit five distinct (viśāta) perfections. If they are different (anya), how can you claim that, in order to practice the perfection of generosity, it is necessary to practice the prajñāpāramitā?

Answer. – They are both the same and different. They are different in the sense that the prajñāpāramitā that considers (samamupaśyati) the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas presupposes and holds no dharma. Generosity itself rejects (tyajati) all inner and outer good. But if one practices generosity in the spirit of the prajñāpāramitā, the generosity (dāna) takes the name of perfection.

Furthermore, the first five perfections establish (avaripayanti) the qualities (guṇa) and the prajñāpāramitā chases away persistent thoughts (samgacitta, abhinivesa) and wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi). It is as if one man
planted grain and another man hoed and weeded to strengthen the grain. In the same way, the prajñāpāramitā makes the four other perfections ripen (paripācayati).

II. PRAJÑĀ AND GENEROSITY

Question. – Why does the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra say that “in order to practice the perfection of generosity, one must exert oneself in the perfection of wisdom”?

Answer. – Generosity is of two kinds: i) pure (viśuddha); ii) impure (aviśuddha).²⁷⁴

1. Impure generosity

Impure generosity is:²⁷⁵

1. Giving from pride (abhimāna, mānastambha), thinking: If destitute people (dīna) give, why should I not give?

2. Giving from jealousy (īrṣyā), thinking: My rival (pratyarthika) has acquired a reputation and has surpassed me by giving. Now I should give more generously still in order to surpass him.

3. Giving from love for reward (vipākachanda), thinking: By giving a little bit, my reward will be ten million times better: therefore I give.

4. Giving for the glory (kīrtyartham), thinking: Now that I like to give, I am esteemed by people and loved by the crowd.

5. Giving in order to win over people (purusāsamgrahaṇārtham), thinking: The person to whom I am giving now will certainly take refuge in me.

Practicing generosity with many fetters (samyojana) of this type is impure generosity.

2. Pure generosity

Pure generosity does not have these mean tricks.

²⁷⁴ Cf. p. 664F.
1. Guided only by pure intention, he thinks about the fruit of ripening (vipākaphala) as a result of causes and conditions; he has consideration and pity for the beneficiary (pratigrāhaka) and does not seek for actual profit; he aims only for the benefit (anuśamsa) of future lifetimes.

2. Furthermore, there is a pure generosity that does not seek the advantages of future lifetimes but which favors access to nirvāṇa by way of mind cultivation (cittabhāvanā) alone.

3. Finally, there is a pure generosity that, out of great compassion for beings, seeks neither personal benefit (svārtha) nor the accelerated acquisition of nirvāṇa but strives only for supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhi).

This is pure generosity, and it is in the spirit of the prajñāpāramitā that it is possible to practice it. And so the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says that “in order to practice the perfection of generosity, it is necessary to practice the perfection of wisdom.”

Moreover, by means of the power of prajñāpāramitā, any feeling of attachment (abhiniveṣācitta) to dharmas is rejected. Why should the feeling of self (ātmacitta) then not be rejected? Having rejected the feeling of self, one regards one’s body, one’s spouse, one’s son, as a blade of grass and, without the least consideration, one renounces them completely. This is why the Prajñāpāramitā says that “in order to practice the perfection of generosity, it is necessary to practice the perfection of wisdom.”

It is the same for the other perfections, morality, patience, exertion and trance, for they are maintained by the spirit of the prajñāpāramitā.

III. POWER OF PRAJÑĀ

Moreover, the other perfections would not have the name of perfection without prajñāpāramitā and would also lack solidity (sāratā). As will be said in the next chapter: “Without prajñāpāramitā, the first five perfections do not have the name of perfection.”

It is like a noble cakravartin king: if he does not possess the jewel of the wheel (cakraratna), he is not called cakravartin king, and it is not his other jewels [273a] that give him his name. Or again, it is like blind people (andha): if they have no guide (nāyaka), they can go nowhere. It is the same with the prajñāpāramitā: it guides the first five perfections to omniscience (sarvajñatā).

A great chariot (ratha), without a good driver, does not fulfill its function. The human body, if deprived of sight, goes nowhere even if it is provided with the other organs. When a person loses their vital organ (jīvitendriya), all the other organs are destroyed; it is because they possess the vital organs that the other organs function. It is the same with the prajñāpāramitā; in the absence of the prajñāpāramitā, the first five perfections do not progress; it is because they possess the prajñāpāramitā that the five perfections progress and rare perfected.

This is why the Buddha says here: “The bodhisattva who wishes to practice the perfection of generosity, etc., should exert himself in the perfection of wisdom.”
Third Section POSSESSING A BODY ENDOURED WITH THE MARKS

Śūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 23, l. 3-5; Śatasūcharikā, p. 70, l. 18-71, l. 4). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to have a body like that of the Buddha in all his existences and who wishes to be assured of the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks of the Great Man, must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom (Bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarvajātiṣu buddhasadṛśam kāyaṃ nispādayitukāmena dvātrimsanmahāpurusalaksanaṇy aṣītyanuvyaṇjanāṃ ca pratilabdukāmena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. THE PHYSICAL MARKS ARE NOT ‘PLANTED’ JUST AT THE END OF THE CAREER

Question. – In the śrāvaka system, it is said that the bodhisattva plants (avaropayati) the causes and conditions for the thirty-two marks (lakṣaṇa) during the hundred kalpas that follow the three incalculable periods (asamkyeyakalpa) of his career. Why does the Prajñāpāramitā say here that “from lifetime to lifetime the bodhisattva has a body like that of the Buddha endowed with the thirty two major marks (lakṣaṇa) and the eighty minor marks (anuvyaña)”?

Answer. – In the Vibhāṣā in the Kātyāyaniputra-bhidharmas, but this is not in question in the Tripiṭaka. Why? Others [besides the bodhisattva] also have these thirty-two marks. What would suffice to distinguish them?

[Nanda’s marks:] Thus in a previous lifetime, Nan-t’o (Nanda) gave a single bath (snāna) to the Community (samgha) making the following aspiration (pranidhāna): “From one lifetime to the next, I would like to be handsome (abhirūpa) and graceful (prāśādika).” In yet another lifetime, he encountered a pratyekabuddha stūpa, adorned it with multicolored designs and brightened up a pratyekabuddha statue (pratimā), formulating the following aspiration: “From lifetime to lifetime, I would like to have a body adorned with fine marks”. For this reason, from lifetime to lifetime, he had a body adorned with marks and

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276 Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 177, p. 890b5-8. See also Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 11, p. 961c9-11. and above, p. 249F, n. 1.
in his last lifetime, he went forth from home (pravrajita) and became a śramaṇa. Seeing him from far off, the members of the Community mistook him to be the Buddha and all stood up to go to welcome him.

If Nanda, a practitioner of the Lesser Vehicle (hīnayāṇika) received such a reward for having planted these few minor merits, what could be said about the Bodhisattva who, during innumerable incalculable periods (asamkhya kalpa), has cultivated merit?

[Bāvari’s marks.]278 – When the bodhisattva Maitreya was still a lay-man with white robes (avadātavasana), his teacher Po-p'o-li (Bāvari) had three marks: i) the white tuft of hairs between the eyebrows (ūrṇā hruror madhye jātā); ii) the tongue able to cover the entire face (jihvā mukhaṃsaṇal avacchādayantī); iii) the secret organs enclosed in a sheath (kośa gabastiguhya).

If those people, who were not bodhisattvas, themselves possessed these marks, how could it be said that the Bodhisattva plants these marks (lakṣaṇa) only after the three incalculable periods?

Besides, according to the Mahāyāna, the bodhisattva who, from the first mind of bodhi (prathamacitta) until supreme complete enlightenment, does not produce a bad mind, possesses the five superknowledges (abhiṣikta) and a body like that of the Buddha from one lifetime to the next.

II. THE BODHISATTVA IS ABLE TO CREATE FOR HIMSELF A BODY ENDOWED WITH THE MARKS

Question. – How does the bodhisattva who has not yet acquired the bodhi of the Buddha obtain a body and marks like those of the Buddha?

Answer. – In order to save beings, the bodhisattva creates for himself a body of the noble cakravartin king, of Śakra Devendra, of Brahmarāja, of a śravaka, of a pratyekabuddha, of a bodhisattva or of Buddha.

[Śūramgamasamādhisūtra.]279 – Thus, in the Cheou-leng-yen king (Śūramgamasamādhisūtra), Mañjuśrī himself said that he appeared as a pratyekabuddha 7,200,000 times and entered into nirvāṇa, that he also manifests under the aspect of a buddha named Long-tchong-tsouen (Nāgavamsāgra).

This is how, at a time when there could not be a Buddha, beings saw [in Mañjuśrī] the body of the Buddha, were happy, submitted and became converted.

278 References, p. 286F, n. 2.

279 Śūramgamasamādhisūtra, T 642, k. 2, p. 642c10-14 (transl. p. 245, §147) and k. 2, p. 644a18-20 (transl. p. 263, §162). If Mañjuśrī feigned the pratyekabuddha nirvāṇa so often, it was at the period when beings could be converted only by pratyekabuddhas (see Traité, above, p. 602F, and later, k. 75, p. 568a28 seq.). – As for the buddha Nāgavamsāgra (in Chinese Long-tchong-tsouen, in Tibetan Kluḥi rigs mchog), identical with the ‘actual’ bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, he reigned at a distant past over the Samā universe, on the borders of the southern region (cf. Śūramgamasamādhi, T 642, k. 2, p. 644a; transl. p. 260-262).
Question. – If the Bodhisattva makes a buddha body for himself, preaches the Dharma and saves beings, how does he differ from a Buddha?

Answer. – 1. The Bodhisattva possesses a great magical power (ṛddhibala), resides in the ten bhumis and is endowed with the attributes of the Buddha; nevertheless, he remains in saṃsāra in order to save the mass of beings; therefore he does not go into nirvāṇa.

2. Like a master magician (māyākāra), he creates for himself a body of metamorphosis (nirmanakāya) in order to preach the Dharma to people, but that is not the true body of the Buddha. That being so, the beings whom he will save are limited in number, whereas those saved by the Buddhas are limitless in number.

3. Although the bodhisattva creates for himself a buddha body, he is unable to completely fill the universes of the ten directions; the body of the Buddha, on the other hand, fills innumerable universes completely.

4. To the beings whom he converts, the bodhisattva shows a buddha body comparable to the moon of the fourteenth day: brilliant as it is, it is not like the moon of the fifteenth day.
These are the differences.

Sometimes there are bodhisattvas who, having obtained the certainty that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣānti) and the body born of the fundamental element (dharmaḥdhatujakāya), remain in the seventh bhūmi, abide in the first five superknowledges (abhiṣēka), create by transformation a body like that of a buddha and convert (paripācayanti) beings. – Sometimes there are bodhisattvas who, having just produced the mind of bodhi (prathamacitotpāda), practice the six perfections (pāramitā) and, by virtue of the actions that they accomplish, obtain a body like that of the Buddha and convert beings.

**IV. THE PERFECTIONS ARE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS OF THE MARKS**

281 For the actions that produce the marks, there are two theories which are not contradictory:

1. A scholastic Abhidharma theory, elaborated by the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas. The bodhisattva accomplishes these acts in Jambudvīpa; as a male; in the presence of the Buddha; thinking about the Buddhas; stemming from reflection; at the time of the hundred cosmic ages following the three incalculable periods of his career. Each of the marks arises from one hundred merits and, according to the most valid explanation, these hundred merits consist of fifty volitions (cetanā) produced in the bodhisattva when he thinks about the Buddha, an another fifty when he too wishes to become Buddha.

   This theory is explained in Vībhāṣa, T 1455, k. 177, p. 887b-892a; Kośa, IV, p. 223-227; Kośavyākhyā, p. 430-431; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 44, p. 590b-591a. The Kośakārikā, IV, 109-110a (Kośabhāṣya, p.266) summarizes this in two and a quarter lines:

   Jambudvīpa pumāna sāmamukham buddhacetanah /
   cintāmayaṃ kalpaśate śeṣa ākṣipate hi tat //
   ekaikāṃ punyāṣatajām.

   The Traité has fully and faithfully set forth this theory above (p. 246-255F), but has also refuted it in detail (p. 283-297F).

2. A less complicated but certainly older theory presents the marks as fruits of accomplishment of various actions (vicitrakarmābhīsaṃskārāphala). The choice of these actions is subjective and largely imaginary. That is why the lists drawn up in the course of time show many differences. Here are some:

   Lalitavistara, p. 429, l. 3-433, l. 2.
   Abhisamayālaṃkāra, p. 918, l. 25-919, l. 20.
   Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 377, l. 20-380, l. 23, which claims to be representative of the Lakṣaṇasūtra (of the Dirghāgama).

   Almost all the virtues appear in the actions producing the marks of which the Traité gives us the list here. This is a list coming from the śrāvakā system, but not claiming to be representative of one or another canonical

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Question. – The thirty-two marks are fruits of ripening (vipākaphala) of generosity (dāna), etc., but the prajñāpāramitā is non-existent (asat) and like space (ākāśasama). How can one say that it is necessary to practice the prajñāpāramitā in order to obtain the major and minor marks?

Answer. – The thirty-two marks are of two kinds: (i) complete (sampanna, parinīpanna), as in the Buddha; (ii) incomplete, as in the noble cakravartin kings, in Nanda, etc.

Although the prajñāpāramitā is associated with generosity, it completes the major and minor marks as is the case in the Buddhas. Among other people who practice only generosity [without the inspiration of the prajñāpāramitā], the marks are incomplete.282

Question. – How do generosity, etc., bring about the thirty-two marks?

Answer. – When the dānapati gives, the recipient (pratigrahaka) obtains five things: color (varṇa), strength (bala), etc.,283 and profits from them; the donor (dāyaka) himself is marked with the sign of the wheel (cakra) on his hands and feet, as has been fully described (p. 668F) in regard to the dānapāramitā.

It is the same for the other perfections, morality (śīla), patience (kṣānti), etc.: each of them favors the thirty-two marks. [273c]

What are these thirty-two marks? The mark consisting of having the soles of the feet well-planted (supraśīhitapādata). For the rest of them (p. 272-279F), refer to the Ts’an-p’ou-sa p’in (Bodhisattvastutiparivarta).

Question. – For what reasons (hetupratyaya) does one get the mark consisting of having the sole of the foot well-planted?

Answer. –

[Mark no. 1]. – From lifetime to lifetime, the Buddha mindfully (smṛtimat) and firmly (sthānavaṭ) kept morality (śīla) and did not allow others to break it. For this karmic cause and condition, he obtained the first mark. This first mark means that he himself is unshakeable (acala) in the Dharma. Had he become a noble cakravartin king, nobody in his kingdom could have attacked him.

[Mark no. 2]. – In accord with justice (saha dharmena), he nourished and protected the populace, the wandering mendicants (parivrājaka), the śramaṇas, etc. For this karmic cause and condition, he obtained the mark consisting of having thousand-spoked wheels [on the soles of his feet] (adhastra pādālayoḥ cakre jāte sahasrerā). This mark lets him turn the wheel of the Dharma (dharmacakra). Had he become a noble cakravartin king, he would have turned the jewel of the wheel (cakratā).

source. Above (p. 668-670F), the Traité shows how the virtue of generosity is foremost in the making of each of the thirty-two marks.

282 The marks of the Bodhisattva prevail over those of a cakravartin in seven points: cf. p. 279-280F.

283 Citation from Anguttara, III, p. 42; see above, p. 218F and 668F.
[Mark no. 3]. – He abstained from killing living beings (prāṇātipāta). For this karmic cause and condition, he obtained the mark of having long fingers (āyatapādapāṛṣṇī).

[Mark no. 4]. – He abstained from theft (adattādana). For this cause and condition, he obtained the mark of having a broad heel (āyatapādāṅguli).

[Mark no. 5]. – By means of the four ways of winning people (saṃgrahavastu), he captivated people. For this karmic cause and condition, he obtained the mark of having webbed hands and feet (jālāṅgulihastapāda).

[Mark no. 6]. – He offered his teachers (mahāmātra, guru) robes (vastra), food (annapāna) and fine beds (śayanāsana). For this karmic cause and condition, he obtained the mark of having soft and delicate hands and feet (mṛdutaruṇipāda).

[Marks nos. 7, 13, 12]. – He developed the cultivation of merits (punyabhāvanā). For this karmic cause and condition, he obtained the marks of having a high instep (utsaṅgacaraṇa), single hairs arising from each of his pores (ekaikaromāpebhya ekaikāni jātāni) and hair standing up (ārdhvāgraroma).

[Mark no. 8]. – In accord with the Dharma, he bequeathed all that he could contribute to the welfare and harmony and quickly taught it to people. This is why he obtained the mark of the marvelous ankles (jaṅghā) like those of Aiṇeya, king of the antelopes (mṛgarāja).

[Marks no. 9, 11]. – In accord with the Dharma, he gave pure things without troubling his beneficiary. This is why he obtained the mark of having arms that, when he was standing, reached his knees (sthitānavanatāṇupralambabāhu), and the mark of having a broad body like the banyan tree (nyagrodhaparimaṇḍala).

[Mark no. 10]. – He always cultivated the sense of modesty and honor (hrīrapatrāpya), avoided lust (kāmamithyādāra) and practiced generosity by giving away houses (grha), garments (vastra), rugs (praticchādana), etc. This is why he obtained the mark of having his secret organs contained in a sheath (koṣagatavastiguhya) like a stallion (ājāneya).

[Marks no. 14, 15]. – He cultivated the concentration of loving-kindness (maürīsamādhi), purity of faith (śraddhaviśuddhi), mental activity (saṃtānabāhulya) and distributed excellent alms-food (annāpāna), garments. (civara) and coverlets (śayanāsana). This is why he obtained the marks of having a golden color (suvarṇavarṇa) and a brilliance of an arm’s-width (vyānaprabhā).

[Mark no. 16]. – He always liked to consult, venerate and gather reverend and holy individuals (satpuruṣa). This is why he has obtained the mark of having a fine soft skin (sūksmacchavi).

[Marks no. 19, 18, 21]. – In order to settle matters in accord with the Dharma, he himself did not administer but delegated his powers of governing. This is why he obtained the marks of having the front part of his body like that of a lion (sinhapūrvārdhakāya), his armpits rounded (citāntarāmsa) and his shoulders perfectly round (susāmyṛttasklandha).

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284 According to the Mahāvyut., no. 9429, the characters sin-to translate saṃtānabāhulya.

285 Adopting the variant tchang-kouang in place of ta-kouang. For this mark, see p. 454-456F.
[Mark no. 20]. – He respected his teachers (mahāmātra, guru), came to them and accompanied them. This is why he obtained the mark of having a great straight body (bṛhadṛjakāya).

[Mark no. 17]. – His gifts were perfect (sampanna) and copious (paripūrṇa). This is why he obtained the mark of having the seven parts of his body rounded (saptosada).

[Mark no. 25]. – There was no restriction in any of his gifts. This is why he obtained the mark of having a square jaw [like that of a lion] (simhahanu).

[Marks no. 22, 23]. – He abstained from malicious gossip (paśunyavāda). This is why he obtained the mark of having forty teeth (catvāriṃśaddanta), the mark of having joined teeth (aviraladanta) and the secret mark of the teeth.

[Mark no. 24]. – He always cultivated loving-kindness (maitrī) and good thoughts (manasikāra). This is why he obtained the mark of having incomparably white teeth (śukladanta).

[Mark no. 27]. – He abstained from falsehood (mṛṣāvāda). This is why he obtained the mark of having a wide thin tongue (prabhūtatanujihvā).

[Mark no. 26]. – He gave excellent food without troubling his recipient (pratigrāhaka). This is why he obtained the mark of having the best of flavors (rasarasāgra).

[Mark no. 28]. – He abstained from harmful words (pāruṣyavāda). This is why he obtained the mark of having a brahmical voice (brahmāsvara).

[Marks no. 29, 30]. – He contemplated beings with a good mind (kuśalacitta) and a kindly regard (priyadarśana). This is why he obtained the marks of having deep blue eyes (abhinīlanetra) and eyelashes like a cow (gopaksmanetra).

[Mark no. 31]. – He honored venerable individuals, he himself maintained discipline (śīla) and taught it to people. This is why he obtained the mark of having a fleshy protuberance on his head (uṣṇīṣasirṣa).

[Mark no. 32]. – He praised those who ought to be praised. This is why he obtained the mark of having a tuft of white hair (ūrṇā hruvor madhye jātā).

According to the śrāvaka system, those are the karmic causes and conditions for the thirty-two marks and they are also the karmic causes and conditions for the thirty-two marks in the Mahāyāna.

V. BODY WITH MARKS AND BODY WITHOUT MARKS

Question. – The Buddhas of the ten directions (daśadīguddha) and the dharmas of the three times (tryadhvadarma) have, as their mark, being without marks (alakaṇṇalakṣaṇa). One mark by itself is already unreal, let alone thirty-two marks.
Answer. – The attributes of the Buddha are of two kinds: i) of conventional truth (saṃvrtisatya); ii) of absolute truth (paramārthasatya). From the point of view of the conventional truth, we say that the Buddha has thirty-two marks; from the point of view of the absolute truth, we say that he is without marks.

There are two paths (mārga): i) the first commits beings to cultivate the path of merit (puñyamārga); ii) the second is the path of wisdom (puñyamārga). For the path of merit, we say that the Buddha has thirty-two marks; for the path of wisdom, we say that he has no marks.

In regard to the body of birth (janmakāya), we say that he has thirty-two marks; in regard to the body of Dharma (dharmakāya), we say that he has no marks.

By its thirty-two major and eighty minor (anuvyañjana) marks, the body of the Buddha adorns the body of the Dharma; by its ten powers (bala), four fearlessnesses (vaiśaradya), its four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid), its eighteen special attributes (āveṇikadharma) and other qualities (guna), it adorns beings.

There are two kinds of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya): i) causes and conditions for merit (puṇya); ii) causes and conditions for wisdom (prajñā). In order to guide beings by means of the causes and conditions of merit, the Buddha uses the body endowed with the thirty-two marks; in order to guide beings by means of the causes and conditions for wisdom, he uses the Dharma body (dharmakāya).

There are two kinds of beings (sattva): i) those who know that dharmas are pure designations (prajñapti); ii) those who are attached to names (nāmābhiniṣṭa). For beings attached to names, we say that the Buddha has no marks; for beings who take dharmas as pure designations, we say that the Buddha has thirty-two marks.

Question. – But the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) and the other qualities each have their special mark; how can you say that the Dharma body is without marks?

Answer. – Because they are associated with the sixteen aspects of the truths (sodāśākāra) and the three concentrations (samādhi), all the pure qualities (anāsravadharma) are said to be ‘without marks’. Wanting beings to penetrate them, the Buddha analyzed them in many ways and said that all the attributes of the Buddha, marked with the seal (mudrā) of emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apraṇihita), all partake in suchness (tathatā), the fundamental element (dharmadhātu), the pinnacle of the truth (bhūtakoṭi). However, so that beings would rejoice and produce the mind of bodhi on seeing his body, the Buddha shows them his body adorned with the thirty-two marks.

Moreover, in order to manifest his great superiority to all beings, the Buddha shows his thirty-two marks without, however, offending the principle of the absence of marks.

[The horoscope of the Bodhisattva.].286 – On the seventh day after the birth of the Bodhisattva, he was wrapped in white woolen blankets and the experts in signs (lakṣanavaipañcaka) were summoned. The

286 This version is very close to that of the Mahāvastu, II, p. 27, l. 1-39, l. 6. – On the nature of this horoscope, the simple prediction about the future of a child, see A. Foucher, La Vie du Bouddha, p. 57-60. – Comparative study of
latter, having consulted an old venerable book of signs, made a prediction and said to the king:
“According to our diagrams, if the person who is endowed with the thirty-two marks stays at home, he will become a noble cakravartin king; if he leaves home, he will become a buddha. There are only these two possibilities, there is no third.”

When the experts in signs went away, the Bodhisattva fell asleep.

[The prediction of Asita]. – Again, there was a rishi named .GetBytes(Asita) (Asita) who said to King Tsing-fan (Śuddhodana): “By means of my divine ear (divyaśrotra), I heard the devas and yakṣas announcing that king Śuddhodana had just had a son endowed with the bodily marks of a buddha. That is why I have come to visit him.”

The king was very happy and said: “This man is a noble rishi, come from afar to see my son.” He ordered his servants to go and get the crown prince (kumāra), but they said to the king: “The crown prince is sleeping.”

Then Asita said: “Let the noble king invite everybody. Those who are satisfied with ambrosia (amṛta) cannot sleep.” Saying this, he rose from his seat and went to get the crown prince. He took him in his arms, examined him from head to toe and, having examined him, burst into tears uncontrollably.

Greatly moved, the king asked the expert in signs: “Is there something unfortunate that makes you weep like that?” The rishi answered: “If even the sky could rain down a mountain of diamonds (vajra), it would be unable to move a single hair of this child: how then could any misfortune menace this child? The crown prince will definitely become a Buddha. As for myself, in the evening of this present year, I will be reborn in the formless heavens (ārūpyasvarga) so that I will be unable either to see the Buddha or hear his teachings: that is why I am so sad.”

The king said: “The experts in signs (lakṣanavaipaṇcaka) did not come to one single solution: they said that if my son remained at home, he would become a noble cakravartin king and if he went forth from home he would become a Buddha.” Asita replied: “The experts in signs base themselves on worldly convention (saṃvṛti) and deductive knowledge (anvayajñāna), and not on the divine eye (divyackusus). They know the holy books of prognosis but they do not know the future fully and completely. They consider the marks in general but are unable to interpret them clearly. That is why they say that if the crown prince remains at home he will become a noble cakravartin king but if he goes forth from home he will...

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287 Mahāpadānasuttanta (Dīgha, II, p. 16) and Mahāvadānasūtra (p. 95), in regard to Vipaśyin: *Ayaṃ hi deva kumāro dvattinsa mahāpurusalakkañhehi samannāgato yehi samannāgatassa mahāpurissa dve gatiyo bhavanti anaṅgā. sace agāraṃ ajihāvasati rājā hoti cakkavatti... sace kho pana agārasmā anagāriyam pabhajati araḥam hoti sammāsambuddho.*

288 References, p. 1344F, n. 2.

289 Cf. Lalitavistara, p. 103: *Evam ukte 'sito maharṣi rājānaṃ suddhodanam etad avocat / putras te Mahārājā jātas tam aham draṣṭukāmā ighātā iti // rājā āha / svapānitamaharse kumāro mūḥtām āgamaya yāvas uthāsyatīt // rṣir avocat / na mahārāja tāḍāyā mahāpuruṣāka ciraṃ svapante jāgasaśīlās tāḍāsāḥ satpuruṣā bhavanti /*

This detail is passed over in silence in the Mahāvastu and the Nidānakathā.
become a Buddha. Now the thirty-two marks are indeed complete in the crown prince, clearly imprinted, very deep, pure and complete. He will certainly become a Buddha and not a cakravartin king.”

By this, we know that the Buddha, by means of his thirty-two marks, is far superior to all beings. If we speak of the absence of marks, it is in order to destroy [the purely imaginary marks] such as the marks of eternity (nitya), purity (śuci) and happiness (sukha), the marks of self (ātman), the marks of man (puruṣa) or woman (strī), of birth (jāti) or death (marana), etc. Thus, although the attributes of the Buddha have, as their mark, being without marks (alakṣaṇa), by manifesting his thirty-two marks, the Buddha leads beings to recognize the primacy (paramatā) and to experience pure faith (prasāda) toward him. Speaking of the thirty-two marks is not a fault (doṣa).

VI. JUSTIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF MARKS

Question. – Why assume thirty-two marks, no more and no less?

Answer. – Assuming more or assuming less would provoke difficulties in either case.

Furthermore, the body of the Buddha is six arm-spans (vyāma) in height. If he had less than thirty-two marks, they would not extend on all sides and would insufficiently ornament him; if he had more than thirty-two marks, they would [274c] be disorderly in arrangement. It is like jewels adorning the body: even if a large quantity of pearls (maṇi) is used, it is not fitting to be overloaded with necklaces (keyūra, niṣka). This is why the target (lakṣya) is reached with exactly thirty-two marks.

290 This subject has already been treated above, p. 280F. The author is faithfully following the Vībhāṣā, T 1545, k. 177, p. 889a12-19: Why are there precisely thirty-two lākṣaṇa, no more and no less (dvātrīṃśa eva mādhikāni nālpatarāṇā)? The venerable Pārśva says: Adding or subtracting from them would in both cases be a difficulty: exactly thirty-two are necessary so as not to contradict the nature of things (dharmatā). Others say: The number thirty-two is generally considered in the world to be a favorable number and nothing should be added to it or subtracted from it. Others say: If thirty-two marks adorn the Buddha’s body, the latter enjoys incomparable superiority in the world: if he had fewer, he would be lacking; if he had more, he would be untidy; in both cases, it would not look good. Just as one can neither add nor subtract from the Buddha’s attributes, so it is for his lākṣaṇa: there is no deficiency to increase and surplus to decrease.”

This is the traditional opinion in regard to the variety of the marks and their number. It could convince only the Indians, and it left foreigners skeptical. Its subjective nature did not escape the author of the Traité, at least according to one of his Chinese or Serindian interpreters. In fact, he will comment in k. 88, p. 684a-b that the Buddha takes into consideration the preferences of beings to be converted and local customs to manifest one particular mark rather than another. There are countries, he says, where the Buddha manifested sometimes myriads of marks, sometimes an incalculable number of marks, and sometimes fifty-six or thirty-four marks. When he conforms to the taste of India, he manifests thirty-two major and eighty minor marks.
Finally, if this small number of marks really adorned him imperfectly, the Buddha still has eighty minor marks (anuvyañjana); going beyond that would not be appropriate.

Question. – If eighty minor marks must be added, why not call them ‘marks’ and why give them the special name of ‘minor marks’?

Answer. – The marks adorn the body particularly, and to mention these major marks is to imply the minor ones.

Moreover, the major marks are coarse (sthūla) whereas the minor marks are fine (sūkṣma). When beings see the Buddha they see his major marks; the minor marks, on the other hand, are hard to see.

Finally, the major marks are commonly obtained by other men. The minor marks are sometimes shared (sāmānya) and sometimes special (āvenika). This is why we speak of the major and minor marks separately.

VII. WHY IS THE BUDDHA ADORNED WITH NON-EXISTENT MARKS?

Question. – The Buddha cut through the mark of existence (sattvalakṣaṇa), the mark of substantial self (ātmalakṣaṇa) absolutely (atytam) and was satisfied with the mark of empty (śūnya) dharmas. Why then does he adorn his body in the manner of those who seize characteristics (nimittāny udgurhṇantī)?

Answer. – If the Buddha adorned just his mind (citta) with wonderful attributes,291 and if his body were lacking the major and minor marks, some beings capable of being converted (vaineyasattva) would mistake him under the pretext that the Buddha is without bodily marks. They would not welcome the Buddhadhharma with open hearts. Thus, if one filled a dirty bowl (aśucihājana) with choice food, the latter would not be appreciated by people; and if one filled a stinking goatskin (durgandhājina) with precious things, those who received them would be miserable. This is why the Buddha adorns his body with the thirty-two marks.

Moreover, often the Buddha utters the lion’s roar in the great assembly (mahāparṣadī sīmhanādam nadati)292 and states that, among men, all his qualities are superior. If the Buddha did not adorn his body of birth (janmakāya) with the major and minor marks, some would say: “His body is ugly (durvarṇā); why believe him?” When the Buddha adorns his body with the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks, there are still people who do not believe him. What would it be like if he did not adorn his body with the major and minor marks?

291 The punctuation of the Traité is defective: the period should be placed between sin and chen. The attributes with which the Buddha adorns his mind go from the ten powers (bala) to great loving-kindness (mahāmatrī) and great compassion (mahākarunā); they have been discussed in chapters XXXIX to XLII (at the beginning).

292 Cf. p. 1594-1598F.
Finally, the attributes of the Buddha are very profound (gambhīra) for they are eternally destroyed (nityaniruddhatvā). Fanatical madmen, beings do not believe in them and do not accept them; they say that in this destruction of the body (kāyanirodha), nothing is to be had. That is why the Buddha uses his broad tongue (prabhūtajihvā) and his brahmic voice (brahmasvara) emits great rays of light from his body (mahāraśmin niscārayati) and, by means of all sorts of nidānas and avadānas, teaches his marvelous attributes. 293 Seeing the majesty of the physical marks of the Buddha and hearing his [brahmic] voice, beings rejoice in them and believe.

Moreover, the ornaments are internal (ādhyātmika) or external (bāhya). The meditations (dhyāna), absorptions (samāpatti), wisdom (prajñā) and other qualities (guṇa) are internal ornaments. The majesty of the physical marks and the perfections of morality (śīlasampad) are external ornaments. Inwardly and outwardly the Buddha is perfect.

Finally, out of compassion for all beings, the Buddha appeared (prādurbhavati) in the world. By means of his qualities of wisdom, etc., he benefits beings of sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya); by utilizing his physical marks, he benefits beings of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya). By the adornment of his mind (citta), he [275a] opens the door to nirvāṇa; by the adornment of his body, he opens the door to godly and human happiness. By the adornment of his body he establishes beings in all the three meritorious activities (puṇyakriyāvastu); 294 by the adornment of his mind, he establishes beings in the three gates of deliverance (vimokṣamukha). By the adornment of his body, he pulls beings out of the three bad destinies (durgati); by the adornment of his mind, he pulls beings out of the prison of the threefold world (traidhātuka).

It is in view of these immense benefits that the Buddha adorns his body of birth with the major and minor marks (janmakāya)

293 See above, p. 456F, the manifestations that precede the preaching of the Prajñāpāramitasūtra.

Fourth Section BEING BORN INTO THE FAMILY OF THE BODHISATTVAS, ETC.

Śūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 23, l. 2-3, 5-6; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 72, l. 2, 5, 7). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to be born into the family of the bodhisattvas, to attain the level of the crown prince and to never be separated from the Buddhas must practice the perfection of wisdom (Bodhisattvena mahāsattvena upapattukāmena, kumārabhūmim anupraptukāmena, buddhair avirahitena bhavitukāmena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. BEING BORN INTO THE FAMILY OF THE BODHISATTVAS

“The family of the bodhisattvas”.295 – If someone produces a very profound mind of profound great compassion (mahākarunācitta) towards beings, he takes birth in the bodhisattva family. In the same way when one is born into a royal family, no one dares to despise you; furthermore, you fear neither hunger nor thirst (kṣutipāsā), cold nor heat (śītosya), etc. It is the same for the one who enters into the assurance (niyāma) of bodhisattva and is born into the family of the bodhisattvas: because he is the child of the Buddha, devas, nāgas, yakṣas, satpuruṣas, etc., do not dare to scorn him but increase their veneration (arcanā): he does not fear the bad destinies (durgāti) or the lower places among gods or men; he is not afraid that the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas or heretical masters (upadeśācārya) will come to destroy his resolution (āśaya).

Furthermore, from his first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), the bodhisattva makes the following vow (praṇidhāna): “Starting from today onward, I will not follow any bad thought (akuśalacitta); I wish only to save all beings and to attain supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarasamādhi).”

Furthermore, the bodhisattva who knows that the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas is unborn (anuttappāda) and unceasing (anirodha) acquires the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣānti); henceforth he is definitively settled in the position of the bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniyāma).

295 Just as there are two kinds of avaivartika bodhisattvas (cf. p. 1804F). so there are two kinds of birth in the family of the bodhisattvas: the first is when the practitioner produces the thought of bodhi for the first time and thus enters the first bhūmi of his career; the second birth, the definitive one, is when the bodhisattva attains anupattikadharmakṣānti and thus enters into the eighth bhūmi. It is this second birth that the Śūtra has in mind here.
Thus the Buddha said in the *Tche-sin king* (Viśeṣacintisūtra): “When I saw the Buddha Ting-kouang (Dīpaṃkara), I obtained the conviction that dharmas do not arise and I completely fulfilled (paryāpūram) the six perfections (pāramitā). Prior to that moment, I did not really possess generosity, discipline, etc.”

Furthermore, the bodhisattva has the following thought: “Suppose that kalpas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges (gangāṇadīvālukopamakalpa) were only one day and one night, that thirty of these days were a month, that twelve of these months were a year, that the number of these years were more than a hundred thousand myriads of thousands of kalpas and that finally there appeared a single Buddha in whose presence a bodhisattva would offer his homage (pūjā), observe morality (śīla) and accumulate qualities (guṇa). Suppose, moreover, that such Buddhas, in number as many as the sands of the Ganges [followed one another] and that afterwards only this bodhisattva receives the prediction (vyākaraṇa) of someday becoming buddha, well then, the mind of this bodhisattva would show neither laziness (kausādyā) nor discouragement (laya) nor weariness (nirvēda), and he would fulfill all the practices of his estate completely.”

Furthermore, the bodhisattva experiences loving-kindness (maitrī) and compassion (karuṇā) toward beings predestined to perdition (mithyāvānīyata) and guilty of the five misdeeds of immediate retribution (ānantaryya) and toward people who have broken the roots of good (kuśalamūla), and he introduces them into the right path without waiting for their gratitude (kṛtyāṅjñatā).

Furthermore, from his first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), the bodhisattva is no longer enveloped by or ruined by the conflicting emotions (kleśa).

Furthermore, although he contemplates the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas, the bodhisattva no longer experiences any attachment (abhūniveśa) towards this consideration. [275b]

Furthermore, the bodhisattva always spontaneously (svarasena) offers words of truth (satyavacana) and, even in his sleep (svapna), tells no lies (mṛṣāvāda).

Furthermore, for the bodhisattva, all the visible forms (rūpa) that he sees are visions of the Buddha, but by the power of the concentration of recollection of the Buddhas (buddhānusmṛtisamādhi), he is not attached to these visions.

Furthermore, seeing all beings wandering in the sufferings of samsāra, the bodhisattva is not attached to any happiness and forms only the following aspiration (pranidhāna): “When will all beings and myself be saved?”

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296. For this sūtra which the *Traité* cites under different titles, see p. 1268-1269F, note.
297. Adopting the version fo in place of ts’ien.
298. Viśeṣacintin, T 586, k. 2, p. 46a22; T 587, k. 3, p. 78a13. The future Šākyamuni, at the end of the second asaṃkhṣeyakalpa of his career, while he was still the brahmācārin Sumedha, Megha or Sumati, met the buddha Dīpaṃkara and from him received the prediction: see above, p. 248F, n. 2.
Furthermore, the bodhisattva is not attached to precious objects and rejoices only in the Three Jewels (triratna).

Furthermore, the bodhisattva has always cut through lust (rāga) until he no longer has either the memory (smṛti) of it or the notion (samjñā) of it; how could it have any reality for him?

Furthermore, beings who see the bodhisattva attain the concentration of loving-kindness (maitriśamādhi) immediately. Furthermore, the bodhisattva has reduced all teachings into ‘the teachings of the Buddha’ and the various classifications (nānāviśeṣa) such as ‘teachings of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas’ or ‘teachings of the tīrthikas’ no longer exist for him.

Finally, having analyzed all the teachings, the bodhisattva feels neither the notion of true teachings (dharmasaṃjñā) nor the notion of false teachings (adharmaṃjñā) towards them.299

These are the innumerable reasons why “he is born into the family of the bodhisattvas”.

Question. – From his first production of the mind of bodhi (prathmacittotpāda), the bodhisattva has already been born into the family of the bodhisattvas. The why does the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra here speak about the bodhisattva who, wishing to be born into the family of the bodhisattvas, must practice the perfection of wisdom?

Answer. – The family of the bodhisattvas (bodhisattvakula) is of two kinds: i) the family with regression (savivartana) and the family without regression (avaivartika); ii) the nominal family and the real family; iii) the pure family and the mixed family; iv) the family strong in faith (śraddhāsāratā) and the family without strength. It is the ‘family without regressions’ and so on up to the ‘family strong in faith’ that the bodhisattva wishes to obtain. This is the sense in which the Prajñāpāramitā here says that “the bodhisattva who wishes to be born into the family of the bodhisattvas must practice the praṇāpāramitā”.

Kumārakabhūmi

II. OBTAINING THE LEVEL OF THE KUMĀRAKA

“The bodhisattva wishes to obtain the level of Kumāraka.”300

1. Some bodhisattvas, from their first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), have destroyed lust (samucchinnarāga) and, up to their acceding to supreme complete enlightenment

299 See Kolopamasūtra of the Majjhima, I, p. 135, already cited above, p. 64F and to which the Traité will refer again, k. 31, p. 290c22; 295b29; k. 85, p. 657a2.

300 Kumāra or kumārakabhūmi is one of the many terms used to designate the eighth bhūmi, the Acalabhūmi. These terms are expounded and justified in the Daśabhūmika, p. 71, l. 11-17 (T 285, k. 4, p. 483c25-484a2; T 286, k. 3, p. 522b15-21; T 287, k. 6, p. 561b24-c2): avivarta, durāsada, kumāra, janma, parinippanna, parinīṣṭhita, nirmāṇa, adhiṣṭhāna and anābhogabhūmi. Kumārabhūmi, because it is beyond reproach.
(anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi), are always in the position of bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniyāma): this is called kumārakabhūmi (level of the child).

2. Furthermore, some bodhisattvas have made the following aspiration (pranidhāna): “From lifetime to lifetime as a kumāra (an unblemished child), I will go forth from home, I will practice the path (mārga) and I will have no worldly sexual relations (maithuna)”: this is called the kumārabhūmi (level of the unblemished child).

3. Furthermore, a king’s son (rājaputra) is called kumāraka (crown prince). The Buddha is the king of the Dharma (dharmarāja) and, from his entry into certainty of the supreme law (dharmasamayāntikāvākānti) up to the tenth bhūmi inclusively, the bodhisattva is called ‘prince with the right of succession to the state of Buddhahood’.

Thus Mañjuśrī, with his ten powers (daśabala), his four fearlessnesses (caturvaiśāraya), etc., completely carries out buddha activity (buddhakāya), dwells in kumārakabhūmi (the level of the crown prince) and saves beings everywhere.

4. Furthermore, a boy who is over four years old but not yet twenty years old is called kumāraka (adolescent). The bodhisattva who has just been born into the family of bodhisattvas is like a baby (bāla). But as soon as he obtains the acquiescence that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣānti) and up to the tenth bhūmi inclusive, he eliminates all bad things: this is what is called kumārabhūmi (level of the adolescent). [275c]

If one wishes to obtain that level, it is necessary to practice the perfection of wisdom.

Buddhāvirahitutā

III. NEVER BEING SEPARATED FROM THE BUDDHAS

“The bodhisattva wishes never to be separated from the Buddhas.” – In all the lifetimes into which he is reborn, the bodhisattva always meets the Buddhas.

1. Benefits of the presence of the Buddhas

Question. – The bodhisattva must convert beings. Why does he want always to meet the Buddhas?

301 Here p’ou-sa-tao renders the Sanskrit bodhisattvaniyāma. Sometimes the character tao used by Kumārajīva has as correspondent nies par ḡgyur ba = niyāma in the Tibetan versions: cf. Śūramgamasamādhisūtra, transl. p. 122, n. 13.

302 For the bodhisattva this niyāmāvākānti is in the eighth bhūmi.
Answer. – Some bodhisattvas have not entered into the certainty of the bodhisattva \textit{(bodhisattvaniyāma)} and have not received the special prediction \textit{(vyākarānaviśeṣa)} reserved for the non-regressing \textit{(avaivartika)} bodhisattvas.\textsuperscript{303} This is why, if they wander away from the Buddhas, they destroy their roots of good \textit{(kuśalamūla)}, fall into the afflictive emotions \textit{(kleśa)} and, unable to save themselves, how could they save others? They are like a sailor who, in a storm, tries to save the others but himself falls into the water. A little bit of boiling water poured onto a great frozen pool melts only a little place and soon itself changes into ice. It is the same for a bodhisattva who, not yet having entered into the certainty \textit{(dharmaniyāma)}, would stray from the Buddhas. Equipped with limited qualities \textit{(alpaguṇa)}, lacking power in skillful means \textit{(upāyabala)}, he wants to convert beings but, even though rendering small services, he himself takes a tumble. This is why a beginning \textit{(ādikarmika)} bodhisattva cannot stray from the Buddhas.

Question. – If that is so, why is he not advised him to stay away from the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas? The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas would also be able to render service to the bodhisattva.

Answer. – The bodhisattva has the great mind \textit{(mahācitta)} [of bodhi]. Although they have the benefit \textit{(upakāra)} of nirvāṇa, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not have omniscience \textit{(sarvajñā)} and consequently cannot guide the bodhisattva. By their knowledge of all the aspects \textit{(sarvākārajñatā)}, the Buddhas alone can guide the bodhisattva.

Thus when an elephant gets stuck in the mud, no animal other than an elephant can pull him out. It is the same for the bodhisattva; if he engages in a bad path \textit{(amārga)}, only the Buddhas can put him back onto the great Path. This is why the Prajñāpāramitā speaks of the bodhisattva here ‘never wishing to be separated from the Buddhas.”

Moreover, the bodhisattva has the following thought: “Not having the Buddha eye \textit{(buddhacakṣus)}, I am no different from a blind man \textit{(andha)}. If I am not guided by the Buddhas, I will be committed to dead-ends. But if people hear the Buddha dharma, finding themselves abroad, they will be ignorant of the time for conversion \textit{(paripacana)} and the exact number of rules of conduct \textit{(pratipatti)}.”

Moreover, the bodhisattva who sees the Buddhas acquires all kinds of benefits \textit{(nānāvidhopakāra)}. When he sees them with his eyes, his mind is purified and when he hears their words, he is pleased with the Dharma and acquires great wisdom \textit{(mahāprajñā)}. Acting in accordance with the Dharma, he finds liberation \textit{(vimukti)}. Since meeting with the Buddhas brings him these immense benefits, why would he not ardently seek to see the Buddhas?

The new-born baby \textit{(bāla)} cannot be separated from its mother. The traveler \textit{(pānthaka)} cannot be separated from his gear; in times of great heat, he does not avoid the cold wind or icy water; in times of great cold, he does not flee from fire; in order to cross deep water, he does not leave his boat behind. The sick person does not renounce good medicine. The bodhisattva has many more good reasons not to wander

\textsuperscript{303} This is a matter of the \textit{anupattikadharmakṣántilabhasammukhayākaraṇa}, the prediction conferred in the presence of and for the benefit of a bodhisattva of the eighth bhūmi who has obtained the conviction that dharmas do not arise.
away from the Buddhas. Why? Father, mother, relatives, friends, humans, gods, etc., are far from equaling the Buddhas in kind deeds. It is [276a] thanks to the kind deeds of the Buddhas that the bodhisattvas escape from the places of suffering and are established in the lands of the Blessed Ones.

For these reasons, the bodhisattva never strays away from the Buddhas.

Question. – Conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) are deceivers (visaṃvādaka), unreal and do not merit belief. How then can one hope never to stray away from the Buddhas?

Answer. – In order to become Buddha, it is necessary that merit (puṇya) and wisdom (prajñā) be fulfilled (saṃpanna), and a fortiori not to become separated from the Buddhas.

As a result of sins (āpatti) accumulated during innumerable kalpas, beings do not come to realize their aspirations (pranidhāna). If they gain in merit, their wisdom is slender (tana), and if they cultivate wisdom, their merit is slender: this is why their aspirations are not realized.

The bodhisattva who seeks the bodhi of the Buddhas must cultivate two patiences (kṣānti): i) patience in regard to beings (sattvakṣānti); ii) patience in regard to things (dharmakṣānti).304 Cultivating patience toward beings, he experiences the feelings of loving-kindness (maitrī) and compassion (karuṇā) for all beings, he destroys the sins committed during numberless kalpas and he gains immense merit (puṇya). Cultivating patience toward things, he destroys the ignorance (avidyā) relating to things and acquires immense wisdom (prajñā). Once these two cultivations are joined, how could his wishes not be realized? This is why, from lifetime to lifetime, the bodhisattva does not stray away from the Buddhas.

Moreover, the bodhisattva is always happy to recollect the Buddha. When he leaves one body to take up another, he always gets to meet the Buddhas.

Thus a being who has cultivated lust (rāgacarita) and whose mind is weighed down takes on the body of a lustful bird, such as a peacock (mayūra) or a duck (cakrabhāka), etc. A being who has cultivated hatred (dveṣa) is inevitably reborn among the poisonous species such as wicked dragons (nāga), rākṣasas, centipedes (śatapadin), venomous snakes (āśīvīṣa), etc. The bodhisattva himself has no ambition for the fate of a noble cakravartin king or human or divine happiness: he recollects only the Buddhas; this is why he assumes the forms to which he attaches the greatest weight.

Finally, the bodhisattva always practices the concentration of the recollection of the Buddhas (buddhānusmṛtisamādhi) splendidly;305 this is why, wherever he is reborn, he always meets the Buddhas.

304 Cf. p. 865F.
305 Distinct from the simple commemoration of the Buddha (p. 1340-1361F), this samādhi of the ‘commemoration of the Buddhas’ according to the Mahāyāna is to ’commemorate all the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times present in innumerable buddha-fields’: see above, p. 409-415F.
concentration of recollecting the Buddha and ceaselessly thinking about it, one gets to be born in my field.\textsuperscript{306}

2. Subjective nature of the appearance of the Buddhas\textsuperscript{307}

\textsuperscript{306} Pan-tsheou-san-mei king, T 418, k. 1, p. 905b8-14. This sūtra is known by four Chinese translations (T 416-419) and one Tibetan translation (Tib. Trip., vol. 32, no. 801). In China at the end of the 4\textsuperscript{th} century, it contributed to the development of the cult of Amita. On this subject, see P. Demiéville, \textit{La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa}, BEFEO, XLIV, 1954, p. 353-355, 431-432.

\textsuperscript{307} The meeting of the bodhisattva with the buddhas of the three times and the ten directions is a purely subjective phenomenon: the buddhas do not come to the bodhisattva and the bodhisattva does not go to the buddhas. The phenomenon occurs at two times: a vision and a reflection.

A. The bodhisattva enters into the ‘concentration of the recollection of the buddhas’ (\textit{buddhānusmrītisamādhi}) and sees them in mind (\textit{cittena}), not in any mind whatsoever, but according to the very words of the sūtras (Majjhima, I, p. 23, etc.) ”in concentrated, purified, cleansed, stainless mind rid of minor stains, softened, amenable, stable mind that has reached immovability” (\textit{samāhita citte parisuddhe pariyoṭṭhe anāgâne vigatāpakkilese mudabhūte kammâmye thite ānejappatte}). He directs it to and fixes it on the body of the Buddha, a body of the color of gold, luminous, endowed with the major and minor marks. Because the mind of the bodhisattva is pure, it receives the image of the body of the Buddha like the mirror of clear water reflects the face of the person who is looking into it. The image of the Buddha impresses the mind of the bodhisattva so that he ceases to see any other object and any other color. He remains fixed in contemplation before the red gold (\textit{kanaka}) surrounded by beryl (\textit{vaiḍūrya}) representing the buddhas. He enters into conversation with them, asks them questions and hears their answers. Subjective though it may be, this meeting with the buddhas plunges him into rapture (\textit{muditā}).

These practices of autosuggestion are not new to Buddhism. The śrāvakas already used a whole arsenal of practices where the directed will (\textit{adhimokṣa}) overtakes objectivity and allows the seeing of things not as they are but as one wants to see them. During the course of the Apramāṇas or the Brahmavihāras, for the purification of one’s own mind, they consider beings of the ten directions in turn as happy, rejoicing or miserable when similar generalizations are, to say the least, unlikely. The practice of the eight vimokṣas, the eight abhibhvāyatanas and the ten kṛtāyatanas allows the ascetic to substitute the vision of external objects for that of the internal objects and vice versa, to contemplate the universe under the form of a single element (earth, water, fire or wind) or under the aspect of a single color (blue, yellow, red or white), of bringing everything to the notion of space, infinite consciousness or nothingness, and finally to eliminate the notions and sensations without a residue. The ascetic having entered into the \textit{āsabhābhāvanā} finally sees the cosmos in the form of a gigantic skeleton. Subjectivism is pushed so far that the theoreticians attribute to the \textit{pariṇāmanarddhi} the power of really transforming things, for example, of changing stone into gold. In a word, samādhi is the triumph of the arbitrary over reality. But if, with use, the arbitrary is revealed as being useful and beneficial, it is appropriate to use it provisionally even if it means abandoning it definitively \textit{a posteriori}.

B. The bodhisattva who has ‘met’ the buddhas in the course of the \textit{buddhānusmrītisamādhi} ends up by coming out of samādhi without losing, for all that, the results of the experience that he has undergone. He retains the memories of the meetings he has had with the buddhas and eventually writes them down in a book (\textit{pustakāṃ karoti}). We think this is the origin of the enormous literature of the Mahāyānasūtras that flooded Buddhism during
Question. – How does this concentration of the recollection of the Buddhas (buddhānusmṛtyuṃśāmbādhi) bring about being born in that field?

Answer. – ‘Recollecting the Buddha’ is to meditate on his thirty-two major marks and his eighty minor marks (anuvyāṇjana), on his golden colored body (suvarṇāvarna kāya), on the rays (raśmi) that shine forth from his body and fill the ten directions, on the clarity and purity of his brilliance like the molten gold of the Jambu river (jāmbūnadasuvarga). The Buddha is like Sumeru, king of the mountains, in the middle of the great sea, which, at the moment the sun shines on it, illuminates everything. 308

the first centuries of our era. Between the sūtras of the Tripitaka compiled by the śrāvakas at the beginnings of Buddhism and the Vaipulya sūtras that accumulated over the course of time, there is the major difference that the former were collected from the very mouth (kaṇṭokta) of the historical Buddha Śākyamuni whereas the latter came from a meeting in samādhī with the buddhas of the three times and ten directions. Without saying anything about the value of the teachings they contain, we can simply state that the sūtras of the Tripitaka transmit historical evidence whereas the Vaipulya sūtras tell of a mystical experience.

The Mahāyānists who benefit from this experience do not believe in the objectivity of their meeting with the buddhas. Having come out of concentration, they first establish that the buddhas came from nowhere and that they themselves have gone nowhere, that it is only to the extent that they have thought they have seen the buddhas. And each of them says: “It is by means of mind (citta) that I have seen the buddhas; it is by means of the mind that I have fabricated the buddhas. The mind is the buddhas; the mind is myself.”

Following their reasoning, they establish that, contrary to the common way of speaking, consciousness (vijñāna) does not discriminate (na vijñānati), mind does not cognize itself, does not see itself, and to cling to the nature of mind is fundamentally ignorance (ajñāna). Pushing to their ultimate conclusions the criticisms raised by the Sautrāntikas against mental operations (cf. Kośa, I, p. 86; IX, p. 280), the Prajñāpāramitās (Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 37-40; Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 121-122; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 495) affirm that the mind is the opposite of mind (cittam acittam), that in this absence of mind, existence or non-existence of the mind does not occur and is not perceived (tatrācitatātayām asitī vā nāsitī vā na vidyate nopalabhya), that this absence of mind excluding all modification and all concept constitutes the very nature of everything (avikāra avikalpā acittatā vā sarvadharmānām dharmatā). In this view, “the bodhisattva penetrates the true nature of things (dharmānān bhūtalaksana) which is none other than eternal emptiness (niṣayaḥvitya).

In samādhī, the bodhisattva meets the buddhas, converses with them and enjoys their presence; by means of prajñā he penetrates the emptiness of beings and things by virtue of which nobody meets anybody and nothing is said about things that are neither existent nor non-existent. Supported by the two wings of samādhī and prajñā, the bodhisattva takes flight like a garuḍa, king of the birds which soars supremely in empty space.

308 Compare this common passage incessantly repeated in the Sarvāstivādin Avadānas (Avadānasūtra, I. p. 3; Divyāvadāna, p. 46. 3tc.): Atha... bhagavatām dādarā dvātirnāṣāt mahāpurasalakṣanaḥ samalakṣyantu asitātā cānuvayājanair virhājītagāraṃ vyānaprabhālaṅkṛtām sūryasahasrātirekāprabhaṃ jaṅgamam iva rainaparvaṃ samantato bhadrakaṃ. – Then N... saw the Blessed One adorned with the thirty-two major marks of the Great Man, his body resplendent with the eighty minor marks, adorned with a halo, one arm-span in width, with a brilliance surpassing a thousand suns, like a mountain of jewels in movement, captivating in every way.
During this concentration, the yogin loses the notion (saṃjñā) of other colors (rūpa) – the colors of the mountains, earth, forests, etc.; in space he sees only the bodily marks if the Buddhas, marks like an appearance of molten gold (kanaka) in the center of a real beryl (vaiḍūrya).

A bhikṣu who has entered onto the meditation on the horrible (aśubhāvāvya) see only bloated bodies (vyādhnātaka), putrefied (vipūyaka), torn apart (vidhūtaka), finally seeing nothing other than a skeleton (asthiśataka). This [276b] skeleton is immobile (akāraka); it comes from nowhere and it goes nowhere (na kutāścid āgacchati, na kvacīd gacchati): the bhikṣu sees this skeleton by means of his memory (anusmāraṇa) and as a concept (saṃjñā). In the same way, the bodhisattva-mahāśásatta who has entered into the concentration of the recollection of the Buddhas (buddhānusmṛtisamādhī) sees the Buddhas insofar as he has concentrated his mind (cittasamādhānāt) and insofar as his mind is pure (cittaviśuddhā).

Emerging from concentration (samādher vyuṭhitah), the bodhisattva has the following thought: “From where do the Buddhas come when I myself have gone nowhere?” At that very moment, he knows that the Buddhas have come from nowhere and that he himself has gone nowhere. – Once again he has the following thought: “Everything that exists in the threefold world (traidhātuka) has been manufactured by the mind (citta). Why? It is insofar as I have thought in my mind that I have seen all these Buddhas. It is by means of the mind that I have seen the Buddhas; it is by means of the mind that I have created the Buddhas. Mind is the Buddhas; mind is myself.”

And yet the mind cannot cognize itself and does not see itself. Clinging to the nature of the mind (cittanimittanām udgrahaṇam) is fundamentally ignorance (ajñāna). The mind itself is deception (mrṣa) and comes from ignorance (avidyā). By separating from his deceptive and erroneous nature of mind, the bodhisattva penetrates into the true nature of things (dharmāṇāṃ bhūtalakṣaṇaḥ or dharmatāḥ), namely, eternal emptiness (nityaśūnayatā).

The bodhisattva thus obtains the concentration of the recollection of the Buddhas (buddhānusmṛtisamādhī) and wisdom (prajñā) [about the true nature, the emptiness of things]. By the power of these two factors (saṃskāra), he comes to never be separated from the Buddhas at will (yatheccham) and according to his wishes (yatāpranidhānām). In the same way that the garuḍa, king of the birds, furnished with two wings (pakṣa), soars supremely in space (ākāśa), so the bodhisattva, in his present lifetime (ihajanmani), by means of the power of concentration and wisdom, is able to pay homage to the Buddhas at will and, after his death, he is able to meet the Buddhas again.

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309 See above, p. 1316F seq.
This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says here that “the bodhisattva who wishes to never be separated from the Buddhas must practice the perfection of wisdom.”
CHAPTER XLVI (p. 1931F) VENERATING WITH THE ROOTS OF GOOD

Buddhapūjā

First Section HONORING ALL THE BUDDHAS

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 23, l. 15-18; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 72, l. 11-15). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to have at his disposal the roots of good capable of honoring, venerating, respecting and praising all the Buddhas as he wishes should practice the perfection of wisdom (Bodhisattvena mahāsattvena yair kuśalamūlair ākāṅkṣet sarvabuddhān pūjayitum satkartum gurūkartum varṇayitum tāni me kuśalamūlāni samṛdhheyur iti praṇāpāramitāyāṁ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. THE DESIRE TO OFFER

[276c] The bodhisattva who gets to be never separated from the Buddhas must honor them (pūjayitum); if he meets the Buddhas and has nothing to offer them, he is very unhappy.

[Offering of Sumati]. 310 – Thus the bodhisattva Siu-mo-t’i (Sumati), in the Ts’in language “Good Intellect”, seeing the Buddha Jan-teng (Dīpamkara) and having nothing to offer him, set out to look everywhere. Seeing a seller of flowers, he bought five blue lotus flowers (nīlotpala) for five hundred gold pieces (kārṣāpana) and offered him the flowers.

[Offering of Sadāprarudita]. 311 – The bodhisattva Sa-t’o-po-louen (Sadāprarudita) sold his body, his blood and his flesh to honor the Teacher. Such bodhisattvas who would meet a Buddha and would wish to honor him were very upset if they did not have any offerings.

When inferior people meet superior individuals and do not offer them any present, it is a lack of respect. Also, the bodhisattvas look for offerings to honor the Buddhas. The Buddhas have no need of [the offerings] but by honoring them, the bodhisattvas perfect themselves mentally.

Thus when a laborer (karmāntika, kārṣaka) finds a good field (kṣetra) but has no seed (bija), he has to increase his work: it is useless for him to use up his energy and he feels great sadness. It is the same for the bodhisattva who meets the Buddha but has no offering at his disposal. Even if he has something but which does not correspond to his idea, he is sad.

311 See p. 1353F, n. 1.
II. METONYMICAL MEANING OF ‘ROOTS OF GOOD’

Here, by ‘roots of good’ (kuśalamūla), we mean the fruits of retribution (vipākapahāla) coming from the roots of good, such as flowers (puṣpa), perfumes (gandha), necklaces (niṣka), garments (vastra), banners (patāka), parasols (chattra) and all kinds of precious gems (maṇīratna). Why is that?

Sometimes, [and this is the case here], the effect is designated by means of the cause (kārye kāranopacārāh), as in the expression: “to eat a thousand ounces of gold monthly”. Gold is not edible but it is by means of gold that one finds something to eat: hence the expression: ‘to eat gold’.

Also, sometimes the cause is designated by means of the result (kāraṇe kāryopacārāh) for example, when on seeing a beautiful picture, one says: “That is a good artist”. The artist is not the picture, but seeing the beauty of the picture, one speaks of the talent of the artist.

It is the same in regard to the roots of good and their fruits of retribution. By virtue of the karmic causes and conditions constituted by the roots of good, one obtains, [as fruits of retribution], objects to offer (pūjokaraṇa) called here [by metonymy] ‘roots of good’, [whereas they are really the results of the roots of good].

Question. – If that is so, why not speak specifically of flowers (puṣpa), perfumes (gandha), etc., by name instead of designating them indirectly by their causes?

312 ‘To honor the Buddhas by the roots of good’ means to honor the Buddhas by the offerings resulting from the roots of good. Expressing oneself thus is to designate the result (the offerings) by the name of the cause (the roots of good).

1) It is kārye kāraṇopacārāh when one metaphorically applies [the name of] the cause to the effect, in other words, when one designates the effect by the cause.

The classical example given here and above (p. 218F) already appeared in the Śatakaśāstra by Āryadeva, T 1569, k. 1, p. 170a16-17: “He eats a thousand ounces of gold monthly”. Gold is not food, but it is the cause of food.

Another example given above (p. 218F): “Woman is the stain of morality”. Woman is not the stain but the cause of the stain.

2) Conversely, there is kāraṇe kāryopacārāh when one metaphorically applies the name of the effect to the cause, in other words when one designates the cause by the effect.

The classical example given here already appeared in the Śatakaśāstra by Āryadeva, T 1569, k. 1, p. 170a17-18: “When, on seeing a beautiful painting, one says that it is a good artist. The artist is not good; it is the painting created by him that is good.”

Another classical example given by the Kosabhāṣya, p. 7, l. 11-13 is taken from a stanza of the Dhammapāda, v. 194, and the Udānavarga, XXX, v. 22: Sukhaṃ buddhasya cotpādaḥ: “The appearance of the Buddha is happiness’. The appearance of the Buddha is not happiness; it is the bliss that it brings that is the happiness. In saying that this appearance is happiness, one is applying an attribute of the effect to the cause.
Answer. – Offerings (pūjā) are of two kinds: i) material offerings (āmiśapūjā); ii) spiritual offerings (dhammapūjā).³¹³ If the sūtra mentions only flowers, perfumes, etc., as offerings, it would not include spiritual offerings. But as it speaks here of ‘roots of good’ as offerings, we know that it includes both material and spiritual offerings.

III. SIGNS OF HONOR, RESPECT, VENERATION AND PRAISE

1. Pūjā

Here is what is meant by honors (pūjā). When one sees the Buddhas or hears their qualities spoken of, one honors them in mind, respects them, goes to meet them, accompanies them, bows before them with joined palms, or if they have withdrawn to a quiet place, one hastens to send them food (annapāna), [277a] flowers (puspa), perfumes (gandha), precious gems (maniratna), etc. – In many ways, one lauds their qualities (guna) of discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā). If they preach the Dharma, one accepts it with faith and one teaches it.

These good physical, vocal and mental actions constitute pūjā.

2. Satkāra

Tsouen-tchong (satkāra ‘veneration’). – Knowing that nobody surpasses the Buddhas in virtue is tsouen; feeling for them a reverential fear surpassing that which one experiences toward one’s father, mother, master or princes, serving them and respecting them is tchong.

3. Gurukāra

Kong-king (gurukāra ‘respect’). – Being humble and fearful is kong; esteeming their knowledge and virtues is king.

4. Varṇana

Tsan-t’an (varṇana ‘praise’) - Praising their qualities is tsan; lauding the ceaselessly and exalting them is t’an.³¹⁴

IV. HAVING OFFERINGS AT ONE’S DISPOSAL AS ONE LIKES

“The bodhisattva wishes to have [offerings] at his disposal as he likes.” – If he has need of a flower to offer, it comes to him as he wishes (yathaccham), whether he looks for it or he gets it without looking for it. Actually there are things that arise spontaneously (svarasena): apparitional beings (upapāduka) on up to musical instruments (tūrya); and it is the same for all the things to be offered (pūjopakaraṇa).

³¹³ Anguttara, I, p. 93: Dve ‘mā bhikkhave pūjā. katamā dve. āmiśapūjā ca dhammapūjā ca.
³¹⁴ These semantic explanations are obviously a Chinese gloss as is customary with the Chinese.
Question. – If the bodhisattva finds them this way, it is easy for him to offer them. Why then does he seek for them as he wishes (yatheccham)?

Answer. – Merit (puṇya) comes from the mind (cittāpekṣa). Using as an offering something that one loves produces an increase in merit (puṇyavardhana).

Thus, king A-yu (Aśoka) became king of Jambudvīpa and built eighty thousand stupas in one single day because, as a child, he had offered to the Buddha a bit of earth (pāṃśu) that he loved very much. If an adult placed earth in the Buddhas’ bowl, even a lot of it, he would gain no merit because [to him] this earth is of no value. Some people have a liking for flowers and, when they offer those they prefer to the Buddha, merit increases for them. It is the same for other precious objects.

Moreover, offerings are adjusted according to the conventions of the times: in cold weather, kindling (indhana), clothing (paricchādana) or food (annapāna) should be given; in hot weather, ice water, fans (vījana), parasols (chattra), cool rooms, very fine garments and very light food should be given; in rainy or windy weather, the needed gear should be procured. Those are offerings adjusted according to the weather. Offerings should also be adjusted according to the conventions of place and the needs of the recipients (pratigrāhaka).

Moreover, the offerings are adjusted according to the desires. Some bodhisattvas know that the Buddhas need nothing; they also know that objects (dravya) are false like a magic show and have as their single characteristic the absence of characteristics. However, in order to convert beings (sattvaparipācanārtham), they adjust themselves to the preferences of beings and countries to make their offerings.

There are as well bodhisattvas who possess very deep concentrations (samādhi) and have acquired the bodhisattva superknowledges (abhiñā). By the power of these superknowledges, they fly to the Buddhas of the ten directions. Sometimes, in the buddha-fields (buddhakṣetra), if necessary, they rain down celestial flowers (divypuspa), filling the trichiliocosm (trisāhasralokadhātu) and offer these to the Buddhas; sometimes they rain down heavenly sandalwood (candana); sometimes they rain down cintāmaṇi as large as Sumeru; sometimes they rain down musical instruments (tūrya) with wondrous sounds; sometimes, taking a body as high as Sumeru, they use it as a lamp-wick to pay homage to [277b] the Buddhas. Those are material offerings.

Moreover, the bodhisattvas who are practicing the six perfections (pāramitā) make spiritual offerings (dharmapūjā) to the Buddhas. By using the practices of a single bhūmi, some bodhisattvas pay homage to the Buddhas; they go up to fulfilling the practices of the ten bhūmis to honor them. Sometimes, having obtained conviction that dharmas do not arise (anuttapattiadharmakṣānti), they destroy their own afflictions (kleśa) and those of beings. Those are spiritual offerings (dharmapūjā).

Sometimes the bodhisattva dwelling in the tenth bhūmi exerts his magical power (ṛddhibala) so well that the fires of the damned (naraka) are extinguished, the pretas are satisfied, the animals are liberated from their fears (bhaya), humans (manusa) and gods (deva) gradually reach the non-regressing bhūmi (avaivartikabhūmi). Such qualities and such powers are also spiritual offerings.

315 Pāṃśupradānāvadāna: references, p. 723F, n. 2
This is why the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says that the bodhisattva “who wishes to have roots of good at his disposal [to honor the Buddhas] should practice the perfection of wisdom.”

Manorathapūraṇa

Second Section FULFILLING THE WISHES OF ALL BEINGS

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 23, l. 19-22; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 72, l. 18-73, l. 5). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to fulfill the desires actually of all beings for food and drink, garments, bedding, ointments and perfumes, vehicles, houses, couches, lamps, etc., should practice the perfection of wisdom (Bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarvasattvenāṁ manorathān paripūrayitukāmena annapānavastraśayanānānavepanaghandhayānagrhakaṇṭvādipādibhiḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṁ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. WHAT IS FULFILLING THE WISHES?

Question. – What order (anukrama) is the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra following here when it says that the bodhisattva “wishes to fulfill the desires of all beings”?

Answer. – The activity of the bodhisattva is twofold: i) honoring the Buddhas (buddhānāṁ pūjā); ii) saving beings (sattvānāṁ paritrāṇa). By honoring the Buddhas, the bodhisattva gains immense merit (puṇya) and, with this merit, he helps beings (sattvāṁ upakaroti) in the sense that “he fulfills their wishes”.

The master merchant goes to sea and collects jewels (ratna); then, having returned safe and sound, he helps his relatives (bandhu), his friends (mitra), etc. Similarly, the bodhisattva goes to the sea of the Buddhadharmā and gathers immense precious qualities there, thanks to which he helps beings.

A petty king in paying homage to the great king has to satisfy him and the latter, in return, grants him the offices and the wealth he desires. Having returned to his native land, the petty king helps beings and drives away thieves (caura). Similarly, the bodhisattva who has paid homage to the Buddha, the king of the Dharma, receives in return a special prediction (vyākaraṇa) and, thanks to the immense treasure of his roots of good (kusālamāla), attains the indestructible power of knowledge (aṣṭavajñānabala). Then, going among beings, he honors good people, gives to the poor whatever they need and destroys the armies of Māra as well as the holders of wrong views and heresies. This is how, after having honored the Buddhas, he fulfills the wishes of beings.

Question. – Does the bodhisattva truly fulfill the wishes of all beings? If he completely fulfilled the wishes of beings, what would be the use of the other Buddhas and bodhisattvas? If he does not completely fulfill them, why does the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra speak of the bodhisattva wanting to fulfill the wishes of all beings and practicing the prajñāpāramitā for this purpose?
Answer. - There are two kinds of wishes (manoratha, āśā): 

1) the realizable wish; 
2) the unrealizable wish.

When someone wants to measure space (ākāśa) and reach its limits, when someone seeks to reach the limits of time or place, when a child wants to grab his image in water or in a mirror, these are all unrealizable wishes.

When one bores wood to make fire, when one digs the earth to find water, when one cultivates merit (puṇya) to attain birth among humans or gods, to find the fruit of arhat or pratyekabuddha or even to become a Buddha, the king of Dharma, these are all realizable wishes.

The realizable wish is of two types: 1) worldly (laukika), 2) supraworldly (lokottara). In the present passage, it is a matter of fulfilling the worldly wishes of beings. How do we know that? Because [here the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra is talking about] supplying them with objects of current need: food and drink (annapāṇa), couches (khaṭvā), bedding (śayanāsana), etc., up to lamps (dīpa).

Question. – Why does the bodhisattva give beings things that are easy to find (sulabha) and not things that are hard to find (durlabha)?

Answer. – Things wished for are inferior (hīna), middling (madhya) or superior (adhimātra). The inferior ones are the causes and conditions bringing about happiness (sukha) in the present life (ihajanman), the middling ones are the causes and conditions assuring happiness in the future life (parajanma), the superior ones are the causes and conditions assuring nirvāṇa. This is why the bodhisattva first fulfills the inferior wishes, then the middling wishes and finally the superior wishes.

Moreover, beings often cling (abhinivīṣṭa) to present happiness, rarely to future happiness, and even more rarely to the happiness of nirvāṇa. By speaking here of things to which beings are most attached, [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] is also including the things to which they are least attached.

Moreover, from beginning to end, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks above all about future lives and the path of nirvāṇa; rarely does it speak of things of the present life. The bodhisattva’s rule is to assure beings all kinds of benefits (anuśāmsa) without omitting any. Why? His first and foremost intention is to lead beings to the Mahāyāna Dharma. If they are unable to adopt it and become converted, the bodhisattva presents to them the path of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. If they are resistant to that, the bodhisattva presents them with the practices of the ten good ways of conduct (daśa kuśaladharmapatha), the four limitless ones (brahmavihāra), etc., so that they can cultivate merit (puṇya). If, finally, beings do not appreciate any of these practices, the bodhisattva does not abandon them but gives them the good things of the present life, namely, food and drink (annapāṇa), etc.

Finally, when worldly people (prthagjana) give someone food, drink, etc., and thus fulfill their wishes, they are fulfilling the causes and conditions [required for this result], insofar as it is things of the present lifetime and those of future lifetimes. Even without fulfilling these causes and conditions, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas also fulfill the wishes of beings but the services that they render are very small. The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who practices the perfection of wisdom, due to his actions, is able, on the other hand, to become king or an important person (mahāśreṣṭhin) enjoying immense wealth. When beings come from the four direction (caturdiśasattva) to call upon him, he satisfies them completely.
The fabulous gifts of Bindu. – Thus, the vaiśya P’in-t’eou (Bindu?) was a great benefactor (dānapati). He sat on a great bed (khaṭva) adorned with the seven jewels (saptaratna). This bed had diamond (vajra) feet, was covered with a heavenly mattress and had rubies (padmarāga) as curtains (vitāna). Eighty thousand servants stood on guard on all sides; their adornments were marvelous; they opened the four great doors [of the palace] and authorized all requests. Six times during both the day and the night the drum was beaten and rays of light shone forth. Of the numberless beings of the ten directions, all those who heard the drum or who were touched by the rays did not fail to rush to the spot in order to receive all kinds of food and drink (annapāna). At the sight of this huge crowd, the śreṣṭhin [Bindu] silently raised his eyes to the heavens and immediately there fell from the sky a rain of different foods of a hundred flavors (śatarasasāhāra) and everybody received as much as they wished. If people did not collect it themselves, the servants gave it to them, dividing it up and distributing it. When all were satisfied, the rain stopped.

Having thus satisfied the desires of beings, Bindu then preached the Dharma to them and led them to renounce the four foods (caturvidhāhāra). All were then established in the non-regressing bhūmi (avaivartikā bhūmi).

By the power of their superknowledges (abhijnā), bodhisattvas fulfill the wishes of beings.

II. DO THE BUDDHAS AND BODHISATTVAS FULFILL WISHES WITHOUT EXCEPTION?

Question. When the Buddha was present in the world, beings were still hungry and thirsty (ksutipipāsā), the sky did not always pour down rain (vṛṣṭī), and beings were distressed. If the Buddha himself could not fulfill the wishes of all beings, how then could the bodhisattva fulfill them?

Answer. – The Bodhisattva abiding on the tenth bhūmi and in the concentration of the progress of the Hero (Śūraṃgamamsamādiḥ) is in the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu, and sometimes he manifests there the first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda) and practices the six perfections (pāramitā); sometimes he manifests as non-regressing (avaivartika); sometimes he manifests as being separated from Buddhahood by one single lifetime (ekajātipratibaddha) and, in the Tuṣita heaven, he preaches the Dharma to the devas; sometimes he comes down from the Tuṣita heaven and is born in the palace of king Śuddhodana; sometimes he leaves home (pravrajati) and becomes Buddha; sometimes he appears in the midst of the great assembly, turns the Wheel of the Dharma (dharmacakram pravartayati) and saves innumerable beings; sometimes he manifests his entry into nirvāṇa and seven precious stūpas are erected.

316 See Dīgha, III, p. 228.

317 Adopting the variant tsai che.
for him so that beings can honor his relics (śarīra) everywhere in all the kingdoms; sometimes finally his Dharma becomes extinct.\(^{318}\) If the Bodhisattva helps in those ways, what can be said about the Buddha?

The body of the Buddha is of two kinds: \(i\) the true body (bhūtakāya); \(ii\) the emanated body (nirmāṇakāya). In beings who see the true body of the Buddha, there is no wish that is not fulfilled. The true body of the Buddha fills space; his rays illumine the ten directions; the sounds of his sermons fill innumerable universes in the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges (ganganadi-vālukopama lokadhātu) equally; all the members of the great assembly hear the Dharma simultaneously and he preaches the Dharma uninterruptedly; in the space of one moment, the listener obtains the understanding of what he has heard.

When the kalpa is finished and by virtue of actions [collectively] accomplished, the great rain (mahāvarṣa) comes down without interruption, it cannot be governed by the other three great elements (mahābhūta); only the winds (vāyu) that come from the ten directions at the end of the kalpa and come up against one another can withstand this water (ap).\(^{319}\) In the same way, the Dharma preached by the Buddha [of the true body] or the body of the fundamental element (dharmadhūtakāya), cannot be accepted by the practitioners of the three Vehicles with the exception of the Bodhisattvas of the tenth bhūmi; only the Bodhisattvas of the tenth bhūmi whose skillful means (upāya) and power of knowledge (jñānabala) are inconceivable can hear and accept this Dharma.

Beings who see the Buddha of the body of the Dharma (dharmakāya) are [278b] liberated from the threefold poison (triviṣa), the afflictive emotions (kleśa), the sufferings of cold and heat (śītosya), and all of their wishes are fulfilled. If the cintāniṣṭi brings all that one desires, what can be said of the Buddha? The

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\(^{318}\) Having entered into the concentration of the progress of the Hero, the bodhisattva of the tenth bhūmi can carry out all the deeds of the career of a Buddha. See the Śāramgamasamādhisūtra, transl., p. 123, 140, 223-224, 263.

\(^{319}\) The Mahākalpa, or great cosmic period, is divided into four incalculable periods (asankhyeyakalpa) each lasting twenty small kalpas (antarakalpa): 1) one period of disappearance of the world (saṃvartakalpa) resulting from one disappearance by fire (tejasamvartani), one disappearance by water (apsamvartani) and one disappearance by wind (vāyusamvartani); 2) one period during which the world remains destroyed (saṃvartasthāyikakalpa); 3) one period of creation (vivartakalpa); 4) one period during which the world remains created (vivartasthāyikakalpa). At the moment when the second period is consumed and the third is about to begin, as a result of the collective action of beings light winds arise in space that are the first signs of the future receptacles (sattvāṇaṃ karmāṇityena bhājanānānāṃ pūrvanimittabhūtā ākāśe mandamandā vāyavah syandante). They constitute the ‘primordial wind’ (prāgāvaya). With the increasing of these winds, there arises the circle of wind (vāyumāṇḍala) which rests on space (ākāśa). Then on this circle of wind, by virtue of the [collective] actions of beings, masses of clouds arise, jets of water like axle-trees begin to rain down, and that becomes the circle of waters (tasmā vāyumāṇḍaḥ sattvāṇaṃ karmabhīr meghaḥ sanbhāyakasamāttrāhībhīr dhārābhīr abhīvarṣaṇī, tad bhavyaḥ apāṃ maṃḍalam). – See Kośabhāṣya, p. 158 and 179.

The Saṃyuktā, T 99, k. 34, p. 243a23-26 alludes to this primordial rain, and its text is cited in Kośabhāṣya, p. 113, l. 23-26: Ṽyādāhāre deva varṣaḥ nāsti vičir vā antarikā vā anatikṣāḥ vā rājāhārāṇāṃ prapatātiṃ / evaṃ pūrvasyāṃ diṣṭi nāsti vičir vā antarikā vā lokadhāṭināṁ saṃvartamānānāṁ vivartamānānāṁ ca / yathāpūrvasyāṃ diṣṭi evaṃ daksinatiṃ paścimāyāṃ uttaraṃṣyāṃ iti /
Finally, some say that Śākyamuni satisfies all worldly wishes (laukika manoratha); the Buddha, on the other hand, satisfies all supraworldly wishes (lokottara manoratha). Claiming that the Buddha does not fulfill the wishes of beings completely is a false statement.

Moreover, the Buddha Śākyamuni who took birth in the palace of the king seemingly took on human qualities; he endured cold and heat (śīloṣaṇa), hunger and thirst (ksutipipāsā), sleep (nidrā): he underwent criticism (pamsana), old age (jarā), sickness (vyāḍhi), death (marāṇa), etc., but in his mentality, wisdom (prajñā) and divine qualities, he was no different from a fully and completely enlightened buddha (samyaksambuddha). Had he wished to fulfill the desires of beings, he would have fulfilled them all. Actually he did not fulfill them because already for numberless lifetimes he had satisfied the desires of beings in regard to garments and food, but without their escaping from suffering. Presently, he wanted only to bring them the unconditional and eternal bliss of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasyaśamskṛtaniyasyasukha). When one has compassion for one’s relatives (bandhu), one does not give them good food mixed with poison. Now worldly (laukika) favors produce fetters (samyojana) and, furthermore, if they are untimely, they give rise to great suffering. This is why Śākyamuni does not consider them to be necessary.

Finally, some say that Śākyamuni did indeed fulfill the wishes of beings but that the latter did not profit from them.321

[Vimalakīrtinirdēsa].322 – Thus it is said in the P’i-mo-lo-kie king (Vimalakīrtisūtra): “The Buddha tapped the earth with his toe and at once his field (kṣetra) was adorned with the seven jewels. [And the Buddha said to Śāriputra]: My Buddha-field is always like that, but because there are many bad people, it appears to be different from a Buddha-field.”

Also when the nāgarāja impartially (samacittena) makes it rain, the rain is water for humans, but for the pretas, it is burning embers.323

320 ‘Presently’, i.e., in the course of his last existence and after his enlightenment.

321 Subject to the law of karma, they do not fulfill the conditions necessary to profit from the teachings and favors of Śākyamuni. See above, p. 541-542F, the misadventure of the old woman of Śākyamuni who took birth in the palace of the king seemingly took on human qualities; he endured cold and heat (śīloṣaṇa), hunger and thirst (ksutipipāsā), sleep (nidrā): he underwent criticism (pamsana), old age (jarā), sickness (vyāḍhi), death (marāṇa), etc., but in his mentality, wisdom (prajñā) and divine qualities, he was no different from a fully and completely enlightened buddha (samyaksambuddha). Had he wished to fulfill the desires of beings, he would have fulfilled them all. Actually he did not fulfill them because already for numberless lifetimes he had satisfied the desires of beings in regard to garments and food, but without their escaping from suffering. Presently, he wanted only to bring them the unconditional and eternal bliss of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasyaśamskṛtaniyasyasukha). When one has compassion for one’s relatives (bandhu), one does not give them good food mixed with poison. Now worldly (laukika) favors produce fetters (samyojana) and, furthermore, if they are untimely, they give rise to great suffering. This is why Śākyamuni does not consider them to be necessary.

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322 Wei-mo-kie-king, T 475, k. 1, p. 538c20-29; transl. p. 122-123.

323 The example of the pretas and water is often evoked by the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins to prove, respectively, the non-existence of the object or its reduction to mere-mind.

For the former, see Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 164 (transl, Muséon, 1910, p. 348): Like someone who has an organ afflicted by ophthalmia, pretas take water to be blood.

For the latter, see Viśṇuṣatika, p. 3, l. 23-4, l. 6. Saṃtanāniyāmaḥ siddhaḥ iti vartate prālānām iva pretavat katham siddhah saman / sarvaṁ pāyayadyādīdarśane / tulyakarmavipākāvasthā hi pretah sarve ̄pi pāyapūrṇām nadiṁ paśyanti naika eva / yathā pāyapūrṇāṃ mūtrapuriśādīpiyātām dandāsidharaśa ca purusāś adhiṣṭhitām ity ādigranahana / eva saṃtanāniyamō vijñāpīnāḥ apy arthe siddhāḥ / Transl.: ‘The indetermination of the mental series’ is demonstrated ‘as in the pretas,’ similarly to the pretas. How is that demonstrated? Because all see rivers at the same time as full of pus. Actually, all pretas who are in the same condition of retribution of actions equally see the river full of pus and not just one single one. Similarly to pus, also full of urine, excrement, etc., guarded by men
Question. – If the bodhisattva fulfilled the wishes of all beings, since the latter are finite (antavat) in number, nobody would suffer from thirst and cold any longer. Why? Because [according to this hypothesis], all beings realized their wishes and all wanted to escape from suffering and find happiness.

Answer. – When the sūtra says: “Fulfilling the wishes of all beings”, the word ‘all’ is taken in a broad sense and not in a narrow sense. It is like the stanza in Fa-kiu (Dharmapada) where it says:

All fear death,
There is no one who does not fear the suffering of being beaten.

By being inspired by the leniency one feels for oneself
One avoids killing, one avoids inflicting a beating.  

The bodhisattva needs four knowledges in order to be convinced of the absolute absence of object (artha). The first is the viruddhavijñananimittatva jñāna noticing that one single thing, or supposedly such, is the object of contradictory cognitions. Thus, hungry ghosts (preta), animals (tiryāṅc), humans (manusya) and gods (deva) have differing concepts (bhinnavijñapti) of one and the same thing (ekadravya).

Commenting on this passage, Asvabhāva states: Where the pretas, by the power of the retribution of their actions (vipākabala), see a river full of pus (naḍī pūyaṇāṃ), animals (tiryāṅc), fish (matsya), etc., see something to drink (pāṇa), a home, and settle there. Humans (manusya) see in it delicious pure clear water: they use it to bathe, to quench their thirst. As for the gods gathered (samāhitadeva) in the sphere of infinite space (ākāśantyāyatana), they see in it only space (ākāśa), for they no longer have any notion of substance (rūpasyaṃjñā). But it is impossible to have so many different cognitions of one and the same thing [if the latter is real]. How could this same river filled with pus (pāṇa), urine (mūtra) and excrement (puṣa), guarded by men carrying sticks and swords (dandaśidharaiś ca puṣaṣair adhiṣṭhitā) play the role of sweet-smelling (sugandha), fresh (śītalā) water, of a dwelling place and a beverage? How could it be identified with space? But if it is accepted that the outer object does not exist, that is all explained.

Asvabhāva ends his commentary by citing a stanza of which the original Sanskrit appears in the Sarvadārśanasamgraha (Ānandārama edition, p. 12, l. 3-4):

Parivrākāmukasunām ekasyām pramadātanau /
kunapaḥ kāmīṃ bhakṣya iti tisto vikalpanāḥ //

“The monk, the lover and the dog have three different concepts of one and the same female body, namely, a rotting carcass, a mistress, or food.”

The responsibility for this statement must be placed on the objector. The Buddha placed among the questions that he declined to answer that of knowing if the loka (not only the receptacle-world, but the world of beings) is finite or infinite (see above, p. 155F). However, the current opinion among scholars is that the number of beings is infinite: sattakāyo ananto (Atthasālinī, p. 160), that the beings of the innumerable universes will never be exhausted, as is the case for space: nāsti sattvānāṃ parīkṣaya ākāsavyat (Koṣabhāṣya, p. 113, l. 21).
Although this stanza claims that everybody fears the suffering of being beaten, the formless beings (arūpissattva) who have no body escape the suffering of the stick, the beings of the subtle form realm (rūpadhātu), while having a body, also escape the suffering of the stick; and among the beings of the desire realm (kāmadhātu), there also are some who do not undergo the suffering of the stick. Here, when the stanza says ‘everybody’, it means ‘all those who are susceptible to being beaten’ and not really everybody. Thus, when the bodhisattva fulfills the wishes of all beings, it means ‘all beings capable of being satisfied’.

[278c]

But the good intentions of the bodhisattva are limitless and the fruits of retribution of merit [that he has acquired] are likewise limitless. Nevertheless, hindered by the sins (āpatti) they have committed during innumerable incalculable periods (asaṃkhyaakalpa), beings are unable to receive the benefits of them.

[Story of Losaka-tiṣṭya].326 – Thus, a disciple of Śāriputra, the monk Lo-p’in-tcheou (Losaka-tiṣṭya?) observed discipline (śīlavat) zealously (vīryavat). When he begged for alms, he was unable to get anything for six days. When the seventh day came, there was only a short time for him to live. A colleague begged for food and gave it to him but a bird carried it away. Then Śāriputra said to Maudgalyāyana: “With your great magical power (ṛddhibala), watch over his food so that he can eat it.” Then Maudgalyāyana took some food and went to offer it to Losaka-tiṣṭya; but as soon as the latter tried to bring it to his mouth, it changed into mud. Śāriputra in turn begged for food and presented it to him, but Losaka-tiṣṭya’s mouth closed up by itself. Finally, the Buddha came with some food and offered it to him; by means of the Buddha’s immense merit (punya), Losaka-tiṣṭya was finally able to eat it. After having eaten, the monk developed joy and increased faith and veneration. The Buddha said to the bhikṣu: “All conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharmā) have suffering as their nature”, and he preached the four noble truths to him. At that very moment, the bhikṣu’s impurities (āsrava) disappeared and his mind opened: he became an arhat.

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325 As it has already done above (p. 1513F), the Traité here cites, under the title of Dharmapada, a stanza appearing in the Udānavarga, V, v. 19, p. 144:

\[
\text{Sarve daṇḍasya bhiyanti, sarvesaṃ jīvitaṃ priyam} / \vspace{10pt}
\text{ātmānaṃ upamāṃ kurtvā, naiva hanyān na ghātayet} //
\]

In Pāli, Dhammapada, v. 130:

\[
\text{Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa, sabbedaṃ jīvitaṃ piyaṃ} / \vspace{10pt}
\text{attānaṃ upamāṃ katvā, na hanyey na ghātaye} //
\]

“All have fear of the stick; life is dear to all. By taking this as comparison, one avoids killing or making someone else kill.”

326 Lo-p’in tcheou has already been mentioned above, p. 931-932F. His story, as it is found here, is told in the same words in the Tsa-p’i-yu king, T 207, p. 525b9-19 (transl. in Chavannes, Contes, II, p. 22-23), but attributed to the monk Lo-yun-tchou. Another basically related tale, differing in details, is in the Pāli Jātaka, no. 41, I, p. 24-236 and is about the thera Losaka Tissa: it is summarized above, p. 932 note.

Lo-p’in tcheou has traits in common with many other individuals ugly by nature, especially with Lavanabhadrīka (cf. p. 1439F, n. 4). On this subject, see Lin Li-Kouang, L’Aide Mémoire de la Vraie Loi, Appendix IV, p. 278-290.
However, there are beings whose merits are so small and whose sins are so heavy that even the Buddha himself cannot save them. 327 Also, knowing that beings do not exist (nopalabhya) and deeply penetrating the fundamental element (dharmadhātu), the Buddhas are without any memories (anusmarana) and thought-constructions (vikalpa) that say: “This one can be saved, that one cannot be saved”: their thoughts (citta) are always calm (śānta) and their minds neither increase nor decrease (anūnānadhiṣṭa).

This is why the bodhisattva wants to fulfill the wishes of all beings, but as a result of their sins (āpatti), the latter cannot receive their favors. It is not the fault of the bodhisattva.

III. MATERIAL BENEFITS GRANTED BY THE BODHISATTVA

[Here the Prājnāpāramitāsūtra is speaking about fulfilling the wishes of beings “in regard to food and drink, garments, bedding, ointments and perfumes, vehicles, houses, couches and other utensils”. What is meant by these objects?]

1. By food and drink (annapāṇa) we understand briefly ‘[mouthfuls] of food which is twofold, coarse or subtle’ (kavaḍākārāhāra audārikaḥ sūkṣmaḥ ca): 328 on the one hand, cakes (maṇḍa), cooked rice (odana), etc.; on the other hand, the food of a hundred flavors (sātaraśāhāra).

Although a sūtra says that “all beings subsist by means of the four foods “ (sarvasattvāḥ
caturāhāraśrasthitikāḥ) 329, here it is a matter of food in mouthfuls only. The other three foods, being immaterial (arūpin), cannot be passed on. Besides, if one gives food in mouthfuls, one is giving by the very

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327 This was the case for the old woman of Śrāvastī (above, p. 541-542F).
328 Dīgha, III, p. 228, 276; Majjhima, I, p. 48, 261; Saṃyutta, II, p. 11, 13, 98, 101; Vibhaṅga, p. 402-403: Cattāro
hārāḥ: kabaḍīṁkāra hārā oḷārīlo vā sukhumo vā, phasso dutiya, manospaṇcetanā tatiyā, viññāṇam catutthamā. –
Nidānasamayukta, p. 190; Daśottarasūtra, ed. K. Mittal, p. 62-63; Saṃgitiśūtra, ed. K. Mittal and V. Rosen, p. 104;
Mahāvyut., no. 2283-2285: catvāra hārāhāḥ: kabāḍīṁkāra hārā audārikaḥ sūkṣmaḥ ca, sparādi dvītiyāḥ,
manospaṇcetanā triyāḥ, viññāṇam catutthahāḥ. – “There are four foods: i) food as mouthfuls which is coarse or subtle;
ii) food as mental activity; iii) food as consciousness.”

They are defined and explained in Visuddhimagga, p. 285; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 130, p. 674e seq.; Kośa, III, p. 119-127.

329 Saṃgitiśutta in Dīgha, III, p. 211: Sabbe sattā ahāraṇātikā, sabbe sattā saṃkhāraṇātikā, ayaṃ kho āvuso
tena bhagavata jñātāt passatā arahatā samāsāṃṣaḥ buddhena eko dhāmo sammadakkhāto. – All beings subsist by
means of food. All beings subsist by means of conditioning. This single doctrine, O venerable ones, has been
completely stated by the Blessed One who knows and who sees, the completely and perfectly enlightened One.

Anguttara, V, p. 50, 55; Paṭisabhidā, I, p. 5, 122; Khuddakapāṭha, IV, Sabbe sattā ahāraṇātikā.
Saṃgitiśūtra, p. 45; Daśottarasūtra, p. 55: Sarvasattvāhāraśrasthitayah.
Kośabhāṣya, p. 152: Eko dharmah bhagavatā svayam abhijñāyābhissambodhyākhyāto yad uta sarvasattvā
ahāraśrasthīkā iti.

Madh. vr̥tī, p. 40: Eko dharmah sattvāṃśrasthitayā yad uta catvāra ahārāḥ.
fact of the other three. Why? Because food in mouthfuls strengthens (*abhivardhayati*) the other three as is said in the sūtra: “When the benefactor (*dānapati*) gives food (*bhojana*), he is giving five benefits to the recipients (*pratigrāhaka*).”

Beverages (*pāṇa*), as they are usually called, are of two types: *i*) wines from plants such as the grape-vine (*drakṣā*), sugar-cane (*iksū*), etc.; *ii*) plant liquors: mead from honey (*madhu*), pomegranate liquor, pear liquor, etc., and all cereal liquors.

This whole grouping constitutes food and drink of humans, but there is also the food and drink of the gods, namely, nectar (*sudhā*), ambrosia (*amṛtarasa*), foods consisting of the heavenly fruits, etc., the liquor of the *madhumādhava* (*Gaertnera racemosa*), etc.

Each being has his own food: beings eat grains, meat, pure food or impure food. When they approach the bodhisattva, all are satisfied.

2. Garments (*vastra*) are of two kinds: *i*) some come from living beings such as silks (*paṭṭaka*), furs (*roman*), tanned leathers (*carman*), etc.; *ii*) others come from plants such as cottons (*kārpāsa*), tree bark (*valkala*), etc. [279a]

There are also the garments of the gods: they have no fabric and arise spontaneously (*svarasena*) on trees: they are brilliant in color, light and soft.

3. Bedding (*sayanāsana*) consist of beds (*khaṭvā*), coverlets (*chādana*), mattresses (*maṇcaka*), curtains (*vitāna*) and pillows (*upadhāna*).

4. Ointments and perfumes (*vilepanagndha*) are of two kinds: *i*) powdered sandalwood (*candana*), etc., which is put on the body; *ii*) all kinds of mixed perfumes that are reduced to powder (*cūrṇa*) and put on the body, used to perfume clothing, or put on the ground or on walls.

5. Vehicles (*yāna*), i.e., elephants (*hastin*), horses (*aśva*), chariots (*ratha*), carriages (*śakaṭa*), etc.

6. Houses (*grha*) such as dwellings (*harmya*), palaces (*rājakula*), temples (*prāśāda*), etc., built of earth, wood or precious objects, to protect from cold (*śīta*), heat (*uṣṇa*), wind (*vāta*), rain (*vṛṣī*), thieves (*caura*).

7. Lamps (*dīpa*), such as tallow candles, oil lamps, wax candles, luminous pearls, etc.

8. Other utensils (*upakaraṇa*), i.e., everything that beings have need of. As it would be impossible to mention them completely, the sūtra gathers them all together into one group.

Question. – Why does it not speak of incense, marvelous flowers, etc?

Answer. – The sūtra has already included them in speaking of ‘other utensils’.

Question. – If that is so, it should have spoken in brief about three things only: food and drink (*annapāna*), clothing (*vastra*) and adornments (*alamkāra*).

Answer. – The [six] things [of which the sūtra spoke] are absolutely essential. Whoever wishes the good of beings first of all gives them food and drink (*annapāna*); next he gives them clothing (*vastra*); the body

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being dirty and bad-smelling, he gives ointments and perfumes (vilepanagandha); then he gives bedding (śayanāsana); cold (śīta) and rain (vṛṣṭi) require houses (grha); finally, darkness (andhakāra) requires lamps (dīpa).

Question. – But the perfume of flowers (puspagandha) also chases away bad smells. Why does the sūtra not speak of it?

Answer. – Flowers do not last and quickly fade; their usefulness is minimal and that is why the sūtra does not speak of them. As for incense-burners, they are necessary in cold weather but difficult in hot weather. Ointments and perfumes are useful in both kinds of weather: when it is cold, they are put into water; when it is hot, they are mixed with sandalwood powder and put on the body. This is why the sūtra speaks only of ointments and perfumes.

IV. GENEROSITY INFORMED BY THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM

Question. – The person who practices the perfection of generosity (dānapāramitā) obtains immense fruits of retribution (vīpākaphala) and can fulfill the wishes of all beings. Why then does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] say that in order to fulfill the wishes of beings, the bodhisattva should practice the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā)?

Answer. – As I said above, it is by union with the perfection of wisdom that generosity becomes truly ‘the perfection of generosity’. I must repeat myself here.

The wishes of the beings that it is a matter of fulfilling are not those of a single territory nor a single Jambudvīpa. The bodhisattva wants to fulfill completely the wishes of people dwelling in the universes of the ten directions and throughout the six destinies (gati). Such a task cannot be realized by simple gifts but, indeed, by the perfection of wisdom. The latter destroys the notions (samjñā) of near and far; it destroys the notions of what is ‘all beings’ and what is not ‘all beings’; it escapes the obstacles (āvaraṇa). This is why, in the time of a fingersnap (acchatāsamghātātra), the bodhisattva creates by metamorphosis an immense body that extends everywhere in the ten directions and fulfills the wishes of all beings. Such superknowledge (abhijñā), such benefits (anuṣāmsa), necessarily have their origin in wisdom (prajñā).

This is why “the bodhisattva who wants to fulfill the wishes of all beings [279b] must practice the prajñāpāramitā.”

Sattvapratiṣṭhāpana

Third Section ESTABLISHING BEINGS IN THE SIX PERFECTIONS

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 24, l. 1-5; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 73, l. 5-11). – Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes that all the people living in universes as numerous as the sands of the
Ganges be established in the perfection of generosity, be established in the perfections of morality, patience, exertion, ecstasy and wisdom, should practice the perfection of wisdom (Punar aparam, Śāriputra, bodhisattvaputren maheśvara Gaṇapadīvatulokopameṣu lokadhātuṣa sattvān dānapāramitāyāṃ pratiṣṭhāpayitukāmena śīlakṣāntivirayadhyānaprajñāpāramitāsu prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra.—

I. ESTABLISHING IN THE SIX PERFECTIONS

Question.—What are the reasons for the order (anukrama) adopted here [by the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra]?  

Answer.—The good (hita) is of three kinds: i) the good of the present life (ihatra), ii) the good of the future life (amutra) and iii) absolute good (atyantahita). Again, there are three kinds of happiness (sukha): i) the happiness of the present life, ii) the happiness of the future life and iii) supramundane happiness (lokottarasukha). In the previous section, the sūtra spoke of the good and the happiness of the present life; here it speaks of the good and the happiness of the future life and supramundane (lokottara) good and happiness: this is why it makes sure “that beings are established in the six perfections.”

The fondness for beings of the bodhisattva surpasses the fondness of parents for their children; feelings of loving-kindness and compassion (maitreya) penetrate him even into the marrow of his bones (asthimajjā). First he fills beings with food and drink (annapāna) and drives away the torments of hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsā); then he adorns their bodies with garments (vastra) and makes them feel comfortable. But the good feelings of the bodhisattva are not fully satisfied.

Then he has the following thought: “Beings have already obtained happiness in the present life, but I am still thinking that they should obtain happiness in the future life. If I teach them the six worldly perfections (laukikapāramitā), they will enjoy happiness among humans (manusya) and gods (deva), but later they will return to wander in saṃsāra. Therefore I still must teach them the six supramundane perfections (lokottarapāramitā) so that they can obtain unconditioned eternal bliss (asamskṛtanyadukhā). Moreover, I have already adorned their bodies with garments (vastra), flowers (puspa), perfumes (gandha), etc.; now I will adorn their minds with qualities (guna). If they possess the three kinds of adornments (alamkāra), they will be complete (sampanna) and faultless (nirdoṣa), namely: i) garments (vastra), the seven jewels (saptarathana), etc.; ii) merits (puṇya); iii) the dharmas of the Path (mārgadharma).”

As the bodhisattva wishes to array beings with this triple adornment, [the Prajñāpāramitā] first spoke [in the preceding section] of the fruits of retribution of the qualities (gūñāṃ vipākapalāni); here it speaks of the causes and conditions of these qualities (gūñāṃ hetupratyayāḥ).

Furthermore, as I previously said (p. 1944F), although they receive great gifts, beings cannot completely profit from them as a result of their sins (āpatti).

331 See p. 598F, n. 2.
[Pretasūtra]. – Thus the Ngo-kouei king (Pretasūtra) says: “Even if they are given food, [the pretas] are unable to eat it, for it is changed for them into glowing embers or into some impure thing.”

Finally, the bodhisattva does not give anything whatsoever (na kimcit tyajati), but he uses skillful means (upāya) so that beings obtain clothing, food and other benefits. This is why the bodhisattva teaches them to practice meritorious actions (puṇyakarman), each before collecting himself what he has done himself. The bodhisattva knows well that [the mechanism] of causes and conditions cannot be violated and that beings must first receive his teachings in order that they [themselves] collect the fruits. This is why, according to the order (anukrama) adopted here, he teaches beings to become established in the six perfections.

II. BEINGS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE SIX PERFECTIONS

1. Their number

Question. – The bodhisattva wants all the beings of the ten directions to become established in the six perfections. Why then does the Prajñāparamitāsūtra here speak only of the beings populating universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges?

Answer. – For the auditors of the Dharma, the expression ‘as numerous as the sands of the Ganges’ (gaṅgānadīvālukopama) is familiar. Moreover, for a bodhisattva who has just produced the mind of bodhi (pratamacittotpāda), to speak of beings ‘infinite and innumerable’ would be too much and would throw [279c] him into confusion; on the contrary, for a great bodhisattva, the expression ‘numerous as the sands of the Ganges’ is not used by way of computation. Moreover, the expression ‘numerous as the sands of the Ganges’ also means an infinite immense number, as will be said in a later chapter. Finally, the expression ‘numerous as the sands of the Ganges’ has already been used to designate the universes of the ten directions and, as here we are not speaking of one single Ganges, there is no objection to be raised. As a result, to speak of universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges is not wrong.

On the meaning of the expression ‘universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges’, see what has been said above (p. 449-452F).

2. The various categories of beings

Beings (sattva). – The name (prajñapti) of ‘being’ is given to the five skandhas (skandha), to the eighteen elements (dhātu), to the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana), to the six elements (dhātu) [of the human

332 The preta eaters of charcoal (aṅgārabhakṣa) appear in the list of 36 categories of pretas in the Smṛtyupasthānasūtra, T 721, k. 16, p. 92b16.
body], to the twelve causes (nidāna) and to a quantity of dharmas; they are gods (deva), humans (manuṣya), cows (ga), horses (aśva), etc.

There are two kinds of beings: mobile (cala) or still (sānta); the mobile ones produce physical and mental actions (kāyavākaran), the still ones are unable to do so; material (rūpin) or immaterial (arūpin); with two feet or without feet; four-footed or multi-footed; worldly (laukika) or supraworldly (lokottara); big (mahat) or small (alpa); noble (bhadrārya) or ordinary (prthagjana).

There are beings predestined to damnation (mithyātvaniyata), predestined to salvation (samyaktvaniyata) or without predestination (aniyata); unhappy (duḥkha), happy (sukha) or neither unhappy nor happy (aduḥkhaṣukha); higher (agra), middling (madhya) or lower (avara); still practicing (śaikṣa), no longer practicing (aśaikṣa) or neither one nor the other (naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa); conscious (saṃjñin) or unconscious (asaṃjñin), or neither conscious nor unconscious (naivasaṃjñināśaṃjñin); belonging to the desire realm (kāmadhātu), to the form realm (rūpadhātu) or to the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu).

Beings belonging to the desire realm are of three kinds: as a result of their roots of good (kuśalamūla), they are higher (agra), middling (madhya) or lower (avara). The higher ones are the six classes of the gods of desire (kāmadeva); the middling ones are those among humans who are wealthy and noble; the lower ones are those among humans who are vile. The four continents (dvīpaka) are distinguished by differences in face.

Bad beings are also of three categories: the higher are the damned (naraka); the middling ones are the animals (tiryāṇe), the lower are the pretas.

Moreover, the beings of the desire realm are of ten types [as they are arranged] in the three bad destinies (durgati), the world of humans and the six classes of gods [of karmadhātu].

There are three kinds of hells (niraya): the hot hells (uṣṇaniraya), the cold hells (śītaniraya) and the dark hells (lokantarikaniraya).

There are three types of animals: aerial, terrestrial, or aquatic; diurnal, nocturnal or both diurnal and nocturnal; and other differences of the same kind.

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334 This is the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣīka doctrine: Kośa, III, p. 1: Narakapretatiryaṅco mānuṣā śaḍ divaukasaḥ / kāmadhātu.
335 The hells have been the topic of a long discussion above, p. 955-968F. For further details, see the analysis of the Smṛtyupasthānasūtra in Lin, Aide-Mémoire.

As for the ‘dark hells’ of which the Traité speaks here, they are certainly lokantarikā aghā asaṃvutā andhakārā andhakāratinisā “intermediate spaces between the worlds, miserable spaces full of miseries, shadows and the darkness of the shades” where the light of the sun or the moon does not penetrate. See Dīgha, II, p. 12, 15; Majjhima, III, p. 120; Saṃyutta, V, p. 454; Anguttara, II, p. 130; Divya, p. 204; Mahāvastu, I, p. 41; Lalita, p. 51, 410; Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 163. – Various translations have been proposed (see Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 464, under lokantarikā).
There are two kinds of pretas: lecherous pretas and emaciated pretas (kṣutṣāma). The lecherous pretas enjoy happiness like the gods but they live with the starving pretas of whom they are the leaders. The starving pretas have an enormous belly (sthūlodara) like a mountain, a mouth like the eye of a needle (sūcimukha) and consist of three things: a black skin (kṛṣṇatvac), tendons (snāyu) and bones (asthi). For innumerable hundreds of years, they have not even heard the words “food and drink” (annapāna), still less have they seen their shapes.

There are also pretas who emit fire from their mouth (ulkāmukha): flying butterflies throw themselves into this fire, and the pretas eat them. There are also pretas who eat excrement (gūtha), spit (śleṣman), pus and blood (pūyaśonita), the water from laundry, who feed on oblations (śraddhabhoktr) or who devour the afterbirth (garbhamalāhāra). There are all kinds of starving pretas of this kind.

The six classes of the desire gods (kāmadēva) are the Caturmahārajadevas, etc. Besides these six classes of gods, there are yet other gods, for example, the Wearers of necklaces, the Corrupted by Joy (krīḍāpramoṣaka), the Corrupted by Mind (manahpradūsika),338 the Gods with birds’ feet, the Gods of pleasant looks [280a (priyadarśin?)]. These gods are included in the six classes of desire gods.

Some say that the beings of the desire realm (kāmadhātu) are of eleven types.339 Sometimes five destinies (gati) are spoken of; actually the destiny of asuras is added to that.

3. The destiny of the asuras340

Question. – No! The asuras are included in the five destinies; they are not gods (deva); they are not humans (manusya), [neither are they] the damned (nāraka) whose sufferings abound, nor animals (tīrvaṅc) differing in shape (saṃsthāna): therefore these asuras should be included in the destiny of the pretas.341

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337 Above, p. 954-955F; Lin, Aide-Mémoire, p. 16-23. – In the present passage, the Traité is very close to the Saṅgatikārikās, ed. P. Mus, Six Voixes, p. 248-261.

338 These are the Khūḍdāpadosikas and the Manopadosikas of the Pāli sources: cf. Brahmajāla (Dīgha, I, p. 19-21), and the Pāṭikasuttanta (Dīgha, III, p. 31-33). They appear also in the Saṅgītīryāya, T 1536, k. 9, p. 403c22-24; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 37, p. 190c18 and 22; k. 151, p. 771c1-4; Kośa, II, p. 219, and Yogacārabhūmi, part 1, p. 103. These gods destroy their own lives by their excessive joy or anger.

339 Eleven classes by adding the category (pradeśa) of the asuras to the traditional ten classes. This is the opinion of the Traité and also of Buddhaghosa in Atthasālini, p. 62..

340 Here the author returns to an opinion dear to him: the separate existence of the asura destiny. To the references gathered on p. 613F, n. 1, we should add Lin, Aide-Mémoire, p. 24-29 and the article Asura in Ceylon Encyclopedia, II, p. 286-291.

341 Limiting the destinies to the number of five, the objector places the asuras with the pretas, and the Vibhāṣā (T1545, k. 172, p. 868c16) agrees with this opinion, but as we have seen above (p. 613F, n. 1) there are other divisions.
Answer. – That is not so. The power of the asuras is equal to that of the devas. Why? Because sometimes they are vanquished by the devas and sometimes they vanquish the devas. Thus it is said in the sūtras: Śakra Devendra was vanquished by the asuras and his four armies (caturaṅgini senā) went into the hollows of lotus roots (bisamāla) to hide.”

The asuras who enjoy the five pleasurable objects (pañca kāmagunā) are like the devas and were disciples of the Buddha as well. If such is their strength (prabhāva), why would they be included among the pretas? Therefore there must be a sixth destiny (gati) [reserved specially for the asuras].

Great gods such as the asuras, kiṃnaras, gandharvas, kumbhāndas, yakṣas, rakṣasas, bhūtas, etc., are asuras, and when their troops increase, those of the devas decrease. Their power (anubhāva) and their transformations (nirmāṇa) were exercised at will (yathacchām).

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343 Victory of the devas and defeat of the asuras: Dīgha, II, p. 285; Majjhima, I, p. 253; Saṁyutta, IV, p. 201; V, p. 447-448; Anguttara, IV, p.433.

344 In the words of a sutta from Anguttara (I, p. 142-145) cited in full above (p. 832-835F), Śakra and the Trayāstrimśa gods send their messengers to the world three times per month to inquire about the moral state of mankind and to find out how many men honor their mothers and fathers, the śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas, the elders of their clan, the ministers of the Caturmahārāja gods, their sons, and finally these gods themselves lead their inquiries on earth in turn on the 8th, 14th and 15th lunar days. Having gotten their information, they return to the Trayāstrimśa heaven to make their reports. If the number of good men is too small, the Trayāstrimśas are unhappy and cry: “To be sure, the troops of the gods will increase and the troops of the asuras are going to increase ” (dibba vata bho parihāyissanti, paripūrissanti asurakāyā). If on the other hand, good men are many, the gods rejoice and say: “To be sure, the troops of the gods will increase and the troops of the asuras will diminish” (dibba vata bho kāyā paripūrissanti, parihāyissanti asurakāyā). – This saying appears again in Dīgha, II, p. 208, 209, 221, 271, in the form of ‘Dibba vata bho kāyā paripūrenti, hāyanti asurakāyā’. – In Mahāvastu, III, p. 200, l. 6-7, there is: Hāyanti āsurāh kāyā, divyā kāya abhivardhanti.

The Traité has used this very ancient legend (cf. Odyssee, XVII, 485-487) in order to prove that the asuras were in a position to rival the devas.
This is why people who are in doubt wonder: “Are these suras or are these not suras?” Sura, in the Ts’in language, indicates ‘deity’. But the time-honored expression is asura and not sura. The asura destiny is called thus because the asuras appear at the head [of a list]; the others, [namely, the kimnaras, gandharvas, kumbhāṇḍas, yakṣas, bhūtas, etc.] constitute one and the same destiny with them.

Question. But the sūtras say that there are five destinies (pañcagati). Then why are you speaking of six destinies (ṣaḍgati)?

Answer. – Once the Buddha disappeared, the old sūtras were broadly disseminated; having been propagated for five hundred years, today they present many differences (viśeṣa) and the various schools do not agree; some assert five destinies, others assert six. Those who accept five destinies are modifying the

345 Read t’ien instead of ta. – Other interpretations of the word in Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 172, p. 868b3-8; Hībğirin, p. 41b.

346 For example, Majjhima, I, p. 73: Pañca kho imā Sāriputta gatiyo, katamā pañca: nirayo tiracchānayoni pittivasayo manussā devā.

The Vibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 172, p. 868b2-3) on the basis of these sūtras, says: “There are schools that make the asuras into a sixth gāti: they should not say that because the sūtras speak only of five gati.”

The opinion of the Traité is diametrically opposed and has declared above (p. 616F): “The Buddha never spoke explicitly of five gatis. The five gatis are an invention of the Sarvāstivādins.”

347 The Hinayāna schools that postulate five gātis (in Chinese wou ts ‘iu or wou tao) are three in number: the Sthaviras or Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins and the Dharmaguptakas.


The canonical sūtras, Pāli as well as Sanskrit, of which the “Elders” appointed themselves compilers and guardians, count only five gātis:

Dīgha, III, p. 234; Majjhima, I, p. 73; Saṃyutta, V, p. 474-477; Anguttara, IV, p. 459. – Dīgha, T 1, p.86b28; Madhyama, T 26, p. 5999c-3; 683c15-16; Saṃyukta, T 99, p. 108c14; 112b25; 243b8; Ekottara, T 125, p. 549b14; 563b4; 631a25; 637c22; 723b22; 756b26; 811b1-9.

It is true, as the Vibhāṣa has it, that the sūtras speak only of five gātis. However, three passages must be mentioned where it is a matter of six gātis: Dīgha, III, p. 264; Petavatthu, p. 66; Saṃyukta, T 99, p. 44a8, but the first two are among the latest canonical scriptures and the third has no correspondent in the Pāli nikāya.

Referring al;ways to the sutta from Majjhima, I, p. 73, cited above, the Abhidharmikas, the exegetists of the canonical schools, Buddhahosa and his school accept only five gatis in the strict sense of the word: the gatigati defined “destinies to which it is necessary to go by virtue of good or bad actions” (M.A., II, p. 36: sukatadukkatakammasenā gantabhā): the Vidusshimagga, p. 471 speaks of the “retribution-consciousness, fivefold because of the destinies” (vipākaviññānaṃ gatisenā pañcavidham).

2) Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika. – The Traité (p. 616F) considers the five gatis as an invention of their school; these disciples of Kātyāyaniputra recognize only five gātis:

Satpādabhāṣa: Saṃgītipāyāya, T 1536, p.415c17; Dharmaskandha, T 1537, p. 461a13; Vījñānakāya, T 1539, p. 537b5-6; Prakaraṇapāda, p. 712b27; Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, p. 1017a27; 1030b17.

The Vibhāṣa (T 1545) assumes five gatis (p. 358b3; 943b10) and does not accept a sixth (p. 730a4; 868b2-3; 992a9-11).
Buddhist sūtras as a result, and they assume five destinies; those who accept six destinies are modifying the text of the Buddhist sūtras as a result and are accepting six destinies. Moreover, the Mahāyāna, the Fa-houa king (Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra) speak of “beings distributed in the six destinies”, and from the viewpoint of the real meaning (abhiprāya) of the texts, there must be six destinies.

Kośa, III, p. 11-15.


Of the schools professing six gatis (in Chinese, lieou ts’iu, or lieou tao), there are the Mahāśamghikas, the Andhakas, the Uttarapāthakas and the Vātsīputriyas.

1) Mahāāṃghika. – From the evidence of their works such as the Mahāsāṃghika Vin., T 1425, 260c25; 511a11, and the Mahāvastu, I, p. 42, 337; II, p. 368.


4) Vātsīputriya. – Bareau, Sectes, p. 120, thesis 36, according to Vibhāṣa, T 1545, p. 8b24, and Traité, (above, p. 616F). See also Sāṃmitiyanikāśāstra, T 1649, p. 470a12.

348 The Saddharmapuṇḍarikā generally lists six destinies (ṣaḍgati), p. 6, 9, 135, 244, 346, 372, but occasionally notes five destinies (pañcagati), p. 131. However, the Traité can hardly excuse the scriptures of the Greater Vehicle for establishing the existence of the sixth gati.

1. The Mahāyānasūtras sometimes refer to six, sometimes to five gatis as though this option was unimportant.

The most striking example is that of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (T 223) which establishes six gatis on p. 271b8, 348c8, 584b23, but five on p. 390b29, 405a29, 409b7, 422a2. This detail has not escaped the notice of the author of the Traité who inserts the entire text of this sūtra and did not think it necessary to modify it in the four places indicated (cf. T1509, p. 675c18, 700c1, 710a19, 745a19).

The other Mahāyānasūtras show the same inconsistencies. Here only the main ones are noted with the following examples:

Avataṃsaka (T 279). – Five gatis, p. 92b17, 288a13, 370b27, 396a3, 417a14, 422b25, 424c10, 426a15. – Six gatis, p. 94a9, 119b13, 170b1, 182a1, 198c16, 204b8, 256c12, 318b8.

Ratnakūṭa (T 310). – Five gatis, p. 42b27, 46b22, 217b28, 237b13, 288c9, 441a25, 460c19, 491b29, 530a20, 536b9, 658b27, 668b21. – Six gatis, p. 361a4, 370b26, 371b18, 378c26, 379a1, 382b23, 475c5, 530c2, 615c27.


What is more, the two great Mahāyāna schools, the Madhyamikas and the Yogācāras, hold only five gatis. Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti, which speaks of pañcagati samsāra (p.218, l. 2-3; 269, l. 9; 304, l. 4). Śatakaśāstra by Āryadeva, T 1569, k. 1, p. 170a22, 171a8.

Prajñāprādīpa by Bhāvaviveka, T 1566, k. 10, p. 99c16.

Śīksāsamuccaya by Sāntideva, which speaks of pañcagati samsāra (p.91, l. 9-10) or of pañcagatika cakra (p. 176, l. 6).

Yogācārabhūmi, Part 1, p. 44, l. 16-17.

Furthermore, since the good is distinguished from the bad, there must be six destinies. The good being of superior (agra), middling (madhya) and inferior (avara) categories, there are three good destinies, Namely, the deva ‘gods’, the manuṣya ‘humans’ and the asuras. The bad being of higher, middling and lower categories, there are three bad destinies (durgait), namely the naraka, ‘damned’, the tiryāṇic ‘animals’ and the pretas. If it were not so – [i.e., if there were only five destinies] – there would be three fruits of retribution (vipākaphala) for the bad and only two fruits for the good. This would be conflicting (virodha). On the other hand, if there are six, the sense of equality is not violated.

Question. – But the good dharmas involve three fruits (phala) as well: the lower fruit is a human destiny, the middling fruit is that of deva and the higher fruit that of nirvāṇa.

Answer. – In the present subject, nirvāṇa is not included: only the abodes (avasthā) constituting fruits of retribution (vipākaphala) for beings are being distinguished. Nirvāṇa is not a fruit of retribution.

The good dharmas (kuśaladharma) are of two kinds: i) the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣika) that lead to nirvāṇa; ii) the dharmas producing happiness (sukha) in the course of rebirths (punarbhava). Here we are speaking only of the good dharmas occurring in the reincarnations (ātmabhāvapratilambha); we are not talking about the good dharmas leading to nirvāṇa.

The good of the mundane order (laukikakūśala) is of three categories: i) the superior category gives as fruit of retribution a deva destiny; ii) the middling category gives as fruit of retribution a human destiny; iii) the inferior category gives as fruit of retribution an asura destiny.

Question. – But you yourself just said (p. 1954F) that the asuras are equal in power to the devas and that their bliss does not differ from that of the devas. Why do you now say that the good of the lower category gives as fruit of retribution an asura destiny?

Answer. – Among humans (manuṣya), it is possible to go forth from home, take up the precepts (śīla) and thus arrive at bodhi; in the destiny of the asuras, the fetters (saṃyojana) cover the mind and it is very difficult to arrive at bodhi. Although they are inclined towards the fetters, the devas have right mind and...

349 Nirvāṇa, being asamskrta by definition, unconditioned or uncreated.
believe in bodhi; the asuras, whose minds, however, are bad and twisted, seldom come near to bodhi. This is why, although they are similar to the devas, it is hard for the asuras to come near to bodhi and this is why they are also inferior to humans. Just as the nāga kings (nāgarāja) and the birds with golden wings (garuḍa), despite their great power (amabhāva) and their power of transformation, belong to the animal destiny (tiryaggati), so the asuras [belong to a good destiny, but one which is of lower order].

Question. – If the nāga kings and the birds with golden wings, despite their great power, are ranked in the animal destiny, the asuras in turn should be ranked in the preta destiny. Why are you still making a sixth destiny?

Answer. – The nāga kings and the birds with golden wings, even though they too enjoy bliss, walk horizontally\(^\text{350}\) and resemble animals in shape; this is why they are classed in the animal destiny. Although they are shaped like humans, the damned (nāraka) undergo great suffering; this is why they are not placed in the human destiny. As for the asuras, their power is great and their shape is like that of humans and gods; this is why they are placed separately in a sixth destiny.

All this is said in summary. For the beings of the desire realm (kāmadhātu), the form realm (rūpadhātu) and the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu), see the following chapters.\(^\text{351}\)

Pāramitāstava

III. EXHORTATIONS TO THE PRACTICE OF THE PERFECTIONS

1. Perfection of generosity

Generosity (dānapamāritā). – The bodhisattva invites beings to practice generosity:

Poverty (dāridrya) is a great suffering but it is not out of poverty that one commits evil actions (duṣkrta) and falls into the bad destinies (durgati). It is by committing evil actions that one falls into the three bad destinies from which it is impossible to become free.

Hearing this, beings give up thoughts of avarice (māṣaryacitta) and practice the perfection of generosity as will be said at length in the following chapters.

Moreover, in the presence of beings, the bodhisattva preaches the Dharma by means of all kinds of nidānas and avadānas and criticizes avarice:

350 According to etymology tiriyaṁ aitchitā tiracchānā (Comm. of Majjhima, II, p. 37). Hence the Tibetan translation dud lgro “that which walks bending over; opposite to man who walks upright” (S. C. Das) and the Chinese translation p’ang hing or, more often, ich’ou cheng. See also Hōbōgiri, IV, p. 310.

351 Especially Pañcaviṃśati, p. 64 seq.
The miser, even for his personal needs, stints and spends nothing. He becomes nervous and turns red in front of beggars (yācaka). In the present lifetime, his voice (svāra) and his color (rūpa) are ugly (durvarṇa). Having planted bad actions for the future (paratra), he will be left with physical ugliness; not having previously planted the seeds of generosity, he is presently miserable. The miser is attached to wealth (dhanā) and his greed does not cease. He opens the gate of sin (āpattidvāra) and does especially bad things; this is why he falls into the bad destinies.

Moreover, while the wheel of transmigration (samsāracakra) is in movement, among the profitable actions there is none that surpasses generosity. Conveniences obtainable at will (yatheccham) in the present lifetime (iha) and in future lifetimes (amutra) all come from generosity. Generosity is the good guide [200c] that opens the doorway to the threefold happiness: heavenly happiness (divyasukha), human happiness (manuṣyasukha) and the happiness of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasukha). Why?

[Sīhasutta.]352 – The reputation of the honest and generous man spreads: among the people well-disposed in the ten directions, there is no one who does not love him; in the great assembly, he is without fear (viśārada); at the moment of death, he has no fear.

This man says to himself: “I have planted my wealth in the good fields of merit (puṇyakṣetra); I will certainly cross through the gate of human happiness, of heavenly happiness and the happiness of nirvāṇa.”

Why? Generosity destroys the fetter of avarice (mātsaryasamyojana), favors the beneficiary (pratigrāhaka), drives away malice (vyāpāda) and suppresses jealousy (īrṣya). The person who honors his beneficiary drives out his own pride (mānastambha) and, by giving with a settled mind (niyatacitta), breaks the thread of his own doubt (saṃśayajāla). Knowing the fruits of retribution (vipākaphala) of generosity, he drives away wrong views (mithyādṛṣti) and destroys ignorance (avidyā). Suppressing all the passions (kleśa) in this way, he opens the doorway to nirvāṇa.

Finally, he opens not only the door to the threefold happiness but also the door to immense Buddhahood and the state of Bhagavat. Why is that? Because the six perfections (pāramitā) are Buddhahood, and generosity (dāna) is the first doorway to it: the other practices (caryā) all follow from it.

These are the immense benefits (anuśānsa) of generosity, and for this reason the bodhisattva “wants beings to become established in the perfection of generosity”. Regarding the perfection of generosity, see what has been said above (p. 662-769F) in regard to generosity.

2. Perfection of morality

Morality (śīla). – The bodhisattva praises the practice of morality in the presence of beings:

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352 Anguttara, III, p. 38-41, cited above, p. 658F.
353 Adopting the variant tche in place of tche.
You, O beings, should learn to observe morality. The virtue of morality uproots the three bad destinies (durgāti) and excludes a position of inferiority among men; it assures [a rebirth] among the gods, an honorable position among men and even attains the bodhi of the Buddhhas.

Morality is the root of bliss (sukhamūla) for all beings. It is like a great treasure (mahānidhi) bringing pearls (maṇi) and jewels (ratna). Morality is a great protector (mahāpāla) that suppresses fears (bhaya). It is like a great army (mahāsena) that destroys thieves (caura). Morality is an ornament (ābharana) to be worn like a necklace (keyūra, niṣka). Morality is a great ship (mahānau) capable of crossing the great ocean of saṃsāra. Morality is a great vehicle (mahāyāna) capable of transporting heavy jewels to the city of nirvāṇa. Morality is the good medicine (bhaiṣajya) capable of curing the sick of their fetters (saṃyojanavyādhi). Morality is a friend (kalyāṇamitra) who follows you from lifetime to lifetime, never leaving you, and that assures the serenity of the mind (cittayogakṣema): thus when a well is dug, as soon as wet mud is noticed, one rejoices and has no more sadness or worry. Morality perfects and improves all practices like a father and mother who are bringing up their children. Morality is the ladder of wisdom (jaññasopāna) that penetrates into purity (anāsrava). Morality terrors the fetters (saṃyojana) like a lion (siṃha) that captures gazelles (mṛga). Morality is the root of the qualities (guṇamūla) and the prerogative of monks. He who practices pure morality sees his aspirations (prāṇidhāna) realized at will (yatheccham): it is like the cintāmaṇi that realizes all the desires of beings as soon as it is invoked.

By praising the qualities of morality thus in many ways, the bodhisattva leads beings to rejoice and make the resolution to become established in the perfection of morality.

3. Perfection of patience

Patience (kṣānti). – In the presence of beings, the bodhisattva praises patience:

Patience is the strength of all monks (pravrajīta): it humbles the wicked [281a] and manifests wondrous things (āścaryavastu) in the assemblies. Patience is the guardian that watches that generosity and morality are not broken. Patience is a great armor (mahāsaṃmnāha) that soldiers cannot pierce. Patience is the good medicine (bhaiṣajya) that eliminates bad poisons (viṣa). Patience is a great victory (mahājaya) that assures safety (yogakṣema) and peace (anupadrava) over the dangerous paths of saṃsāra. Patience is a great treasure that gives to the poor and the unfortunate an unlimited quantity of jewels. Patience is a great boat (mahānau) that takes one from this shore (apāra) of saṃsāra to the other shore (pāra) of nirvāṇa. Patience is a file that makes the qualities shine: actually, the person who does you wrong is like a pig that by rubbing against the golden mountain increases its brilliance still further.354 Of the cutting tools used to seek the bodhi of the Buddhhas and save beings, patience is the most admirable.

The yogin should make the following reflection: If I answer this man maliciously (vyāpāda), I am wounding myself. Besides, I too, in a previous existence, have committed such a fault; it is impossible to

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354 Translation proposed with reservations.
change it, I must necessarily atone for it. If I do not pardon this man, others will torment me again and I will be unable to escape from them. Then why should I get angry? Moreover, if a being carried away by passion (kleśa) commits an evil deed [towards me], it is because he cannot control himself [and, knowing that, I ought to pardon him]. When a man possessed by a demon (amanuṣya) insults his physician (vaidya), the good physician limits himself to chasing away the demon and does not complain about the insults. The good yogin does the same: when a being commits an evil deed against him, he does not complain about this offense and limits himself to freeing this being from his fetters (samyojana). Finally, the patient man, seeing someone cursing him, acts like parents toward their son who is insulting them: he increases his affection and loves him even more.

The yogin also says to himself: If this man attacks me, it is because of actions that I myself committed in my previous lives the results of which I now must endure. If now I answer [this offense] with anger (dveṣa), I am creating new suffering for the future and when will I finally be freed from it? If I now endure this offense, I will escape the suffering forever. This is why I must not feel angry.

Condemning malice (vyāpāda) thus in many ways, the yogin produces loving-kindness (maitrī) and compassion (karuṇā) and penetrates into patience towards beings (sattvaksānti). Having entered into this patience, he has the following thought: According to the Dharma preached by the Buddhas of the ten directions, there is no self (ātman) and no ‘mine’ (ātmiya), it is only an assemblage of dharmas (dharmasāmagrī) designated (prajñapta) under the name of ‘a being’ (sattva). The being is like a mechanical doll (yantra): it moves and acts, but inwardly there is no master entity (svāmin). It is the same for the body (kāya): it is just an arrangement of skin (tvac) and bone (asthi) that turns with the wind of the mind; being born and perishing from moment to moment, it is impermanent (anītya), empty (śūnya) and pacified (śānta). No one is acting, no one is cursing, no one is undergoing curses for, from beginning to end, there is absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnya); it is only by error (viparyāsa) and falsehood (mṛṣā) that worldly people (prthagjana) are attached in their minds to it.

For the person who has reflected in this way, there is no being and, since the being does not exist, dharmas do not depend on anything (anapekṣa). Simple assemblages of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī), they are without self nature (niḥsvabhāva). The being is an assemblage to which the name of being is wrongly given and it is the same for the dharmas. Knowing this is to enter into possession of patience in regard to things.

Having obtained this sattvaksānti and this dharmakṣānti, one attains supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksāṃbodhī) and a fortiori yet other benefits.

Having heard these exhortations, beings “become established in the perfection of patience”.

4. Perfection of exertion
Exertion (vīrya). – Speaking to beings, the bodhisattva tells them: Do not be lazy (kusīda), O beings. For the energetic person, there is no aspiration (prajñādāna) that is not realized. The higher qualities usually obtained are not without causes and conditions, but all of them come from exertion.

Exertion has two characteristics (laksana): i) it gives rise to good dharmas; ii) it eliminates bad dharmas.

It also has three characteristics: i) it wants to do something; ii) it does it with exertion; iii) it does not desist.

It also has four characteristics: i) it destroys and eliminates bad dharmas that have already arisen; ii) it prevents bad dharmas that have not yet arisen from arising; iii) it makes good dharmas that have not yet arisen arise; iv) it assures the development of good dharmas that have already arisen. These are the characteristics of exertion.

Exertion contributes to the realization of all the good dharmas: thus, when fire (anala) meets with the help of wind (anila), burning is activated. And just as in this world, a strong man (dhīra) is able to cross mountains and seas, so exertion applied to the dharmas of the Path, succeeds in attaining the bodhi of the Buddhas and, a fortiori, yet other things.

Beings who hear these exhortations are “established in the perfection of exertion”.

Moreover, seeing that some beings have not yet produced [the mind] of supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhi), the bodhisattva praises this anuttarā samyaksambodhi to them:

Among all the dharmas, it is by far the foremost and the most noble. It helps everyone. It finds the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of dharmas and of the non-deceptive Dharma (avañcanadharma). It has great loving-kindness (mahāmatrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā). It holds omniscience (sarvajñatā), the physical mark of golden color (suvarṇavarṇatā), the supreme miracles of the thirty-two major marks (laksana) and the eighty minor marks (anuvyañjana), the immense [anāsravaskandha] – morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā), liberation (vimukti), knowledge and vision of liberation (vimuktijñānadarśana) -, the three knowledges (tīsro vidyāh), the unhindered [knowledges] (pratisamvid), and the unhindered penetration into all dharmas.

Those who have attained it are the most venerable among all beings and have the right to the worship (pūjā) of the whole world. If the person who limits himself to mentally commemorate the Buddhas gains immeasurable indestructible immense merit (puṇya), what can be said of those who exercise exertion (vīrya), generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), worship (pūjā), service (paryupāsana) and respect (vandana)?

Speaking to beings, the bodhisattva again tells them: Buddha activity (buddhakārya) being like that, you must produce the mind of supreme bodhi (anuttarabodhicitta). By diligently practicing exertion and by acting in accordance with the Dharma, you will attain it without any difficulty.

Having heard these exhortations, beings produce the mind of supreme bodhi. Those who produce it do not do so in vain; they will succeed in practicing the perfection of generosity and, having practiced it, they will also practice the [281c] perfection of morality, the perfection of patience, the perfection of meditation and

355 Compare the definition of the four samyakpradhānas, p. 1123F
the perfection of wisdom. Now the practice of these five perfections is precisely the fact of the perfection of exertion.

To those who do not produce the mind of the Mahāyāna, the bodhisattva must teach the pratyekabuddha bodhi. To those who do not have the pratyekabuddha bodhi, he teaches the renunciation of desire (kāma) and to taste the many blisses of the formless absorptions (dhyāna) of the form realm (rūpadhātu). To those who do not have the dhyānas, he teaches the development of the ten good paths of action (kuśala karmapatha) and to taste the many happinesses belonging to gods and humans.

[To all, the bodhisattva says:] Do not give yourself up to empty and ineffective laziness (kausūḍya). Poor people (daridra) and lowly people (iṭvara) are afflicted by all kinds of painful efforts, but laziness is the lowest of the faults: it destroys the benefits (anuśāṃsa) and good paths (kuśalapatha) of the present life and the future life (iḥaparatra janman).

Hearing these exhortations, beings gather the good dharmas and practice exertion diligently.

5. Perfection of trance

In the presence of beings, the bodhisattva praises the pure bliss (viśuddhasukha) of the trances (dhyāna) and the absorptions (samāpatti), inner bliss (adhyātmasukha), the bliss of lordship (aiśvaryasukha), the bliss of renunciation of sin (āpattiviratisukha), the bliss of the present and the future life (iḥaparatasukha), the bliss experienced by the saint (ārya), the bliss of the Brahma-devarajas, the bliss felt by the entire body (kāyasākṣāṭkurtasukha)536, deep, solid and wonderful bliss.

[He says to beings:] Why do you cling, O beings, to the defiled bliss (aśucisukha) of the five objects of enjoyment (pañca-kāmaguṇa)? Like animals, you are tasting the defiled bliss of sins and you are abandoning the wonderful bliss [mentioned above]. If you could renounce limited bliss, you would obtain great bliss. Do you not see that the farmer sacrifices a few seeds (bīja) in order to subsequently reap great fruits (mahāphala)? The person who makes the king a moderate gift receives in return a great reward; with a small fish as bait, one captures a big fish: if the sacrifice is modest, the capture is very important. It is the same for the wise person: by rejecting worldly happiness (laukika sukha), he obtains the intense happiness of the profound dhyānas and samāpattis; having this happiness, he looks back at sensual bliss (kāmasukha) and finds it very impure (aśuci). He is like a man who has come out of prison or like a man sick with scabies (kacchū) who, once he is cured, no longer looks for the medicine.

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536 Bliss is experienced bodily during or rather on leaving the sanjñāveditanir�haṃamāpatti: explanation of the Vaibhaṣikas and the Sautrāntikas in Kośa VI, p. 224.
Moreover, the dhyānas and samāpattis are the first gateway of true knowledge: they clarify wisdom (prajñā) and illumine the dhammas. Like a lamp in a secret room, their light is very useful. The yogin who is based on the dhyānas and samāpattis attains the four immeasurables (apramāṇa), the liberations (vimokṣa), the sources of mastery (abhibhūyatana), the superknowledges (abhijnā), eloquence (pratibhāna) and other very profound qualities (guṇa). Possessing them fully, he is able to transform bricks and stones into cintāmani and, a fortiori, into other things. There is nothing he cannot accomplish at will:

1) he dives into the earth as into water,
2) he walks on water as on the earth,
3) he touches the sun and moon with his hand without either being burned or frozen,
4) he is transformed into all kinds of animals without taking on their properties,
5) sometimes he transforms his body and fills space with it,
6) sometimes he reduces it to the size of a grain of dust,
7) sometimes he makes himself as light as a feather of a crane (sārasaroman),
8) sometimes he makes himself as heavy as a huge mountain,
9) sometimes he taps the earth with his toe and the heaven and the earth begin to shake like grass or leaves being shaken.

These superknowledges (abhijnā) and this power of transformation (nirmāṇabala) come from all the dhyānas.

Hearing these exhortations, beings “become established in the perfection of trance.”

6. Perfection of wisdom

The perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā). – The bodhisattva teaches beings to practice wisdom:

Wisdom, whose light is most brilliant, is called the ‘eye of wisdom’ (prajñācakṣus). Without this eye of wisdom, a person, even though he has a fleshly eye (māṃsacakṣus), is like a blind man (andhā); although he claims to have an eye, he is no different from the animals. The person who has wisdom distinguishes by himself the beautiful (suvarṇa) from the ugly (durvarṇa) without depending on another’s teaching. The person without wisdom follows others from east to west like a cow (go) or a camel (uṣṭra) with pierced nose following its leader.

Wisdom is the foremost of all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) for, cherished by the saints (āryakāṇṭa), it destroys conditioned dharmas precisely. As is said in the sūtras: Of all the jewels, the jewel

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357 Without being burned by the sun or the stars with hot rays (uṣṇaraśmi), or frozen by the moon or the stars with cold rays (śītaraśmi).
of wisdom (*prajñāratna*) is foremost.\(^{358}\) There is no further sadness or torment for the person who is established at the summit of wisdom: considering unfortunate and troubled beings, there is nothing that he does not discover except by the sword of wisdom; he breaks the passions which have had no beginning (*anādikakleśa*) and the shackles (*tālaka*) of *saṃsāra*.

By the power of wisdom, one is able to perfect the six perfections, one obtains the inconceivable (*acintya*) immense (*āpramāṇa*) bodhi of the Buddhas, one realizes omniscience (*sravyātā*) and, *a fortiori*, the high qualities of the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and worldly people. When this wisdom has grown, been purified and rendered indestructible, it is called ‘perfection’.

Hearing these exhortations, beings “become established in the perfection of wisdom.”

We may add that the bodhisattva does not always preach orally: sometimes he manifests the bases of his miraculous power (*ṛddhipāda*) and emits rays so that beings become established in the six perfections; sometimes he resorts to many other methods and even goes so far as to exercise his activity in dreams (*svapna*) so that beings “awaken” and “become established in the six perfections.”\(^{359}\)

This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra has said: “The bodhisattva who wishes that beings become established in the six perfections must practice the perfection of wisdom.”

Aksayaṃ kuśalamūlam

**Fourth Section PLANTING INEXHAUSTIBLE ROOTS OF GOOD**

*Sūtra* (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 24, l. 5-7; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 73, l. 11-14). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to plant even one single root of good in the field of merit of the Buddhas and make it inexhaustible until he accedes to supreme complete enlightenment must practice the perfection of wisdom (*Bodhisattvena mahāśāsvenaikam api kuśalamūlam buddhānāṃ punyakṣetre varopitukāmena tac cāksayaṃ kartukāmena yāvad anuttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhāv abhisambodheḥ praṇāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyaṃ*).

Śāstra. –

**I. ONE SINGLE ROOT TO BE PLANTED IN THE FIELD OF THE BUDDHAS**

\(^{358}\) Unidentified passage, but the images called forth are canonical: for the Saṃyutta, I, p. 36 and 37, and Udāna, VI, st. 4, wisdom is the jewel of men (*paññā narāṇaṃ ratanaṃ*), and the heroes of the Theragāthā, st. 1094, hope to cut the creeper of thirst by taking up the pointed sword of wisdom (*paññāmayayāṃ tikhiṇam asim gahetvā*).

\(^{359}\) The oratorical skills of the bodhisattva are the results of his *pratibhānapratīṣṭamāid*, see p. 1623-1624F.
Roots of good (kusalamula). – There are three roots of good: i) absence of desire (alobha); ii) absence of hatred (adeva); iii) absence of delusion (amoha). All the good dharmas derive their birth (utpada) and their increase (vrdhiti) from the three roots of good, just as plants, trees, grasses and bushes derive their arising and growth from their roots. This is why they are called ‘roots of good’.

Here by ‘roots of good’ the Prajñaparamitasutra means [not the roots of good themselves] but rather things to be offered (pupakaraṇa) which are the roots of good for causes and conditions, e.g., flowers (puspa), perfumes (gandha), lamps (dīpa) or also spiritual offerings (dhammapājā) such as the observance of morality (śīlasamādāna), the recitation of sūtras (sūrodgrahaṇa), etc. [Here, actually, the Prajñaparamitasutra] is metaphorically designating the effect by the cause (kārya kāraṇopacāraḥ).

Why is that? Perfumes and flowers are morally indeterminate (aniyata); they must be offered with a good intention (kusalacitta) to really be roots of good. [In itself] the gift (dana) is not meritorious (punya): it is only when it destroys avarice (mātasya) and opens the door to the good dharmas that it is a root of good and qualifies as meritorious. Thus, the needle (suci) guides the thread (sūtra) and sews the garment, but the sewing is not the needle.

[Here the Prajñaparamitasutra is speaking about] a “single root of good”, one flower, one perfume, one lamp, one ceremony, one recitation of a sūtra, one observance of morality, one trance (dhyana), one wisdom (prajña), etc. Taken one by one, these material offerings (pūjā) and these spiritual offerings (dhammapājā) are planted (avaropita) in the Buddha field.

The ‘field of the Buddhas’ (buddhaksetra) is the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times. Whether it is a matter of one Buddha present in the world, one statue (pratimā), one relic (śarīra) or simply one recollection (anusmṛti) of a Buddha, one is planting it (avaropayati) in the sense that one’s mind is being firmly attached to it.

Question. – The sūtras mention many fields of merit (punyakṣetra); why is it a question here of planting in the field of the Buddhas only?

Answer. – Although there are many fields of merit, the Buddha is the foremost field of merit because he has the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaisāradya), the eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma) and innumerable Buddha attributes of the same type. That is why it is a matter here of planting only in “the field of the Buddhas”. It is true that the Jewel of the Dharma is the Buddha’s teacher (buddhācārya), but if the Buddha did not preach the Dharma, this Jewel would be unused. In the same way, although there are good medicines (bhaisajya), if there are no good physicians (vaidya) to prescribe them, they would be unused. This is why, although the Jewel of the Dharma is superior, we always mention the

References in Śūraṃgamasaṃādhisūtra, transl. p. 231-233, note.
Moreover, the field of the Buddhas produces immense fruits of retribution (vipākaphala) whereas the fruits produced by the other fields, immense though they are, are indeed inferior. This is why the field of the Buddhas is placed first.

II. ‘INEXHAUSTIBLE’ ROOT

[The bodhisattva wants the root of good that he is planting in the field of the Buddhas] ‘to be inexhaustible’ (akṣaya). The Buddhas are endowed with inexhaustible qualities (akṣayaguna); this is why the merits that are planted therein are also inexhaustible.

Moreover, since the qualities (guna) of the Buddhas are immense (apramāṇa), infinite (ananta), innumerable (asamkhya) and unequaled (asama), the merits that are planted therein are also inexhaustible.

Moreover, when the Buddha was still a bodhisattva, he had in mind the universality of beings (sarvadattva). But these beings are immeasurable and infinite [in number]. Therefore his merit also was inexhaustible.

Finally, the field of the Buddhas is very pure (pariśuddha), for all the dirty weeds of the passions (kleśa), craving (trṣṇā), etc., have been uprooted. Pure morality (vīśuddhaśīla) is its leveled soil; great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā) are its beauties; it is free of poor brackish fields; the thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipāśika) are its canals; the ten powers (bala), the

363 Respective value of the Three Jewels, in the order: Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha, of which the first and the third constitute punyākṣetras.

Theoretically the Dharma is superior to the Buddha. Shortly after his enlightenment, Śākyamuni began to search for a teacher to venerate, respect and serve, but not finding one anywhere, he decided to take as teacher the Dharma that he had discovered (cf. Gārava sutta, Samyutta, I, p. 138-140; Samyukta, T 99, no. 1188, k. 44, p. 321c18-322a7; T 100, no. 101, k. 5, p. 410a3-b8; Traité, p. 586F). If the Buddha appears at the head of the Three Jewels, it is because he is the physician (vaidya), the Dharma is the medicine (bhaiṣajya) and the Saṃgha, the patient (upasthāyaka), as has been said above (p. 1393F, n. 1). Although it effects the cure, the medicine is lower than the physician, for without the latter, it would neither be prescribed nor applied.

There remains to be known in which buddhakṣetra one should plant preferentially. Here the sūtras differ: according to the Majjhima, III, p. 254, l. 27-29, gifts should be made first of all to the Buddha, but the latter on several occasions (Anguttara, III, p. 286, l. 7-9) has given the Saṃgha of disciples as the buddhakṣetra par excellence (anuttara). Hence divergences among the Buddhist sects, described above p. 1400F, n. 1.


364 Adopting the variant pou-tsin.
four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), the four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid), etc., are its great walls; it produces the three Vehicles (yānātraya), nirvāṇa and the fruits of ripening (vipākaphala). Whoever plants in this peerless (anuttara) and unequaled (asama) field reaps inexhaustible merit.

Question. – However, all the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma), having impermanence as their nature (anityalakṣaṇa), all end up in being exhausted (kṣaya). How then could merit (puṇya), the result of causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna), be inexhaustible (akṣaya)?

Answer. – [The Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] here does not say that it is always inexhaustible, but rather that it is inexhaustible during the interval of time [that it takes for the bodhisattva] to become Buddha.365

Moreover, although they arise and perish from moment to moment, the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) are inexhaustible (akṣīṇa) insofar as their series (saṃtāna) is not cut and the fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) is not lost. It is like the lamp (dīpa) which, although its successive flames arise and are extinguished [from instant to instant], is not said to be “extinguished”: it is necessary that the tallow (medas) be melted and the wick (varti) be consumed for the lamp to be ‘extinguished’. It is the same for merit: resolutely planted (adhyāśayena) in an excellent field, it remains non-extinguished (akṣīṇa) until the disappearance of things (dharmakṣaya). [282c]

Finally, the Bodhisattva knows that the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas is inexhaustible (akṣaya), like nirvāṇa. But the merit (puṇya) is part of to the true nature of the dharmas, therefore it too is inexhaustible.

If that is so, nirvāṇa being inexhaustible, merit too should be always inexhaustible. Why does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] say that it remains inexhaustible during the interval of time [required for the bodhisattva] to become Buddha?

Answer. – By the power of the wisdom (prajñābala) [that it inspires], this merit becomes a quality (guṇa) ‘comparable to nirvāṇa’: absolutely empty (atyantaśūnya), unborn (anupāda) and unceasing (aniruddha). This is why it is compared to nirvāṇa, but it is not nirvāṇa.366 If it were confused with nirvāṇa, one would be unable to establish a comparison (upamāna) [between this merit and nirvāṇa]. If it were really nirvāṇa, then what would this fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) that remains indestructible consist of when one becomes Buddha?

This can be compared to the three gates of deliverance (vimoṣamukha), namely, emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apraṇihita).

365 The passage of the Pañcaviṃśati commented on here says textually: yāvad anuttarāśayāṃ samyaksambodhāv abhisambodheḥ; literally: “until the great awakening [of the bodhisattva] into supreme complete enlightenment”.

366 The merit that consists of planting a root of good, i.e., an offering, in the field of Buddha is so great that, while being renewed from moment to moment, it lasts until arriving at Buddhahood. If it disappears at that moment, it is because this merit is the result of causes and conditions and, as conditioned (saṃskṛta), it must finally perish. This merit may be compared to nirvāṇa, but nirvāṇa which, by definition, is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), escapes all destruction, as well as all production. It is not a fruit of retribution.
Just as deliverance (vimokṣa) has absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā) as nature, so the śūnyatā-vimokṣamukha considers the world to be absolutely empty. – Just as deliverance (vimokṣa) has the absence of nature (ānimitta) as nature, so also the ānimitta-vimokṣamukha considers the world to be without nature. – Just as deliverance (vimokṣa) has wishlessness (apraṇihita) as nature, so also the apraṇihita-vimokṣamukha considers the world as excluding any wishing.

[In summary,] just as the three gates of deliverance (vimokṣamukha) are like deliverance (vimokṣa) but are not deliverance, so the merit planted in the field of the Buddhas is like nirvāṇa but is not nirvāṇa.

This is why the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra says here: “The bodhisattva who wants to plant even one single root of good in the field of merit of the Buddhas and make it inexhaustible until he accedes to supreme complete enlightenment must practice the perfection of wisdom.”
CHAPTER XLVII PRAISES MADE BY THE BUDDHAS

First Section WINNING THE PRAISES OF THE BUDDHAS

Śūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 24, l. 7-8; Śatasūtrasirīkā, p. 73, l. 14-74, l. 16). – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes that the Buddhas of the ten directions praise him must practice the perfection of wisdom (Ye daśasu dikṣu buddhā bhagavantas te me varṇaṁ bhāṣerann iti bodhisattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṁ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

Bodhisattvavarna

I. CONVENTIONAL NATURE OF THE DESIRE FOR PRAISE

Question. – Considering the absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnatā) of dharmas and inwardly being free of egoism (ahaṁkmara), the bodhisattva has already destroyed all pride (mānakṣamha); why would he still want the Buddhas to praise him? Besides, it is the rule among bodhisattvas to pay homage to the Buddhas; why would he expect the Buddhas to pay homage to him in return?

Answer. – The Buddhist system has two gates (mukha): i) the gate of absolute meaning (parāṁrtha); ii) the gate of conventional meaning. Conventionally, the bodhisattva wants the Buddhas to praise him, but when he is praised by the Buddhas, he does not see [in himself] any substantial self (ātman) and does not grasp any nature of existence (na sattvanimuttam udgrhṇāti). It is purely a manner of speaking (lokaprajñati), therefore, that the sūtra expresses itself thus.

Are you wondering why the bodhisattva “would expect in return that the Buddhas would pay homage (pūjā) to him?” In a subsequent chapter, the bodhisattva praised by the Buddhas is the bodhisattva “completely non-regressing in his course towards supreme complete enlightenment” (atyantāvinivartanīyo `nutterāyāḥ samyaksamādbodheḥ). In the present case, this bodhisattva wishes to know with certainty (niyatam) if he is or is not non-regressing. This is why he seeks the ‘praise’ (varṇa) of the Buddhas but does not seek their ‘homage’ (pūjā).

II. VALUE OF THE PRAISES GIVEN BY THE BUDDHAS

367 Chapter LV of the Pañcaviṃśati (T 223, k. 16, p. 339a8-341b6) entitled Pou t’ouei p’in (Avinivartaniyaparivarta).
Furthermore, other people, other beings, whose minds are clouded by lust (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha), are unable to praise in accordance [283a] with the truth. Why? If they have the tendency to love, they do not see the real defects (doṣa) and they see only the qualities (guna); if they have the tendency to hate, they see only the defects and do not see the qualities; if delusion is predominant in them, they are incapable of really discerning the beautiful (suvarṇa) from the ugly (durvarṇa).

Gods and humans have a [certain] wisdom (prajñā) and the threefold (triviṣa) poison is subdued (tanu) in them; however, they too are incapable of praising in accordance with the truth. Indeed, they are still subject to error (vañcana), they do not have omniscience (sarvajñatā) and their fetters are not broken (asamucchinnasamyojana).

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, while they have eliminated the threefold poison, they too cannot praise in accordance with truth for they have not yet exhausted all the traces of passion (vāsanā) and, in addition, their wisdom (prajñā) is not perfect (saṃpanna).

The Buddha alone has definitively destroyed the three poisons and their traces (vāsanā) and his omniscience (sarvajñatā) is complete. This is why he can praise in accordance with the truth, without exaggerating or minimizing (anānadhikam). Consequently the yogin wants to obtain the praise of the Buddhas in order to know his real qualities. He does not seek the praise of other people.

III. ALTHOUGH NON-EXISTENT, THE BODHISATTVA MERITS SPECIAL PRAISES

Question. – “The Buddhas born into the threefold world are detached from the world” and for them there is neither ‘me’ (ātman) nor ‘mine’ (ātmya). They consider that the heretics (tīrthika) and bad people on the one hand and the great bodhisattvas and arhats on the other hand are equal and no different. Why then do they praise the bodhisattva?

Answer. – Although the Buddhas are without egotism (ahamkāra), without aversion (pratigha) or affection (anunaya), although their minds are detached from all the dharmas, they have pity on beings and guide them all by means of feelings of great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā). This is why they distinguish honest men and praise them. They also want to destroy the evil Māras.

What the Buddhas wish by praising [the bodhisattva] is that innumerable beings should love the bodhisattva, respect him, honor him, and then all attain the bodhi of the Buddhas. This is why the Buddhas praise the bodhisattva.

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368 Here, these are the śrāvakas who have attained arhathood.
Question. How do they praise him?

Answer. – The Buddhas who preach the Dharma in the great assembly and want people to penetrate into the very profound Dharma (atigambhīradharma) praise the bodhisattvas such as, for example, Sa-t’o polouen (Sadāprarudita), etc.

Moreover, the Buddhas who praise the bodhisattva express themselves in this way.371

1) The bodhisattva is able to contemplate the absolute emptiness (atyantasūnyatā) of dharmas and can also have great loving-kindness and great compassion for beings.

He is able to practice patience in regard to beings and also to not see beings.

Even though he practices patience towards things (dharmaksānti), he experiences no attachment (abhiniveśa) for all these things.

Although he sees the events of past lifetimes (pūrvanivāsa), he does not fall into the wrong view of the earlier time (pūrvānta).

Although he sees beings enter into nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning (nirpadhiśesanirvāṇa), he does not fall into the wrong view of the later time (aparānta).372

While knowing that nirvāṇa is the peerless (anuttara) true dharma, he still accomplishes good bodily, vocal and mental actions (kāyavānmanaskarman).

While traveling through saṃsāra, he resolutely (adhyāśayena) loves nirvāṇa.

370 References above, p. 1353F, n. 1.

371 Explanation dedicated to the “double life” of bodhisattvas: the practice of the pāramitās by the method of non-abiding: asthānayogena (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 18, l. 7-15; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 56, l. 1-9); the path of the twofold practice of skillful means and the truth (Avatamsaka, T 279, k. 56, p. 296v22-297c3); the “deviations” (agati) of the bodhisattva (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, transl. p. 285-289).

372 The wrong views of earlier time and later time, i.e., relating to the past and the future, have already been condemned by the canonical texts where it is said that the learned noble disciple (srutavān āryaśravaka) does not concern himself with them. Whereas the Pāli sutta (Samyutta, II, p. 26-27) asks a question to which it replies in the negative: Netaṁ thāṁ vijjati, the Sanskrit sūtra (Nidānasam yukta, p. 150-151) and its Chinese version (T 99, k. 12, p. 84b17-c1) expresses itself directly in the negative form:

Sa na pūrvānta pratisarati / kin nv aham abhūvam atīte ’dhvani / aho svin nāham atīte ’dhvani / ka nv aham abhūvam atīte ’dhvani / kathām nv aham abhūvam atīte ’dhvani / Aparāntaṃ vā na partisarati / ko nu anāgata ’dhvani / kathām nu bhavisyām anāgata ’dhvani /

This [noble learned disciple] does not care about previous time by asking: What was I in the past? Or else, was I not in the past? Who was I in the past? How was I in the past?

He does not care about later time by asking: What will I be in the future? Or else, will I not be in the future? Who will I be in the future? How will I be in the future?
While abiding in the three gates of deliverance (vimokṣaṃukha) and contemplating nirvāṇa, he does not violate his earlier vows (pūrvaṇaprajñāṇa) or his good practices (kuśalacaryā). The many extraordinary qualities are very difficult to find.

2) Furthermore, when the bodhisattva has not yet obtained the acquiescence that dharmas do not arise (anupādaksānti) or the five superknowledges (abhijñā), his fleshly body of birth-death (saṃsāramāṃsakāya or cyutypapādāsāmaskāya) has feelings of great loving-kindness (mahāmaitri) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā) [283b] for beings, and he distributes completely his most precious inner (adhyaṭmika) and outer (bāhya) goods: his outer goods, such as his dearly loved wife and children, five objects of enjoyment (pāncakāmagnuṇa) of great value, pacified lands, etc.; his inner goods, such as his body (kāya), flesh (māṃsa), skin (tvac), bones (asthi), blood (lohitā), head (śiras), eyes (nayana), marrow (majjan), skull (mastaka), ears (śrota), nose (nāsā), hands (pāni), feet (pāda), etc. Such things are very rare (durlabha). This is why the Buddhas praise the virtues of this bodhisattva.

3) When the bodhisattva has entered into his position assured of attaining enlightenment (dharmaṃiyāma) and possesses the superknowledges (abhijñā), he devotes himself to the austerities (duṣkaraṇacaryā) without ever getting tired of the difficulties. In this bodhisattva, the body of birth (janmakāya), the fleshly eye (māṃsatarkaṇa) and the aptitudes (abhiprāya) are very extensive. He has feelings of great compassion (mahākaruṇā) and he loves the bodhi of the Buddhas. Such feats are very extraordinary (adhibhuta).

4) Furthermore, when the bodhisattva is endowed with the purity of morality (ṣīlaśuddhaṃpanna) and possesses the superknowledges (abhijñā), he no longer distinguishes between morality (ṣīla) and immorality (daubṣīla).373 In the face of dharmas absolutely without birth (ayantāmuppanna) and always empty (sadāśūnya), his dharmakṣānti and his exertion (vīrya) are unceasing. He has neither attraction nor aversion. [To his eyes] exertion (vīrya) and laziness (kausīda) are of the same nature (ekalakṣaṇa) and no different.374 For immense (paramāṇa) infinite (ananta) and incalculable (asamkhīyeva) kalpas, he has practiced exertion diligently and, in general, he takes up and practices the most profound concentrations (gambhīrasamādhī), but without being attached to them, for concentrations (samādhī) and distraction (vikṣepa) are no different.375 Without leaving concentration, he creates for himself (nirminīte) an immense body that fills the ten directions completely, preaches the Dharma and saves people.

5) Applying profound wisdom (gambhīraprajñā), he considers all dharmas as anutpanna-aniruddha “unborn and undestroyed”, not anutpanna-aniruddha, both anutpanna-aniruddha and non-anutpanna-aniruddha, neither anutpanna-aniruddha and non-anutpanna-aniruddha;376 beyond all speech

373 See above, p. 770F and 861F.
374 See above, p. 981F
375 See preceding note.
376 In the muddle of the Chinese negations, we seem to recognize here one of the teraelemmas (catuskoṭi) of which the Madhyamika logic is fond (see above, p. 155F). On this mode of argumentation (A, non-A, A and non-A, neither A nor non-A), see J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 16; S. Schayer, Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prassanapadā, Cracow, 1931, p. xxxv-xxvi.
The Buddhas of the ten directions together praise this bodhisattva.

6) Furthermore, when the bodhisattva has not obtained the prediction (vyākarana), has not obtained the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmaśānti), has not met the Buddhas and has not seen the saints (bhadrārya), he is able, by means of right thought (samyaksamkalpa) to contemplate the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas and, while contemplating this true nature, his mind is not attached to it. The Buddhas of the ten directions together praise this bodhisattva.

7) Furthermore, when he hears speak of the very profound (gambhīra) immense (aprameya) infinite (ananta) and inconceivable (acintya) Buddha attributes, even though he has not yet himself obtained wisdom, the bodhisattva can believe strongly in these attributes without feeling any doubt (vicitāsā). If Māra, changed into buddha, came to create doubt in him, the mind of the bodhisattva would show neither high nor low (anūnānadhikā). This bodhisattva is praised buy the Buddhas.

8) There are also bodhisattvas who, from their first production of the mind of bodhi (bodhicittotpāda), immediately become buddhas. The Buddha praises them for they have great power of exertion (mahāvīryabala).

Thus, when the [future] Buddha Śākyamuni and the bodhisattva Maitreya simultaneously produced the mind of bodhi (cittotpāda), the Buddha Śākyamuni, by the power of is exertion, crossed over nine kalpas [over the hundred that he normally would have had to course through].

[283c] 9) Finally, there are bodhisattvas who are endowed with bodhisattva attributes, namely, the ten bhumis, the six perfections (pāramitā), the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāryadya), the four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid), the eighteen special attributes (āveñikadharmas) and innumerable pure Buddha attributes. However, for beings, they remain in saṃsāra for a long time and, without taking

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377 These are upapadyaparinirvāyin bodhisattvas who attain sambodhi at the moment when they produce the mind of bodhi. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 66, l. 4-7 defines them as follows: Santi bodhisattvā mahāsattvā ye prathamacittotpādenaivañc utā samyaksambodhīm abhisambudhyante, dharmacakraṃ pravrtaṇy aprameyānām asamkhyaeyānāṃ sattvānāṃ cārthāṃ krtvā nirupadhiśeṣe nirvānadhātāṃ parinirvānti, teṣāṃ parinirvāṇām kalpaṃ vā kalpaśvaṇaṃ vā sattvānāṃ tīṣṭhati. ity upapadyaparinirvāyī. They correspond to the upapadyaparinirvāyin anāgāmins of the early Buddhism who attain nirvāṇa on taking rebirth (see Kośa, iii, p. 38).

379 The simultaneous cittotpāda of the future Buddha and Maitreya has already been told above. For parallel sources, see p. 252F, n. 2 and also Kośabhāṣya, p. 267, l.11-17. For the nine kalpas skipped (pratyuddavartita) by Śākyamuni, see p. 252F, n. 1. The question of ‘skipping’ has been treated by J. May in detail, Hībhūgirin, IV, p. 353-360, see under chīkīf.

380 Note that the balas, vaśitas, vaiśāryadyas and āveñikadharmas of the bodhisattvas are not the same as those of the Buddhas: cf. Mahāvyut., chaps. XXVI to XXIX. Here it is a matter of the bodhisattva of the tenth bhūmi.
up supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhi), they save beings widely. The Bud\nhas praise these bodhisattvas. Who are they? They are, for example, Wen-chou-che-li (Mañjuśrī), P‘i-mo-lo-kie (Vimalakīrti), Kouan-che-yin (Avalokiteśvara), Ta-che-tche (Mahāsthāmaprāpta), Pien-ki (Samantabhadra). These leaders among the bodhisattvas appear in the threefold world (tridhātuka), create for themselves innumerable bodies by transformation, enter into saṃsāra and convert beings. From such exploits (adbhuta) comes the entire very profound prajñāpāramitā.

This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says here: “The bodhisattva who wishes to obtain the praises of the Buddhas must practice the perfection of wisdom.”

381 The best-known bodhisattvas of legend and worship are precisely those who retard their entry into parinirvāṇa indefinitely in order to dedicate themselves to the welfare and happiness of beings. The Traité here cites six with Mañjuśrī in first place. Like that of all bodhisattvas, his career is encapsulated between two crucial moments: i) the production of the mind of enlightenment (bodhicittotpāda) or the grand resolution (adhyāśaya) of becoming buddha; ii) the arrival at supreme complete enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhi).

According to the Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraṇavyūha (T 318, k. 2, p. 896c-899b; T 310, k. 59, p. 345b-347c; T 319, k. 2-3, p. 912b-915b; OKC 760, no, 14), - formerly – kalpas as numerous as the sands of 70 myriads of an incalculable number of Ganges – the Tathāgata Megasvara appeared in the east, in the Anutpāda universe, separated from ours by 72 nayutas of Buddha fields.

It was in the presence of this Buddha and in this universe that a religious king named Ākāśa produced the mind of enlightenment and formulated his vows and intentions in words the original of which appeared in Śikṣasamuccaya, p. 14:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Nāhaṃ tvaritarūpeṇa bodhiṃ prāptum ihotsahe} & \\
\text{parāntakōṭim sthāsāmi satvasyaikasya kāraṇāt} & \\
\text{kṣetram viśodhayisāyām aprameya, acintiyam} & \\
\text{nāmadheyam kariṣyāmi daśa dikṣu ca viśṛtām} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

“I have no eagerness to attain enlightenment and I shall remain here below as long as there will remain one being to be saved. I will purify an immense inconceivable field and I will make my name famous in the ten directions.”

This king Ākāśa was none other than the actual bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. Kalpas as numerous as the sands of 70 myriads of Ganges ago. he produced for the first time the mind of enlightenment; kalpas as numerous as the sands of 64 Ganges ago he obtained the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣānti) and acceded thus to the eighth bhūmi. Now that he has become a great bodhisattva of the tenth bhūmi, he has no thought of entering into parinirvāṇa.

It is only after an incalculable number of incalculable periods that he will attain supreme complete enlightenment. In the Vimala universe of the southern direction, he will be the buddha Samantadarśin, so called “because he will make himself visible everywhere in the innumerable hundreds of thousands of hundred thousands of nayutas of buddhaksetras.” – The legend of Mañjuśrī may be taken as typical and its framework useful for all the great bodhisattvas with slight modifications of time and place.

That of Vimalakīrti is less detailed; see, however, the Śūramgamasamādhisūtra, transl. p. 191-192, n. 181.
Lokadhētūpasāṃkramāṇa

Second Section ACCEDING TO INNUMERABLE UNIVERSES

Śūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 27, l. 4-7; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 74, l. 16-75, l. 19). – Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes, in one single production of mind, to go to universes in the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, must practice the perfection of wisdom (Punar aparāṃ, Śāriputra, bodhisattvena mahāsattvena, ekacittotpādenadāsasu dikṣu gangaṅadīvālukopamān lokadhētūnupasaṃkramitukāmena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. MAGICAL POWERS OF MULTIPLICATION AND DISPLACEMENT

The bodhisattva who has acquired the power of transformation of bodies (kāyanirmanābalā) creates for himself bodies as numerous as the sands of the Ganges of the ten directions and goes simultaneously to universes of the ten directions also as numerous as the sands of the Ganges.

Question. – A sūtra says: “In one single fingersnap, there are sixty moments” (acchaṭāmātreṇa ṣaṭṭiḥ kṣanā atikrāmānti).382 It is already incredible that in a single instant the bodhisattva is able to go to universes of a single direction as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; what can be said then if he goes to universes of the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges? In such a short time, the destinations are truly too numerous!

Answer. – A sūtra says: “There are five incomprehensible (acintya) things, namely: i) the number of beings; ii) the retribution of action (karmavipāka); iii) the power of a person in meditation (dhyāyabala); iv) the power of the nāgas; v) the power of the Buddha. Of these five incomprehensible things, the power of the Buddha is the most incomprehensible.”383

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382 The Ābhidharmikas hesitate between 60, 64 or 65 moments:
Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 136, p. 701b14: In the time that a strong man snaps his fingers, there are 64 kṣaṇa.
Kośabhaṣya, p. 176, l. 13-14: Balavatpurusācchaṭāmātreṇa pañčaṣaṭṭih kṣaṇā atikrāmantī
Ābhidhārmikāḥ.
Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 32, p.521c13-14: 65 kṣaṇa.
Madh. vr̥tti, p. 547: Balavatpurusāddhaṭāmātreṇa pañčaṣaṭṭih kṣaṇā atikrāmantī pāṭhāt.

383 See references above, p. 1639F, n. 1.
The bodhisattva in profound concentrations (gambhīrasamādhi) produces incomprehensible superknowledges (acintyabhijñā) and by means of them, in a single moment, goes everywhere in the Buddha universes of the ten directions.

As has been said (p. 329-330F, 1819-1820F) in regard to the four magical powers of movement (gamanarāddhi), only the Buddhas and bodhisattvas have the magical powers (rddhiabhiṣānti) of moving at the speed of thought (manojāvā gati). As soon as the chick of the bird with golden wings (garuḍa) comes out of its shell, it goes from Sumeru to Sumeru. It is the same with the bodhisattvas; by the power of their conviction of the non-arising of things (anutpādakṣānti) they have destroyed the passions (kleśa) and broken the egg-shell of ignorance (avidyā). From then on, in a single instant, they create innumerable bodies for themselves and go in the ten directions.

Furthermore, for the bodhisattva, all the sins (āpatti) committed during innumerable lifetimes are completely erased and, by the power of wisdom (prajñābala), he is able to transform things: to make huge that which is small and to make small that which is huge. He is able to reduce a thousand myriads of immense kalpas into a single day and to extend a single day into the space of a thousand myriads of kalpas. This bodhisattva is the master of the world (lokāsvāmin) and his wishes are sovereign. What wish would not be fulfilled? Thus [284a] it is said in the P’i-mo-lo-kie king (Vimalakīrtisūtra): “The bodhisattva makes seven nights last for a kalpa”.384

This is why the bodhisattva, mounted on the power of the superknowledges (abhijñābalarūḍha) is able to leap quickly in the universes of the ten directions.

II. THE POWER OF THE BUDDHA IS DEPENDENT ON THAT OF THE BODHISATTVA

Question. – But the bodhisattva does not appear in the list if the five incomprehensible (acintya) things mentioned above. Why then do you mention the incomprehensible [power] of the bodhisattva here?

Answer. – Sometimes the effect is designated by the cause (kārye kāranopacārah), e.g., when it is said that somebody eats a hundred pounds of gold sterling each day: gold is inedible, but since it is because of gold that food can be obtained, it is said that he eats gold. Here, it is designating the effect by the cause.

But sometimes the cause is designated by the effect (kārane kāryopacārah), e.g., when on seeing a fine painting, we say that it is a good artist: that is designating the cause by the effect.385 It is the same here for the bodhisattvas, for [in this case] the bodhisattvas are cause and the Buddhas are effect. If it is said that “the power of the Buddha is incomprehensible” (buddhabalam acintyam), we should know that that is already valid for the bodhisattva [for the bodhisattva is, in reference to the Buddha, an antecedent cause].

384 Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, trasl. p. 254.
385 Examples of upacāra have already been used above: see p. 1932F, n. 1
This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says here: "The bodhisattva who wishes, in a single thought, to go to the universes of the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, must practice the perfection of wisdom."

Ekasvaratā

**Third Section SPEAKING TO INNUMERABLE UNIVERSES BY MEANS OF A SINGLE SOUND**

Śūtra (cf. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 75, l. 19-76, l. 22). – Furthermore, Śāriputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to emit a single sound spoken in such a way that the universes of the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges hear this sound, must practice the perfection of wisdom (Punar aparaṃ, Śāriputra ye daśasu dīkṣu gaṅgānadīvālukopamā lokadātavas tān sarvān ekasvaraghoṣeṇa vijnāpayitukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāvāṃ śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

I. RANGE OF VOICE OF THE BUDDHAS AND BODHISATTVAS

The bodhisattva who has acquired the six superknowledges (abhijñā) has developed the mark (lakṣaṇa) of the brahmic voice (brahmāsvara) which, going beyond the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu, reaches the universes of the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges.

Question. – If that is so, how does his voice differ from that of the Buddha?

Answer. – The voice of the bodhisattva is measured by the number of sand grains of the Ganges, whereas the range of the voice of the Buddha is unlimited (maryādā).

[Tathāgatācintyaguḥyanirdeśa]. – Thus it is said in the Mi-tsi king (Guhyakūṭātra): "In order to experience the Buddha’s voice, Maudgalyāyana went very far in the direction of the west, but he still heard the Buddha’s voice as if they were face to face."³⁸⁶

Question. – So be it! But when the Buddha was dwelling in the kingdoms (rāṣṭra) and the towns (nīgama) to preach the Dharma and convert the people, the inhabitants of Jambudvīpa who were not nearby did not hear him. How do we know that? Because many came from distant regions to listen to the Dharma.

³⁸⁶ Passage cited in full above, p. 560-561F.
Answer. – The voice of the Buddha is of two kinds: i) the voice hidden in the mouth (mukhagūḍhaghoṣa); 387 ii) the unhidden (nirgūḍhaghoṣa) voice. It has just been a matter of the hidden voice; as for the unhidden voice, one must come near the Buddha to hear it.

Also, there are two kinds of disciples: i) the supramundane (lokottarikārya) saints; ii) mundane ordinary people (laukikaprthagjana). The supramundane saints such as Maudgalyāyana, etc., are able to hear the subtle hidden voice; ordinary people hear [the unhidden voice] to the extent that they come near the Buddha.

Furthermore, the bodhisattvas who have entered into the position of salvation (samyaktvaniyāmāvākrānta), who have abandoned the body of birth and death (saṃsāarakāya or cyutupādakāya) and have acquired the true body of the fundamental element (dharmaḥdhatukāya), these bodhisattvas, I say, see the innumerable Buddha bodies of the ten directions and their brilliant rays (raśmi); they also succeed in hearing the sixty kinds of sounds (saṣṭyaṅgasvara), 388 distant and immense, uttered by the Buddhas.

[284b] Although the great bodhisattvas are not endowed with sounds like those of the Buddhas, nevertheless they have their share (aṃśa, bhāga) in these sounds of the Buddhas.

II. THE THREEFOLD VOICE OF THE BUDDHAS AND THE BODHISATTVAS389

The voice of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas is of three kinds:

1) Having planted the causes and conditions in their previous lives for good vocalization, they have the four subtle and marvelous (prāśādika) great elements in their throat (kaṇṭha), 390 and they produce all kinds of marvelous sounds (śabda), distant or close, for a distance of one, two, three, ten, a hundred, a thousand li which go out to fill up the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātū. 391

387 Adopting the variant mi-k’eou.

388 These are the sixty qualities of the voice of the Buddhas listed in the Mahāvyut., no. 445-504, and the Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 79-81. See also Ekottara, T 125, k. 47, p. 805a2 (64 kinds); Lalitavistara, p. 286 (incomplete list); Pañcaviṃśati p. 234, l. 10, (saṣṭyeṣopetaḥ svarah); Avatamsaka, T 279, k. 29, p. 158c2; k. 50, [p. 266c19; Ratnakūṭa, T 310, k. 10, p. 55c20-56a5; k. 85, p. 48c23; k. 101, p. 56c4-5; Tathāgataguhyaśūtra, T 312, k. 7, p. 719c7-720c16 (64 kinds)). – For other lists of vocal qualities, see Hībōgirin, p. 134 under Bonnon.

389 Section partially translated in Hībōgirin, p. 216 under Button.

390 These are the subtle material (rūpaprāsāda) or derived material (upādāyarūpa or bhautika) elements constituting the five indriyas (cf. Kośa, I, p. 15, n. 1).

391 This voice, or more precisely, this vocal apparatus, is usually acquired by means of the play of causes and conditions; the other two voices, particularly the third, are very difficult to obtain.
2) By the power of their superknowledges (abhijñābala), the four great elements (mahābhūta) of their throat produce sounds that fill not only the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu but also the universes of the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges.

3) The voice of the Buddhas is always able to fill all of space (ākāśa), covering all of the ten directions.

III. WHO CAN HEAR THE VOICE OF THE BUDDHAS?

Question. – If the voice of the Buddhas always fills space, why do actual beings not always hear it?

Answer. – For incalculable eons (asamkhyaeyakalpa) beings have been clouded over (āvṛta) by the bad actions they have committed. This is why they do not hear it. Just as the rumble of thunder and lightning is not heard by the deaf (badhira) without the thunder being diminished by that, so also the Buddhas, like the dragons discharging great bolts of thunder, are always preaching the Dharma to beings but the latter, due to their sins (āpatti), are not in a position to hear them.

However, in the present lifetime, some zealous (vīryavat) and moral (śīlavat) beings enter into the concentration of the recollection of the Buddhas (buddhānusmrītisamādhi). At the moment when their mind acquires this concentration, the defilements of their faults (āpattimala) are no longer an obstacle (āvarana) and henceforth they get to see the Buddhas and to hear distinctly the sounds of their preaching.

Of the three kinds of voice [mentioned above], the bodhisattva wishes to acquire the [last] two, for these two voices are very hard to obtain (durlabha) and are miraculous (āscarya), whereas [the first voice] is the fruit of actions (karmaphala) and is acquired spontaneously (svarasena).

This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says here: “The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes [to emit] a single sound articulated in such a way that the universes of the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges can hear this sound, must practice the perfection of wisdom.”

Buddhakṣetrānupaccheda

Fourth Section ASSURING THE CONTINUITY OF THE BUDDHA UNIVERSES

Sūtra (cf. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 77, l. 4-5).392 – Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes that the Buddha universes never be interrupted must practice the perfection of wisdom (Punar
I. PRECISE RANGE OF THIS WISH

“May all the Buddha universes never be interrupted.” – The bodhisattva wishes that, in the various fields (kṣetra), beings successively formulate the resolution to become buddha.

Question. – You are speaking of succession. This can be a matter of a [Buddha] succession in order of anteriority and posteriority in one single field, or of a [Buddha] series in the universes (lokadhātu) of the ten directions.

Let us suppose that it is a matter of a [Buddha] succession in one single field. Since the great compassion (mahākaruṇā) [of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas] envelops all beings, why does it not extend to other fields as well?

Let us suppose that it is a matter of a [Buddha] series in all the universes of the ten directions. Then what would be the use of other Buddhas and bodhisattvas?

Answer. – The bodhisattva wishes mentally that in all the universes everyone should become buddha. This grand wish is vast and extended and has no limit (maryādā), for it is in this intention that the bodhisattva accumulates the wisdoms (prajñā), immense merit (apramāṇapunya) and the power of the superknowledges (abhijñābala). But it is all the beings who have planted the causes and conditions required to become buddha that the bodhisattva wants to lead to this result.

[284c] If, in all the universes, everyone planted the causes and conditions required to become buddha, the other Buddhas and bodhisattvas would be useless. But such a hypothesis cannot be verified.

Furthermore, the universes of the ten directions are innumerable (apramāṇa) and infinite (ananta) and it is impossible that a single bodhisattva is able to travel to them all in such a way that the Buddha lineage is not interrupted (anupacchinna). The other bodhisattvas, each according to his means, play their part [in this great work]. Since his loving-kindness (maitri) and compassion (karuṇā) are great, the wish (pranidhāna) of the bodhisattva is great also, and his desire to do good is limitless (maryādā). Nevertheless, as the race of beings is infinite (apramāṇa), they cannot all be saved by a single Buddha or a single bodhisattva.

II. PURELY SUBJECTIVE RESULT OF THIS WISH

one and the same Buddha universe (buddhalokadhātu or buddhakṣetra) or when one Buddha series is distributed over all the universes.
Question. – Since reality does not come up to his expectation, why does the bodhisattva formulate the wish (praṇidhāna)?

Answer. – So that his own mind may progress in purity (viśuddhi). He is like the yogin in the concentration of loving-kindness (maitrīsamādhi) who, unable to do anything about beings in suffering, only formulates the wish so that his own mind may progress in purity.393

III. LIMITS TO THE SALVIFIC ACTION OF THE BUDDHAS

Thus, the Buddhas and the great bodhisattvas are strong enough that they can save all beings, but, since beings do not possess wisdom and do not fulfill the required cause and conditions, they cannot be saved.

Let us take, for example, the water in the great ocean (mahāsamudrodaka): if all beings drew water from it, it would never run dry; but all beings do not use it. Thus beings in the preta category, because of their own sins (āpatti), are unable to see the water and, even when they do see it, it dries up or changes into molten copper,394 or it becomes pus (pūya) and blood (sonita). It is the same with the Buddhas: having great loving-kindness and great compassion, using an immense and infinite wisdom (prajñā), they are able to satisfy all beings, but the latter, because of their sins, do not meet the Buddhas and, even if they do meet them, they are no different from the rest of the people who are angry with the Buddha or who denigrate him. This is why they do not see the power (anubhāva) of the Buddhas or their magical power (ṛddhibala) and, even if they do meet the Buddhas, they derive no benefit (hita) from it.

Moreover, two causes (hetu), two conditions (pratyaya) are necessary to produce right view (samyagdrṣṭi), namely, an inner cause (adhyātma) and an outer condition (bahirdhā). The Buddha who is the outer cause-and-condition is perfect (sampatama): he possesses thirty-two major marks (laksana), eighty minor marks (anuvyānjava), immense rays (raśmi) adorning his body, many magical powers (ṛddhibala) and many articulated sounds (svaraghoṣa); he preaches the Dharma (dharmaṃdeśayati) as required (yatheccham) and cuts through all doubts (sarvasamśayān samucchadayati). Only beings, who are the inner cause-and-condition, are not perfect. Not having previously planted the roots of good (kuśalamūla) required to see the Buddha, they have neither faith in nor respect for him; they have neither exertion (vīrya) nor morality (śīla), having weak faculties (mṛdvindriya), they are deeply attached to worldly happiness (lokasukha) and, consequently, derive no benefit [from meeting the Buddha]. This is not the fault (doṣa) of the Buddha.

The Buddha converts beings (sattvān paripācayati) and the divine tools that he uses are perfect. When the sun rises (sūrya), beings who have an eye (cakṣusmat) see it, whereas blind people (andha) do not see it.

393 The ascetic who, in the course of the meditation on loving-kindness, so that “all beings may be happy”, formulates a purely platonic vow; this vow is of profit only to himself; beings gain no advantage from it (cf. p. 1240F, 1259F).
394 Adopting the variant yang-t’ong.
On the other hand, assuming that there is an eye but there is no sun, there is nothing to see. Thus the fault is not with the sun. It is the same with the Buddha-light.

IV. HOW TO PREVENT THE INTERRUPTION OF THE BUDDHA FIELDS

Question. – What should be done to make the Buddha universes (buddhalokadhātu) not be interrupted (anupacchinna)?

[285a] Answer. - In the midst of beings, the bodhisattva praises the bodhi of he Buddhas so well that beings produce the mind of supreme complete enlightenment (aumtarāyām samyaksambodhau cittamutpayant), gradually (amukrameṇa) practice the six perfections (pāramitā) and finally, in the universes, each become buddha.

That they successively become buddha in one and the same field (kṣetra), or that they each become buddha in a different field is what is called “not breaking the Buddha fields” (buddhakusetrānapacheda).

Furthermore, some bodhisattvas rapidly accumulate the wisdoms (prajñā), become perfect buddhas and save innumerable beings. On the point of entering into nirvāṇa, they make the prediction (vyākarana) to a bodhisattva, saying: “After my nirvāṇa, you in turn will become buddha.” Transmissions (paramparā) such as that thus prevent interruption [of the Buddha fields]. Buddhas who would not give the prediction to a bodhisattva break the Buddha-field. In this way, kings name their crown prince (kumāra) and, by virtue of this transmission), their dynasty is not broken.

V. VALUE OF THE BUDDHA FIELDS

Question. – Why praise the universes that have a Buddha and depreciate those that do not have one?

Answer. – The subject does not lend itself to such a question. The Buddha adorned with the ten powers (daśabala) is the master of the entire universe (lokadhātusvāmin) and, a fortiori, of a single field (kṣetra). The inhabitants of a universe without a Buddha can enjoy human and divine happiness (manusyadevasukha), but do not know the extent of the beneficent power of the Buddhas and so are no different from animals.

If Buddhas did not appear in the world, the path (mārga) of the three Vehicles (yānatraya) and of nirvāṇa would not exist; beings would be always shut up in the prison of the threefold world (trādhātukabandhana) and would never get out. In the universes where there is a Buddha, beings succeed in leaving the prison of the threefold world.
[Acchariyā abhutadhammā sutta]. 395 - Thus, in the intermediate spaces between two worlds (lokāntarikā) where there is no sun, beings live and die in the shadows (andhakāra). At the time when a Buddha is born, a brilliant light (avabhāsa) shines temporarily, and all see themselves, see one another (anonyaṃ paśyanti) and see the sun and moon. Thus illuminated, the beings [of the lokāntarikā] recognize and say: “Those over there are very worthy; we ourselves are great sinners.” Sometimes, the Buddha illumines the Buddha fields with his brilliance completely, and the beings of the universes without Buddha, 396 seeing the Buddha’s brilliance, experience great joy (mahāmuditā) and say: “For us, it was shadows (andhakāra), but for them, great light.”

395 Anguttara, II, p. 130-131 (T 125, k. 17,p. 631b19-c10). – On four occasions, when the Bodhisattva descends into the womb of his mother (mātu kucchiyām okkamati), comes out of his mother’s womb (mātu kucchisma nikkhamati), attains supreme complete enlightenment (anuttaram sammāsambodhiḥ abhisambujhati), or turns the Wheel of Dharma (dhammacakkam paṭavateti), there is a grand miracle: a brilliant light illuminates the lokāntarikā (fem. pl.). These are the intermediate spaces between the universes of four continents. Grouped into three, these universes, circular in form, touch one another by their outer walls (cakravāla), like three coins brought together. Thus between them they demarcate a surface with the form of a triangle with three arched sides. These lokāntarikās, infinite in number like the universes that demarcate them, are always plunged in deep darkness to the point that their inhabitants cannot even distinguish their own limbs. However, a brilliant light illuminates them on the four occasions indicated above. Then the inhabitants of the lokāntarikas notice one another and also discover the beings populating the neighboring universes, normally illuminated by the sun and moon.

The illumination of the lokāntarikas is fully described by a stock phrase which, both in the Pāli and the Sanskrit, shows numerous variations:

Pāli, Dīgha, II, p. 12,15; Majjhima, III, p. 120; Saṁyutta, V, p. 454; Anguttara, II, p. 130. – I. B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings, II, p. 165, translates it as follows: And even in those spaces between the worlds, gloomy, baseless regions of blackness plunged in blackness, where the moon and the sun, powerful and majestic though they are, cannot make their light prevail – even there there appeared the illimitable glorious radiance, surpassing even the deva-majesty of devas. And those beings who had uprisen there recognized one another by means of this radiance, and they thought: “Indeed there are other beings who are uprising here.”

Sanskrit in Sanskr. Mahāpādāna, p. 82-83; Sanskr. Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 214-216; Mahāvastu, I, p. 41, 229, 240; II, p. 162; III,p. 334, 341; Divyāvadāna, p. 204, 205, 206: lalitavistara, p. 51, 410; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 102; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 163. F. Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 464-465, translates thus: And even those world-interstitial-spaces, (which are) miseries and covered over with miseries, darknesses, glooms of darkness, - in which the moon and sun here, which possess such great supernatural power and dignity (pr capacity) are not capable of (producing) light by (their) light... even in them a great, magnificent radiance appeared (at that time).

Dīgha, II, p. 12: Yā pi tā lokantarikā aghā asaṁvutā andhakārā andhakāratimisā ... sañjīvanī: Aññe pi kīra bhā sattā idhūpapannā ti.

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 163: Sarvesu ca tesu lokadhātuṣu yā lokantarikās tāsu ya aksaṇāḥ ... anye ‘pi bata bhāḥ satvah santīhappannā iti.

The Traité departs somewhat from the original texts, themselves poorly established.

396 Adopting the variant wou fo kouo.
Finally, in the fields where there is a Buddha, beings recognize the existence of sin (āpatti) and merit (punya); the people take the triple refuge (triśaraṇa), the fivefold morality (pañcaśīla) [of the upāsaka] or the fast of eight vows [of the upāvāsasthā]397, the many profound meditations (āhyāna), absorptions (samāpatti) and wisdoms (prajñā); the four fruits of religious life (śrāmanyaphala), the five kinds of religious stages,398 nirvāṇa with residue (sopadhīśeṣa) or without residue (nirupadhīśeṣa), etc. Because it is the cause and conditions (hetupratyaya) of these many good dharmas, the Buddha field (buddhakṣetra) is honored.

Supposing even that the beings of a Buddha field do not see the Buddha, they meet, however, the Dharma of the sūtras, cultivate the roots of good (kuśalamūla),399 morality (śīla), generosity (dāna), the signs of respect (vandana), etc.; they plant the causes and conditions for nirvāṇa, and even animals can plant the causes and conditions of merit (punya).400 On the other hand, in the fields without a Buddha, even the gods and humans there are incapable of practicing good. This is why the bodhisattva formulates the vow (prāṇidhāna) that the Buddha universes not be broken.

397 The pañcaśīla and the upavāsa of the layman have already been studied above, p. 819-839F.
398 Bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, śāikṣa, śrāmaṇera and śrāmaṇerī: cf. p. 577F.
399 Adopting the variant chan-ken.
400 On the Buddhist behavior towards animals, or the Bodhisattva in animal form, see p. 716-721F, and Hōbōgirin, p. 317-318, under chikushū.
CHAPTER XLVIII THE EIGHTEEN EMPTINESSES

First Section NOTE ON EMPTINESS

Preliminary note. – The eighteen emptinesses, the subject of the present chapter, are the end-point of a long doctrinal evolution the milestones of which should be marked. The subject is of importance because, to a great extent, it is on account of it that the two first Vehicles, that of the śrāvakas and that of the bodhisattvas, present differences. In general, one can say with the Traité, p. 239F: “The Śrāvakayāna teaches mainly the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā), whereas the Buddhayāna (or Greater Vehicle), teaches both the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).” The assertion will be developed later, p. 2060F.

Here we will treat in a summary manner the twofold emptiness in the canonical sūtras, the emptiness of beings in the Abhidharmas and the śāstras of the Hīnayānists, and finally the emptinesses according to the Madhyamaka.

I. THE TWOFOLD EMPTINESS IN THE CANONICAL SŪTRAS

1. Sattvaśūnyatā or Pudgalanairātmīya

Sattvaśūnyatā is the non-existence of the being (sattva), of the soul, of the self (ātman), of the living being (jīva), of the man (puruṣa), of the individual (pudgala): all these words are only designations (prajñapti) of the group of fragmentary entities.

On the evidence of the Brahmagālasatta (D., I, p. 31-34), the first Buddhists were fully informed about the animistic and spiritualistic concepts current in their time among the śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas: persistence after death of a conscious self (saṃjñī ātmā), in sixteen forms; or of an unconscious self (asaṃjñā ātmā), in eight forms; or of a neither conscious nor unconscious self (naivasaṃjñāsaṃjñā ātmā), in eight forms; annihilation in seven forms of the existent being (sato sattvasya uccheda) or its deliverance, in five forms, in the present lifetime (dṛṣṭadharmanirvāṇa). All these theories were condemned by the Buddha.

More precisely, the notion of ātman against which the Buddhists struggled is that of a permanent (nitya), stable (dhrūva), eternal (śāśvata), immutable (aviparināmadharman) entity which the ignorant attribute to the great Brahman (D. I, p. 18-19), to some deities (D. I, p. 19-20) to themselves or to others (M. I, p. 8, 135, 137; S. III, p. 98-99, 183): this notion is closely related to that of the Brahman-Ātman of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta.

The Buddha resolutely moved away from it and declared: Natthi nicco dhuvo sassato aviparināmadhammo (S. III, p. 144).
In order to designate this substantial soul, the Indian language uses an extensive vocabulary and a broad range of synonyms: ātman, but also sattva, jīva, poṣa, puruṣa, pudgala, manuja, mānava, kartr, kāraka, jānaka, samjanaka, paśyaka, vedaka, pratirāgayā, uthāpaka, samutthāpaka, etc. But all these terms do not express what it is, even if only metaphorically.

Nothing is outside of sattvaśūnyatā. In order to be convinced of that, it is necessary to recall some elementary notions.

Dharmas or things occur in two main categories: unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas and conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas.

The saṃskṛtas, not formed by causes, are unproduced (utpāda), without extinction (vyaya), and without duration-change (sthitanyathāva): cf. A. I, p. 152. The schools debate their number: from one to nine (L. de La Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, p. 180-187).

The saṃskṛtas, also called saṃskāras, formations, are dependently originated (pratītyasamutpanna) from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) and furnished with three (or four) conditioned characteristics: birth (utpāda), extinction (vyaya) and duration-change (sthitanyathāva) as a function of which they arise, endure and disappear: cf. A. I, p. 152; S. III, p. 37; Nidānasamyanukta, p. 139; and abovep. 36-37F, 921F, 1163F.

The canonical texts arrange the saṃskṛtas into three classes, all three covering one single grouping:

I. The five skandhas or aggregates: 1) matter or corporeality (rūpa). 2) sensation (vedanā), 3) concept (saṃjñā), 4) volition (saṃskāra), 5) consciousness (vijñāna). – See, e.g., S. III, p. 47-48, 100; V, p. 60-61.

II. The twelve āyatanas or bases of consciousness, namely, the six inner bases (ādhyaṃtika āyatanā): 1) eye (caksus), 2) ear (śrotāra). 3) nose (ghrāṇa), 4) tongue (jīhvā), 5) body (kāya), 6) mind (manas); and the six outer bases (bāhya āyatanā): 7) matter (rūpa), 8) sound (śabda), 9) odor (gandha), 10) taste (rāsa), 11) touch (sparśāvya), 12) dharma. – See, e.g., D. II, p. 302; III, p. 102, 243; M. I, p. 61.

III. The eighteen dhātus or elements, namely the six organs and the six objects in the previous list, plus: 13) eye consciousness (caksurāvijñāna). 14) ear consciousness (śrotavijñāna). 15) nose consciousness (grāṇavijñāna), 16) tongue consciousness (jīhvāvijñāna), 17) body consciousness (kāyavijñāna), 18) mental consciousness (manovijñāna). See, e.g., S. II p. 140.

The grouping of conditioned dharmas defined by each of the three classes is called sarvam, ‘everything’ (S. IV, p. 15; Mahānīḍḍesa, I, p. 133; Kośabhāṣya, p. 301, 7-8), loka, ‘the world’ (S. IV, p. 52, 54) or also duḥkha, ‘suffering’ (S. IV, p. 28).

In order to pass valid judgment on all these dharmas, it is necessary always to refer to the four seals of the Dharma (dharma-mudra) mentioned above (p. 1369F): Sarvasaṃskāra anityāḥ, sarvasaṃskāra duḥkḥāḥ, sarvasaṃskāra anātmānāḥ, sāntaṃ virāṇaṃ “All the saṃskāras (= saṃkṛtadharma) are impermanent; all the saṃskāras are painful; all the dharmas (whether saṃskṛta or asaṃskṛta) are non-self; nirvāṇa is peace.”
The asaṃskṛtas and especially nirvāṇa also are just as impersonal as the saṃskṛtas (Vin. V, p. 86: Nibbānañ c’eva paññatti anattā iti nicchayā). Nirvāṇa is the cessation of desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha): cf. S. IV, p. 251, 261. In that capacity, it is necessary to be aware of the non-existence of the self in order to attain nirvāṇa in this life, which abolishes the pride of “I am” (A. IV, p. 353: Anattasaññī asmimānasamugghātaṃ pāpunāti diṭṭh’ eva dhamme nibbānaṃ).

Thus the Buddha so often lectured his monks about the list of the five skandhas (Vin. I, p. 14; M. I, p. 138-139; III, p. 19-20; S. II, p. 124-125; III, p. 88-89, 94, 111, 138, 148-149; Catuspāriṣad, p. 164-168), the twelve āyatanas (S. II, p. 244-246) and the eighteen dhātus (M. III, p. 271-272). Pausing after each skandha, āyatana and dhātu, he has the following conversation with his monks:

“What do you think, O monks. Is rūpa permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya)?
- Impermanent, Lord.
- But that which is impermanent, is it painful (duḥkhā) or pleasant (sukha)?
- Painful, Lord.
- Now, that which is impermanent, painful and subject to change, when one thinks about it, can one say: That is mine, I am that, that is my self (etan mama, eṣo 'ham asmi, eṣa ma ātmā)?
- One cannot, Lord.”

And the Buddha concludes: Consequently, O monks, every past, future or present (rūpa), internal or external, coarse or subtle, lower or higher, distant or close, all this rūpa is not mine, I am not it, it is not my self: this is what must be truly seen according to the right cognition.

The same dialogue and the same conclusion are repeated in regard to the other four skandhas, the twelve āyatanas and the eighteen dhātus.

If the saṃskāras are not a self and do not belong to a self, it is because they are impermanent and painful: “Short and brief is the life of humans; it abounds in suffering and torments. It is like a mountain river that goes afar, runs rapidly, carries everything in its passing. There is no second, no minute, no hour that it stops; it forges ahead, whirls about and rushes on. For the one who is born here below, there is no immortality.” (A. IV, p. 136-137).

Then why look for a self in these saṃskāras “so transitory (anitya), so fragile (adhrurva), so untrustworthy (anaśvāsyya)” (S. II, p. 191, 193). – Does somebody say: ”In the mind”? “But it would be better to take as the self the body (kāya) that can last one year, two years or even a hundred or more years, rather than the mind. For what is called mind (citta, manas) or consciousness (vijñāna) arises and disappears in perpetual change, day and night. The mind is like a monkey frolicking in the forest that grasps one branch, then lets it go to grasp another branch.” (S. II, p. 94-95; Traité, p. 1165F).

There are three types of suffering: suffering as suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhata), suffering as the fact of being conditioned (saṃkāraduḥkhata) and the suffering resulting from change (viparītaduḥkhata): cf. D. III,
As conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta), the skandhas, arising, enduring a very short time and ceasing, evolve ceaselessly in the cycle of existence (bhavacakrā) according to the immutable mechanism of the twelve-membered dependent origination (dvādaśaṅgapratītyasamutpāda, detailed above, p. 349F seq). Pratītyasamutpāda was discovered by the Buddhas but was not created by them nor by any agent (kāraka) whatsoever: “This pratītyasamutpada has not been made by me nor by anyone else; but whether the Tathāgatas appear in this world or not, this nature of the dharmas is stable.” (Niḍānasamuykta, p. 164, cited in the Traité above, p. 157F and later, k. 32, p. 298a: Na bhikṣo mayā pratītyasamutpādaḥ kṛto nāpy anyaiḥ, api tātpādaḥ vā tathāgatānām anutpādaḥ vā sthitā eveyaṁ dharmatā. Dependent origination is inherent in conditioned dharmas. As Kośa III, p. 60, says: “The series of skandhas that develops in three lifetimes [taken at random in the infinite series of lifetimes] is the twelve-membered pratītyasamutpāda. Each of its members is a complex of the five skandha, although it takes the name of the dharma that is the most important one (Kośa, III, p. 66). Each of its members, including ignorance (avidyā) which opens the list, prevails over its neighbor; all are equally impermanent (anītya), conditioned (saṃskṛta), result from dependency (pratītyasamutpanna), given to destruction, to disappearance, to detachment, to suppression (S. II, p. 26).

One would search in vain in the pratītyasamutpāda for a substantial self or an autonomous agent. The Paramārthaśāṅyatāśtra of the Saṃyuktāgama which the Traité will cite in full below (p. 2136F) is categorical in this regard: “There is action (karman), there is retribution (vipāka) but there is no agent (kāraka) that, [at death], puts aside these skandhas and takes up other skandhas, unless that is a question of a conventional (saṃketa) metaphor to designate the law of dependent origination” (T 99, k. 13, p. 92c12-26; Bimbisārasūtra in E. Waldschmidt, Bruchstücke buddh. Sūtras, p. 131; Catuspāriṣad, p. 358; Mahāvastu, III, p. 448, 4-6; Kośavyākhyā, p. 707, 13-16).

The non-existence of the self involves or assumes the non-existence of the ‘mine’ and vice versa: “If the ‘me’ existed, there would be a ‘mine’; if the ‘mine’ existed, there would be a ‘me’. But since the ‘me’ and the ‘mine’ do not truly exist certainly (attaini ca attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhmāne), it is not complete folly to think: This world (loka here designating the twelve āyatanas, according to Samyutta, p. 87), this world is ‘me’; after my death, I will be permanent (nīcca), stable (dhūva), eternal (sassata),
immutable (*avipariṇāmadhamma*), and I will remain so for ever (*sassatisamaṃ tath’ eva ṭhassāmi*)?” (M. I, p. 138).

The group of the *sāṃskṛtadhammas* (skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus) designated by the demonstrative pronoun *idam* or by the noun *loka* is proclaimed to be empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’: *Suññām idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā* (M. I, p. 297, 37; II, p. 263, 26-27; S. IV, p. 296, 33): *Yasmā ca kho suññam attena vā attaniyena vā tasma suñño loko ti vuccati* (S., IV, p. 54, 5-6). It is not just in the twofold aspect of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ that emptiness is presented. It can also be envisaged in a number of other aspects (*ākāra*): the canonical texts distinguish four, six, eight, ten, twelve, and even forty-two (cf. Cullaniddesa, p. 278-280; Visuddhimaggā, ed. Warren, p. 278-280; Visuddhimaggā, ed. Warren, p. 561-562). To speak plainly, it is a question there of synonyms rather than distinct realities: the emptiness is the same, the expressions alone are different (*M*. I, p. 297: *dhammā ekattā, byañjanam eva nāṃ*).

The emptiness of beings (*sattvaśūnyatā*) serves as antidote to the fatal satkārā or belief in an individual. This is a wrong view (*drṣṭi*) mistakenly attributing a self to the five aggregates of attachment (*upādānaskandha*). Indeed, Śāriputra said that the five *upādānakkhandā* are called satkāya by the Buddha (S. IV, p. 259): *Pañcime upādānakkhandā sakkāyo vutto Bhagavatā*, and the Teacher himself stated that the five skandhas, *rūpa*, etc., must be present in order that satkārā be produced (S. III, p. 185).

Led astray by this wrong view, the ignorant worldly person considers the *rūpa* as the ātman (*rūpaṃ attato samanupassati*), or the ātman as possessing the *rūpa* (*rūpavantaṃ vā attānam*), or the *rūpa* as present in the ātman (*attani vā rūpam*), or the ātman as present in the *rūpa* (*rūpasmiṃ vā attanam*). And it is the same for the other skandhas: *vedana*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra and vijnāna* (M. I, p. 300; III, p. 17; S. III, p. 3-4, 15-17, 42-43, 46, 56, 102, 113-14, 138, 150, 164-165; S. IV, p. 287, 395; A. II, p. 214-215; Mahāvyut., no 4685-4704). The worldly person thus nourishing four prejudices (*abhiniveśa*) in regard to each of the four skandhas, we speak of the *vimśatīśikharasamudgataḥ satkārādṛṣṭīśailah*: the twenty-peaked mountain of the satkārā (Gilgit Manuscripts.III, 1, p. 21, 7-8; Divyāvadāna, p. 46, 25; 52, 24-25; 549, 16; 554, 20; Avadānaśataka, I, p. 385, 12).

Satkārā is not a defiled view in the sense that it is not directly the cause of sin and hell. Actually, the person who believes in the self wishes to be happy after his death and, to this end, practices generosity, observes morality: all good actions assuring a rebirth in the world of men or in the heavens (cf. Kośa, V, p. 40).

But belief in an ‘I’ is incompatible with the spiritual Buddhist life, the uprooting of desire, access to nirvāṇa.

Taking a small pellet of dung in his fingers, the Buddha said to his bhikṣus: “Belief in the existence of a permanent, stable, eternal and immutable self, be it as small as this pellet, will ruin the religious life that leads to the complete destruction of suffering (*brahmacariyavāso sammādukkhakhaya*: S. III, p. 144).
“On this account,” the Buddha again said, “I do not see any adhesion to this view that does not engender, in the person who holds it, sorrow, lamentation, unhappiness and torment (M. I, p. 137-138).” Furthermore, satkāyadrṣṭi is followed by the sixty-two wrong views of which the Brahmajālasūtra speaks (S. IV, p. 287).

Mithyādṛṣṭi, satkāyadrṣṭi and ātmānudṛṣṭi are closely linked: in order to overcome them, it is necessary to consider all the conditioned factors as impermanent (anityatas), painful (duḥkhatas) and without self (anātmatas); cf. S IV, p. 147-148.

However, both in the canonical and the paracanonical scriptures, there are passages where the Buddha expressed himself in a more qualified way. Under diverse names (ātman, sattva, jīva, pruṣa, pudgala, kāraka, etc.), he spoke of the ‘soul’ as an obvious reality the existence of which is unquestionable; to some disciples he affirmed the existence of a soul whereas to others he denied it; sometimes, also, questioned about the existence or non-existence of the soul, he refused to answer. How can these apparently contradictory texts be reconciled? The problem has occupied the old and the modern exegesis and many solutions ranging from categorical affirmation to complete negation have been proposed. The most interesting date from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. The description and critique may be found in L. de La Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, Paris, 1925, p. 85-129. Awkwardly without bias, I [Lamotte] will avoid intervening in the debate and will limit myself to summarizing here, as briefly as possible, the position adopted by the author of the Traité.

A. The worldly point of view (laukika siddhanta)

When the Buddha speaks of the ātman as an obvious thing, he is, naturally, coming from a worldly point of view and is adopting the current language. It is hard to think of a language not having recourse to any process (e.g., pronouns or conjugations) to distinguish the one who speaks (first person), the one who is being addressed (second person) and the one who is being spoken about (third person); confusion between the ‘I’, the ‘you’ and the ‘he’ would make speech incomprehensible. It happens a hundred times each day that we pronounce the word ‘I’ without, however, considering it as a spiritual factor, separable from the body and immortal. Moreover, coming from the Sanskrit, the word ātman is not unequivocal: sometimes it can be a noun designating the spiritual soul, but it is also most often a simple reflexive pronoun which, commonly used in oblique singular cases, applies to the three persons no matter what of kind or of what number (cf. H. von Glasenapp, Vedānta und Buddhismus, Ak. Der Wissens. und der Literatur, II (1950), p. 1020; W. Rahula, L’enseignement du Bouddha, Paris, 1961, p. 87).

In some scriptural passages, ātman and its synonyms are taken in a sense that has nothing philosophical about it and they should be translated, accordingly, without giving them meaningful value:

1. Dhammapāda, v. 160, Udānavarga, XXIII, v. 11 foll. (Traité, p. 29F); Atā hi attano nātho – Each one (and not ‘the self’) is his own refuge.

2. D. II, p. 100; III, p. 58, 77; S. III, p. 42; V, P. 154, 163; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 200: Attādāpā viharathā attasaraṇā anaṅfasaṇā. – Remain by taking yourselves (and not ‘the self’) as island, by taking
yourselves as refuge and not another; Nehmt euch selbst als Insel, nehmt euch selbst als Zuflucht, habt keine andere Zuflucht (E. Waldschmidt).

3. D. I, p. 82; M. I, p. 23, 348; II, p. 21; Mahāvastu, II, p. 283; Lalita, p. 344 (Traité, p. 28-29): So dibbena cakkhumā... satte passati cavamāne upapajjamāne... - With the divine eye, he sees people (and not 'beings') being born and perishing...

4. A. I, p. 22 (Traité, p. 29F): Ekapuggalo loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahujanajitāya... Katamo ekapuggalo? Tathāgato araham sammāsambuddho. – One alone (and not one single ‘individual’), being born into the world, is born for the benefit of many people. Who is that? The Tathāgata, the holy completely enlightened one. – Same interpretation in Kośa, IX, p. 259.

5. The samodhānas that end the Jātaka tales and by means of which the Buddha establishes the connection between individuals of the present story (paccuppannavatthu) and those of the story of the past (atīvatthu), these samodhānas do not constitute any confirmation of a self. "Perhaps you are wondering if, at that time and that epoch, such a one was not another than myself. Well then, no, you should not imagine that. Why? Because at that time and that epoch, I was indeed that one (aham eva sa tena kālena tena aamayena asāv abhūvam)." By means of this formula, comments the Kośa, IX, p. 272, the Bhagavat tells us that the skandhas that constitute his ‘self’ actually make up part of the same series (ekasaṃtāna) as the skandhas that constitute the individual in question, in the way that one says: “The fire came here by burning” (sa evānir dahann āgata iti).

Other canonical passages where the term ātman and its synonyms have no metaphysical intent may be found in chapter IX of the Kośa and in the L'enseignement du Buddha, p. 81-96, by W. Rahula. And we think it is wrong that good minds have seen in the Bhārasutta and the Natumhāka “the affirmation of an ātman distinct from the skandhas.”

Bhārasutta in Samyutta, III, p. 25026 (other references above, p. 215F, n. 1). – O monks, I will explain to you the burden (bhāra), the taking up of the burden (bhāradāna), the setting down of the burden (bhāraniksepana), the bearer of the burden (bhārahāra). The burden is the five aggregates of attachment (upādānaskandha); the taking up of the burden is the thirst that produces rebirth (trṣnā paunarbhavikī); the setting down of the burden is the extinction of the thirst (trṣṇāyāḥ prahāṇam); the bearer of the burden is such and such an individual (pudgala), the venerable one who bears such and such a name who is of such and such a family and such and such a clan, who takes such and such food, who takes part in such and such happiness and suffering, who lives for so and so many years, who dwells for such and such a time.” The Vātsīputrīyas use this sūtra as an excuse to speak about an ineffable pudgala. But in his Kośa, IX, p. 267, Vasubandhu retorts: “It is only in order to conform with worldly usage that one says: ‘This venerable one of such and such a name, of such and such a clan’ and the rest, in order that one may know that the pudgala is utterable, impermanent, without self nature... Therefore the pudgala is not an entity.”

Natumhākasutta and parable of the Jeta Grove, S. III, p. 33-34; IV, p. 81-82, 128-129; Majjhima, I, p. 140, 33-141, 19; Samyukta, T 99, no. 269, k. 10, p. 70b; no. 274, k. 11, p. 73a). – “Monks, reject that which is not yours (na tumhākaṃ): form, feeling, concept, volition and consciousness are not yours, reject them and, doing this, you will derive benefit and happiness. But if someone came into this Jeta Grove where we are
and took the grass, the wood, the branches and the leaves to burn them, would you say that he takes and
burns you? – No, Lord. – Why? - Because, Lord, these things are not ‘me’ and not ‘mine’. – In the same
way, monks, reject what is not yours.”

The rejection of skandhas which are not a self and not ‘mine’ does not in any way imply that one will find a
self or ‘mine’ or that the self and ‘mine’ exist. The Mahāniddesa, II, p. 438-439 quite rightly compares the
parable of the chariot that does not exist apart from its parts (S. I, p. 135) and the well-known saying: Suñño
loko attena vā attaniyena vā (S. IV, p. 54).

If the Buddha orders his monks to “reject the skandhas”, it is not only because they are empty of self and
‘mine’, but perhaps also because they are empty of intrinsic nature and characteristic. Such is the opinion of
the Traité (p. 2108F) which sees in the Buddha’s injunction to Rādha “These skandhas, O Radha, destroy
them, crush them, reduce them to nothing” (S. III, p. 190) an affirmation of dharmaśūnyatā.

In summary, for ease and conciseness of language, the Buddha did not hesitate to use the terms ātman,
sattva, jīva, puruṣa, pudgala which were current in his time: "Those are”, he said, “names, expressions,
phrases, popular designations which the Tathāgata uses, but without being fooled by them (D. I, p. 202:
Itimā kho Citta, lokasamaiñā lokaniruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññattiyo yāti Tathāgato voharati
aparāmasan).” They do not imply the existence of a permanent, stable, eternal, immutable entity; they are
simple labels to designate conveniently a complex of impermanent, painful and impersonal saṃskṛtas.

To Māra who spoke to her about the self, the nun Vajirā answered: “What do you mean, O Māra? That
there is a sattva? Your doctrine is false. It is but a mass of changing formations (saṅkhāra). Just as there
where the parts of the chariot are assembled, the word ‘chariot’ is used, so also, there where the five
skandhas are, it is appropriate to speak of sattva” (S. I, p. 135).

B. The individual (prātipauruṣika) and therapeutic (prātipakṣika) point of view

According to the Traité (p. 31-38F), the Buddha always varied his teaching according to the aspirations
(āśaya) and needs of his listeners: to some he taught the existence of the self, to others, the non-existence of
the self.

Influenced by nihilistic views (ucchedadṛṣṭi), some of his disciples doubted that there is an afterlife, the
reward for the good and punishment for the wicked throughout lifetimes, removing in this way any
sanctions on morality. The Buddha therefore taught them that “wherever a self is produced (ātmabhāva),
that is where its action ripens, and when this action is ripe it undergoes retribution in the present life, in the
next life or in future lives (A. I, p. 134: yatth’ assa attabhāvo nibbaṭṭati tattha taṃ kammaṃ vipaccati,
yattha taṃ kammaṃ vipaccati, tattha tassa kammassass vipākāṃ paṭisamvedetī diṭṭh’ eva dhamme uppaṭje
apare vā ariyāye).

On the other hand, drawn to eternalistic views (śāśvatadṛṣṭi), others imagine that they go from existence to
existence, that they abandon one body to take up another and undergo, from age to age, the consequences
of their own actions. They do not endanger the norms of morality but, nonetheless, they fall into the fatal
belief in the self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), the root of desire and the source of wrong views. To them the Buddha
explains that the mechanism of retribution functions perfectly in the absence of any agent or any transmigrating entity. In the *Paramārthaśānyatāsūtra* (see below, p. 2136F), he states that there is action and retribution, but that there is no agent to reject these skandhas and to assume others. To Phalguna who asks him: “Then who touches (*phussati*), who feels (*vedayati*)?”, the Teacher answers: “I deny that anyone touches or that anyone feels. Your question is badly put. You should have asked me what is the condition (*paccaya*) of touching and what is the condition of feeling, and I would have answered [that, in terms of dependent origination], touching has, as condition, the six internal āyatanas and that feeling has, as condition, touching” (*S.* II, p. 13; cited by the *Traité*, p. 32F, 1683-84F).

In affirming the respective existence and non-existence of the substantial self, the Buddha is obviously contradicting himself but, nevertheless, the two answers are valid. As the *Traité* will comment (p. 2102F), the Buddha denies the ātman more often than he affirms it, for the good reason that people, moved by the instinct of conservation, aspire to eternal survival rather than to a total annihilation. If people had opted for annihilation, the Teacher would not have omitted insisting on survival. Both being true, the opposing theses do not, however, have the same true potential. From the Hinayānist point of view at least, the Ātmavāda holds in absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*) for the skandhas alone exist. The Ātmavāda itself fits into the category of conventional and provisional truth (*samvṛtisatya*) in that it corrects the errors of the nihilists. Now, the *Traité* will tell us (p. 2101F), a useful opinion is never false.

### C. The refused questions

The Buddha often remained silent (*tūṣṇīṃbhāva*) on the questions under consideration here, and for him, this silence is an answer, a *sthāpanīavyākaraṇa*, an answer by not responding (cf. p. 156F). He refuses to say anything not only about the existence of the ātman but also about the various modalities of the latter. *Ānandasutta* (*S.* IV, p. 400-401; *Saṃyukta*, T 99, no. 961. k. 34, p. 245b; T 100, no. 195, k. 10. p. 444c). –

One day the wandering mendicant Vatsagotra came to the Buddha and asked: “Does the ātman exist (*atth’ attā*)?” but the Teacher remained silent; thereupon Vatsagotra asked: “Does the ātman not exist (*natth’ attā*)?” and again the Buddha remained silent. The mendicant having gone, the Buddha justified his silence to Ānanda: “If I had answered that the ātman exists, I would have been siding with the eternalists (*sāśvatavāda*) and I would have been preventing Vatsagotra from reaching the knowledge (*jñāna*) that the dhammas are without self (*Sarve dharmā anātmanah*). On the other hand, if I had answered that the ātman does not exist, I would have been siding with the nihilists (*ucchedvāda*) and poor Vatsagotra would have asked himself: ‘But did I not previously exist? And now I no longer exist!’ “

Here, and despite his reluctance, the Buddha allows us to imply that he is intimately persuaded of the non-self nature of all things.

In regard to the modalities of this ātman in the case that it would exist, the Teacher is even more careful. He declares the fourteen reserved points (*avyākrtavastu*), ‘difficult questions’ which his disciples always asked him: eternity and infinity of the world (*loka*) and of the self (*ātman*), survival of the Tathāgata (or the saint liberated from desire) after death, connection between the life force (*jīva*) and the body (references above,
Here the Buddha makes no effort to justify his silence, and the reasons that he invokes are not lacking. Two especially should be remembered: the first practical in nature, and the second logical in nature.

a. If the Buddha was silent, it is because knowledge of these things does not make for progress in the holy life since they are of no use to peace and enlightenment (D. I, p. 188-189; III, p. 136; M. I, p. 431; S. II, p. 223).

b. Since everything is empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’, there is no ātman and, since there is no ātman, it is absurd to wonder if it is eternal or transitory, finite or infinite, the same as the body or different from it. One does not go on and on about the height of the son of a sterile woman and a eunuch, on the color of a sky-flower, on the shape of the sixth finger of one’s hand, on the number of liters of milk produced by a cow’s horn. The author of the Traité returns to this subject a number of times (e.g., p. 155-158F, 423F, 913-919F) and he concludes (p. 1684F): “It is the anātman that is true”, not without immediately adding, like a good Mādhyamikan, that one cannot grasp its characteristic.

That said, the Buddha is perfectly aware of the outcry that his teachings were to provoke. The theory of dependent origination which explains, without the intervention of a substantial entity, the mechanism of action and retribution, is a profound truth, difficult to see, difficult to understand, pacifying, sublime, surpassing any dialectic, abstruse, comprehensible only to the wise (Vin., I, p. 4; Catuspariṣad, p. 108; Mahāvastu, III, p. 314; Lalitavistara, p. 392). As for emptiness - if it is a question only of the self and ‘mine’ - “the entire world is averse to it” (sarvalokavipratyanīka).

The Buddha foresaw that, in future centuries, some bhikṣus would not listen to it, would not lend an ear to it and would not want to understand ‘the sūtras expounded by the Tathāgata, profound sūtras, deep in meaning, superhuman and dealing with emptiness’ (S. II, p. 267; V, p. 407; A. I, p. 72; III, p. 107: suttantā tathāgatabhāsītā gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokottarā suññatāpaṭisanyuttā).

If any prediction is realized, that one certainly was. In the early centuries of Buddhism, some schools, in any case, those of the Vātsiputryas and the Sāṃmittiyas (cf. p. 43, F, n. 4) professed personalist views (pudgalavāda) in such an insidious way that one wonders if they were still indeed Buddhist (cf. preliminary note of L. de La Vallée Poussin to chap. IX of the Kośa, p. 228). Throughout history, efforts were made to introduce into the holy Dharma the ātman of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta. Even in our times, some critics maintain the following reasoning: The Buddha denied that the ṣāṃskṛtas are a self or belong to a self, but he did not formally combat an ātman transcending the world of contingencies. E. Frauwallner, in his Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin, 1956, expressed himself thus:

Der Buddha wird nicht müde, immer wieder zu betonen, dass keine der fünf Gruppen (skandha), aus denen die irdische Persönlichkeit zusammensetzt, für das Ich gehalten werden darf. Ihm selbst lag es zwar fern, damit das Vorhandensein einer Seels überhaupt zu leugnen.

But this argumentum ex silentio bears no weight in face of the similar dialogues, exchanges between Śāriputra and Yamaka (S. III, p. 111-112), between the Buddha and Anurāda (S. IV, p. 383-384) on the existence of the tathāgata, a word that here means not the Buddha but more generally the saint delivered from desire. There it is said that the tathāgata is not any of the five skandhas (rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā,
sanśkāra, viññāna), is not found in them **nor elsewhere** (anyatra), is not the group of the five skandhas and yet is not separate from them. In conclusion: *Ettha ca te, āvuso Yamaka, diṭṭh’ eva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgato anupalabbhiyāmāno.*

This finale has been translated and understood differently by H. Oldenberg (*Buddha, sein Leben*, 13th ed., 1959, p. 296: “So ist also, Freund Yamaka, schon hier in der sichtbaren Welt der Vollendete für dich nicht in Wahrheit und Wesenhaftigkeit zu erfassen”, and L. de La Vallée Poussin who understands: “Donc, mon ami, mÔme maintenant, tu ne perçois pas le Bouddha comme existant réellement, vraiment” (*Le bouddhisme*, 3rd ed., 1925, p. 172), or “Donc, Yamaka, dans ce monde même, le tathāgata n’est pas perçu, constaté, comme vrai, réel” (*Nirvāṇa*, 1925, p. 104). Oldenberg sees in this phrase the affirmation of a transcendent ātman, the ātman of the Upaniṣads; de La Vallée Poussin finds in it the same negation of the tathāgata of which one cannot say that it perishes at death for the good reason that in order to perish, it is necessary to exist.

In his fine work, *L’Ātman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien*, Paris, 1973, p. 67, K. Bhattacharya writes: “The controversy between Oldenberg and de La Vallée Poussin seems senseless, for it is placed on two distinct levels. In fact, however, the learned Indian scholar sides with Oldenberg and Frauwallner by adding: ‘What this text and others similar to it mean is this: ‘The ātman, the Absolute, cannot be the object of ‘grasping’… But that which escapes ‘grasping’ is not ‘non-existent’; its objective ‘non-existence’ is, on the other hand, its metaphysical ‘existence’ par excellence; its ‘non-grasping’ is its ‘grasping’ par excellence’ “.

But the Omniscient One knew very well what he needed to say and what he needed to be silent about, and one would seek in vain in the canonical sūtras of exact and definitive meaning (*nītārthasūtra*) any support for an ātman both immanent and transcendent, permanent (*nitya*), stable (*dhrūva*), eternal (*sāsvata*) and immutable (*aviparīṇāmadharma*), whereas they endlessly say and repeat that all things without exception, conditioned or unconditioned, are not an ātman (*sarve dharmā anātmanah*) and that the most fatal ignorance, whatever the forms they may borrow, is the satkāyadṛṣṭi.

Under these conditions and until proof of the contrary, it is best to stick to the recommendation of the Teacher: “What I have not declared, hold that as non-declared, and what I have declared, hold that as having been declared” (*M. I*, p. 431: *Abyākataṁ ca me abyākatato dhāretha, byākataṁ ca me byākatato dhāretha*). By conforming to this golden rule and by endeavoring to realize by themselves the profound meaning of the teachings of the Blessed One, for over twenty-five centuries numerous bhikṣus have found in the doctrine of non-self the pacifying of the mind and joyful hearts. On this subject, see W. Rahula, *L’enseignement fondamental du bouddhisme* in *Présence du bouddhisme*, Saigon, 1959, p. 265-266; *L’enseignement du Buddha*, Paris, 1961, p. 77-96.

“In conclusion,” writes the author of the *Traité* (p. 747F), “look for the ātman in heaven or on earth, inside (adhyātman) or outside (bahirddhā), in the three times (tryadhvan) or in the ten directions (daśādiś), nowhere will you find it. Only the meeting of the twelve bases of consciousness [dvādaśāyatana, i.e., the six sense organs and their respective objects] produces the six consciousnesses (ṣadvijñāna). The meeting of the three [trikasāṇnāpā, or the meeting of the organs, the objects and the consciousnesses] is called
Contact (sparṣa). Contact produces feeling (vedanā), concept (samjñā), the act of intention (cetanā) and other mental dharmas (caitasi kadharma). According to the Buddhist system, it is by the power of ignorance (avidyā) that belief in the self (satkāyadrṣṭi) arises. As a result of satkāyadrṣṭi, one affirms the existence of the ātman. This satkāyadrṣṭi is destroyed by the vision of the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatyadarśana): the knowledge of the truth of suffering (duḥkhe dharma jñāna) and the consecutive knowledge of suffering (duḥkhe ‘nvajñāna). When satkāyadrṣṭi is destroyed, one no longer sees that there is an ātman.”

2. Dharmaśūnyatā

The canonical scriptures do not teach the emptiness of beings alone; occasionally they also talk about the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā): dharmas are empty of self-nature (svabhāva) and also of characteristics (lakṣaṇa) and are like a magic show. This long before the term existed Madhyamaka shows up in some sūtras of the Tripiṭaka, in theories attributing to samādhi a complete control over things and especially in the philosophical interpretation given to the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad).

A. Sūtra concerning the emptiness of things

Early Buddhism considered conditioned dharmas, coming from causes, to be impermanent, painful and without self, but as a general rule, did not doubt their reality; it acknowledged their intrinsic nature and definite characteristics. Some sūtras, however, seem to have wandered away from this realism and lean toward nihilism: they would have taught the twofold emptiness of beings and things or only the emptiness of things. Twice, without pretending to be complete, the Traité has tried to set up the list of them:

Mahāśūnyatāsūtra, Brahmajālasūtra, Pasūrasutta (p. 1079-1090F), Śrene ṭikaparivrjajasūtra, Dīrga nakhāsūtra, Satvasūtra, Kolopamasūtra, and a few sūtras of the Pārīyāna and the Arthavarga(p. 2141-2144F). The reader who is interested is referred to the indicated pages.

Candrakīrti likewise thinks that the world deprived of reality has been taught in the sūtras dealing with the śrāvaka path and gives as sample the Phenasutta (Ś. III, p. 140-143) and the Kātyāyanāvavāda (Ś. II, p. 17): see Madh. avatāra, p. 22 (transl. Muséon, 1907, p. 271).

B. Supremacy of samādhi

The Path of nirvāṇa is a path of deliverance, of detachment in regard to the threefold world, of renunciation of the five objects of sensory enjoyment, of the taste of the trances and absorptions felt in the material world, the world of form and the formless world. This detachment follows a pure wisdom (prajñā anāsrava) which cannot be acquired without the support of samādhi. The practices of the Path described in preceding chapters (chap. XXXI-XXXVIII) are samadhi insofar as they are practiced in a state of concentrated mind. They are aimed at detaching the mind from contingencies. The practitioner who is concentrated obtains a mastery of mind (cetovaśita), a mental aptitude (cittakarmanyate) that makes him
capable of seeing things as he wishes and even of transforming them at will. The power of conviction (adhimuktibala) is manifested particularly in the meditation on ugliness (aśubhabhāvana), the four immeasurables (apramāna), the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the eight spheres of mastery (abhivyāyatana) and the ten spheres of totality (kṛtsnāyatana).

By the strength of twisting and kneading the object at will, the practitioner ends up by finding the emptiness of intrinsic nature (svalakṣaṇa), specific mark (nimitta), and wishlessness (aprāṇihita). Those are the three doors of deliverance (vimokṣamukha) opening directly onto destruction of the three poisons and nirvāṇa. Having reached this stage, the ascetic śrāvakā practically catches up with the bodhisattva in the awareness of the true nature of things which is none other than the absence of nature. For all of this, see Traité, p. 1213-1232F.

A disciple of the Buddha, well-known in the Pāli tradition as well as the Sanskrit, without being burdened by preliminary considerations, had instinctively found the formula for good meditation. The Saṃthakāyāyanasūtra (see references above, p. 86F, n. 2) tells us that he had destroyed all notions whatsoever (sarvatra sarvasamjñā) and that he meditated by not meditating on anything (na sarvam sarvam iti dhyāyati). And the gods congratulated him saying: “Praise to you, excellent man, for we do not know on what you are meditating (yasya te nābhijānīmah kiṃ tvam niṣṛtya dhyāyasi).” This precursor of Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti and Śāntideva had undoubtedly found the truth by not seeing it.

C. Interpretation of the Middle Way

Śrāvakas and bodhisattvas are also in agreement on the philosophical interpretation given to the Madhyamā pratipad, with the difference that the latter have attributed to it an absolutely unlimited extension.

In the Sermon at Benares (Vin. I, p. 10; M. I, p. 15-16; III, p. 231; S. IV, p. 330; V, p. 421; Catuspariṣad, p. 140; Mahāvastu, III, p. 331; Lalitavistara, p. 416), Śākyamuni revealed to his first disciples the Middle Way which “opens the eyes and the mind, which leads to rest, to knowledge, to enlightenment, to nirvāṇa”: this is the noble eightfold Path.

In the sources cited, this Path is a middle way insofar as it is equally distant from hedonism and rigorism, between a life of pleasure (kāmasukhālikānyoga) and a life of mortification (ātmaklamathānyoga). However, other canonical passages see in it a middle way insofar as it reflects, back to back, a series of extreme and opposing philosophical views: “By not adopting these paired groups of extremes, the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma by means of the Middle Way” (etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamyā madhyamayā pratipadā tathāgato dharmanm deśayati).

Here are some of the extremes to which the Buddha objects:


2. For the one who sees precisely with right wisdom the origin of the world, that which in the world is called “non-existence” does not exist; for the one who sees precisely with right wisdom the cessation of the
world, that which in the world is called ‘existence’ does not exist (lokasamudayam yathābhūtam samyakprajñayā paśyato yā loke nāstītā sā na bhavati, lokanirodham yathābhūtam samyakprajñayā paśyato yā loke 'sthitā sā na bhavati); Nidānasamuykta, p. 169 = S. II, p. 17, 10-13.

The false view of existence, the eternalist view, is not found in the person who sees precisely, by right wisdom, the causal origin of formations. The false view of non-existence, the nihilist view, is not found in the person who sees precisely, with right wisdom, the causal cessation of the formations sahetusamskārasamudayam yathābhūtam samyakprajñayā paśyato yā bhavadrṣṭi śāśvatadrṣṭi sā na bhavati, sahetusamskāramirodham ca yathābhūtam samyakprajñayā paśyato yā vibhavadrṣṭi ucchedadrṣṭi sāpi na bhavati): Mahāvastu, III, p. 448, 8-10.

3. The Acēlasūtra has come down to us in its Pāli recension (S. II, p. 19-22) and its Sanskrit recension (Nidānasamuykta, p. 170-178), with some differences between them. The Buddha denies that suffering – meaning the world of suffering – is made by oneself (svayamkrta) or made by another (parakṛta). Those who claim that it is made by oneself fall into the eternalist heresy (śāśvatadrṣṭi); those who believe that it is made by another fall into the nihilist heresy (ucchedadrṣṭi). For the same reasons, one cannot say that the person who acts is identical with the person who suffers (so karoti so paṭisāṃvediyati) or that the person who acts is other than the person who suffers (aṇṇo karoti aṇṇo paṭisāṃvediyati); one cannot say that feeling is identical with the one who feels (sā vedanā so vediyati) or that feeling is other than the one who feels (aṇṇā vedanā aṇṇo vedayati). Avoiding these groups of extremes, the Buddha expounds the dependent origination of phenomena.

4. According to the Avijjāpaccayā (S. II, p. 61; Nidānasamuykta, p. 154, 155), to think that the living being is identical to the body (taj jīvam tac charīram) and to think that the living being is different from the body (anyaj jīvam anyac charīram) are two extreme views that make the religious life (brahmacaryavāsa) impossible.

Avoiding all these extremes, the Buddha preaches the Dharma (particularly the pratītyasamutpāda) by means of the Middle Way.

It is true that in these old canonical sūtras the refusal of the extremes is especially directed against belief in a self, but the simultaneous rejection of the astī and the nāsti, of the astītā and the nāstītā, confines the philosophy to a neutral position where it is impossible for it to affirm or deny what is. This is the position adopted by the Madhyamaka, and later (l. 43, p. 370a25-b10), the Traité will comment that it does not go against any limit. To practice the Madhyamā pratipad in the spirit of the Prajñāpāramitā is to reject all extremes: eternity (śāśvata) and annihilation (uccheda), suffering (duḥkha) and happiness (sukha), empty (śūnya) and real (tattva), self (ātman) and non-self (anātman), material things (rūpin) and non-material things (arūpin), visible (sāndarśana) and invisible (anidarśana), resistant (sapratigha) and non-resistant (apratigha), conditioned (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (saṃskṛta), impure (sāsvrava) and pure (anāsvrava), mundane (laukika) and supramundane (lokottara), ignorance (avidyā) and destruction of ignorance (avidyākṣaya), old age and death (jarāmaraṇa) and cessation of old age and death (jarāmaraṇaniruddha), existence (astītā) and non-existence (nāstītāa) of things, bodhisattva and six pāramitās, buddha and bodhi,
the six inner organs (indriya) and the six outer objects (viṣaya), the perfection of wisdom and the non-perfection of wisdom. – The old canonical sūtras are not there yet but they are on the way.

Why does the Tripiṭaka go on at length about the emptiness of beings and pass rapidly over the emptiness of things? In the words of the Traité, there are several reasons. First, because the Tripiṭaka is addressed to the śrāvakas who, being weak in their faculties, understand the first more easily than the second. The bodhisattvas, on the other hand, are better prepared to understand the doctrines of the Prajñāpāramitās (cf. p. 2061F). Secondly, because beings cling especially to eternity and happiness and much less to impermanence and suffering. The worldly person is more attracted to the eternal happiness of the afterlife than to annihilation on death (p. 2102F). Thirdly and finally, for pedagogical reasons: the doctrine of the non-self serves as introduction to that of the emptiness of things and it is appropriate to speak of it first (p. 2138F).

II. EMPTINESS IN THE HINAYĀNIST SECTS

The Traité (p. 106-108F), in a few lines, has summarized the history of the first centuries of Buddhism:
“When the Buddha was in this world, the Dharma encountered no obstacles. After the Buddha died, when the Dharma was recited for the first time, it was still as it was at the time when the Buddha lived. One hundred years later, king Aśoka made a grand five-yearly assembly and the great Dharma teachers debated. As a result of their differences, there were distinct sects (nikāya) each having a name, and they subsequently developed.” Each sect, or rather, each school explained their particular views in scholastic manuals (abhidharma) to which they attributed canonical value and in treatises (śāstra) signed with the names of illustrious authors.

Comparing the doctrines of the Sūtrapiṭaka, recognized broadly by all the schools, to the teachings consigned to the Abhidharmas and the Śāstras, the Traité (p. 1095F) comments as follows: “Whoever has not grasped the Prajñāpāramitā system [will come up against innumerable contradictions]: if he tackles the teaching of the Abhidharma, he falls into realism; if he tackles the teaching of emptiness, he falls into nihilism; if he tackles the teaching of the Piṭaka (= Sūtrapiṭaka), he falls [sometimes] into realism and [sometimes] into nihilism.”

Although this comment concerns especially the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, it also has a more general range. As we have seen in the preceding section, the canonical sūtras teach mainly the sattva-śūnyatā, but sometimes also the dharma-śūnyatā, and those who read them fall sometimes into realism and sometimes into nihilism. Generally – there are some exceptions – the Abhidharmas insist on sattva-śūnyatā, but remain silent on dharma-śūnyatā; thus they risk their readers falling into realism. The Mahāyānasūtras that teach both the sattva- and the dharma-śūnyatā are difficult to interpret, and a superficial exegesis frequently ends up in nihilism.

In regard to the problem of emptiness, the Hīnayānist sects, traditionally eighteen in number, may be divided into three classes: the personalists, the realists and the nominalists.
1. The Personalists (*pudgalavādin*). –

Among the sects believing in the individual, in the person, the best known is that of the Vātsīputrīya-SaÎmittīya. We know their theories roughly by the criticisms their adversaries addressed to them and from an original work, the *Sāṃmityanikāyasāstra*, translated into Chinese (T 1649). Other authentic sources, notably the Kārikās, have been found by G. Tucci and are presently being studied.

The sect accepts a pudgala, i.e., an individual, a person, acknowledging, nevertheless, that it is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas. It is not identical with the skandhas for it would be condemned to annihilation (*uccheda*); it is not other than the skandhas for it would be eternal (*sāśvata*) and thus unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). It behaves towards the elements like fire in regard to fuel: fire is not identical with the fuel for “that which is being consumed” would be confused with “that which is consuming”; it is not different from the fuel for the fuel would not be hot (Kośa, IX, p. 234). For the sect, the pudgala is the only dharma to transmigrate (*saṃkrāmati*) from this world to the other world: at death, it abandons the skandhas of the present existence to assume those of the future existence and, at the cessation of its transmigration, it remains in a nirvāṇa of which we cannot say that it does not truly exist.

These theories provoked a lively reaction in the orthodox circles and one wonders if the Pudgalavādins were still Buddhists (cf. Kośa, preliminary note to chap. IX, p. 228). At any rate, the notion of emptiness, whether that of beings or that of things, remained foreign to them.

The *Traité* makes some allusions to the Vatsīputrīyas (p. 43F, 112F, 424F, 616F) and attests the existence of a *Vatsīputrīyābhidharma* (p. 43F, 424F).

2. The Realists. –

The epithet renders only imperfectly the basic doctrinal position adopted both by the Theravādins of Ceylon and the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika of the Indian continent. Worried about rendering faithfully and clearly the mind of the Buddha, the two schools have elaborated, in parallel but independently of each other, a scholasticism voluminous in size. For the record, we may cite, on the Theravādin side, the seven books of the Abhidhamma and the Pāli Visuddhimagga; on the Sarvāstivādin side, the Šatpādābhidharma gathering six works around the *Jhānaprasthāna* of Kātyāyanīputra and the *Mahāvibhāsā* of the Kashmirian arhats. E. Frauwallner’s *Abhidharma-Studien* (see WZKSA, VII (1963), p. 20-36; VIII (1964), p. 59-99; XV (1971, p.69-102; 103-121; XVI (1972), p. 95-152); XVII (1973), p. 97-121) has thrown new light on this literature.

The two schools may be described as realists because, while rejecting the existence of an eternal and immutable ātman, they recognize a certain reality in dharmas. In a word, they combine *skandhamātraravāda*, the affirmation of the existence of the five skandhas only (as well as the asaṃskṛta), with *nairātmyavāda*, the negation of the person.
The author of the *Traité* seems to be unaware of the existence of the Theravādins of Ceylon; by contrast, he has at his fingertips the works of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāśikas to which he often refers (see, e.g., p. 109-110F, 11F, 245F, 285F, 424F, 614F, 786F, 787F, 1697F, 1715F, etc.). He was broadly dependent on this school; one could say that it is to it that he addresses his work. Here we must say a few words about this.

To begin with, the Sarvāstivādins distinguish two classes of things: i) those that exist by designation only (*prajñaptisat*), truly conventional (*saṃvṛtisatya*), and ii) those that really exist (*dravyasat, vastusat*), truly absolute (*paramārthasatya*): cf. Kośa, II, p. 186, 214.

The first are names only serving, out of convention, to designate groups, groups that are valid only insofar as their parts are not in turn subdivisible. Thus an army is reduced to the soldiers that compose it, a forest to its trees, cloth to its threads. The chariot does not in itself exist, merely as a designation of the parts that enter into its manufacture: caisson, shaft, wheels, etc. In the same way, the ātman, the soul, the self, is a simple label applied to the groupings of skandhas, āyatanas or dhātus; there is no substantial entity there, no one to be, to act or to feel.

Nevertheless there do exist – and it is in this that the Sarvāstivādins show themselves as realists – simple facts, recalcitrant to analysis, which truly exist, brief though their duration may be, with a specific intrinsic nature or character (*svabhāva = svalakṣaṇa*) and some general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). These are, for example, the atom of color which cannot be broken, feeling, concept, mental activity and consciousness, each of which forms in itself an indivisible entity.

The Sarvāstivādins have carefully analyzed these realities and, without necessarily forgetting the classification already proposed by the canonical scriptures, have drawn up a new list, the *Pañcavastuka*. The dharmas are sixty-six in number and are divided into five classes:

a. the three asaṃskṛtas or unconditioned: space (*ākāśa*) which does not obstruct matter and is not obstructed by it; the two kinds of nirvāṇa: the cessation of suffering by means of the awareness (*pratisamkhyānirodha*) that consists of the understanding of the truths and the disjunction from impure dharmas; the cessation of suffering not due to the awareness (*apratisamkhyānirodha*) that consists of the absolute prevention of the arising of future dharmas.

The dharmas that follow in the list are sixty-two in number and are all *saṃskṛta*, conditioned or the results of causes. They are divided into four groups:

b. the 11 *rūpa*, material dharmas, namely: the 5 *indriya*, sense organs, the 6 *viśaya*, objects, and *avijñapti*.

c. the *citta*, also called *manas*, mind, or *vijñāna*, consciousness. It is pure and simple awareness, without any content.

d. the 46 *caitta*, mental or psychic factors, concomitant with the mind and cooperating with it.

e. the 14 *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra*, dissociated from the mind which are neither matter nor mind. Among these are the four ‘characteristics of conditioned dharmas’ (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*): birth (*jāti*), old age (*jāra*), duration (*sthiti*) and impermanence (*anityatā*), by virtue of which conditioned dharmas arise, endure for a brief instant, decay and disappear.
Like the skandhas, āyatana and dhātu listed by the canonical sūtras, the 72 samskṛtadharms of the Sarvāstivādins make up the whole lot (sarvam), suffering (duḥkha), the world (loka) of suffering. Causes and caused, impermanent, painful, empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’, they form a series (samtāna) that transmigrates through the existences of the three times, is defiled or is purified due to the delusions and passions (kleśā), as a result of actions (karman). These dharmas are true, but under the action of their general characteristics, the characteris of the conditioned, their manifestation last only a very short time, so short that they perish there where they are born, which renders movement impossible.

By acknowledging a true nature and true characteristics in dharmas, the Sarvāstivādins show themselves to be realists; by limiting their duration to a strict minimum and refusing to them any ātman worthy of the name, they lapse into phenomenalism and thus endanger their own system.

The Sarvāstivādins were to be attacked head on by one of their subsects, that of the Sautrāntikas, so called because they rejected the Abhidharmas and recognized no other authority than the canonical sūtras. Their most qualified spokesperson was Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharmakośa, who lived, according to E. Frauwallner, between 400 and 480 AD. He was certainly later than the author of the Traité, but, although the latter makes no mention of the Kośa, he was perfectly aware of the Sautrāntika doctrines, even if this was only by consulting the Mahāvibhāṣa. In the criticisms that he raises against the Sarvāstivādins, in regard to, for example, the three times (p. 1690-1694F), he meets and uses the Sautrāntika argumentation. However, in the actual state of the information, it is not possible to know with any certitude who was the borrower and who was the lender.

Be that as it may, without lapsing into eternalism or nihilism, the Sautrāntikas seriously gave the realism of the Sarvāstivādins a heavy pounding. The latter, as their name indicates, based their system on the existence of the dharmas of the three times, past, present and future “because the Bhagavat said, it, because the mental consciousness proceeds from the organ and the object and because the past bears a fruit.” The Sautrāntikas reject any temporal distinction “because if past and future things really exist, the dharmas coming from causes (samskṛta) would always exist and would thus be eternal. And yet scripture and reasoning declare that they are impermanent.” On this subject, see Kośa, V, p. 50-65, and Documents d’Abhidharma, published by L. de La Vallée Poussin in MCB, V, 1936-1937, p. 7-158.

In addition, the Sautrāntikas noticeably reduced the list of 75 dharmas recognized as real by the Sarvāstivādins. For them, the three asaṃskṛtas are false, for space (ākāśa) is the simple absence of matter, and nirvāṇa is, after the destruction of the passions and the dharmas of existence, the absence of their renewal. Nirvāṇa is the culmination, negative and unreal, of a dependent origination which was positive and real; it is a pascad abhāva, non-existence following after existence, a nirodha, none other than cessation (Kośa, II, p. 282-284). – The Sautrāntikas accept the non-existence of the mind, but reject the caittas completely or partially (Kośa, II, p. 150, n.). – Finally they consider the 14 dissociated dharmas (viprayuktasamskāra) as purely inventions of the mind. In particular, birth, duration, old age and impermanence of the conditioned dharmas are not things in themselves, distinct from the dharmas that arise and that perish, but simple modifications of the series which begins, is prolonged, is modified and perishes
(Kośa, II, p. 226-238). Destruction is spontaneous (ākasmika): the dharma perishes incessantly by itself, is incessantly reborn from itself under normal conditions. The dharma-cause produces the dharma-effect in the same way that one balance-pan rises when the other descends (Kośa, IV, p. 4-8).

Thus, not content with eliminating a number of dharmas, the Sautrāntikas reduced the duration of those that it wanted to spare practically to zero. The dharmas are instantaneous (kṣaṇika), for it is in their nature to perish as soon as they are born.

In order to bring about these somber cuts in the Sarvāstivādin forest, the Sautrāntikas claimed to follow, among other sources, a sūtra where the Buddha said: “Here, O monks, are five things that are only names, designations, conventions, manners of speaking, namely: the past, the future, space, nirvāṇa and pudgala” (cf. Madh. vr̥tti, p. 389; Kośa, IV, p. 5, n. 2). However, their nominalism was not complete, for by maintaining a number, however restricted, of real entities like rūpa and citta, and above all, by accepting the mechanism of dependent origination as the nature of things, these relentless critics remain ‘realists’ on the philosophical level.

3. The Nominalists

– In terms of the old canonical sūtras, the group of the saṃskṛtadharmaśas limited by the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas, the twelve dhātus constituted a reality called sarvam, the all (S. IV, p. 15), loka, the world (S. IV, p. 52, 54) or, as well, dukkha, suffering (S. IV, p. 28). It is on this realist basis that the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas elaborated their respective theories. In contrast, a Hinayānist sect derived from the Mahāsāṃghikas saw in the skandhas, the āyatanas and the dhātus simple nominal beings only, without the least reality. The practitioners of this sect were designated by the name Prajñaptivādins, i.e., ‘Nominalists’.

In his syllabus of the sects, the Samayabhedaoparacanacakra (transl. Hiuan-tsang, T 2013, p. 16a17-18), the historian Vasumitra, who lived in the 4th century after the Nirvāṇa, attributes the following three theses to the Prajñaptivādins: 1) duḥkha is not the skandhas; 2) the twelve āyatanas are not really true; 3) the saṃskāras that combine in interdependence and succession are metaphorically (prajñapyante) called duḥkha.” To express oneself thus is to deny any reality to conditioned things and their dependent origination; it is complete Madhyamaka.

Moreover, the Prajñaptivādins had inaugurated the Śūnyavāda by drawing up a list of ten emptinesses. In the Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 104, p. 540a20, we read: “The Prajñaptivādins (Che-chō-louen) say that there are many śūnyatās: 1) adhyātma-ś., 2) bahirdhā-ś., 3) adhyātmabahirdha-ś., 4) saṃskṛta-ś., 5) asaṃskṛta-ś, 6) atyanta-ś., 7) prakṛti-ś., 8) apravṛtti-ś., 9) paramārtha-ś. 10) śūnyatā-ś. These ten types of śūnyatā are examined in other places (cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545,k. 8, p. 37a12-15; T 1546, k. 4, p. 27a17-19). Why distinguish so many emptinesses? Because their practice serves as antidote (pratipakṣa) to twenty kinds of belief in personality, [in vimśatiśikharasamudgata satkāyadrṣṭiśaila]. These twenty kinds of belief in the
person, roots of all the passions (sarvakleśamūla), persist in samsāra and do not end up in nirvāṇa: they are serious faults and this is why the emptinesses which are their close counteragents are often spoken of."

Were the Prajñaptivādins the inventors of these ten śūnyatās or were they borrowed from the Mahāyānists? These are questions that cannot be answered at the moment because of the absence of any information. But it will be noted that in the opinion of the Vibhāṣā, the ten śūnyatās of the Prajñaptivādins were directed solely against belief in the atman whereas they perhaps also countered the reality of things.

Be that as it may, and as the Traité would have it, it should be recognized that, taken altogether, the study of the Abhidharmas and the Hīnayānist śāstras leads to a qualified realism rather than a complete nihilism.

III. EMPTINESS ACCORDING TO THE MADHYAMAKA

As we have just seen, the early schools of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins thought to interpret the canonical doctrines correctly by comparing the dharmas that exist only as designation (prajñaptisat, nāmamātra), such as an army, a forest, the pitcher, the atman, with a series of dharmas that exist in reality (dravyasat, vastusat) some of which, the saṃskṛtas, arise due to causes and others, the asaṃskṛtas, are uncaused.

1. The canonical sūtras established three lists of saṃskṛtas each covering the same grouping: the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas and the eighteen dhātus. While keeping these classifications, the Theravādins put next to them a list of 81 saṃskṛtadharmas (plus 1 asaṃskṛta), and the Sarvāstivādins, a list of 72 saṃskṛtadharmas (plus 3 asaṃskṛtas): see H. von Glasenapp, Die Philosophie der Inder, Stuttgart, 1949, p. 330 and 334.

The saṃskṛtas (also called saṃskāras) are characterized by three or four saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas: arising (utpāda), disappearance (vyaya) and duration-change (sthityanyathāva).

Although they do not exist in themselves, they are real (dravyasat, vastusat) insofar as they have an intrinsic nature or their own character (svabhāva = svalakṣaṇa: Kośa, VI, p. 159) and general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa): they are impermanent (aniyata), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and non-self (anātman).

Basing themselves on the great majority of canonical sūtras, the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, in their Abhidharmas, profess the non-self (nairātmya), the emptiness of the being or the person (sattvaśūnyatā, pudgalaśūnyatā). By self (ātman) is meant a permanent (nitya), stable (dhrupa), eternal (śāśvata) and immutable (avipariṇāmadharman) entity. Now the saṃskṛtas (skandhas, āyatanas or dhātus) are impermanent, precarious, of very brief not to say instantaneous duration, and show perpetual changing in their own nature and their characteristics. Therefore they are not a self, do not belong to a self: they are ‘empty of me and mine’ (śūnya ātmanā cāmiṣyena ca).

Being causes and coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyayasamutpanna), these saṃskṛtas are carried away in the round of a samsāra that has had no beginning. The skandhas forming series appear and
disappear from moment to moment according to the immutable process of the ‘twelve-membered dependent origination’ (dvādaśaṅga-pratīyāsamatpāda) going from ignorance to old age-death: “This being, that is; from the production of this, that is produced, i.e., the formations have as condition ignorance, old age and death has as condition birth, and so this is the origin of the entire great mass of suffering. Conversely, this not being, that is not; by the destruction of this, that is destroyed, i.e., from the destruction of ignorance there results the destruction of the formations, from the destruction of birth results the destruction of old age and death, and such is the destruction of the entire great mass of suffering.” The arising and perishing skandhas are present in each of the twelve stages of the pratītyasamutpāda, for, as the Kośa, III, p. 60 and 66 comments, the series of the skandhas that develops in the existences is the twelve-membered pratītyasamutpāda and its members are called by the name of the dharma that is the most important therein.

The pratītyasamutpāda makes up the true nature (dharmatā) of conditioned dharmas: “Whether the Tathāgatas appear or whether the Tathāgatas do not appear, this dharma-nature of the dharmas (dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā) remains stable” (references in Traité, p. 157F; add Nidānasamūyaka, p. 148, 164).

2. In contrast to the saṃskṛtas there are the asaṃskṛtas or unconditioned. The canonical texts and the Abhidharmas of the Theravādins know only one, namely, nirvāṇa; the Sarvāstivādins have three, namely, space (ākaśa) and the two ‘types’ of nirvāṇa. Differing from the saṃskṛtas, they are without birth, without disappearance and without duration-change (A. I, p. 152) and completely escape the law of pratītyasamutpāda. One would like to think that nirvāṇa is an abode of eternal bliss, but it is in no way an ātman. In the words of the third seal of the Dharma, all dharmas, saṃskṛta as well as asaṃskṛta, are non-self (anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ) and, what is more, there is no one to enter into nirvāṇa.

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The Sarvāstivādin scholasticism is a grandiose but fragile edifice. We saw above how it was attacked head on by the Sautrāntikas. The last blow was delivered by the Mahāyānists, particularly the Mādhyamikas. The author of the Traité has, to a great extent, contributed to this work of demolition by taking his inspiration from some canonical sūtras that profess the twofold emptiness, from a number of Mahāyānasūtras among which are primarily the Prajñāpāramitasūtras, and finally from the philosophical śāstras of the Madhyamaka school, signed by the great names of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rahulabhadra. Here I [Lamotte] will try to summarize his position with the aid of the works of L. de La Vallée Poussin, R Grousset, E. Conze and J. May which have been especially useful to me. In the pages that follow, the abbreviations used are:

P. = Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā; Ś. = Śatasāhasrikā; Madh. kār. = Madhyamakakārikā by Nāgārjuna; Madh. vr̥tti = Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti; Madh. av. = Madhyamakāvatāra also by Candrakīrti.

In the search for the Mystery, the Thomist scholasticism uses the triple method of negation (via negationis), of causality (via causalitatis) and of transcendence (via eminentiae); the Mādhyamika scholasticism resorts to the first, evades the second and substitutes for the third a cautious silence (via silentii).
The system rests on the distinction between the two truths: i) the conventional truth or truth of worldly convention (saṃvyātisatya) marred by realism, pluralism and determinism and built up on ignorance alone; ii) the absolute truth (paramārtha satya) which, while rejecting realism, keeps itself from falling into nihilism and thus takes a Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad) between negation and affirmation, a path leading to the stopping of the mind and of speech. – See Madh. vṛtti, p. 491-499 (J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 224-234); Traité, p. 27F, 1091F, 1101F, 1379F, etc.

1. Rejection of realism

Capable of being envisaged under various aspects, the doctrine of emptiness is applied to all dharmas (sarvadharmasānyatatā) without exception (atyantasūnyatatā). Dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāvasūnyatatā), essence (prakṛti sūnyatatā) and specific nature (svalaksana sūnyatatā). They are also without general characteristics and elude causality. They do not truly exist: they are merely designations (prajñāpti), simple names (nāmamātra). No longer are there distinctions between inner dharmas (adhyātmasūnyatatā), outer dharmas (bahīrdhāsūnyatatā) and both inner and outer dharmas (adhyātabahīrdhāsūnyatatā), or between conditioned dharmas (samskṛtasūnyatatā) and unconditioned dharmas (asamskṛtadharma sūnyatatā).

Without pretending to be complete, the Ś. (p. 930-936) attempts to draw up the list of empty dharmas. Everything imagined by worldly persons (prthagāna) or by the saints (ārya) appears in it: the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas, the eighteen dhatuḥ, the twelve āṅgas of the pratītyasamutpāda, the six pāramitās, the eighteen sūnyatās, the thirty-seven bodhipakṣadharmas and other dharmas supplementary to the Path (4 āryasatyas, 4 dhyānas, 4 apramāṇas, 4 ārāpyasamāpattis, 8 vimokṣas, 9 amupārvasamāpattis, 3 vimokṣamukhas, 6 abhijñās, 112 samādhis, 43 dhāraṇīmukhas), finally, all the Buddhadharmas (10 tathāgatabalas, 4 vaiśāraṇyas, 4 pratītaṃvids, mahāmaitrī, mahākarunā, 18 āveñikabuddhadharmas): in brief, all possible and imaginable dharmas, from rūpa up to the sarvākāraṇyatā of the Buddhas.

It is to be noted that the eighteen sūnyatās appear in the list. It is that they perform no action, and each time the sūtra adds: “It is not by means of the thing’s emptiness that this thing is empty; the thing itself is emptiness, the very emptiness is the thing (e.g., na rūpaśūnyatayā rūpaṃ sūnyaṃ rūpaṃ eva sūnyatā sūnyataiva rūpaṃ).

If one examines this universal emptiness, the following deductions are reached:

1) The samskṛtas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāva), essence (prakṛti) or self-character (svalaksana). Matter is devoid of materiality and all the rest in keeping (P., p. 128, ii; Ś. p. 554, 6: rūpaṃ rūpena sūnyaṃ). Matter is devoid of the character of matter (P., p. 137, 12; Ś., p. 653, 11: rūpaṃ virahitam rūpalaksanena). The bodhisattva should consider all these dharmas as empty of essence (P., 132, 23; Ś., p. 613, 5: bodhisattvam prakṛtiśūnyāḥ sarvadharmāḥ pratya veṣātayaḥ).
If the intrinsic nature of dhammas were a real self-nature, a being in itself, it would be innate (nija), non-artificial (akṛtrima), independent of other (parānapekṣa), permanent (nitya) and immutable (aviparīnāmadhirman) (Madh. kāra, XIII, 1-3; Madh, vṛtti, p. 262-263). But the nature of dhammas seemed to be caused, manufactured, subject to conditions, permanent and changing. Thus water is cold, but if it is put near a pot of hot coals, it becomes hot and takes on the nature of the fire; once the embers are cold, it becomes cold (Traité, p. 2112F). Therefore the intrinsic nature of dhammas is a non-nature: the intrinsic nature of rūpa is a non-nature (P., p. 137, 2-3; Ś. p. 664, 17: abhāvo rūpasya svabhāvah) and it is the same for all the skandhas, dhātus, āyatanaṃ, pratītyasamutpāda, up to and including the pinnacle of the truth (bhūtakoṭi) which is empty of the nature of bhūtakoṭi (P., p. 137, 9-11).

2) The samskṛtas, empty of nature and self characteristics, are likewise devoid of general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), impermanence, etc., because applied to natures that are not so, these general characteristics are without substratum. It would be futile to try to find impermanence (anīyatā), suffering (duḥkhatā), non-self (anātmatā), calm (santarīṣa), emptiness (śūnyatā), absence of marks (animitta), insignificance (apraṇiḥhitatā) and isolation (viviktatā) in them. Therefore the impermanence of rūpa is empty of the impermanence of rūpa, and it is the same for all the general characteristics applied to the skandhas (P., p. 131, 5-132, 2; Ś., p. 568, 8-580-16: rūpānīyatā anīyātāsvabhāvena śūnyā, etc., etc.). Dhammas have but one characteristic: the absence of characteristics (P., p. 164, 225, 244, 258, 261, 262: ekalakṣaṇaḥ yadutālakṣanaḥ; Traité, p. 1376F, 1382F, 1694F, 1703F, etc.).

3) The samskṛtas are the result of causes ( pratītyasamutpamna) only in apparent truth. They are dhammas empty of self existence and of characteristics that arise from dhammas empty of self existence and of characteristics (Pratītyasamutpādaḥdayakārikā, no. 4, cited in Pañjikā, p. 355, 14; 532, 5: śūnebhyā eva śūnyā dharmāḥ prabhavanti dharmabhyaḥ).

The early sources (Saṃyutta, II, p. 25; Nidānasamuykta, p. 147-149; Anguttara, I, p. 286) considered as ‘dharma-nature of the dhammas’ the twelve-membered pratītyasamutpāda controlling the production and destruction of the samskṛtas throughout the cycle of existence (saṃsāra). This dharma-nature of the dhammas they called dhātu, dharmatītītā, dhammaniyatā, idappacayatā (Pāli listing); dharmatā dharmasthittatā, dharmaniyātatā, dharmayāṭhatatā, avitathatā, ananyathā, bhūtakoṭī, satyatā, tattvā yathātathatā, avipaṭītā, aviparyāśatatthatā, idampratyayatā (Sanskrit listing), but we should not be impressed by the accumulation of these abstract nouns.

Actually: “That which arises from conditions is in fact unborn; there is no real production for it. That which depends on conditions is declared to be empty. He who knows emptiness is not fooled.” (Madh. vṛtti, p. 239, 491, 500, 504; Pañjikā, p. 355: yaḥ pratayavair jayati sa hy ajāto, na tasya utpādu sabbhāto ‘eti; yaḥ pratayādiḥīnu sa śūnya ukto, yaḥ śūnyatām jānati so ‘pramattaḥ).

A dependent production which, if one may say so, functions in emptiness, is not that. It is inefficacious in itself and in its twelve members (ariga). In fact, ignorance is empty of ignorance and so on up to old age and death, empty in turn of old age and death (P., p. 129, 17-130, 2; Ś., p. 558, 19-559, 22: avidyā avidyātvena śūnyaḥ... yāvaj paramārāṇanam jāramaṇātvena śūnyam). And this alleged ‘dharma nature of dhammas’, that is called tathatā, dharmatā, dharmadhātu, dharmaniyamtatā, bhūtakoṭī, etc., is likewise
empty of intrinsic nature (P., p. 132, 3-8; Š., 580, 17-582, 3), does not exist and is not perceived (*na vidyate nopalabhyate*; P., p. 136, 7; Š., p. 580, 17-582, 3).

Nāgārjuna also said: “Dependent production we call emptiness; it is a metaphorical designation; it is the Middle Way” (*Madh. kār.,* XXIV, 18: *Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe; să prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā.* – Cf. J. May, *Candrakīrti,* p. 237 and note 840). Homage to the Teacher “who has taught that the pratītyasamutpāda is without destruction (*anirodha*), without production (*anupāda*), without interruption (*anuccheda*), without permanence (*asāśvata*), without identity (*anekārtha*), without multiplicity (*anāncheda*), without coming (*anāgama*), without going (*anirgama*)” (*Madh. vṛtti,* p. 3, 11). Those are the “eight non’s” of Nāgārjuna which the *Traité* cites twice (p. 326F, 1638F); for its author, to teach the pratītyasamutpāda conclusively is to reject the whole system for the experience only of the true nature that underlies it, namely, the absence of nature (p. 351F).

Pratītyasamutpāda being empty, saṃsāra, or the succession of births and deaths due to impassioned actions, has never begun. By that very fact, nirvāṇa, which marks the cessation of saṃsāra, is acquired at any time. Being the interruption of a process that has never begun, nirvāṇa is devoid of the nature of nirvāṇa. “There is the emptiness of the absolute. The absolute is nirvāṇa and this nirvāṇa is empty of nirvāṇa” (P., p. 196, 9; Š., p. 1408, 20-21; *Paramārthaśūnyataḥ; paramārtha ucyate nirvāṇam, tae ca nirvāṇena śūnyam*). Meeting in emptiness, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are identical: there is not the slightest difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (*Madh. kāra.,* XXV, 19; *Traité,* p. 1142F: *Na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣanam*).

4) Devoid of the characteristics of saṃskṛta (production, duration and destruction), would not the saṃskṛta dharmas actually be asaṃskṛtas, defined precisely by the absence of these same characteristics? Without a doubt, but as we have just seen, the saṃskṛtas are simple designations (*prajñaptir* and, by virtue of the solidarity of opposites (*pratidvandvisādharmya*), wherever a given fact does not exist, its contrary does not exist either (*Madh. vṛtti,* p. 287, 15). But the saṃskṛtas, without production, duration and destruction, do not exist. Therefore their opposite, the asaṃskṛtas, do not exist either (*Madh. kār.,* VII, 33; *Traité,* p. 2080F).

5) In conclusion, conditioned or unconditioned, dharmas do not exist and are not perceived (P., p. 135, 20; Š., p. 642: *dharmā na vidyante nopalabhyante*); they are unborn and without beginning (P., p. 137, 19-138, 1; Š., p. 675, 5: *ajāta anirvātāḥ sarvadharmāḥ*); they are in fact pacified from the very beginning, unproduced and nirvanized in essence (Ratnameghasūtra, cited in Madh. vṛtti, p. 225, 9: *ādiśantā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyāiva ca nirvṛtaḥ*).

Candrakīrti has summarized fully the Mādhyamika attitude in regard to dharmas and, since his final word scandalizes some of our thinkers, it must be cited here in the original text (*Madh. vṛtti,* p. 265, 6-8) and in the translation given to it by L. de La Vallée Poussin (*Madhyamaka,* p. 41):

*Akṛtrimah svabhāvo hi nirapeksaḥ ca iti vyavasthāpayāmabhāhuvur ācāryāḥ iti viññeyam. Sa ca isaḥ bhāvānām anupādaśrūtaḥ svabhāvo ‘kiṃcitvenābhāvamātravād avasthāva eveti kṛtvābhāvasvabhāva iti viññeyam. – “This intrinsic nature the Teacher has defined as non-artifical, independent (or absolute). This intrinsic nature of things consists of their non-production; being none other than what is (akīmcitvena), being
merely non-existence (abhāvamātra), it is a non-self nature (asvabhāva); therefore the intrinsic nature of dharmas is not (nāsti bhāvasvabhāvah).” (transl. L. de La Vallée Poussin, l.c.).

Whether one speaks of it in positive or negative terms does not change anything. The Prajñās call it non-arising (anupāda), non-destruction (anirodha), non-defilement (asamkleśa), non-purification (avvavadāna), non-manifestation (aprādurbhāva), non-grasping (anupalambha), non-accomplishment (anabhisaṃskāra), but also purity (visuddhi): cf. P., p. 146, 19-20; Ś., p. 842, 12-14.

The Traité prefers to designate it by the name of dharmatā, a term which Kumārajīva usually renders by the characters tshou-fa-che-siang, ‘true nature of dharmas’, but this true nature has as its sole nature the absence of characteristics.

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the highest aspiration of the bodhisattvas is to accede to the knowledge of non-production (anutpādaṇa) or, according to the time-honored expression, to anutpattikadharmakṣānti, the conviction that dharmas do not arise, a conviction definitively acquired (pratilabdha) in the eighth bhūmi. By means of it and without either effort or change in the mind (cittānubhoga), the bodhisattva cognizes the true nature of dharmas (cf. above, p. 1788F).

2. Rejection of nihilism

Opponents of realism, the Mādhyamikas are also resistant to nihilism. Thus they are separated from the radical negativism of the Nāstikas and the semi-negativism of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins.

The Nāstika is a heretic who denies production due to causes, falls into the pit of wrong view par excellence (mithyādṛṣṭi), the negation of the life to come, of cause and fruit, of action and retribution. He breaks the roots of good (kusalamūla) that are innate in everyone and by virtue of which we are able to do good and avoid evil (Kośa, IV, p. 170). Thus he turns his back on nirvāṇa and is infallibly reborn in the hells (cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamaka, p. 25; Traité, p. 1091-1092F).

The Theravādin and, more so, the Sarvāstivādin who ‘professes the existence of everything’, acknowledge a reality and an ephemeral causality in the saṃskṛtadharmas, but deny to them a substantial self and proclaim them to be empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’. They grasp an empty aspect in these dharmas (Kośa, VII, p. 31). They profess a qualified nihilism, but a nihilism just the same.

The Mādhyamikas want nothing to do with it. Rejecting respectively the views of existence and non-existence, they halt any subject of preaching and make negation and affirmation both impossible. The predicate assumes a subject and, in the absence of a subject, it loses any meaning. This is why the Mādhyamikas do not grasp, are unable to seize any part whatsoever of a characteristic mark (nimitta), empty or real (Traité, p.1093F).

In his Madh. kār., V, 8, Nāgārjuna says: “The fools who see the existence (astitva) and the non-existence (nāstitva) of essences do not see the beneficial pacification of the empirical world (draṣṭavyopāśamaṃ śivam).” And Candrakīrti, in his Madh. vyrtti (p. 135-136) rests this kārikā on a citation of the
Samādhīrājasūtra: To say “it is”, to say “it is not”, those are both extremes (anta). “Pure” (śuddhin) and “impure” (asuddhin) are also extremes. This is why, having sidestepped the two extremes, the wise man keeps his place at the middle (madhya). “It is” and “it is not” give rise to controversy (vivāda); “pure” and “impure” also give rise to controversy. When there is controversy, suffering (duḥkha) is not appeased; beyond controversy, suffering ceases.

By prohibiting affirmation, negation and prevarication, the Madhyamikas establish themselves on neutral ground where nobody can attack them.

3. Emptiness and the Middle Way

Prajñāpāramitā is the non-grasping and the non-rejection of all dharmas (P., p.135, 2: yah sarvadharmāṇām aparigraho ‘natsargah sā prajñāpāramitā). In the same perspective, the śūnyatā that avoids the extremes of existence and non-existence is the rejection of all wrong views (Kāśyapaparivarta, § 65: sarvadṛṣṭikṛtām hi śūnyatā niḥsaranām. – Madh. kār., XIII, 8: śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭināṃ proktā niḥsaranam jīnaih).

It is a tool by means of which the mind is purified, but a tool that must be used with care and rejected as soon as it has fulfilled its purpose, like the raft after the river has been crossed (Traité, p. 64F), a medicine after the cure (ibid., p. 1227F, 2066F), a magic spell after the miracle (Madh. kār., XXIV, 11).

“But the comparison that the Madhyamaka prefers, inherited from the Majjhima (I, p. 134), is the comparison of the snake (alagarda) that carries miraculous gems on its crest. The gems will make the fortune of the person who ‘captures’ the snake properly, but the snake fatally stings the person who ‘captures’ it improperly” (L. de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamaka, p. 32, summarizing the Madh. vṛttī, p. 497).

One captures śūnyatā improperly and is stung by the snake when one posits an emptiness in itself. The emptiness which is the means of escaping from wrong views does not posit an absolute that itself would become the object of a wrong view, a śūnyatāṛṣṭi. In a paragraph of the Kāśyapaparivarta often invoked by other sources (cf. Traité, p. 1227-1228F), the Buddha says to his disciple: “It is not by means of emptiness that one makes the dharmas empty, but the dharmas themselves are empty… It is this consideration indeed that is called the Middle Way. Actually, those who take refuge in emptiness by grasping an emptiness (śūnyatopamabhena), them I declare to be lost to my teaching (naṣṭapranasṭā itopravacanāt). A view of the individual (pudgalarṣṭi) as high as Sumeru is better than a view of emptiness (śūnyatāṛṣṭi) in the one who wrongly clings to it. Emptiness is the means of avoiding all kinds of wrong views; on the other hand, he who has this very emptiness as a belief, him I declare to be incurable (acikitsya).”

The danger is so great that, in order to prevent this sickness, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, apart from the emptinesses excluding the dharmas, distinguish an emptiness of emptiness (śūnyatāśūnyatā), excluding all
the others. Thus, when brigands infest a country, it requires a strong man to destroy them; but when the latter has imposed his law, another strong man must be called upon to kill him (Traité, p. 2066F).

Moreover, as we have already seen, the absolute, which is called tathatā, dhammadhatu. fundamental element, etc., is devoid of absolute self nature: “Tathatā is empty of the intrinsic nature of tathatā, and this emptiness of tathatā is not tathatā; apart from tathatā, there is no emptiness; tathatā itself is emptiness; emptiness itself is tathatā” (P., p. 132, 4-5; Š. P. 580, 18-20: Tathatā tathatāsvabhāvena śūnyā; yā ca tathatāyāḥ śūnyatā na sā tathatā, na cānyatra tathatāyāḥ śūnyatā; tathataiva śūnyatā, śūnyataiva tathatā).

If you look for emptiness, you will not find it anywhere. It is merged with the ‘dharma-nature’ of dharmas, and these exist and arise only in apparent truth. So little do they exist that in absolute truth it cannot be said that they are or that they are not. Do not say that if you do not find them it is because of the weakness of your knowledge: “It is because the dharmas do not truly exist that they are not perceived, and not because of weakness of knowledge… The Buddha himself acknowledged: ‘Since my first production of the mind of Bodhi to the moment I became Buddha, a Buddha with the ten powers, I have looked for a reality in dhammas without ever finding it.’ That is indeed anupalambha of weakness of knowledge… The Buddha himself acknowledged: ‘Since my first production of the mind of Bodhi to the moment I became Buddha, a Buddha with the ten powers, I have looked for a reality in dhammas without ever finding it.’ That is indeed anupalambhaśūnyatā, or emptiness consisting of non-perception” (Traité, p. 2145-2146F).

This kind of talk is difficult and who is able to hear it? Not, certainly, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Only the bodhisattva skilled in skilful means (upāyakusāla), duly instructed by good friends (kalyānāmitra) and practicing the Perfection of Wisdom will understand this talk without trembling, without shuddering, without shivering (nottrasyati na saṃtrasyati na saṃtrāsāṃ āpadyate).

Ordinary people – of all eras – will be dizzied by emptiness and will desperately seek a reality (an absolute, a nirvāṇa) onto which they grab hold. And since the views of existence and non-existence are wrong, they will think that they find nirvāṇa in a higher synthesis of existence and non-existence. But here the way of transcendence (via eminentiae) leads to absurdity. The Buddha stated that existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) should be abandoned, but nirvāṇa, deliverance (mokṣa), should be kept. If nirvāṇa were both existence and non-existence, it should be both abandoned and kept; as nirvāṇa, it would be real, not produced by causes and non-conditioned, but as the synthesis of existence and non-existence, it would be unreal, produced by causes and conditioned (Madh. kār., XXV, 10-13). Thus worldly people, not utilizing emptiness at all, the sole tool that would appease their minds, turn their backs on the Middle Way and are engulfed in stupidity (moha).

The only efficacious absolute, which is not perceived (does not exist), is the emptiness of all dharmas.

In his Pañjikā (p. 427, 2-9) on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Prajñākaramati writes:

Sarva eva bhāvā āropitam anāropitam ceti rūpadvayam udvahanti / tatra tad avidyāpravāhītam āropitam rūpaṃ tat sarvajanasādāhārayam iti na tadupalabdhēḥ samklesaprahāṇam upapadyate / anyathā sarve bālajānās tathāgatāḥ syur iti prācinaprasaṅgaḥ / ity anāropitam eva tattvam anu[pa]lambhāyog[na]dhigamamāṇam ajñānasravakṣaṇyāya sāmarthyavad upalabhya / tac ca prajñāyā vivecyamāṇam sarvadharmaṃ upalambhakṣaṇam avasitam iti satvadharmasūnyataśa sarvāvaranaviḥrhomaprahāṇāya paṭīyasīty avagamyate //
Translation. – All things (bhāva) have two natures (rūpa): one (erroneously attributed) superimposed nature and one non-superimposed nature. The superimposed nature, carried by ignorance, is (a mistake) common to all humanity; and it is not by perceiving this nature that the destruction of the defilements is made possible. In the opposite case, the obvious result would be that all fools are tathāgatas. Thus only the non-superimposed absolute (tattva), attained by a method of non-perception, would seem to be capable of destroying the impurities of non-knowledge. And this absolute, discerned by wisdom, leads to the non-perception of any dharma: it is, purely and simply, the emptiness of all dharmas, and it is clear that it is perfectly capable of destroying all obstacles and mental problems.

- Now we must see how it is accessed.

4. Progression to silence

As we have seen above (p. 1796F), the career of the bodhisattva essentially involves four stages (avasthā) distributed over two levels (bhūmi), but it is already at the fourth stage and the eighth bhūmi when the bodhisattva has attained anupattikadharmaśānti that he accedes to the silence which is the philosophy of the sages (āryāṃ tāśāṃbhāva). Without going into these systematizations, the present note will attempt to show how the bodhisattva (or the Mahāyānist) arrives at the desired goal by textual studies, negation of the apparently real and spontaneous elimination of this negation.

1. STUDY OF THE TEXTS. –

In order to enter into the great concentrations (samadhi) on emptiness, it is necessary to pass through the lesser ‘gate of means’ (upāyamukha): to learn, recite, memorize, study and apply the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras (Traité, p. 2047F). Study of this voluminous literature is the condition for success. And besides, the other Mahāyānasūtras invariably end with the same demand and promise their readers invaluable spiritual and material benefits.

2. NEGATION OF THE APPARENTLY REAL. –

It must be understood that things (dharma) as they appear to the deluded minds of worldly people (prthagjana) and to the saints (ārya) exist only in relative provisional truth (samvṛtisatya) and that, in real truth (paramārthasatya), they are: i) impermanent (anitya), ii) empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ (śūnya ātmanā.

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401 This voluminous literature is now within the reach of everyone thanks to the all-consuming activity of E. Conze over the last 35 years. The medium, great and small Prajñās have now been spread across the world by the editions, translations, glossaries and analyses he has devoted to them, without being disheartened by the texts which are made tiresome by the long lists and the endless repetitions.
cātmīyena ca), ii) empty of existence itself and of real characteristics and, consequently, without production (upāda) or destruction (nirodha).

The starting point of this radical criticism is the observation of the impermanence of all phenomena. The canonical sūtras repeat incessantly that what is impermanent is not a self and does not belong to a self. And as the Traité will comment (p. 2138F), the emptiness of dharmas is the logical outcome of the teaching of non-self. In the same way, the sick baby is cured when the mother takes a remedy, for the baby forms a continuous series with her.

Like the pudgalaśūnyatā, the dharmaśūnyatā affects all dharmas without exception; it encompasses all the dharmas of the path of nirvāṇa, loved and practiced by the saints (ārya). Seen from this angle, the four noble truths preached in the sermon of Brenares take on a new coloration.

The Buddha revealed suffering (duḥkha), its origin (samudaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path (mūrga) of its cessation. He said:

a. Sarvam duḥkham. Everything, namely, the skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus are suffering, and this suffering should be known completely.

b. Dukkhasamudayaḥ tryṣū. The origin of the suffering is desire. According to the immutable process of pratītyasamutpāda, birth (janman) is conditioned by action (karman), and action itself is conditioned by passion (kleśa). The desire which is the origin of this suffering must be abandoned (prahātavya).

c. Duḥkhanirodho nirvāṇam. The cessation of the suffering marking the stopping of pratītyasamutpāda is nirvāṇa. This cessation must be realized (sākṣātkartavya).

d. Duḥkhanirodrodghamīni pratipan mūrgaḥ. The path that leads to the cessation of suffering is the path of nirvāṇa, and this path must be cultivated (bhāvayitavya).

There is nothing to be changed in this formula, good in meaning as well as in letter; as the emperor Aśoka said: “Everything that the Buddha Bhagavat said is well said.”

Nevertheless, influenced by the teaching of non-self, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have modified the formula and, as expressed by the tongue of Buddhaghosa (Visuddhimagga, p. 436), they interpreted it in the following way:

a. Dukkham eva hi, na koci dukkhitō. Yes, there is suffering, but nothing has been made to be painful.

b. Kārako na, kiriyā va vijjati. There is no agent, but activity exists. In other words, conditioned origination exists, but in the absence of any personal agent.

c. Atthi nibutti, na nibutto pumā. There is extinction, but nobody is extinct. Nirvāṇa exists, but the nirvanized one does not exist.

d. Maggam atthi, gamako na vijjatī. There is a Path, but nobody to travel on it.
Finally, impressed by the twofold emptiness of beings and things, the bodhisattvas embarked on the Mahāyāna give their interpretation in turn (Dhyāyitasamūṣṭisūtra, cited in Mad. vṛtti, p. 517, 13-15):

a. Yenānutpanṇāḥ sarvadhāma dṛṣṭās tena duḥkhaṁ pariṇātām. He who sees that no dharma is produced knows suffering completely.

b. Yenāsamsuṭhitāḥ sarvadhāma dṛṣṭās tasya samudayāḥ praḥīṇāḥ. He who sees that no dharma arises, for him the origin is destroyed.

c. Yenātyantapurinirvṛtāḥ sarvadharmādṛṣṭās tena nirodhāḥ sākṣākṛtaḥ. He who has seen that all dharmas without exception are parinirvanized has realized cessation.

d. Yenātyantsūnyāḥ sarvadhāma dṛṣṭās tena mārgo bhāvitaḥ. He who sees that all dharmas are completely empty has cultivated the Path.

In other words, saṃsāra, or the world of suffering, has never existed (truth of suffering); the pratītyasamutpāda supposed to control its production and its destruction has never functioned (truth of the origin); nirvāṇa marking the end of suffering has always been acquired (truth of cessation) without the path leading to it having been traveled (truth of the path).

Therefore, of the three seals of the Dharma imprinted on the BuddhaDharma – sarvasaṃskāra anityāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmanāḥ, sāntam nirvāṇam (references in Traité, p. 1369F) – only the Sāntam nirvāṇam is valid, but the latter leads to a pure and simple absence of natures: “Thus, although it is said in the Mahāyāna that dharmas are not born, do not perish and have but one single nature, namely the absence of nature (ekalakṣaṇā yadutālakṣaṇāḥ), this absence of nature is precisely sāntam nirvāṇam. It is the object of the concentration recollecting the Dharma (dharmānusmrīsamādhi), the object of the knowledge (jñānālambana) that exhausts all the qualities of the bodhisattvas and pratyekabuddhas” (Traité, p. 1382F).

3. SPONTANEOUS ELIMINATION OF NEGATION. –

If the Mādhyamika were limited to destroying the idea of existence by the idea of non-existence, it would not be different from the fatal nihilism. But the idea of non-existence is not posed in opposition to the idea of existence and, when the latter has disappeared, the idea of non-existence, not being applied to anything, would disappear by itself without any need to combat it. All the Mādhyamika scholars agree on this reasoning.

In his Madh. kār., XVIII, 7 (cited by the Traité, p. 45F and 323F), Nāgārjuna says:

Nivṛttam abhidhātavayam nivṛtte cittagocare /
anupamāniruddhā hi nirvāṇām iva dharmatā //

Translation. – When the object of the mind has been destroyed, all preaching is put to an end. Actually, the nature of things is unborn, non-destroyed, like nirvāṇa.

Another stanza, but with a different import, is cited by the Traité, p. 1610F: “Eliminate the views of existence and of non-existence and the mind itself will be inwardly extinguished.”
Candrakīrti expanded at length on this topic (cf. L.de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamaka, p. 53-54), but as has already been noted (p. 1229F), the final word is left incontestably to that of Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, § 33-35:

Śūnyatāvāsanādhānād dhīyate bhāvavāsanā //
kiñcinaṁ nāstīti cābhyaśāt sāpi paścāt prahīyate //
Yadā na labhaye bhāvo yo nāstīti prakalpyate //
tadā nirāśrayo 'bhāvako katham tiṣṭhen mateḥ puraḥ //
Yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ //
tadānyagatayabhāvena nirālambā praśamyati //

Transl. L. de La Vallée Poussin. – When one assumes the idea of the void, when one is impregnated by it, the idea of existence disappears; and later, by the habit of this thought that “nothing exists”, the idea of the void itself is eliminated.

Actually, when one no longer perceives [as a result of the elimination of the idea of existence] an existence that one is able to deny, how then would non-existence, already deprived of support, present itself to the mind?

And when neither existence nor non-existence present themselves to the mind, then, not having any more material [to affirm or deny], the two modes of action, the mind is pacified.

Thus this reality (tattva) imagined by worldly people (prthagjana), seen by the saints (ārya) and which the Buddha himself, out of pity for beings and not wanting to alarm them, sometimes pretended to accept (see, e.g., Udāna, p. 80-81; Itivuttaka, p. 37-38), vanishes into smoke. By having repudiated it and by using śūnyatā, the Mahāyānist inevitably ends up by no longer conceiving of it and still less talking about it. There is nothing to say about it, for that which is not an object of mind cannot be spoken of.

The wise see reality by not seeing it (adarśanayogena) and, not seeing it, they say nothing. This philosophical silence observed so completely by Vimalakīrti (cf. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, French transl., p. 317-318) is the prerogative of the omniscient buddhas as well as the great bodhisattvas who, starting from the eighth bhūmi, have acceded to the full complete conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharma-kṣaṇītratilabdhah); rather than the most eloquent discourses, silence is ‘buddha activity’ and converts beings (ibid., p. 342F). Evidently, this is true only in apparent truth, open to all the fantasies; in absolute truth, nothing comes and nothing has gone. Candrakīrti opportunely recalls it in his Madh. avatāra, p. 111, by citing an extract of the Āryasathadvayāvatāra: “O devaputra, the paramārthasatya cannot be taught. Why? He who teaches it, what is taught, and the person to whom it is taught, all these things do not truly arise (parmārthato na prabhavanti). Non-arisen things cannot be taught by non-arisen things, etc.” (Lхаи bu don dam paḥi bden pa ni bstan par mi nusa so // de ciḥi phyir ṭe na / gaṅ gi ston pa daṅ ci ston pa daṅ /
In his Madh, vṛtti, p. 537-538, Candrakīrti uses the same reasoning in regard to nirvāṇa. It could have been taught if some dharma existed as existence in itself (yadi kaścid dharma nāma svabhāvarūpataḥ syāt), if there were some beings to hear it (yadi kecit sttvās tasya dharmasya śrotāraḥ syuh) and if there were some Buddha to teach it (kaścid vā deśitā Buddhaḥ syāt). As this is not the case, nirvāṇa leads to the non-functioning of speech and mind (vācāṃ cittasyāpravṛttiḥ); and the absence of the object of cognition (jñeya) and of the cognition itself (jñāna) is bliss (śiva).

Philosophical wisdom is not a simple silence; it is closely joined to the abstention of practice, and the Mahāyāṇa is easily defined as the cutting off of all speech and all practice (cf. Vimlamakīrti, transl. p. 358, n. 5: sarvādacaryoccheda). It is true that a good part of the career of the bodhisattva is dedicated to the practice of the six pāramiṣṭas and nobody will think of blaming them. Nevertheless, if the bad practices are reprehensible, the good ones are hardly any better, for in the long run they appear to be fatal. But if they areempoisoned at all, foods, disgusting or appetizing, are to be avoided. And so the Buddha described abstention from practices as the noble practice (āryacarya), for it is the most in accord with the true nature of dharmas (Traité, p. 111F-1113F).

‘Non-speaking’ and ‘non-acting’, when all is said and done, rests on pacification of the mind.

4. MENTAL PEACE AND BLISS. –

If any concept has played a major rôle in Buddhism, it is indeed that of the mind (citta), the mind (manas) or consciousness (vijñāna), a temporary phenomenon among all but one of prodigious dynamism.

The canonical sūtras and the early scholasticism have the vijñāna as the fifth skandha and the last six dhātus. The mind (citta) is a samskṛta, a conditioned dharma, since it too arises in dependence on dharmas as object and on the manas as organ (S. II, p. 72; IV, p. 87: Manañ ca paṭicca dhamme ca upajjati manoviññāṇam). It is fleeting since, in the time of a finger-snap (acchaṭāmāraṇa) there are sixty moments (kṣaṇa) and, in each of these moments, the mind is born and perishes. Worldly people think it is eternal, but that is a fatal mistake (viparyāsa) that must be overcome by fixing the attention (smṛtyupasthāna) on the mind (Traité, p. 1162-1167F).

Nevertheless, and according to the same texts, the mind has immense power, for it is that which controls the destinies of beings. Saṃsāra is due to actions (karman) thought about and voluntary. Action is thinking (cetanā), for it is by ‘thinking’ that one acts by body, speech and mind; action ripens as feelings in the five destinies, in the course of the present existence, in the future existence or even later (A. III, p. 415). The fortunate or unfortunate lifetimes that accumulate in the course of the long night of saṃsāra are the fruits of ripening (vipākaphalā) of thoughts of actions, good or bad. The result is that “the world is led by the mind, is controlled by the mind: everything obeys this one dharma, the mind” (S. I, p. 39: Cittena nīyati loko cittena parikīssati, cittassa ekadhammassa sabbeva vasam anvagā). Nirvāṇa, the asāmskṛta situated opposite to saṃsāra, is in no way a fruit of ripening, but presupposes the neutralization of actions and the
pacification of the mind by means of destruction of lust (rāga), hatred (dveśa) and delusion (moha); rather, it is this destruction (S. IV, p. 251: Rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati nibbāṇam).

All of that is well and good, replies the Madhyamika, but it holds only in relative truth and, furthermore, you are searching for midday at 2 in the afternoon. When you devote yourself daily to the smṛtyupasthānas, you acknowledge that the mind is a saṃskṛtadharma due to causes and conditions, that it is impermanent and, as such, far from being a self in itself, eternal and immutable, is empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’. For my part, I would have you note that a dharma empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ is devoid of intrinsic nature and of dharma characteristics and that, in real truth, it is without birth or destruction. The mind does not escape this verdict. The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras (P., p. 121, 12-122, 12; Š., p. 495, 3-21) do indeed speak of a luminosity of the mind (cittasya prabhāṣvaratā), but they tell us immediately that it is a ‘non-mind mind’ (cittam acittam) and that, in this absence of mind (acicitattā), the existence or non-existence of the mind does not occur, is not perceived (aсти vā na vidyate nopalabhyate). When we as Mahāyānists practice the citsasmṛtyupasthāna, we will discover that the mind is only the fruit of mistakes (viparyāsa) and errors (bhrānti), and we will subscribe to this passage of the Traité (p. 1192F) that says: “The mind is empty (śūnya), without self (anātman), without ‘mine’ (anātmīya), impermanent (anitya) and non-existent (asat)…To know that the nature of the mind is without birth is to enter into the dharmas that do not arise. Why? Because this mind is without birth, without intrinsic nature and without characteristics. The wise person can know it, and, although he considers the characteristics of arising (upāda) and destruction (nirodha) of this mind, he finds in it no real arising and no destruction. Not distinguishing in it any defilement (saṃkleśa) or purification (vyavādāna), he discovers this luminosity of the mind (cittasya prabhāṣvaratā), a luminosity by virtue of which the mind is not defiled by the adventitious passions (na khalv āgantukair upakleśair upakīśyate).”

You śrāvakas have long before us practiced the saṃyñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti, the absorption of the cessation of concept and feeling, a cessation that you realize bodily; you yourselves have dived into the śūnyatānimittrapraṇīhitasamādhi (cf. above, p. 1213F-1215F) and have thus crossed over what you yourselves call the doors of deliverance (vimokṣamukha) or nirvāṇa. We meet each other on this point, with the difference that the result to which you lean we ourselves consider as having been acquired from the very beginning. For us, nirvāṇa resides in the pacification of the mind (cittasopa) or, to express it more bluntly, in the fact that the mind does not think (acītattā). What is true for the mind is valid also for all dharmas: “The true nature of dharmas is the absence of nature”. Thus rid of this absolute, which is not so, we keep ourselves, sick as we are, from hypostatizing anew. But perhaps we are incurable (acikitsya).

We can only conclude this lengthy explanation by citing a passage from Candrakīrti (Vṛtti, p. 351, 4-11) in which L. de La Vallée Poussin (Madhyamaka, p. 53) has aroused interest and has translated as a summary:

_Evaṃ yogino ‘pi śūnyatādārśanāvästāh niravāśasanskhandhātvyātattanā svarūpato nopalabhante / na cānupalabhamānā vastusvarāpaṃ tadvisayam prapañcam avatārayanti / na cānāvatārya taddvaśayam prapañcam vikalpaṃ avatārayanti / na cānāvatārya vikalpaṃ ahaṃ mam abhiniveṣāt satkāyadṛśṭimūlaṃ klesa-gaṇaṃ upādaiyanti / na cānupādāya satkāyadṛśtyādikāṃ klesa-gaṇaṃ karmāṇi kurtvanti / na cākūrvarṇāḥ jātārarāmarājakhyam samsāraṃ anubhavanti // tadd aśeṣapraṣaṅgoṣamaśivalaṃ śūnyatām āgamya yasmād aśeṣakalpanājālapraṣaṅcavigamo bhavati //_
prapañcavigam ace vikalpanivṛttyā cāēṣakarmakleśanivṛttyā ca janmanivṛttyā tasmāc śūnyataiva sarvpaprapañcāpratilaksanatvān nirvāṇam ity ucyate /

Transl. – Thus, established in the vision of emptiness, the yogins no longer perceive the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas as being things. Not perceiving them as things, they do not fall into futile proliferation about them. Not falling into futile proliferation about them, they do not fall into thought-constructions [fantasies]. Not falling into thought-constructions, they do not produce this jumble of passions having as root the belief in the individual resulting from a [blind] attachment to ‘me’ and ‘mine’. Not producing this jumble of passions beginning with the belief in the individual, they no longer perform actions. No longer performing actions, they do not experience the transmigrations called ‘birth, old age and death’. Thus, when they have reached emptiness the beneficial nature of which is the pacification of all futile chatter, there is for them the total disappearance of the string of thought-constructions or (and) futile proliferation; by the disappearance of futile proliferation, the abolition of thought-constructions, by the abolition of thought-construction, the abolition of all actions and passions; by the abolition of actions and passions, abolition of birth; thus emptiness itself, having as characteristic the abolition of all futile chatter, is called nirvāṇa.

Because it abolishes all prapaṇa – hi louen in Chinese, spros pa in Tibetan – emptiness is nirvāṇa. It is indeed this Middle Way which the Buddha taught to his disciples in the Sermon of Benares: “This Middle Way discovered by the Tathāgata, a path that opens one’s eyes, produces knowledge and leads to pacification, to enlightenment, to nirvāṇa” (Vin. I, p.10; Catuspārisad, p. 140: Majjhīma paṭipadā tathāgatena abhīsambuddhā cakkhukaraṇī nānakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbāṇāya samvattati). Of weak faculties, the śrāvakas believed that this Middle Way was still to be traveled; the bodhisattvas, deeply penetrating the profound meaning of the Buddha, know that it is already traveled, that nirvāṇa is acquired by all, forever, because there has never been a saṃsāra. Nirvāṇa is none other than the pacification of the mind in the seeing of emptiness. When this vision itself has vanished, pacification is complete.

IV. THE EMPTINESSES IN THE GREAT PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀŚŪTRAS

Dharmas do not truly exist (na vastutsat, na dravysat); they are but names (nāmamātra) or designations (praṇiṣapta). They are without self (anātman), without ‘mine’ (anātmiya), without self nature (nīhsvabhāva), without mark (animitta), without arising (anuttīpa) and without cessation (anirodha). As thought-constructions, they are infinite in number, but the definitions given to them are just wrong views (mithyadṛṣṭi). Emptiness, the outlet for all wrong views (sarvadṛṣṭiṇām niḥsaraṇam), is the means (upāya) to destroy them, but it has no reality either: it is, if you like, a predicate, but a predicate that does not apply to anything, an attribute without a subject.

There are as many emptinesses as there are dharmas to be destroyed. To speak of the emptiness of all dharmas (sarvadharmaśūnyatā) is too general an assertion and is not too convincing; to enumerate all the emptinesses would be impossible and frightening to the mind: therefore a choice must be made. Borrowing
a middle way here again, the great Wisdom Sūtras – Aṣṭādaśa-, Pañcávimśati- and Śataśāhasrikā - set their hearts on the eighteen emptinesses to which they dedicate an entire section, but without ever subjecting themselves to listing them fully in any connection whatsoever. According to the subject to be treated, they present partial lists of two, seven, fourteen or sixteen emptinesses. Here I [Lamotte] will limit myself to mentioning briefly some partial lists and later will study the list of eighteen emptinesses in more detail.

1. Some partial lists

1. Lists of two emptinesses

The twofold emptiness of beings (sattva) and of things (dharma), the showpiece of the Mahāyāna, is the one most frequently mentioned. Sometimes presented together: 1. anavarāgra-ś., 2. atyanta-ś.


2. List of seven emptinesses

1. prakṛti-ś. 4. anupalambha-ś. 7. abhāva-ś.
2. svalakṣaṇa-ś. 5. abhāva-ś.
3. sarvadharma-ś. 6. svabhāva-ś.


3. List of fourteen emptinesses

1. adhyātma-ś. 6. paramartha-ś. 11. anavakāra-ś.
2. bahīrdā-ś. 7. samskṛta-ś. 12. prakṛti-ś.
5. śūnyatā-ś. 10. anavarāgra-ś.

4. List of sixteen emptinesses

1. adhyātma-ś. 7. saṃskṛta-ś. 13. laksana-ś.
3. adhyātmabahirdhā-ś. 9. atyanta-ś. 15. abhava-ś.
4. mahā-ś. 10. anavarāga-ś. 16. abhāvasvabhāva-ś.
5. śūnyatā-ś. 11. anavakāra-ś.

Sources: Aṣṭadaśa, T 220, VII, k. 510, p. 604a17; k. 512, p. 616a23. - Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, ed. Nagao, p. 24, 15-21 (complete listing); Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, ed. Yamaguchi, p. 52 seq.. This list is perhaps the prototype of the following in which it is often incorporated, but without being confused with it.

2. Related lists of eighteen and four emptinesses

Like the other great Wisdom Sūtras, the Pañcaviṃśatisūtrasikā proposes a developed list of eighteen śūnyatās, followed by a condensed list of four śūnyatās.

To bring a measure of order to such a tangled subject, I [Lamotte] will give a few lexicographical indications, establish a synopsis of the Sanskrit and the Tibetan text, present a translation and finally give a comparative table of the various versions.

A. Lexicographical indications

These are taken from the original Sanskrit text, the Tibetan version and the Chinese translations made by Dh (Dharmarakṣa: T 222); Mo (Mokṣala: T 221); Ku (Kumārajīva: T 223) and Ht (Hiuan-tsang: T 220, VII).

1. Emptiness of internal [dharmas]: adhyātmaśūnyatā, naṅ stoṅ pa ńid, nei k’ong.
2. Emptiness of external [dharmas]: bahirdhāśūnyatā, phyi stoṅ pa ńid, wai k’ong.
3. Emptiness of internal-external [dharmas]: adhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatā, phyi naṅ stoṅ pa ńid, nei wai k’ong.
4. Emptiness of emptinesses: śūnyatāśūnyatā, stoṅpa ńid stoṅ pa ńid, k’ong k’ong.
5. Great emptiness: mahāśūnyatā, chen po stoṅ pa ńid, ta k’ong.
6. Emptiness of the absolute: paramārthaśūnyatā, don dam pa stoṅ pa ńid, tchen miao k’ong (Dh), tsouei k’ong (Mo), Ti yi yi k’ong (Ku), cheng yi k’ong (Ht).
7. Emptiness of the conditioned: saṃskṛtaśūnyatā, ldus byas stoṅ pa ńid, yeou wei k’ong.

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9. Absolute emptiness: \textit{atyaṅtaśūnyatā}, mṭhaḥ las ḣdas pa stōn pa ſnid, kieou king k’ōng (Dh), tche king k’ōng (Mo), pi king k’ōng (Ku, Ḥt).

10. Emptiness [of dharmas] without end or beginning: \textit{anavarāgrāśūnyatā}, thog ma daṅ tha ma med pa stōn pa ſnid, wou tsi k’ōng (Ḥt).

\textbf{Variant – Emptiness [of dharmas] without beginning:} \textit{anagrāśūnyatā}, wou che k’ōng (Ku).


12. Emptiness of essences: \textit{prakṛtiśūnyatā}, raṅ bēin stōn pa ſnid, pen tsing k’ōng (Dh), sing k’ōng (Mo, Ku), pen sing k’ōng (Ḥt).

13. Emptiness of all dharmas: \textit{sarvadharmaśūnyatā}, chos thams cad stōn pa ſnid, yi ts’ie fa k’ōng or tchou fa k’ōng.

14. Emptiness of specific characteristics: \textit{svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā}, raṅ gi mtshan ſnid stōn pa ſnid, tseu jan siang k’ōng (Dh), tseu sinag k’ōng (Mo, Ku).

\textbf{Variants – Emptiness of specific and general characteristics} (svasāmānyalakṣaṇaśūnyatā): tseu kong k’ōng, sometimes subdivided into tseu siang k’ōng and tseu kong siang k’ōng (Ḥt).

15. Emptiness consisting of non-perception: \textit{anupalambhaśūnyatā}, mi dmigs pa stōn pa ſnid, pou k’ō tō k’ōng.

16. Emptiness of non-existence (abhāvaśūnyatā, dīos po med pa stōn pa ſnid, wou so weou k’ōng (Dh), wou k’ōng (Mo), wou fa k’ōng (Ku), wou sing k’ōng (Ḥt).

17. Emptiness of existence: \textit{svabhāvaśūnyatā}, no bo ſnid stōn pa ſnid, tseu jan k’ōng (Dh), yeou k’ōng (Mo), yeou fa k’ōng (Ku), tseu sing k’ōng (Ḥt).

18. Emptiness of non-existence and of existence: \textit{abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā}, dīos po med paḥi no bo ſnid stōn pa ſnid, wou so yeou tseu jan k’ōng (Dh), wou fa yeou fa k’ōng (Ku), wou sing tseu sing k’ōng (Ḥt).

***

\textbf{1a. Existence is empty of existence:} bhāvo bhāvena śūnyah, dīos po ni dīos po stōn no, fa fa siang k’ōng (Ku), yeou sing yeou yeou sing k’ōng (Ḥt).

\textbf{2a. Non-existence is empty of non-existence:} abhāvo ‘bhāvena śūnyah, dīos po med pa ni dīos po med pas stōn no, wou fa wou fa siang k’ōng (Ku), wou sing yeou wou sing k’ōng (Ḥt).

\textbf{3a. Existence in itself is empty of existence in itself:} svabhāvā svabhāvena śūnyah, raṅ bēin ni raṅ bēin gyis stōn no, tseu fa tseu fa k’ōng (Ku), tseu sing yeou tseu sing k’ōng (Ḥt).
4a. Other existence is empty of other existence: *parabhāvah parabhāvena śūnyāḥ, gēan gyi dīos po ni gēan gyi dīos pos stoṅ ūno, t’a fa t’a fa siang k’ong (Ku), t’a sing yeou t’a sing k’ong (Ht).

The order adopted here is not always respected and it may be that some emptinesses are omitted and others adopted. The oldest Chinese translations, those of Dharmarakṣa and Mokṣala, are still tentative and lack consequence in the choice of equivalences.

B. Tibetan-Sanskrit synopsis

The section of the Pañcaviṃśati dedicated to the emptinesses gives two lists: one developed list of eighteen emptinesses and one condensed list of only four. The section consists of four parts:

a. the wording of the eighteen emptinesses of the developed list,
b. the definition of the first sixteen emptinesses on the list,
c. the wording of the four emptinesses of the condensed list,
d. the definition of the four emptinesses.

To state eighteen emptinesses and to define only sixteen is an inconsistency which some Chinese translations, particularly those of Kumārajīva and Hiuan-tsang, have tried to remedy (see table below, p. 2041F). The Sanskrit editions at our disposal are not very satisfactory and so I [Lamotte] present here a synopsis of the Tibetan version (Tib. Trip., no, 731, vol. 18, p. 130, fol. 224b1-227a1) and of a Sanskrit text restored according to the Tibetan version with the aid of the editions of the Pañcaviṃśati by N. Dutt (p. 195, 10-198, 10) and the Śatasāhasrikā by P. Ghosa, p. 1407, 4-1412, 6.

a. Wording of the eighteen emptinesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>rab ḥbyor gēan nyan chub sens</em></td>
<td>punar aparāṇa subhūte bodhisattvasya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>dpah sens dpah chen poḥl theg pa chen</em></td>
<td>mahāsattvasya mahāyānam. yad uta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>po ni / bdi lta ste /</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. *naṅ stoṅ pa ṅid daṅ/* 1. *adhyātmaśūnyatā,*
2. *phyi stoṅ pa ṅid daṅ /* 2. *bahirddhāśūnyatā,*
3. *phyi naṅstoṅ pa ṅid daṅ /* 3. *adhyātmaḥbahirddhāśūnyatā,*
4. *stoṅ pa ṅid stoṅpaṅid daṅ/* 4. *śūnyatāśūnyatā,*
5. *chen po stoṅ pa ṅid daṅ /* 5. *mahāśūnyatā,*
7. *ḥdus byas stoṅ pa ṅid daṅ /* 7. *śamskṛtaśūnyatā,*
8. *ḥdus ma byas stoṅ pa ṅid daṅ /* 8. *asamskṛtaśūnyatā,*

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9. matḥ las ḡdas pa sṭōṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
10. thog ma daṅ tha ma med pa sṭoṅ pa
    ṅīḍ daṅ /
11. dor ba med pa sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
12. raṅ bēṅ sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
13. chos thams cad sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
14. raṅ gi mṭshan ṅīḍ sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
15. mi dmigs pa sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
16. dṅos pa med pa sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
17. ṇo bo ṅīḍ sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ daṅ /
18. dṅos pa med paḥl ṇo bo ṅīḍ sṭoṅ
    pa ṅīḍ de /

9. atyantaśūnyatā,
10. atyantaśūnyatā,
11. anavakāraśūnyatā,
12. prakṛtiśūntaā,
13. sarvadharmaśūnyatā,
14. svalaṅkaṇaśūnyatā,
15. anupalambhaśūnyatā,
16. abhāvaśūnyatā,
17. svabhāvaśūnyatā,
18. abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā.

b. Definition of the first sixteen emptinesses

( pp. 2031-2034F)

1. de la naṅ sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ gaṅ…sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ do /
2. de la phyi sṭoṅ pa ṅīḍ gaṅ ze na…

2, 3, 4. tatra katamā śūnyatā.

e tc. etc.

c. Wording of the four emptinesses

/ rab ḥbyor gčan yaṅ pnun aparāṃ sūbhūte
1. dṅos pa ni sṅos po sṭoṅ ṇo /
2. / dṅos po med pa ni dṅos po med
3. / raṅ bēṅ ni raṅ bēṅ gys sṭoṅ ṇo /
4. / gčan gys dṅos po ni gčan gys
    dṅos pos sṭoṅ ṇo /
1. bhāvo bhāvena śūnyāḥ,
2. abhāvo ‘bhāvena śūnyāḥ, pas sṭoṅ ṇo /
3. svabhāvaḥ svabhāvena śūnyāḥ,
4. parabhāvaḥ parabhāvena śūnyāḥ.
d. **Definition of the four emptinesses**

(p. 2036F, Tibetan and Sanskrit)

C. **Translation from the French**

a. **Wording of the eighteen emptinesses**

Furthermore, O Subhūti, the Great Vehicle of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva is:

1. the emptiness of internal dharmas,

2. the emptiness of external dharmas,

3. the emptiness of external and internal dharmas,

4. the emptiness of emptiness,

5. great emptiness,

6. the emptiness of the absolute,

7. the emptiness of the conditioned,

8. the emptiness of the unconditioned,

9. absolute emptiness,

10. the emptiness of dharmas without end or beginning,

11. the emptiness of non-dispersion,

12. the emptiness of essence,

13. the emptiness of all dharmas,

14. the emptiness of specific characteristics,

15. the emptiness of non-perception,

16. the emptiness of non-existence,

17. the emptiness of existence,

18. the emptiness of non-existence and of existence.

b. **Definition of the first sixteen emptinesses**

1. What is the *emptiness of internal dharmas*? Internal dharmas are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. Now the eye is empty of eye because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. The ear, nose, tongue, body and mind are empty of ear, nose, tongue, body and mind respectively
because they are neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is their essence. That is called: 
emptiness of internal dharmas.

2. What is the emptiness of external dharmas? External dharmas are color, sound, smell, taste, tangible and 
dharmas. And yet color is empty of color because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is 
its essence. Likewise, sound, smell, taste, tangible and dharma. Why? Because such is its essence. That is 
called: emptiness of external dharmas.

3. What is the emptiness of internal and external dharmas? The six inner bases and the six outer bases of 
consciousness are called internal and external dharmas. And yet the internal dharmas are empty of external 
dharmas because they are neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is their essence. The external 
dharmas are empty of internal dharmas. Why? Because such is their essence. That is called: emptiness of 
internal and external dharmas.

4. What is the emptiness of emptiness? This emptiness of dharmas is empty of emptiness [itself] because it 
is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is called: emptiness of emptiness.

5. What is great emptiness? The region of the east is empty of the region of the east, the region of the south 
is empty of the region of the south, the region of the west is empty of the region of the west, the region of 
the north is empty of the region of the north, the region of the nadir is empty of the region of the nadir, the 
region of the zenith is empty of the region of the zenith, the intermediary regions are empty of the 
intermediary regions because the regions are neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is their 
nature. That is called: great emptiness.

6. What is the emptiness of the absolute? Here the absolute is nirvāṇa, and this nirvāṇa is empty of nirvāṇa 
because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is called: emptiness of 
the absolute.

7. What is the emptiness of the conditioned? The conditioned is the world of desire, the world of form and 
the formless world. And yet the world of desire is empty of the world of desire, the world of form is empty 
of the world of form, the formless world is empty of the formless world because they are neither eternal nor 
transitory. Why? Because such is their essence. That is called: emptiness of the conditioned.

8. What is the emptiness of the unconditioned? The unconditioned is that which has neither production nor 
destruction, neither modification nor duration: That is the unconditioned. Now the unconditioned is empty 
of the unconditioned because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is 
called: emptiness of the unconditioned.

9. What is absolute emptiness? That which has no limit is absolute. The absolute is empty of the absolute 
because it is neither eternal, nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is called: absolute 
emptiness.

10. What is the emptiness [of dharmas] without end or beginning? [The Dharma] whose beginning or end 
are not perceived has neither going nor coming. And yet a dharma without end or beginning is empty of 
this absence of end and beginning because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its 
essence. That is called: emptiness of dharmas without end or beginning.
11. What is the emptiness of non-dispersal? That where there is no dispersion. Now non-dispersal is empty of non-dispersal because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is called: emptiness of non-dispersal.

12. What is the emptiness of essence? The essence of all conditioned or non-conditioned dharmas is not created by the hearers, is not created by the pratyekabuddhas, is not created by the bodhisattvamahāsattvas, is not created by the holy, completely and perfectly enlightened Buddhas. The essence is empty of essence because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is called: emptiness of essence.

13. What is the emptiness of all dharmas? All dharmas is form, sensation, concept, formations and consciousness; eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind; color, sound, smell, taste, contact and dharmas; eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness and mental consciousness; eye contact, ear contact, nose contact, tongue contact, body contact and mind contact; sensation due to eye contact, sensation due to ear contact, sensation due to nose contact, sensation due to tongue contact, sensation due to body contact, sensation due to mind contact; form dharmas and formless dharmas; conditioned dharmas and unconditioned dharmas: those are called ‘all dharmas’. Now all dharmas are empty of all dharmas because they are neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is their essence. That is called: emptiness of all dharmas.

14. What is the emptiness of specific characteristic? Form has, as its characteristics, to be broken up; sensation, to be experienced; concept, the grasping [of characteristics]; formations, the fact of conditioning; consciousness, the fact of apprehending. Whether it is a matter of the characteristic of conditioned dharmas or unconditioned dharmas, all these dharmas are each empty of their own characteristic because they are neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is their essence. That is called: emptiness of specific characteristics.

15. What is the emptiness of non-perception? It is that where neither the past nor the future nor the duration of the present are perceived. Non-perception is empty of non-perception because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is called: emptiness of non-perception.

16. What is the emptiness of non-existence and of existence? There is no nature that is a combination [of existence and non-existence] since all dharmas are produced in dependence [on causes and conditions]. This [alleged] combination is empty of combination because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essence. That is called: emptiness of non-existence and self existence.

c. Wording of the four emptinesses

Furthermore, O Subhūti:

1. existence is empty of existence;

2. non-existence is empty of non-existence;
3. existence in itself (or self existence) is empty of existence in itself (or self existence);
4. other existence is empty of other existence.

d. Definition of the four emptinesses

1. What is existence? By existence is meant the five aggregates. But the five aggregates are empty of the five aggregates. Therefore existence is empty of existence.

2. Why is non-existence empty of non-existence? By non-existence is meant the non-conditioned. But this non-conditioned is empty of non-conditioned. Therefore non-existence is empty of non-existence.

3. Why is self existence empty of self existence? By self existence is meant the true essence. But the emptiness [of this true essence] is not created by the knowledge nor by the vision [of the saints]. That is called emptiness of self existence.

4. What is the emptiness of other existence? Whether the Tathāgatas appear or the Tathāgatas do not appear, this stability of dharmaniyāmatā, the way of existing, the true manner of being, the unchanged manner of being, the utmost point of truth, remains stable. As a result, the fact that these dharmas are empty [of intervention] of another is called emptiness of other existence. Such, O Subhūti, is the great Vehicle of the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas.

Comments of the Traité (T 1509, k. 46, p. 396a)

Question. – After each of the eighteen emptinesses, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra repeats itself and says: Akuṭasthāvināsitām upādāya “because they are neither eternal nor transitory”. What does this phrase mean?

Answer. – The person who does not practice these emptinesses inevitably falls into one of the following two extremes (antadvaya), i.e., eternalism (śāsvata) or nihilism (uccheda). The yogin tormented by existence resorts to the emptinesses (śūnyatā) in order to destroy existence. Next, he venerates emptiness, but whoever clings (abhinivīṣate) to emptiness falls into nihilism (uccheda). This is why practicing emptiness so as to destroy existence but not clinging to emptiness is to avoid the two extremes and follow the middle way (madhyamā pratipad). The eighteen emptinesses, inspired by a mind of great compassion (mahākaruṇācitta), serve to save beings. This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, after each of them, repeats: Akuṭasthāvināsitām upādāya. That is the Mahāyāna, and those who stray from it are madmen who talk too much…

Question. – The eighteen emptinesses already contain all the emptinesses. Why then does the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra add four more?

Answer. – It is true that all the emptinesses are contained in the eighteen emptinesses, but the Buddhas have two ways of preaching the Dharma: either they first condense and later develop, or else they first
develop and then condense. In the first case, it is to explain the meaning; in the second case, it is to facilitate memorization. Here the Buddha begins by speaking at length (vistareṇa) about the eighteen emptinesses; then he summarizes them (saṃkṣepena) into the four emptinesses.

D. Comparative table of recensions (p. 2040F)

The combined lists of the eighteen and the four emptinesses, lists published in the great Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, has come down to us in various Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese recensions. There are numerous divergences among them as the following comparative table shows. Hiuan-tsang has tried to eliminate them. His translation of the Āṣṭādaśa states and defines sixteen emptinesses; that of the Pañcaviṃśati, eighteen, and that of the Śata, twenty.

• Table is omitted from this English translation•

Thus, according to the Traité in its section dedicated to emptiness, the Pañcaviṃśati sets up two lists of śūnyatā having exactly the same import: one developed list of eighteen and one condensed list of four.

Using the same material, the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrika school established a list of twenty śūnyatas forming a gradation amongst themselves and each occurring in turn in the career of the bodhisattva. These new insights appear for the first time in the Abhisamayālamkāra (I, v. 47) said to be ’by Maitreyanātha’ (about 350 A.D.), commented on at length by Haribhadra (about 750 A.D.) in his Abhisamayālamkāraloka (ed. U. Wogihara, p. 95, 5-96, 29) and are taken up again in the great Vijñānavādin śastras such as the Mahāyānasamgraha, the Madhyāntavibhāga and the Vijñaptimātraśīdaṃkāra

The twenty śūnyatās are put into relationship with the tenfold dharmadhātu or tathatā, sarvatraga, etc., serving as antidote to as many ignorances (prthagjanatva), etc. – Cf. Mahāyānasamgraha, tr. É. Lamotte, p. 196-199; Madhyāntavibhāgabhasya, ed. G. M. Nagao, p. 34-36; Madhyāntavibhāgatikā, ed. Yamaguchi, p. 87-107; Siddhi, p. 639-657; 658-660 (where the vocabulary should be corrected).

Cultivation of the twenty śūnyatās and the tenfold dharmadhātu occurs in all the stages of the bodhisattva career: cf. Āloka, p. 95, 5-96, 29; tr. E Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamayālamkāra, p. 126-143; notes of E. Conze, The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, p. 144-148:

1. In the adhimukticaryābhūmi, level of the practice of adhesion: adhyātma, bahirdhā and adhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatā.

2. In the prayogamārga, preparatory path: śūnyatāśūnyatā.

3. On the first bhūmi: mahāśūnyatā.


5. On the third bhūmi: saṃskṛtaśūnyatā.
6. On the fourth bhūmi: *asamskṛtaśūnyatā*.

7. On the fifth bhūmi: *atyantaśūnyatā*.

8. On the sixth bhūmi: *anavarāgraśūnyatā*.


10. On the eighth bhūmi: *prakṛti* and *sarvadharmaśūnyatā*.

11. On the ninth bhūmi: *lakṣana* and *anupalambhaśūnyatā*.

12. On the tenth bhūmi: *abhāva* (1) and *bhāvaśūnyatā*.


Aṣṭadaśaśūnyatā

[285a] Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 24, l. 10-17; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 77, l. 6-80, l. 4) – Furthermore, O Subhūti, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to become established (*sthātukāma*) in:

1. the emptiness of inner dharmas (*adhyātmasāṇya*),

2. the emptiness of outer dharmas (*bahirdhāśūnyatā*),

3. the emptiness of inner and outer dharmas (*adhyātma-bahirdhāśūnyatā*),

4. the emptiness of emptiness (*śūnyatāśūnyatā*),

5. great emptiness (*mahāśūnyatā*),

6. the emptiness of the absolute (*paramārthaśūnyatā*),

7. the emptiness of the conditioned (*asamskṛtaśūnyatā*),

8. the emptiness of the unconditioned (*asamskṛtaśūnyatā*),

9. absolute emptiness (*atyantaśūnyatā*),

10. the emptiness of beginningless dharmas (*anagraśūnyatā*),

11. the emptiness of dispersed dharmas (*avakāraśūnyatā*),

12. the emptiness of essences (*prakṛtiśūnyatā*),

13. the emptiness of specific characteristics (*svalakṣanaśūnyatā*),

14. the emptiness of all dharmas (*sarvadharmaśūnyatā*),

15. the emptiness consisting of non-perception (*anupalambhaśūnyatā*),

16. the emptiness of non-existence (*abhāvaśūnyatā*),

17. the emptiness of existence (*svabhāvaśūnyatā*),

[1680]
18. the emptiness of non-existence and existence (abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā), this bodhisattva-mahāsattva must practice the Perfection of Wisdom.

Adhyātmaśūnyatā

Second Section EMPTINESSES 1-3: EMPTINESSES OF INNER, OUTER AND BOTH INNER AND OUTER DHARMAS

I. SUMMARY DEFINITION OF THE THREE EMPTINESSES

[285b] 1. Inner emptiness (adhyātmaśūnayatā). – Inner dharmas (adhyātma-dharma) are empty of inner dharmas. Inner dharmas are the six internal bases of consciousness (saḍ adhyātma-yatana): eye (cakṣus), ear (śrotra), nose (ghraṇa), tongue (jihvā), body (kāya) and mind (manas).

The eye is empty (śūnya): in it there is no ‘me’ (ātman) or ‘mine’ (ātmīya), and there is no dharma ‘eye’. It is the same for the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.

2. Outer emptiness (bahirdhāśūnyatā). – Outer dharmas (bahirdhādharma) are empty of outer dharmas. The outer dharmas are the six external bases of consciousness (saḍ bahirdhā-yatana): color (rūpa), sound (śabda), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), tangible (spraṣṭavya) and dharma.

Color is empty: in it there is no ‘me’ or ‘mine’, and there is no dharma ‘color’. It is the same for sound, smell, taste, tangible and dharma.

3. Inner and outer emptiness (adhyātmbahirdhāśūnyatā). – Inner and outer dharmas (adhyātma-bahirdhādharma) are empty of inner and outer dharmas (adhyātma-bahirdhādharma). Inner and outer dharmas are the twelve internal and external bases of consciousness (dvādaśāyatana). In these twelve bases, there is no ‘me’ or ‘mine’ and there is no ‘inner and outer dharma’.

II. WHY DISTINGUISH EIGHTEEN EMPTINESSES

402 These three emptinesses were already grouped together in the Mahāsusūnatsutta of Majjhima, III, p. 112 (cf. T 26, k. 49, p. 738c). They concern the twelve āyatana, i.e., all things together since “the twelve āyatanas are called everything” (sabham vaccati dvādaśāyatani). For the śrāvakas, they are empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ (śūnya ṣūnya vātmāyena vā); for the Mahāyānists for whom the Traité is the spokesman here, they are not only empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ but empty of intrinsic nature (svabhava) and the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of āyatana. In a word, the śrāvakas teach the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnayatā) or anātman whereas the Mahāyāna teaches both the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnayatā): cf. p. 239F, 1090F-1091F.
emptiness, the many wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi) avoided; if one takes too much, the symptoms (upadāva) are aggravated. It is by measuring out the medicine according to the sickness and by not taking too much or too little (anūnādhi) that the sickness can be cured. It is the same with emptiness. If the Buddha were to speak of only one single emptiness in regard to each wrong view, the emptinesses would be too numerous. People who cling to one emptiness in regard to each wrong view, the emptinesses would likewise provoke doubts (ucchedānta); to speak of the eighteen emptinesses is to hit the target (lakṣyata) right on. To speak of ten or fifteen emptinesses would likewise provoke doubts (samśaya), but this is not at issue.

Moreover, good (kuśala) and bad (akuśala) dharmas exist in definite (niyata) numbers. There are four foundations of mindfulness (samyaksamādhi), four right efforts (samyakpradhi), thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipāsika), ten powers (bala), four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid), eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma), five aggregates (skandha), twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana), eighteen elements (dhātu), twelve causes (nidāna), three poisons (viṣa), three bonds (bandha), four torrents (oghā), five obstacles (nīvaraṇa) etc. Therefore dharmas exist in definite numbers. It is by means of eighteen sorts of dharmas that one destroys the tendencies (abhiniveśa) towards them: this is why eighteen emptinesses are posed.

### III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM AND THE EIGHTEEN EMPTINESSES

Question. – Prajñāpāramitā and the eighteen emptinesses are either different or the same. If they are different, then what is this Prajñāpāramitā distinct from the eighteen emptinesses? See what the Buddha said: “What is this Prajñāpāramitā? It is the emptiness of form (rūpasūnyatā), the emptiness of feelings,
concepts, volitions, consciousnesses (vednāsamjñāsamāsāmśkapāvijñānasānyyatā) and so on up to the emptiness of the cognition of all the aspects (sarvakārajñatāsānyyatā). 407 – If they are not different, why does [the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra] say here that “the bodhisattva who wishes to become established in the eighteen emptinesses should exert himself in the praṇāpāramitā”?

Answer. – There are reasons to say they are different and there are reasons to say they are the same.

1) They are different. – The praṇāpāramitā called the true nature of dharmas (bhūtalakṣana) stops all consideration about dharmas (dharmanidhyāna). 408 The eighteen emptinesses are eighteen ways of considering dharmas as empty. By exerting himself in the true nature of dharmas, the bodhisattva produces these eighteen kinds of emptiness. Therefore [praṇāpāramitā and the eighteen emptinesses] are different.

2) They are the same. – The eighteen emptinesses are empty (śūnya) and unreal (asadbhūtalakṣaṇa); Prajñāpāramitā also is empty and unreal. – The eighteen emptinesses are the rejection of characteristics (nimittaparītyāga); Prajñāpāramitā also is the rejection of characteristics. – The eighteen emptinesses are not attached to any characteristic; praṇāpāramitā also is not attached to any characteristic. Consequently, to exert oneself in the praṇāpāramitā is to exert oneself in the eighteen emptinesses: there is no difference.

Prajñāpāramitā has two parts (bhūga, anśa), the lesser and the greater. 409 The person who wants to attain the greater should first exert himself in the lesser, namely the ‘gate of means’ (upāyamukha). To attain the greater prajñā, it is necessary to practice the eighteen emptinesses, and it is by first staying in the lesser prajñā, namely the ‘gate of means’, that the eighteen emptinesses are acquired.

What is this ‘gate of means’ (upayamukha)? It is learning (udgahitum), reciting (vācyitum), retaining (dhārayitum), studying (paryavāptum) and textually applying (bhāvanākāreṇa prayoktum) 410 the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra.

Just as a man who wants to find all kinds of fine jewels (ratna) must go to the great ocean (mahāsamudra), so the person who wants to acquire these jewels of the prajñā which are the concentrations (samādhi) on inner emptiness (adhyātmāsānyyatā), etc., must go to the great ocean of the praṇāpāramitā [by reading the texts dedicated to it].

IV. THE FIRST THREE EMPTINESSES AND THE FOUR FOUNDATIONS OF MINDFULNESS 411

407 San houei p’ in in Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 21, p. 373b22 seq. Subhūti had asked the Buddha: At the time when he is practicing the prajñāpāramitā, how should the bodhisattva-mahāsattva exert himself in rūpa, how should he exert himself in vedanā, samjñā, saṁskāra and vijianā, and finally how should he exert himself in sarvakārajñatā?

408 On the equivalence of Prajñāpāramitā = Dhammatā of true nature of dharmas, see above, p. 655-656F, 1059F

409 The greater Prajñāpāramitā is identical with the true nature of dharmas; the lesser Prajñāpāramitā is the Prajñāpāramitāśūtras where the eighteen emptinesses constituting the gate of entry into the true nature of dharmas are taught.

Question. – Why does the yogin who is exerting himself in the prajñāpāramitā first stay in the emptiness of inner dharmas (adhyātmaśūnyatā), the emptiness of outer dharmas (bahirdhāśūnyatā) and the emptiness of inner and outer dharmas (adhyātma-bahirdhāśūnyatā)?

Answer. – There are four mistakes (viparītāsa) in the world: i) the mistake of taking that which is impure to be pure (aśucat śucir iti viparītāsa); ii) the mistake of taking that which is suffering to be happy (duḥkhe sukham iti viparītāsa); iii) the mistake of taking that which is impermanent to be permanent (anitye nityam iti viparītāsa); iv) the mistake of taking that which is not a ‘self’ to be a ‘self’ (anātmano atmeti viparītāsa).412

In order to destroy the four mistakes, the yogin cultivates the twelve considerations (samamupaśyanā) inherent in the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna).413

[1. Considerationa 1-3 coming under Kāyasmṛtyupasthāna]

a. First he considers [his own body], the inner body (adhyātmakāya): consisting of thirty-six elements (dhātu),414 full of impurities (aśuci) that flow out of the nine holes (navacchidra),415 it is very disgusting and void of any pure [286a] character. This absence of pure character (śucilaksanānupalabdhi) is called emptiness of inner dharmas (adhyātmaśūnyatā).

b. Knowing the impurity of the inner body, the yogin next considers [another’s body], the outer body (bahirdhākāya), which is, for him, an object of attachment. But here it is the same thing; the two bodies are really impure. “Foolish worldly people (bālapṛthagjana), fanatical and disturbed, in whom desire (rāga) has covered their minds, claim that this body is pure; but when I consider the beauty that I love, it is exactly the same as my own body.” This absence of pure nature [in another’s body] is the emptiness of outer dharmas (bahirdhāśūnyatā).

411 The author returns to this subject which he has already treated at length, p. 1150-1176F, 1187-1194F. Here he establishes a parallel between the four smṛtyupasthānas and the first three emptinesses. The smṛtyupasthānas and the emptinesses concern inner, outer, both inner and outer dharmas, but the former lead to the conclusion that they are empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’; the latter, that they are devoid of self nature and characteristics and, as a result, without production or destruction.

For the Anguttara, I, p. 196, 10-16, the four satipaṭṭhānas (kāye kāyānupassi viharati, etc.) constitute the majjhima paṭipada; for the Madh. kārikā, XXIV, 18, śūnyatā, the designation by virtue of (prajñāpīta upādāya), is the pratipad madhyamā. Two entities equal to a third entity…

412 Cf. p. 925F, 1076F, 1151F.

413 During the four smṛtyupasthānas, the practitioner turns his attention to the body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), mind (citta) and dharmas. He examines each of these objects first within himself (adhyātma), then outside himself (bahirdhā) and finally inside and outside himself (adhyātma-bahirdhā): thus making a total of twelve considerations.

414 Cf. p. 1297F, n. 2.

c. When the yogin was considering the impurity of his own body, it happened that he said that another’s body (bahirdhārūpa) is beautiful, and when he was considering the body of another, it happened that he said that his own body was pure. Now he considers both the inner [body] and the outer [body], and he notices: “My own body is impure and that of another is impure also; the body of another and mine are quite alike: they are no different.” This absence of pure characteristic [characterizing both one’s own body and that of another] is the emptiness of inner and outer dharmas (adhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatā).

[2. Considerations 4-6 coming under Vedanāśṛtyupasthāna]

a. The yogin knows by reflection (manasikāra) that the inner body and the outer body are both impure, but indecisive people cling to it because of a group of feelings (vedanākāya), [namely, pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā)]. This group is a lot of suffering (duḥkha), but fools (mūḍha) consider it to be happiness (sukha). 416

Question. – But the three kinds of feeling, [sukhavedanā, duḥkhavedanā, aduḥkhāsukhavedanā] are all included (saṃgrhīta) in the external bases of consciousness (bahirdhāyatana); why is it said then that the yogin “considers the internal feeling” (adhyātmavedanāṃ samanupaśyati)? 417

Answer. – First, the meeting between the six objects (viṣaya) and the six organs (indriya) gives rise to a happiness called external happiness (bahirdhāsukha); then, extreme desire (prarigredha), penetrating deeply, gives rise to a happiness called internal happiness (adhyātmasukha).

In addition, the happiness that has internal dharmas as condition (adhyātmadharmacaryavyayaṃ sukham) is called internal happiness, and the happiness that has external dharmas as condition (bahirdhādharma-caryavyayaṃ sukham) is called external happiness. In addition, the happiness associated with the [first] five consciousnesses (pañcāvijñānasamprayukta) is called external happiness, and the happiness associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasamprayukta) is called internal happiness. The coarse (audārika) happiness is called external happiness, and the subtle (sūkṣma) happiness is called internal happiness.

These are the distinctions between internal and external happiness, and they are also valid in regard to unpleasant feeling (duḥkha) and neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling (aduḥkhāsukhavedanā).

Moreover, the yogin reflects and wonders whether this internal happiness (adhyātmasukha) really exists or if it is imaginary (vikalpita). He recognizes that it is just suffering (duḥkha) to which the name of happiness (sukha) is applied.

Furthermore, the yogin reflects and wonders whether this internal happiness (adhyātmasukha) really exists (na tattvenopalabhya) or whether it is imaginary (vikalpita). He recognizes that it is merely suffering (duḥkha) to which the name of happiness (sukha) is given out of habit. Why? Because this happiness, coming from unfortunate causes and conditions (duḥkhahetuprayayaja), itself arouses a painful fruit of retribution (duḥkhavipākapahala). The happiness of which one is never satiated is suffering.

416 Cf. p. 1159F.
417 This problem has already been treated above, p. 1173-1175F.
Furthermore, when a person suffering from scabies (kacchū) scratches himself or approaches a fire, the slight suffering [that he momentarily experienced] is followed by a physical suffering and becomes a great suffering. What the fool (mūdha) calls happiness, the wise man (jñānin) sees in it only suffering. In the same way, people (loka), victims of the error consisting of taking [what is suffering] to be happiness (duḥkhhe sukham iti viparyāsa), cling to the happiness resulting from the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaṇgaṇa) and their passions (kleśa) increase. For this reason, the yogin does not see happiness and “considers only suffering, like a sickness, a boil, an ulcer, a thorn” (duḥkam rogato śalyataḥ samupaśyati).

Furthermore, since happiness is rare and suffering frequent, the small amount of happiness does not appear and is therefore called suffering. It is like a ko of salt (lavāṇa) thrown into a big river: it loses its salty characteristic and is no longer called salty.

Finally, happiness is so poorly established (aniyata) that there is doubt (śaṅkā) about it: what one person considers as happiness, another person considers as suffering; and what the other person considers as happiness, the first person considers as suffering. That which one gains is happiness, that which [286b] one loses is suffering. That which the fool takes to be happiness, the wise man takes to be suffering. Seeing the torments of happiness is suffering; not seeing the defects of happiness is happiness. Not seeing the impermanent nature of happiness (anityalakṣaṇa) is happiness; seeing the impermanent nature of happiness is suffering. What the person not detached from desire (avītarāga) takes to be happiness, the person detached from desire (vītarāga) takes to be suffering.

Therefore the yogin considers happiness (sukha) as suffering; he considers suffering to be an arrow (śalya) piercing the body; he considers the impermanent and changing characteristics (anityaviparītāmalakṣaṇa) of that which is neither suffering nor happiness (aduḥkhāsukha). Considering the threefold feeling [pleasant, unpleasant, neither pleasant nor unpleasant] in this way, he mentally rejects it, and this is called the emptiness of internal feelings (adhyātmavedanāśūnyatā).

b-c. His considerations on external feelings (bahirdhāvedanā) and on both internal and external feelings (adhyātmabahirdhāvedanā) are similar.

[3. Considerations 7-9 coming under cittasmṛtyupasthāna]

The yogin has this thought: If happiness is suffering, then who experiences (prativedayati) suffering? Having reflected, he knows that it is the mind (citta) that experiences it. Next, he considers the mind in

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418 Example already used above, p. 1157F.
419 Cf. p. 1222F, note.
421 Adopting the variant houo.
order to know if it is true or false. He notices that the mind is impermanent (anitya) and has production (upāda), duration (sthitī) and disappearance (vyaya) as characteristics.\footnote{Conditioned by causes, the mind inevitably has the three or four conditioned characteristics (samskṛtalakṣaṇa): cf. p. 36-37F, 992F, 1163F.}

The mind of unpleasant feeling (duḥkhavedanā), the mind of pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā) and the mind of neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling each constitutes a different moment (bhīmalakṣaṇa): when the pleasant mind disappears, the unpleasant mind arises; the unpleasant mind lasts for the space of an instant and, having lasted, it disappears; next, there arises a neither unpleasant nor pleasant mind. This neither unpleasant nor pleasant mind lasts for the space of an instant and, having lasted, it disappears; when it has disappeared, there arises again a pleasant mind. The three feelings (vedanā) being impermanent, the mind (citta) also is impermanent.

Furthermore, the ascetic knows that there are minds of lust (rāga) or non-lust, of hatred (dveṣa) or non-hatred, of delusion (moha) or non-delusion, distracted (vikṣipta) or concentrated (saṃgrhitā), fettered (baddha) or liberated (vimukta), and he knows that these minds each have a different characteristic. Thus he knows that the mind is impermanent (anitya), that there is no fixed (niyata) mind lasting for eternity. Minds experiencing suffering, minds experiencing happiness, etc., arise from a complex of causes and conditions (hetuprayayasaṃgrī), and when these causes and conditions disperse, the minds disappear as well.

This is how the yogin considers the impermanent nature (anityalakṣaṇa) of the inner minds (adhyātmacitta), the outer minds (bahirdhācitta) and the both internal and external minds (adhyātmabahirdhācitta).

Question. – Since the mind consists of the inner bases of consciousness (adhyātmāyatana), how can there be external minds (bahirdhācitta)?\footnote{This subject has already been treated above, p. 1175F.}

Answer. – When the inner body [i.e., one’s own body] is being considered, there is ‘inner mind’ (adhyātmacitta); but when the outer body [i.e., another’s body] is being considered, there is ‘outer mind’.

Moreover, if it concerns (ālambate) inner dharmas, the mind is inner; but if it concerns external dharmas, the mind is external.

Moreover, the [first] five consciousnesses (pañcavijñāna) always concern outer dharmas and, being unable to make distinctions, are outer minds; but the mental consciousness (manovijñāna), being concerned with inner dharmas and distinguishing beauty from ugliness, is an inner mind.

Finally, the mental consciousness which, on its arising, is incapable of distinguishing and specifying, is an external mind; but the developed and deepened mental consciousness which can make distinctions and grasp characteristics (nimitta) is an inner mind. Such are the distinctions between inner and outer minds.

[4. Considerations 10-12 coming under dharmasmṛtyupasthāna]
The yogin whose mind (citta and manas) has been cultivated knows that the body (kāya) is of impure nature (aśucilakṣaṇa), that feeling (vedanā) is suffering in nature (duḥkhalakṣaṇa) and that the mind (citta) has no duration and is impermanent in nature (anityalakṣaṇa). Nevertheless, not having yet broken through the fetters (samucchinnasamyojana), he still happens to be aware of self (ahaṃkāra).

Then he has the following thought: “If the mind is impermanent, who is cognizing the mind and on whom does the mind depend? Who is the master (svāmin) of the mind that is experiencing suffering and happiness? To whom does everything belong?” Then he analyzes and recognizes that there is no master as such are the considerations on inner, outer and both onner and outer dharmas.

One grasps characteristics (nīmītāṇy udgrhṇāti) in the five aggregates (skandha) and, just for this single reason, one imagines the existence of ‘a man’ (puruṣa) and one produces the idea of ‘me’ (ātman). From the idea of ‘me’ comes the idea of ‘mine’ (ātmīya), and from the idea of ‘mine’ comes that of existence (bhāva). Toward those who benefit (hita) us, we feel love (rāga); toward those who thwart us, we feel hatred (dveṣa); these two fetters (samyojana) do not come from knowledge (jñāna) but from error: this is what is called delusion (moha). The triple poison (triviṣa), love, hatred and delusion, is the root (mūla) of all the passions (kleśa).

By means of egotism (ahaṃkāra), one accomplishes meritorious actions (puṇya) “in order,” one says, “that I may then be able to cultivate the auxiliary dharmas of the Path and may be able to attain deliverance (mokṣa).”

The grasping of characteristics (nimittodgrahana) that occurred at the beginning is called the ‘concept aggregate’ (saṃjñāskandha). Then out of egotism (ahaṃkāra), one produces the fetters and the good formations called the ‘formation aggregate’ (saṃskāraskandha). These two aggregates are [the object] of mindfulness of dharmas (dharmanāsmyupasthāna). The yogin, who is seeking the ātman in these dharmas that are the saṃjñāskandha and the saṃskāraskandha, does not find it there. Why? Because dharmas are the result of causes and conditions (hetupratyayavasamutpanna), are all of them conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) and have no solidity (sāra): there is no true ātman.

“They are the formations like the trunk of a banana tree” (saṃskararāḥ kadalānibhāḥ): leaf by leaf it is examined, but no pith (sāra) is found. – “Concept is like a mirage (marīcisedrśi saṃjñā) seen from afar:” without there being any water there, one gets the notion that there is water, one has the concept of water but it is nothing but an illusion.

Such are the considerations on inner, outer and both onner and outer dharmas.

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424 Among the five skandhas, rūpa is the object belonging to kāyasmyupasthāna; vedanā, that of vedanāsmyupasthāna; saṃjñā, the samskāras and viṇāna, those of cittasmyupasthāna. As for dharmanāsmyupasthāna, it can bear upon any skandha whatsoever, since it includes the totality of dharmas.

425 The punctuation of the Taishō is defective: the final period should be placed between fa and king.

426 Allusion to a verse of the Pheṇasutta of Saṃyutta, III, p. 142. See references, p. 370, as note; Vimalakīrti, transl. p. 132, n. 23.
Question. – Dharmas being included in the outer bases of consciousness (bahir dhāyatana), how can there be inner dharmas (adhyātmadharmā)?

Answer. – By inner dharmas (adhyātmadharmā) we mean the skandha of concept (saṃjñāskandha) and the skandha of formations (saṃskāraskandha) associated with the inner mind (adhyātmacittasaṃprayukta). – By outer dharmas (bahir dhādarmā) we mean: i) the skandha of concept (saṃjñāskandha) and the skandha of formations (saṃskāraskandha) associated with the outer mind (bahir dhācittasaṃprayukta); ii) the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra); iii) the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛtadharmā). – Taken simultaneously and together [these internal and external dharmas] are called ‘both inner and outer dharmas’ (adhyātma bahir dhādarmā).

Furthermore, the inner dharmas are the six organs (śadindriya); the outer dharmas are the six objects (śadviśaya).

Finally, the general considerations (samanupāsyaṇā) on i) the body (kāya), ii) the sensations (vedanā), iii) the mind (citta), iv) the aggregate of concept (saṃjñāskandha) and v) the aggregate of formations (saṃskāraskandha) are the mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasṃṛtyupasthāna). Why is that?

Actually, the yogin first looks for the ātman in the aggregate of concept (saṃjñāskandha) but does not find it there. He then turns his search to the body (kāya), sensations (vedanā) and mind (citta), but does not find it there either. In no matter what dharma, be it material (rūpin) or non-material (arūpin), visible (saṇḍarśana) or invisible (anidāraśana), resistant (sapratiṅga) or non-resistant (apratiṅga), impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), conditioned (saṃskṛta) or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), distant (dīre) or near (sāntike), coarse (audārika) or subtle (sūkṣma), the yogin seeks in vain for the ātman but does not find it. It is only to the complex of the five aggregates (pañca skandhasāmagri) that the name of being (sattva) is given out of habit, and ‘being’ is synonymous with ātman. The self (ātman) being non-existent (anupalabdha), neither is there any ‘mine’ (ātmiya) and, the ‘mine’ being non-existent, all the passions (kleśa) are eliminated.

[5. Summary]

A. The foundation of mindfulness of the body (kāyasāṃṛtyupasthāna) concerns all material dharmas (rūpadharma).

[As a first approach], the yogin considers the inner material things (adhyātmarūpa) as being impermanent (anītya), painful (dukkha), empty (śūnya) and without self (anātman).

[As a second and third approach], he considers outer material things (bahirdhārūpa), then inner and outer material things (adhyātma bahirdhārūpa) likewise as being [impermanent, painful, empty and without self].

[The other three foundations of mindfulness consider] sensations (vedanā), mind (citta) and dharmas as being likewise [impermanent, painful, empty and without self, respectively].

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427 This question has already been discussed above, p. 1175-1176F.
B. The concentration of emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi) associated with the inner considerations (adhyātmanupāśyanā) of the four foundations of mindfulness is called inner emptiness (adhyātmaśūnyatā). [287a]

The concentration of emptiness associated with the outer considerations (bahirdhānupāśyana) of the four foundations of mindfulness is called outer emptiness (bahirdhāśūnyatā).

The concentration of emptiness associated with inner and outer considerations (adhyātmabahirdhānupāśyana) of the four foundations of mindfulness is called inner and outer emptiness (adhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatā).

V. THE THREE EMPTINESSES RESULT FROM CONCENTRATION

Question. – Are the emptinesses in question empty by the power of concentration (samādhibala) or are they empty in themselves?

Answer. – They are empty by the power of concentration,428 as is said in a sūtra: “The three concentrations (samādhi) or the three doors to deliverance (vimokṣamukha) are emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apranihita). The concentration of emptiness (śūnyatāsamadhi) concerns

428 There are close connections between the three concentrations (p. 1213F-1232F) and the four foundations of mindfulness (p. 1150F-1176F; 1187F-1194F on the one hand and the three emptinesses on the other hand. They are not substantial entities, but rather cittasya sthitiḥ, situations of mind (p. 1213F-1214F), concentrations (samādhi) of the mind centered on emptiness, empty of individuals (sattvasūnya) for the śrāvaka, empty of things (dharmaśūnyatā) for the bodhisattva. These mental practices closely tied to the comprehension of the four noble truths converge on the same result: the rejection of the world and entry into nirvāṇa. The three concentrations are the vimokṣamukhas or doors of deliverance (p. 1213F); the three emptinesses, by radically removing the imaginary seeing of the inner, outer or mixed world, assure the mind of this supreme pacification that is nirvāṇa.

The three mental practices, concentrations, foundations of mindfulness and emptinesses are shared by the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas, with the difference, essential it is true, that the former penetrate only the emptiness of beings whereas the latter penetrate both the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of things. The śrāvakas still cling to characteristics (nīmīttānī udgṛhiṇiti) within and outside themselves; the bodhisattvas see them no longer and everything ends in a total absence of vision for them. It would be absurd to hypostatize an emptiness that is something other than an absence of vision and fruit of a certain situation of mind.

J. May comments: “This absence of vision in the great bodhisattvas starting with the eighth bhūmi is not something negative: it constitutes the result of a long effort by the mind; it is the very vision par excellence: the bodhisattvas see by not seeing.” We may add Nāgārjuna, Madh. kārikā, III, §6: “With or without seeing, the agent of seeing does not exist” (tiraskṛtya draṣṭā nāsty atiraskṛtya ca darśanam).
VI. RELATIONSHIPS OF THE FOUR GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONED DHARMAS AND THE FOUR VIEW-POINTS OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF MINDFULNESS

Question. – The four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) should all consider empty dharmas as being impermanent (anītya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and without self (anātman). Why then do they consider [respectively] the body (kāya) as impure (aśuci), the sensations (vedanā) as suffering (duḥkha), the mind (citta) as impermanent (anītya) and the dharmas as empty of self (anātman)?

Answer. – All consider the four things as impermanent, suffering, empty and without self. However, in regard to the body, beings cling especially to the mistake of taking [what is impure] to be pure (aśucau śucir iti viparyāsa); in regard to the sensations, they cling especially to the mistake of taking [what is suffering] to be happy (duhkhe sukham iti viparyāsa); in regard to the mind, they cling especially to the mistake of taking [what is impermanent] to be permanent (anīye nityam iti viparyāsa), and in regard to dharmas, they cling especially to the mistake of taking [what is not a self] to be a self (anātmany ātmeti viparyāsa). This is why, [in the course of the four foundations of mindfulness], the yogin considers the body as impure, the sensations as painful, the mind as impermanent, and the dharmas as being deprived of self.

Furthermore, in regard to inner emptiness (adhyātmasūnyatā) and outer emptiness (bahirdhāśūnyatā), there is no dharma that is definitively inner or definitively outer for, depending [on one another] as mutual cause (sahabhūhetu), they can be said to be [sometimes] inner and [sometimes] outer. In fact, what my neighbor considers as outer (bahirdhā), I consider to be inner (adhyātma), and what I hold to be outer, my neighbor considers to be inner. It depends on the subject [and not on the object] that the inner dharma is inner, and it depends on the subject [and not on the object] that the outer dharma is outer. Thus for a given individual, his own house is inner, but the house of another is outer. For the yogin who is considering inner and outer dharmas, they have no fixed nature (niyatalaksana); therefore they are empty (śūnya).

Finally, inner and outer dharmas have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Why? Because they arise from an assemblage (sāmagrī) [of causes and conditions].430 These dharmas are not found in the assembled causes

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429 This unidentified sūtra establishes a close relationship among the śūnyatā-samādhis and the smṛtyupasthānas bearing on the body, the sensations, the mind and dharmas leading to the conclusion that they are empty of ‘me’ and ‘mine’.

430 Cf. Madh. kārikā, VII, §16 (p. 159-160):

Pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac śāntam svabhāvataḥ /
tasmād utpadyamānaṁ ca śāntam utpattir eva ca //
and conditions and, since they do not exist in their causes and conditions, they are not found elsewhere either.\(^{431}\) The causes and conditions of inner and outer dharmas do not exist either. Thus as the cause (kāraṇa) and the effect (kārya) are absent, inner and outer dharmas are empty.

**VII. THE PROBLEM OF THE WHOLE AND THE PART\(^{432}\)**

Question. – From all evidence (niyatam) inner and outer dharmas exist; why do you say that they do not exist? Thus, when the hands (pāṇi), feet (pāda), etc., come together, there is birth of the body-dharma (kāyadharma): it is an inner dharma (adhyātmadharma). When the beams (gosāraka), walls (bhitti), etc., are brought together, there is the arising of the house-dharma (grhadharma): it is an outer dharma (bahirdhādharma). Although the body-dharma has a different name than its parts (avayava), it is not different from the foot, etc. Why? Because in the absence of the foot, etc., the body would not exist. It is the same for the house.

Answer. – If the foot were no different than the body, the head (śiras) would be the foot, since, [in your hypothesis], the foot is not different from the body. But if the head were the foot, that is perfectly ridiculous.

Question. – If the foot were not different from than the body, your objection would be valid. But in the present case, it is necessary that the foot, etc., be brought together in order that there be the arising of the dharma called body. Although the body is different from the foot, etc., it must depend on the foot in order to subsist. In the same way, the threads (tantu) must be brought together in order to produce a cloth (paṭa): this cloth depends on the threads to exist.

Answer. – [Two things, first]: either this body-dharma occurs at the same time in all its parts (avayavin), the foot, etc., or else it occurs separately.

\(^{431}\) Cf. Madh. kārikā, XX, §1-2 (p. 391-392):

\[
\text{Hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryā yadi} / \\
\text{phalam astī ca sāmagryām smamagyā jāyate katham} // \\
\text{hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi} / \\
\text{phalam nāsti sāmagryāṃ sāmagryā jāyate katham} // \\
\]

If the fruit arises from an assemblage of causes and conditions and [according to you] the fruit is within this assemblage, how then would it arise from the assemblage [since it is already therein]?

If the fruit arises from an assemblage of causes and conditions and [according to you] the fruit is not within this assemblage, how then would it arise from the assemblage [since it does not occur within it]?

\(^{432}\) This problem has already been discussed above, p. 1217F-1218F.
a. If the body occurs at once in all its parts, the foot (pāda) would be also in the head (śiras). Why? Because [by the hypothesis] the body-dharma occurs [in all the parts] at once.

b. If the body existed separately, it would not be different from the other parts, foot, etc., [in the sense that it would cease being a whole to become a part].

Furthermore, the body, [as a whole (avayavin)], is a single thing whereas its causes, [as ‘parts’ (avayava)], are many. But singularity (ekatva) is not plurality (nānātva), and plurality is not singularity.

Finally, to claim that a special dharma called ‘body’ exists outside of its parts is to be in contradiction with the whole world.

Thus one cannot say that the body is identical with its parts or that it is different from its parts. This is why there is no body and, the body not existing, the foot, etc., does not exist either. That is what should be understood by inner emptiness (adhyātmaśūnyatā).

Outer dharmas, houses, etc., also are empty in the same way. That is what is meant by outer emptiness (bahirdhāsūnyatā).

Question. – Destroying the body (kāya), the house (grha), etc., is to destroy singularity (ekatva) and multiplicity (prthaktva). Destroying singularity and multiplicity is the work of the heretical śūtras. In Buddhist sūtras, inner and outer dharmas really exist (adhyātmakahirdhā-dharma), namely, the six inner organs (adhyātmendriya) and the six outer objects (bahirdhāviṣaya). Why do you say they do not exist?

Answer. – These inner and outer dharmas are assemblages existing metaphorically (prajñaptisat) as simple names (nāmamātra) as was the case for the body or the house.

VIII. EMPTINESS ACCORDING TO THE TWO VEHICLES

Furthermore, in brief (saṃkṣepeṇa), there are two kinds of emptiness: the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā) and the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā). For the disciples of the Hinayāna ‘Lesser Vehicle’ who are of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya), the emptiness of beings is taught so that, freed [from notions] of ‘me’ (ātman) and ‘mine’ (ātmīya), they do not become attached to any others. – For the disciples of the Mahāyāna ‘Greater Vehicle’ who are of keen faculties (tīknendriya), the emptiness of dharmas is taught, and immediately they know that saṃsāra is eternally empty (nityaśūnyā) and the same as nirvāṇa.

The śrāvakas and their scholars (upadeśācārya) teach inner emptiness (adhyātmaśūnyatā): “In inner dharmas (adhyātmadharma) there is neither ‘me’ (ātman) nor ‘mine’ (ātmīya), neither eternal entity nor agent (kāraka), neither a knower nor an experiencer (vedaka): this is called inner emptiness, and it is the same for outer emptiness.” However, they do not teach that inner and outer dharmas are empty [of their

433 The character p’o appearing in the fourth place in line 287b11 should probably be removed.

434 Cf. p. 239F, 1079F, 1685F.
Destroying only the causes and conditions of his egotism (āhaṃkāra), the śrāvaka no longer produces passions (kleśa) and eliminates the thirst for dharmas (dharmatāra), but fearing the suffering of old age (jarā), sickness (vyāḍhi), death (marāṇa) and the evil destinies (durgati), he does not investigate the beginning of desire (kāma) and does not destroy dharmas at the root: for him, only deliverance (vimukti) is important. – The Mahāyānist, on the other hand, destroys the prison of the triple world (traidhātukā), subdues the armies of Māra (mārasenā), breaks the fetters (samyojana) and eliminates the traces of the passions (vāsanā); he knows clearly the beginning and end of all dharmas; his penetrations (prativedha) are unhindered (nīvarana); he destroys and scatters all dharmas so well [that to his eyes] sāṃsāra is the same as nirvāṇa and is merged with calm (upaśama), cessation (nirodha). The Mahāyānist attains supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarā sāmyaksambodhi), guides all beings and makes them come out of the triple world.

435 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 128 (T 223, k. 3, p. 235a11; k. 9, p. 288b10; k. 16, p. 337b4, k. 21, p. 372c11; 373c3: tathā hi rūpaṃ rūpatvena śūnyaṃ... yā ca rūpasya śūnyatā na tad rūpaṃ. na cānyatra śūnyatāya rūpaṃ. rūpaṃ eva śūnyatā śūnyataiva rūpaṃ. And so on for all dharmas of which the complete list is given by the Śatasahasrikā, p. 554, 6-559, 22.

436 Adopting the variant pou cheng.

437 Cf. p. 1013F, n. 1; Anguttara, V, p. 113, 116.

438 See p. 1142F.
IX. METHOD OF TEACHING EMPTINESS

Question. – By what method (upāya) does the Mahāyāna destroy the dharmas?

Answer. – [In the Phena Sutta] the Buddha said: “Form (rūpa) born from many causes and conditions has no solidity (sāratā). Waves (tarāṇa) on the water produce a ball of foam (phenapiṇḍa) which, as soon as it is seen, disappears; it is the same for form.”

When the four great elements (mahābhūta) of the present existence (iḥa janman) are brought together, they produce a form, but as soon as these causes and conditions disappear, the form disappears along with them.

The practitioner who follows the path of impermanence (anityatāmārga) penetrates gradually into the door of emptiness (śūnyatāmukha). How is that? The dharmas that perish as soon as they are born have not even a moment of duration (sthiti) and, not having a moment of duration, are not grasped.

Furthermore, by virtue of the characteristics of conditioned [dharmas] (saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa), at the moment of production (utpāda) there is disappearance (vyaya) and at the moment of disappearance there is production. If dharmas are already produced, production is useless; if they are not produced, production produces nothing. Between dharma and production there can be no difference. Why? If production had the nature of production (utpādalakṣaṇa), there would have to be ‘production of production’ (utpādotpāda), and this in turn would need a production: hence an infinite regression (anavasthā). If the ‘production of

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439 Phena Sutta in Saṃyutta, III, p. 140-141: Seyyathāpi bhikkhave ayaṃ Gāṇḍā nādi mahantaṃ phena piṇḍam āvaheya. tam enaṃ cakkhumā puriso passeyya nijjhāyeyya yoniso upaparikkheyya. tassa tam passato nijjhāyato yoniso upaparikkhato rittakānīveva khāyeyya tucchakānīveva khāyeyya asārakañāyeva khāyeyya. kiṃ hi siyā bhikkhave phena piṇḍe sāro. Evam eva kho bhikkhave yaṃ kiṃci rūpaṃ arūpāṅgataṃ paccuppannaṃ p. yaṃ dūre santike vā. tāṃ bhikkhu passati nijjhāhato yoniso upaparikkhati. tassa tam passato nijjhāyato yoniso upaparikkhato rittakānīveva khāyati tucchakānīveva khāyati asārakañāyeva khāyati. kiṃ hi bhikkhave rūpe sāro. – It is as if the river Ganges was carrying a great ball of foam and a perceptive man saw it, contemplated it, examined it deeply and doing that, found it empty, hollow and worthless. What value, O monks would there be in a ball of foam? It is the same for no matter what form, past, future or present, distant or close, that a bhikku sees, contemplates and examines deeply. Doing that, he finds it empty, hollow and without value. What value, O monks, is there in form?

440 Cf. Madh. kārikā, VII, 2 (p. 146):

Utupādāyās trayo vyastā nālam lakṣāna ākṣaraṃ /
saṃskṛtasya samastāḥ syur ekatra kathām ekadā //

“The three characteristics, production, etc., if they are separated, are not enough to characterize the conditioned; if they are brought together, how would they exist in the same place and at the same time?” Argument already used above, p. 922F.

441 Cf. Madh. kārikā, VII, 3 (p. 147):

Utupādaśthiti bhāṅgānām anyat saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam /
asti ced anavasthāvam nāsti cet te na saṃskṛtāḥ //
production’ did not in its turn have a production, the [initial] production would not have a production either. If the [initial] production did not have production, the dharma itself would not have it either. Thus, production does not exist (nopalabhyate), neither does disappearance (vyaya). Therefore dharmas are empty (śūnya), without production (anupāda), without destruction (anirodha): that is the truth.

Finally, if dharmas exist, they end up in non-existence finally. But that which is subsequently non-existent should also be previously non-existent. Thus, when a man wears wooden shoes (kāṣṭha-padaukā) for the first time, they already possess [this non-existence], but as it is subtle, it is not noticed.442 If the shoes did not possess this non-existence from the beginning, they would always be new. If they possess it afterwards, it is because they already possessed it previously. It is the same for dharmas: if they possess non-existence afterwards, it is because they already possess it before.

This is why all dharmas are necessarily empty. But as the result of a mistake consisting of taking to be a being that which is not a being (sattva sattva iti viparyāsa), one becomes attached to the six inner organs (adhyātmendriya). The yogin, however, destroys this error and this is what is called inner emptiness (adhyātmasaṁyutatā). It is the same for the outer emptiness (bahirdhāsāṁyutatā) and the both inner and outer emptiness (adhyātambahirdhāsaṁyutatā).

Śūnyaśāṁyutatā

Third Section EMPTINESS 4: EMPTINESS OF EMPTINESS

I. DEFINITION OF THE EMPTINESS OF EMPTINESSES443

“If production, duration and destruction in turn possessed another round of conditioned characteristics, there would be an infinite regression (of these rounds); but if they do not possess it, they are not conditioned.”

The Sarvāstivādin theory of secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa) affecting the characteristics of the conditioned, namely, production of production, etc., will be refuted by the Kośa, II, p. 224-225. See above, p. 1164F.

442 The author has already used the example of the new garment, already used before even being worn. See above, p. 1163F.

443 Apart from the three samādhīs of śūnyatā, ānimitta and apraṇihita constituting the doors of deliverance (p.1213F seq.), the Abhidharma authors assume a śūnyaśāṁyutāsamādhi, an apraṇihitāprapraniḥitasamādhi and an ānimittānimittasamādhi, signalling an advance over the three preceding ones.

Śūnyaśāṁyutāsamādhi, concerning the last two aspects (ākāra) of the truth of suffering, considers dharmas as empty (śūnya) and non-self (anātman): cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 104, p. 538b; Kośabhāṣya, p. 449, 15. And by empty dharmas, these authors mean dharmas contradictory to the view of self (ātmīyadṛṣṭivipaścāsa), without inner activity, without individuality (antarva-pāra-puruṣarorahita), without self (ātmarahita): cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 400, 3, 9, 14.

Śūnyaśāṁyutāsamādhi considers the śūnyaśāṁyutā samādhi of the arhats solely as empty and not as non-self, because śūnyatā is more distasteful than anātman: cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 105, p. 543c16-27; Kośa, VIII, p. 188; Kośabhāṣya, p. 450, 13-14; Kośavyākyā, p. 683, 12-21.
In the Pāli scholasticism as well, there is a question of the emptiness of emptiness (suññasuññam). For the Pañjīsambhidā, II, p. 178, it is the fact that the six inner organs, eye, etc., are empty of self (atta), of ‘mine’ (attanīya), of permanence (nīccha), of solidity (dhaiva), of perpetuity (sassa), and of unchangeability (aviparītāmaṇadhāma). According to the Commentary of the Pañjīsambhidā, III, p. 632, emptiness as emptiness is called the emptiness of emptiness, not determined by any other incidental word (suññasankhāraṁ suññam, na aḍṭena upapadenavissessestan ‘ti suññam suññam’).

Thus, the early masters of the Abhidharma considered emptiness as such as the lack of ‘me’ and ‘mine’, and professed simply the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā). But they did not deny the reality of things or dharmas. For them, dharmas, although transitory and suffering, really existed with their self nature (svabhāva) and their characteristics (lakṣaṇa), and non-self was one of their shared characteristics. In dharmas they grasped the mark (nimitta) of non-self (anātman) which they qualified as empty (śūnya), but this emptiness had the dharma itself as substratum (āsraya). Realists and pluralists by affirming the existence of everything, viz., the five aggregates (skandha) the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana) or the eighteen elements (dhiṭa), they were nihilists insofar as they denied any substantial reality whatsoever, eternal and immutable, to this ‘everything’.

The position of the Mahāyānists is quite different. The Traité, which is their spokesman, endlessly criticizes the Sarvāstivādins for their nimittoḍghraṇa, their grasping at the characteristics in things and, in particular, their grasping at emptiness (p. 1093F, 2082F, 2130F). Seeing emptiness in dharmas is acknowledging a certain existence to the latter and hypostatizing the emptiness of self which characterizes them. To tell the truth, dharmas are not only empty of self and of ‘mine’ (sattvaśūnya), they are also empty of dharmas (dharma), empty of self nature and of the characteristics of dharma. Not existing in any manner, they do not lend themselves to any grasping. The emptiness that one thinks to find in them is nothing at all because it does not apply to anything. There is, therefore, not only the emptiness of beings and of things, but also the emptiness of emptiness (śūnyatāśūnyatā). To hypostatize it would be the height of foolishness.

This is explained very well by Nāgārjuna and his commentator Candrakīrti in Madhyamakaśāstra, kārikā XIII, 7 (p. 245-246):

Yac coktam asvabhāvo bhāvo naivāsti śūnyatā ca bhāvanāṁ isyate / tasmād asti śūnyatāśrayo
bhāvasvabhāva iti / etad api na yuyata ity āha /
Yadi aśūnyam bhavet kiṁ cit syāc śūnyam iti kiṁ can /
na kiṁ cid asti aśūnyam ca kutaḥ śūnyam bhaviṣyati //
Yadi śūnyatā nāma kā cit syāt tadāśrayo bhāvasvabhāvaḥ syāt / na tv evam / iha hi śūnyatā nāmeti
sarvadharmam sāmānyalakṣaṇam ity abhyapagamād aśūnyadharmābibhāvād aśūnyataiva nāsti / yadā cāśūnyāḥ
padārthā na santi / aśūnyatā ca nāsti / tadā pratipakṣaniraapeśvatvāc śūnyatāpi khaṇḍupamālāvan nāsitī avasīyatām /
yadā ca śūnyatā nāsti tadā tadāśrayā api padārthā na santiṁ sthitam avikalam /.

Transl. - We are told: “An essence without existence in itself does not exist. Now the emptiness of essences is postulated. Therefore there is a substratum of emptiness, namely, the existence in itself of the essences.” This objection also is absurd and, to refute it, Nāgārjuna says:

If something were non-empty, there could be a certain emptiness in it.
But there is nothing that is not non-empty; then how could there be emptiness?
If there were some ‘emptiness’, its support, namely, the existence in itself of essences, would exist. But that is not so. Here actually a thesis is postulated that ‘emptiness’ is a characteristic shared by all dharmas, but as there is no dharma that is not non-empty, non-emptiness itself does not exist either. Since there are neither non-
By means of [this fourth] emptiness, the emptiness of inner dharmas (adhyātmāśūnyatā), the emptiness of outer dharmas (bahirdhāśūnyatā) and the emptiness of both inner and outer dharmas (adhyātmbahirdhāśūnyatā) is eliminated. Since [this fourth] emptiness destroys the [first] three emptinesses, it is called the emptiness of emptinesses (śūnyatāśūnyatā).

First, one uses [the three] emptinesses of dharmas to destroy inner and outer dharmas, and then one uses this [fourth] emptiness to destroy the [first] three emptinesses. This [fourth emptiness] is called the emptiness of emptinesses.

Furthermore, by means of the three concentrations of emptiness (śūnyatāsādhi), the yogin considers (anupaśyati) the emptiness of the five aggregates (skandha), obtains the eightfold noble path (āryāṣṭāṅga), destroys the passions (kleśa) and obtains nirvāṇa with residue of conditioning (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa). Then, as a result of the karmic causes and conditions of his previous lifetimes (pūrvajanman), the yogin, at the dissolution of the body after [288a] death (kāyasya bhedā pariṁ maraṇāt) abandons the eightfold path and produces a concentration of emptiness of emptinesses (śūnyatāśūnyatāsādhi) called emptiness of emptinesses.

II. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EMPTINESS AND EMPTINESS OF EMPTINESS

Question. – What difference is there between emptiness and the emptiness of emptiness?

Answer. – 1) The emptiness destroys the five aggregates of attachment (pañcopāṅgaskandha); the emptiness of emptinesses destroys the emptinesses.

Question. – If the emptinesses are dharmas, as empty, they are already destroyed; if they are not dharmas, of what destruction of emptinesses is it a question here?

- This is why the Madhyamika Mahāyānists keep from grasping the mark of emptiness and hypostatizing an emptiness that they do not see (cf. p. 925F, 1091F, 1226-29F). Carefully following the Middle Way, they are neither realists nor nihilists, whereas by grasping a certain emptiness in things, the Sarvāstivādins, realists as they would like to be, are not free of some negativity.

- Šūnyatāsādhi provokes disgust for saṃsāra; śūnyatāśūnyatāsādhi which follows it involves disgust for the dharmas of the Path. By means of the knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana), the ascetic knows that the path of cessation of suffering practiced by him no longer need be practiced (mārgo me bhāvito na punar bhavitavyah): cf. p. 1359F.
Answer. – When the emptinesses have destroyed all the dharmas, there remain only the emptinesses, but these emptinesses must in their turn be rejected after they have destroyed all the dharmas. This is why an emptiness of emptinesses is needed.

2) Furthermore, the emptinesses concern (ālambhante) all the dharmas, whereas the emptiness of emptinesses concerns only the emptinesses.

Thus, when a strong man (balavat puruṣa) has destroyed all the brigands (caura), yet another individual is necessary in order to destroy this first strong man. The emptiness of emptinesses plays that role.

Thus, when one swallows a remedy (bhaiṣajya), the remedy suppresses the illness (vyāḍhi), but once the illness has been destroyed, the remedy in turn must be rejected. If the remedy were not rejected, there would be sickness again. In the same way, when one has destroyed the sicknesses of the passions (kleśavyāḍhi) by means of the emptinesses, it is to be feared lest these emptinesses themselves present drawbacks (upadrava) in turn. This is why recourse is made to another emptiness to destroy the previous ones: it is called emptiness of emptinesses.

3) Finally, as this last emptiness destroys the other seventeen emptinesses, it is called emptiness of emptinesses (śūnyatāśūnyatā).

Mahāśūnyatā

Fourth Section EMPTINESS 5: GREAT EMPTINESS OR EMPTINESS OF THE TEN DIRECTIONS

I. GREAT EMPTINESS IN THE TWO VEHICLES

This is about the great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā).

1) In the śrāvaka system, it is the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā) that is the great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā).

[Mahāśūnyatāsūtra.] – Thus it is said in the Ta-k‘ong king (Mahāśūnyatāsūtra) of the Tsa-a han (Saṃyuktāgama): It is said that old age and death has birth (jātipratyayaṃ jarāmaraṇam) as condition. In this regard, if somebody said: ‘This is old age and death’ or ‘Old age and death belong to this man’ (asya vā jarāmaraṇam), the two statements together would be wrong views (mithyādrṣṭi). Actually, the man to

445 Example borrowed from Kāśyapaparivarta, §63-65; see above, p. 1227, n.
whom old age and death belongs is empty of being (sattvaśūnyatā) and old age and death is empty of dharma (dharmaśūnyatā). 446

2) On the other hand, the Mahāyānasūtras say that the ten directions (diś) are empty of characteristics of the ten directions (daśadiglakṣaṇaśūnya)  447 and that that is the great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā).

II. SIZE OF THE DIRECTIONS

Question. – Why is the emptiness of the ten directions (daśadikṣūnyatā) called great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā)?

Answer. – The directions, the east (pūrva diś), etc., being limitless (ananta), are called great. They are called great because they are omnipresent (sarvatraga), because they include all forms (rūpa), because they

446 By mahāśūnyatā, the śrāvakas mean the twofold emptiness of beings and things (sattva- and dharma-śūnyatā), while the Mahāyānists see in it the emptiness of the ten spatial directions (diṣṭūnyatā).

The twofold emptiness of beings and things is taught in a canonical sūtra mentioned three times by the Traité: k. 18, p. 192c26-27, see above, p. 1079F); k. 31, p. 288a12 (the present passage); k. 31, p. 295b27 (see below, p. 2143F).

This sūtra is entitled Mahāśūnyatāsūtra (or Mahāśūnyatā nāma dharmaparyāya) in the Sanskrit Samyuktāgama (Nidānasamyukta, ed. C. Tripathi, p.152-157), Ta k’ong fa in the Chinese version (T 99, no. 297, p. 84c11-85a10). It has as correspondent in the Pāli Samyutta (II, 60-63) a suttanta entitled Avijjāpaccayā. Here is the translation of the Sanskrit:

The scene takes place among the Kuru. Then the Blessed One addressed the monks: “I will teach you the Dharma that is good at the beginning, good in the middle and good at the end”, up to: “I will reveal it to you”, namely, the religious teaching called Great Vehicle. Listen then, reflect well as is appropriate. I will speak.”

What are the religious teachings of great emptiness? They are: “If this is, then that is; from the production of this, that is produced, namely, the formations have as condition ignorance”, up to “such is the origin…”

It is said that “old age-death has as condition birth”, and some people may ask what is old age-death and to whom does it belong? Somebody might answer: “This is old age-death”, or “Old age death belongs to this person”. Somebody else might answer: “The vital principle is identical with the body”, or “The vital principle is different from the body”. These two answers would be identical (in error) and different (only) in the letter.

As long as the wrong view that consists of saying that the vital principle is the same as the body persists, the religious life is impossible. As long, O monks, as the wrong view that consists of saying that the vital principle is different from the body persists, the religious life is impossible.

There is a middle path that avoids these two extremes: it is the right view, noble, supramundane, correct and free of error, affirming (simply) that old age and death has birth as condition.

- Below (p. 2143F), the Traité will place the Mahāśūnyatāsūtra among the rare texts of the Tripiṭaka where dharmaśūnyatā is taught.

447 See above (p. 2143F) the definition of mahāśūnyatā proposed by all the great Prajñāpāramitāsūtras.
exist eternally, because they benefit people (loka) and because they prevent people from becoming disoriented.\footnote{448} This is why the emptiness that can destroy these ten directions is called great emptiness.

The other emptinesses that destroy the dharmas coming from causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpāna), conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta), coarse (audārika) dharmas that are easy to destroy, are not called great. By contrast, the directions are not dharmas coming from causes and conditions or conditioned dharmas: they are subtle (sūkṣma) dharmas and difficult to destroy. This is why [the emptiness that destroys them] is called great emptiness.

### III. THE DIRECTIONS EXIST ONLY IN RELATIVE TRUTH

**Question.** – However, in the Buddhist system, there is no question of the directions: they are not included (saṃgrhīta) among the three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), namely, space (ākāśa), cessation due to knowledge (pratisamkhyanirodha) and the cessation not due to knowledge (apratisamkhyanirodha).\footnote{449} Then why do you claim that there are directions that you define as eternal (nitya) entities, unconditioned dharmas (anabhisaṃskṛtyadharma), dharmas not coming from causes and conditions (apratisamkhyaniutpanna), dharmas without formation (asaṃskāradharma), subtle (sūkṣma) dharmas?

**Answer.** – It is true that in the treatises of the śrāvakas the directions do not occur, but according to the Mahāyāna system, they exist in relative truth (samvṛtisatya). From the absolute point of view (paramārtha), all dharmas are non-existent (anupalabdha) and the directions in particular.

Just as the complex of the five aggregates is metaphorically (prajñāpyate) called ‘being’, in the same way the complex of forms derived from the four great elements (caturmahābhūtopādāyārūpasāmagrī), where

\footnote{448} Above (p. 76F, 595-597F, 922-923F0, the Traité has already alluded to one or another category of the heretical system of the Vaiśeṣikas. Here it adopts, but only provisionally, the Vaiśeṣika concept of diś, the spatial orientation or direction of things, a concept which the Buddhists have always rejected. According to the Vaiśeṣika-Ūutra of Kaṇāda (I, I, 5), the universe is composed of nine substances (dravya): earth (prthivi), water (āpas), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), the ether (ākāśa), time (kāla), spatial direction (diś), the soul (ātman) and mind (manas). Five of these substances, earth, water, fire, air and mind, are called active; the other four, ether, time, direction and the soul are inactive. Besides, five of them, ether, time, spatial direction, the soul and mind are eternal; the other four, earth, water, fire and air are each considered to be eternal or non-eternal as the case may be. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are bathed in the ether (ākāśa) and are arranged according to two principles: time (kāla) and spatial direction (diś). – See the summary of the system in Inde Classique, II, p. 65-74; R. Grousset, Philosophies indiennes, I, p. 69-84; J. Filliozat, Les Philosophies de l’Inde, Paris, 1970, p. 91-95.

\footnote{449} It is often a question of the ten directions in Buddhist texts (cf. p. 445F, n. 3), but they do not appear in the list of 75 dharmas (72 saṃskṛtas and 3 asaṃskṛtas) prepared by the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas, or in the list of 100 dharmas of the Viṣṇūdānis (cf. R. Kimura, The original and developed Doctrines of Indian Buddhism in Charts, Calcutta, 1920, p. 14, 55). The Buddhists have undoubtedly thought that diś made ākāśa redundant. Besides, the Traité (p. 923F) condemned the nine dravyas of the Vaiśeṣikas.
such and such localization is distinguished, is called ‘direction’ metaphorically. The place where the sun rises is [288b] the eastern direction (pūrvā diś); the place where the sun sets is the western direction (paścimā diś): those are the directions. These directions spontaneously (svarasena) exist eternally; therefore they do not come from causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna). Neither is it about actual existences preceded by an earlier non-existence, nor of later non-existences preceded by an present existence; they are not formations (samskāra) and they are not known by direct perception (pratyakṣa); therefore they are subtle (sūksma) dharmas.

Question. – If the directions are truly real, how can they be destroyed?

Answer. – Did you not understand what I just said? These directions exist in relative truth (saṃvṛtisatya) but, from the absolute point of view (paramārtha), they are [fundamentally] destroyed. By saying that they exist in relative truth, I do not fall into the [wrong view] of nihilism (ucchedadrṣṭi); by saying that, from the absolute viewpoint, they are destroyed, I do not fall into the [wrong view] of eternalism (sāvatadrṣṭi). In summary (saṃkṣepeṇa), that is what great emptiness means.

Question. – But emptiness of the absolute (paramārthaśūnyatā, no. 6) also destroys the unconditioned (asamskṛta) dharmas, the dharmas not coming from causes and conditions (apratiyāsamutpanna), the subtle (sūksma) dharmas. Why then is it not called ‘great’?

Answer. – Since the adjective ‘great’ is being applied here to ‘great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā, no. 5), the emptiness of the absolute (paramārthaśūnyatā, no. 6) will not be qualified as ‘great’. But even though absolute emptiness is qualified differently, it really is great: the supramundane (lokottara) in its quality of nirvāṇa is great; and the universe (loka), in its quality of directions (diś), is great. This is why the emptiness of the absolute, it too, is great.

IV. WRONG VIEWS DESTROYED BY GREAT EMPTINESS

Finally, because it destroys the major wrong views (mithyādrṣṭi), [the emptiness of the directions] is called great.

Let us suppose that a yogin wants to make his loving-kindness (maitrī) spread to the beings of a certain kingdom (ṛāṣṭra) of the eastern direction, then to the beings of another kingdom [of the east], and so on. If he says: “My loving-kindness applies completely to all the kingdoms of the east”, he falls into the wrong view of a finite world (antavānlokaḥ); and if he says: “My loving-kindness does not completely apply to all these kingdoms”, he falls into the wrong view of an infinite world (anantavān lokah). By thus producing these two wrong views, he loses his mind of loving-kindness.

This is a yogin practicing the meditation on loving-kindness (maitrī), the first of the four apramāṇas or brahmavihāras (cf. p. 1239F seq.).

The theories of a finite or infinite world have been put among the fourteen difficult questions to which the Buddha refused to reply: cf. P. 154-158F, 421F, 423F, 529F, 1589F, 1682F, etc.
If the yogin uses the emptiness of the directions (dikṣūnyatā) to destroy this direction of the east, he destroys the wrong views of a finite world and an infinite world. – If he does not use the emptiness of the directions to destroy the direction of the east, he prolongs in himself the thought of the eastern direction and this prolongation being endless, his mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcitta) vanishes and wrong thoughts arise.

Thus, when the great sea (mahāsamudra), has reached its usual limits (mayādā) at the time of the tide (pariṣyanda), the water recedes and the fish⁴⁵² (matsya) that do not withdraw with it are left wriggling on the shore, suffering horrible torments. If the fish are wise, they withdraw with the water and find definitive safety. In the same way, the yogin who does not withdraw following the mind [of loving-kindness] is left wriggling in wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭī), but if he withdraws following the mind, he does not lose the mind of loving-kindness.

Therefore, because it destroys the major wrong views, [the emptiness of the directions] is called great emptiness.

Paramārthaśūnyatā

Fifth Section: EMPTINESS 6: EMPTINESS OF THE ABSOLUTE OR OF NIRVĀṆA

I. DEFINITION AND SYNONYMS OF THE ABSOLUTE⁴⁵³

⁴⁵² The image of the fish that dries up in the absence of water (macho appodake) is canonical: Suttanipāta, v. 777 (p. 152), 936 (p. 183); Theragāthā, v. 362 (p. 40), 387 (p. 43); Mahāniddesa, II, p. 408.

⁴⁵³ Here paramārthaśūnyatā is not taken in the sense of emptiness in the true sense of the word, but of emptiness of the paramārtha, i.e., of nirvāṇa. The two terms are often synonymous: paramattho vuccati amataṃ nibbanaṃ (Cullaniddesa, p. 197).

The Traité intercedes here in the controversy between the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika concerning the asamskṛta of which nirvāṇa is a part. It has been discussed in detail by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Documents d’Abhidharma, BEFEO, XXX, 1930, p. 1-28, 247-298, but it should be summarized briefly.

According to scripture, unlike conditioned dharmas (samskṛta), form, etc., the asamskṛta has neither production (utpāda), disappearance (vyaya) nor duration-modification (sthityanyathāva): cf. Aṅguttara, I, p. 192; Kathāvatthu, p. 61; Nīdānasamyukta, p. 139; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 168; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1262.

1) The Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas posit three asamskṛtas: space (ākāsa) and the two cessations (nirodha), the cessation due to knowledge (pratisamkhyānirodha) and the cessation not due to knowledge (aprasamkhyānirodha): cf. Koṇa, I, p. 8.

Ākāsa has as its nature the non-hindering of form (rūpānāvaraṇasvabhāva) and giving way to it: Koṇa, I, p. 8.

Pratisamkhyānirodha, or nirvāṇa properly called, is disjunction from the impure dharmas (sāsravair dharmair visamyogah), a disjunction of which one takes possession by means of a certain knowledge (prajñāviśeṣa):
1) The absolute (paramārtha) is the true nature of dharmas (dharmānāṃ bhūtalakṣaṇam or dharmatā) because it is indestructible and inalterable. This true nature of dharmas itself is empty (śūnya). Why? Because there is no grasping (upādāna) or attachment (abhiniveśa) [in regard to it]. If the true nature of dharmas existed, one would be able to take it and become attached to it, but as it does not really exist, one does not take it and one does not become attached to it. If one does take it and becomes attached to it, that is a mistake.

the pratisaṃkhyaṇa, the understanding of the four Buddhist truths (āryasyatānām pratisaṃkhyaṇaṃ): cf. Kośa, I, p. 9.

Apratisaṃkhyaṇaśyānirodha is also a cessation, but is different from the preceding disjunction (visanyayogād anyaḥ). It is an absolute obstacle to the production of future dharmas (anāgatānām dharmānāṃ upādasyāyataviggnabhūta). It is obtained, not by understanding of the Buddhist truths, but by the insufficiency of causes for birth (pratyayavaikalya): cf. Kośa, I, p. 10.

The Sarvāstivādins consider the three asaṃskṛtās to be real and claim that there really (asti) exists a dharma to be inwardly realized by the saints (āryaḥ pratyaśtmavedyaḥ), a real and distinct entity, good and eternal (nityam kuśālam dravyāntaram) called pratisaṃkhyaṇaśyānirodha or nirvāṇa: cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 92, 2-3.

2) The Saṃkhyānikas and, in particular, Vasubandhu define the asaṃskṛtās in quite another way:

Ākāśa is merely the absence of the tangible (spraṣṭavyābhāvamātra). Thus people who do not come across any obstacle in the dark say that there is space: cf. Kośa, II, p. 279.

Pratisaṃkhyaṇaśyānirodha or nirvāṇa is the cessation of the passions and already produced births (uppannānusayajanmanirodha) and the absence of production of any other passions and other births (anyasyāṅutpāda), and this by the power of understanding the truths (pratisaṃkhyaṇalena): cf. Kośa, II, p. 279; Kośabhāṣya, p. 92, 5-6.

Apratisaṃkhyaṇaśyānirodha, independently of the understanding of the truths and by virtue of the insufficiency of the causes of birth, is the absence of production of any dharma (vinaiva pratisaṃkhyaṇā pratyayavaikalyād anutpādaḥ): cf. Kośa, II, p. 279; Kośabhāṣya, p. 92, 7.

Having thus defined the asaṃskṛtās in terms of absence, the Saṃkhyānikas deny any reality to them: Sarva evaṃskṛtād adṛṣṭam: Kośabhāṣya, p. 92, 3-4.

3) For the Prājñāpāramitā, all dharmas, conditioned or unconditioned, are empty of their respective characteristics and consequently escape any predication; they are thus neither to be grasped (parigraha) nor to be abandoned (utsarga): Yac ca samskṛtānāṃ dharmānāṃ lakṣaṇāṃ yac cāsāmānānāṃ dharmānāṃ lakṣaṇāṃ evaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ sarva ete dharmāḥ śūnyāḥ (above, p. 2035F)

According to the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 234, 21-236, 7, ākāśa does not lend itself to any qualification; it is not grasped (na labhyate nopalabhyate); it is neither object nor non-object of speech (na pravyāhāro nāpravyāhāhāh).

The Asaṅgaḥsahārikā, p. 50-51, the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 134-135 and the Śatasāh., p. 615 seq., praise the wandering ascetic Śrenika who, taught by the Buddha and trusting in his word, neither welcomed nor rejected any dharma: “He did not even think of nirvāṇa, basing himself on the fact that no dharma can be either taken nor abandoned. Why? Because the non-taking, the non-rejecting of dharmas is the perfection of wisdom” (sa nirvāṇenāpi na manyate sarvadharmanāpriyagrabānusargatām upādāyam tat kasya hetoh? yaḥ sarvadharmānām aparigraho ’nusargaḥ sā prajñāpāramitā).
2) Furthermore, the dharma supreme among all dharmas (paramadharma) is called nirvāṇa. Thus it is said in the Abhidharma:454 “What are the dharmas surpassed by others (sottara)? These are: a) all conditioned dharmas (samskṛtadharma); b) space (ākāśa); c) cessation not due to knowledge (apratisaṃkhyānirodha). – What is the unsurpassed (anuttara) dharma? It is cessation due to knowledge (pratisaṃkhyānirodha).”455

But cessation due to knowledge is nirvāṇa.

II. EMPTINESS OF NIRVĀṆA

[288c] In nirvāṇa, there is no nature of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇalakṣaṇa), and the emptiness of nirvāṇa is the emptiness of the absolute (paramārthaśūnyatā).

Question. – If nirvāṇa is empty and without nature, why do the saints enter into the three Vehicles (yāna) and enter into nirvāṇa? Furthermore, it is said that “all the teachings of the Buddha lead to nirvāṇa” (nirvāṇaparyavasānāḥ sarve buddhadharmāḥ)456 like waves all enter into the sea.

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454 Prakaraṇapāda, T 1541, k. 4, p. 64829-c1; T 1542, k. 6, p. 716a5-6. This passage appears in chap. VI, the Samgrahavibhāga (?), counting among the last four chapters of the Prakaraṇapāda attributed by the Traité (p. 11F, n. 1) to the Kaśmirian arhats.

455 Cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 440, 20-24: Anāsravā api samskrtaḥ asamskrtaḥ sottarāḥ. asamskrtaḥ am nityavāt. asamskrtaḥ api ākāśa-pratisaṃkhyānirodhau pratisaṃkhyānirodhena sottaru. pratisaṃkhyānirodhasya kuśalaniyavāt. mokṣas te anuttaraḥ na hi nirvāṇād viśiṣṭatamam asti. – Even though they are pure, the samskrta are surpassed (sottarā iti sātisâyāḥ) by the asamskrta, for the latter are eternal. Two asamskrta also, ākāśa and apratisaṃkhyānirodha, are surpassed by the pratisaṃkhyānirodha because the latter is good and eternal. But deliverance (mokṣa = pratisaṃkhyānirodha) itself is not surpassed, for there is nothing superior to nirvāṇa.

The distinction between surpassed (sottara) dharmas and unsurpassed (anuttara) dharmas appears frequently in the Abhidharma treatises: cf. Dhammasaṅgani, p. 225, 263-264; Atthasālinī, p. 50; Vibhāṅga, p. 19, etc.

456 Mālasutta in Anguttara, V, p. 107, 11(Madhyma, T 26, k. 28, p. 602c16): nibbānapariyosānaṁ sabbe dhammā. – Cf. the expression nibbāninna, nibbānapoṇa, nibbānapabbhāra: Majjhima, I, p. 493; Saṃyutta, V, p. 28-40, etc.
Answer. – There ‘is’ (asti) a nirvāṇa: it is the supreme jewel (paramartha), the dharma without superior (anuttaradharma), and it is of two kinds: 1) nirvāṇa with residue of conditioning (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa); 2) nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning (anuttaradharma).

457 To deny nirvāṇa is equivalent to denying Buddhism. This is why all the scholars, whatever their school, say that nirvāṇa ‘is’ (asti), but the meaning of the verb should be understood.

1) For the Sarvāstivādins, no difficulty, for they consider the asaṃskṛta to be an existence (bhāva).

2) For the Saṅcatikas, the question is more delicate since they plead ‘non-existence’ (abhāva) for nirvāṇa: cf. p. 2012F. Here is their explanation: We do not say definitely that asaṃskṛta does not exist, but the latter is such as has been said by us (na vai nāsti evāsaṃskṛtam iti brūmaḥ, etat tu tadbhūtya yathāsaṃbhūh uktam). Thus there ‘is’ a prior non-existence of sound (before it has been emitted) and there ‘is’ a later non-existence of sound (after it has been emitted) and yet it is not established that this non-existence is an existence; it is the same as with the unconditioned (tadyathā asti sabdasya prāgbhāvo ‘sti paścadbhāva ity ucyate, atha ca punarnabhāvo bhāvaḥ sidhyati. evam asaṃskṛtam api draśṭavyam). However, a certain non-existence, very worthy of praise, does ‘exist’; the absolute non-existence of any torment; it is superior to the others and consequently merits receiving praise (abhāvo ‘pi ca kaścit prāṣayatamo bhavati yah sakalasayopadravasyāyantabhāva ity anyesam so ‘gra iti prāṣaṃsām labdhum arhati): cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 93, 5-9). – In a word, the verb ‘to be’ does not mean ‘to exist’.

3) In chap. XXV of his Mūlamadhyamaka, Nāgārjuna describes his concept of nirvāṇa and the summary in a few words in kārikā 9 (p. 529):

Ya ājavanjavāhāva upādāya pratītya vā /
so ‘pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate //

Literally: The presence of comings and goings in ‘relation to’ or ‘in dependence on’ is defined as nirvāṇa, setting aside this relation and this dependency.

Candrakīrti comments: Jammaparamaparamprabhāhāvaprajñāpratītya vānupādāya vā yāpravrtr nirvāṇam iti vyavasthāpyate. – The non-functioning of the continuity of births and deaths in the absence of all relationship and dependency (in respect to anything at all) is established as nirvāṇa.

The continuity of births and deaths, i.e., saṃsāra, has never functioned since everything is empty, and nirvāṇa should be understood as the non-functioning (apravrtyti) of a saṃsāra that has never started.

That being so, nirvāṇa cannot be either bhāva ‘being’ (st. 4-6) or abhāva ‘not being’ (st. 7-8) or a higher synthesis of being and not being (st. 11). Let us admit frankly that it escapes the metaphysical realm; it is only a being for argument’s sake, “if, by a being for argument’s sake, we mean something that is not at all” (Descartes). The Ratnāvali (cited in Madh. vrṭti, p. 524) defines it: bhāvabhāvaparārśiṣkṣaya, the elimination of any mind of existence or of non-existence.


458 Pasādasutta in Anguttara, II, p. 34 (Tseng-yi-a-han, T 125, k. 12, p. 602a11-13) often reproduced in other sūtras (Anguttara, II, p. 35; Itivuttaka, p. 88):

Yāvattā dhammā sāṅkhātā vā asaṅkhātā vā virāgo tesam dharmānām aggam akkhyāyati yathidam madanimmadano pipāsāvino ālayasamugghāto vṛttapacchedo tāṇhakkhayo virāgo niodho nibbānam. – Of all the conditioned or unconditioned dharmas, the best is detachment, namely, the disintoxication of pride, the regulating of thirst, the crushing of the supports, the breaking of the functioning, the exhaustion of thirst, detachment, cessation, nirvāṇa.
ii) nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning (nirupadiḥśesanirvāṇa). The nirvāṇa with residue of conditioning is the cutting off of all the passions, thirst, etc. (sarvesaṃ tṛṣṇādikleśāṃ prahāṇam); the nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning is the exhaustion of the five aggregates assumed by the saint (āryopattānāṃ pañcaskandhānāṃ kusayaḥ) during the present life and the fact that they will not be taken up anew. Therefore it is impossible to say that there is no nirvāṇa.

But hearing the name of nirvāṇa pronounced, beings produce wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi), become attached (abhiniviśante) to the sound (ghoṣa) of nirvāṇa and provoke futile discussions (prapañca) on its existence (bhāva) or its non-existence (abhhāva). It is in order to destroy these prejudices (abhiniveśa) that the emptiness of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇāśūnyatā) is taught here.

If people are attached to existence (bhāva), they are attached to saṃsāra; if they are attached to non-existence (abhhāva), they are attached to nirvāṇa. [For myself], I destroy the nirvāṇa, the one that is desired (abhiniviśa) by worldly people (prthagjana); I do not destroy nirvāṇa, the one that is grasped (upalabdha) by the saints (ārya). Why? Because the saints do not grasp any characteristic (na nimittam udgrhaṇanat) in any dharma.

Furthermore, the passions, thirst, etc. (tṛṣṇādikleśa) are metaphorically called (prajñapyante) ‘bonds’ (bandhana). If the path (mārga) is cultivated, these bonds are untied and the deliverance (vimukti) called nirvāṇa is obtained: apart from that there is no dharma that is ‘nirvāṇa’.

Imagine a man bound in chains who, once he is freed, engages in vain chatter, saying: "Here are the chains, here are the feet, what then is deliverance?” This man is foolish to look for a dharma ‘deliverance’ outside the feet and chains. Beings do the same thing when they seek a dharma ‘deliverance’ elsewhere than the chains of the five aggregates (skandha).

Finally, dharmas are not separate from the absolute (paramārtha) and the absolute is not separate from the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. The result is that the emptiness of the true nature of dharmas is the ‘emptiness of the absolute’. These are the various names used to designate the emptiness of the absolute.


The topic in question bears the name aggappasāda in Pāli, agraprajñapti in Sanskrit.

459 Cf. Ts-a-han, T 99, no. 306, k. 13, p. 88a9-12, cited in Kośabhāṣya, p. 93, 23-94, 2: yat svalpasya dukkhasyāśeṣaprahaṇam pratiniḥsargā vyantibhāvaḥ kaśaya virāgā nirodho vyupāśamo 'stangamab anyasya ca dukkhasayaprativaṃdhīr anutpādo 'prādurbhāvah, etat kāntam etat praṇītām yaduta sarvopadhipratiniḥsargas tṛṣṇākṣayo virāgā nirodho nirvāṇam. – The complete destruction of the least suffering, its rejection, its purification, its exhaustion; the detachment, the suppression, the pacification, the disappearance of this suffering; the non-rebirth, the non-production, the non-appearance of another suffering, that is what is cherished by the saints), that is excellent, namely, the rejection of all upadhi (= skandha), the exhaustion of thirst, renunciation, suppression, nirvāṇa.

The Sautrāntikas use this sūtra to support their thesis of nirvāṇa as pure non-existence (abhāvamātra): cf. Kośa, II, p. 284.
Sixth Section EMPTINESSES 7 AND 8: EMPTINESS OF THE CONDITIONED AND EMPTINESS OF THE UNCONDITIONED

Conditioned dharmas (samskrtadharma) are dharmas coming from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayaśaṅgṛhyutpanna), namely, the five aggregates (pañcaskandha), the twelve bases of consciousness (dvādaśāyatana) and the eighteen elements (aṣṭādaśādhaṭā). The unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛtadharma) are dharmas without causes or conditions, eternal (nitya), unborn (anuppana), undestroyed (aniruddha) and like space (ākāśasama).

I. THE TWOFOLD EMPTINESS OF THE CONDITIONED

Here, the saṃskṛtadharmas are empty for two reasons:

1) They are empty because they have neither ‘me’ (ātman) nor ‘mine’ (ātmiya) and because eternity (nitya), immutability (aviparīṇāmadharma) are lacking in them.461

2) The saṃskṛtadharmas are empty of saṃskṛta characteristics, are not born (notpadyante), do not perish (na nirudhyante), do not exist (nopalabhyante).

460 Cf. the canonical definitions:

Anguttara, I, p. 152. – Thīn’ imāni bhikkhave saṅkhata sāṅkhatalakṣaṇāni / kātamāni tīt? / uppādo paṇṇāyati vayo paṇṇāyati āhita sāṅkhatalakṣaṇāni paṇṇāyati / ...tiṇ imāni bhikkhave saṅkhata sāṅkhatalakṣaṇāni / karakānāni tīt? / na uppādo paṇṇāyati na vayo paṇṇāyati na āhita sāṅkhatalakṣaṇāni paṇṇāyati...

Niddānasamyukta, p. 139. – Dvāyam idām saṃskṛta cāsaṃskṛta ca / tatra saṃskṛtasayotpādo ‘pi prajñāyate vayo ‘pi sthityanyathātvaṃ api / asaṃskṛtasya naivotpādaḥ prajñāyate na vayo na sthityanyathātvaṃ.

On this topic and its numerous variations, see above, p. 36F, n. 2; 1163F, n. 1.

461 Here this is the emptiness of being (sattvaśūnyatā) or the doctrine of the anātman, already professed by the canonical scriptures and defined by the Abhidhamma (Cullāniddesa, p. 279; Paṭissambhidā, I, p. 109: Visuddhimagga, p. 561) in the following way: Saṅñaṃ attena vā attanīyaṃ vā nīcena vā dhuvena vā sassatena vā aviparīṇāmadhānmaṇaṃ vā. – Empty of self, of ‘mine’, of eternity, of solidity, of permanency, of immutability.

462 Here this is the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā) added to the preceding by the Mahāyānists. The saṃskṛtas are, in addition, empty of characteristics of saṃskṛta in the sense that they are without production (utpāda), without destruction (vyaya) and without duration-alteration (sthityanyathātva). This is their purity (viśuddha).

Śatasāhasrikā, p. 842, 12-10 (cf. Pañcevaṁśati, p. 146, 18-147, 7): Kin iti bhagavan viśuddhitā/ - bhagavān āha/ānupādaḥ/ aniruddhaḥ/... evam asanvidyamānā tenocyate ‘vidyeti/ Transl. – What, O Blessed One, is purity? – The Blessed One replied: Non-production, non-destruction, non-defilement, non-purification, non-appearance, non-grasping, non-functioning of all dharmas, that is purity. This is how, O Śāradvatputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva
Question. – Since the ‘me’, the ‘mine’ and eternity are absent in them, they are empty. Why do you say further that the sanskritadharman are empty of characteristics of sanskritadharma?

Answer. – Since there is no being (śattva = ātman), these dharman are without basis (apratisṭhāna). Since they have no eternity, they have no time of duration (sthitikāla), and not having any duration, they are non-existent (anupalabdha). From that, we know that these dharman are empty. [289a]

Question. – In the sanskritadharman, eternity is absent. Is this lack [of eternity] an emptiness of being (sattvaśūnyatā) or an emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā)?

Answer. – 1) Some speak about an [eternal] ātman. But it is as a result of a mental error (viparyāsa) that they posit an eternal ātman: this emptiness of eternity (nityaśūnyatā) introduces the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā).463

2) Others claim to consider the mind (citta) as eternal. Thus Fan T’ien-wang (Brahmā devarāja) said that the four great elements (mahābhūta) and material derived (upādīyarūpa) from the four great elements are non-eternal, whereas the mind (citta, manas) or the consciousness (vijñāna) is eternal.464 [Now the mind is not eternal]: this emptiness of eternity introduces the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).

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463 In the words of the incessantly repeated canonical saying: Yad aniccam tam dukkham, yam dukkham tad anattā.

But impermanence does not explain the emptiness of beings alone, i.e., their non-individuality, it explains also the emptiness of dharman called ‘conditioned’. Actually entities without ‘me’ and ‘mine’ do not exist in themselves, do not exist by themselves, and are empty of self nature and characteristics.

464 Kevaddhasutta of Dīgha, I, p. 211-223 (Tch’ang-a-han, T 1, k. 16, p. 101b-102c): The grhaapatiputra Kevaddha, wishing to know where the great elements, earth, water, fire and wind definitively perish, uses his magical powers to go to the heavens and questions all the deities of the desire realm and the form realm successively. The gods confess their ignorance except for Mahābrahmā, the great god of the fourth dhyāna who, unable to answer, avoids the question by boasting: “I am Brahmā, the great Brahmā, the conqueror, never vanquished, the witness of everything, the sovereign, the lord, the agent, the creator, the best, the instigator, the mother, the father of beings present and future” (aham asmi brahmā mahābrahmā abhibhū anabhībhūto aṇṇatathudaso vasavatti issaro kattā nimmatā seṭṭho sañjitā vasī pitā bhūtabhavānam). Then taking Kevaddha aside, he acknowledged himself to be unable to answer the question and advised him to go to consult the Buddha. The latter told Kevaddha that the four great elements endlessly disappear into the invisible Consciousness, infinite, brilliant in every way (viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato paham) and that, by the elimination from the consciousness of all the great elements, all nāma rūpa, are destroyed (viññāṇassa nirodhenā eth’ etam uparujhāti).

The expression sabbato paham is difficult. Rhys Davids (Dialogues, I, p. 283) gives it as “accessible from every side”, but proposes, in the Pāli Dictionary, s.v. paha, the translation “giving up entirely”. The Chinese translation of the Dīgha (T 1, p. 102c17) understands: tseu yeou kouang “shining by itself”.

The Kevaddhasutta is often mentioned by the Abhidharma authors to prove that dissimulation (māyā) and hypocrisy (sāthya) exist up to the realm of Brahmā. But these writers make the bhikṣu Aśvajit the hero of the story.
3) Finally, others say: “The five aggregates (skandha) are eternal. Thus the aggregate of form (rupasakandha), although it suffers transformations (parinama), does not perish, nor do the other [four], such as the mind.”

We, however, proclaim the emptiness of the five aggregates, i.e., the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).

Therefore the emptiness of eternity introduces the emptiness of things.

II. CONDITIONED AND UNCONDITIONED ARE INTERDEPENDENT IN EMPTINESS

Furthermore, the yogin considers the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of the saṃskṛtadharmas and the asaṃskṛtadharmas: they have no agent (kāraka); since they exist as a result of a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasmamagrī), they are all false and deceptive; they arise from memories and thought-constructions (anusmaraṇavikalpa); they occur neither on the inside nor on the outside nor in between the two (nādhyātmaṁ nabhāirdhā nobhayam antareṇopalabhyante); they are the result of the mistaken visions of worldly people (prthagjana). The wise man finds no self natures (svabhāva) in these and introduce some modifications into Brahmā’s boasts: aham asmi brahmā śvaraḥ kartā nirmātā sraṣṭā srjāh pitṛhūto bhūtānām: cf. Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 12, p. 399a7; Kārikāvibhāṣa, T 1563, k. 6, p. 804c3.

On Brahmā’s pride, see also Ṣaṅgētikā, p. 115.

465 Those who affirm that everything exists, past, future and present, are the Sarvāstivādins (Kośabhāṣya, p. 296, 4: ye hi sarvam asti vadanti, atītam anāgataṃ pratycetpanṇaṃ ca te sarvātivādāḥ). Their opponents, the Sautrāntikas and Mādhyamikas, do not fail to underline the lack of logic in their position. It is arbitrary to claim that the self nature (svabhāva) of dharmas is eternal when their being (bhāva) is transitory and undergoes variations with time. Hence this stanza (Kośabhāṣya, p. 298, 21-22; Pañjikā, p. 581, 11-12):

Svabhāvaḥ sarvādā cāsti bhāvo nityaś ca nesyaṭe / na ca svabhāvād bhāvo ‘nyo vyaktam śvaraceṣṭitatam //

“The self nature always exists, but you deny that the being is eternal and that the being is different from the self nature. That is indeed the gesture of a dictator!”

466 By virtue of the law of the interdependence of opposites (pratidvandvisādharmya), “there where a given thing is not, its opposite is not” (Madh. vr̥tti, p. 287, 15: iha yo nāsti na tasya pratidvandvi vidyate). Now the saṃskṛtas, lacking production, disappearance and duration-modification do not exist. Therefore their opposite, the asaṃskṛtas, do not exist either. See Madh. kārikā, VII, st. 33 (p. 176):

Utpādasthitibhaṅgānām asiddher nāsti saṃskṛtam / saṃskṛtasyāpraprididhau ca katham seṣyaty asaṃskṛtam //

“The production, duration and destruction not being proved, there is no conditioned. And the conditioned not having been demonstrated, how could there be the unconditioned?”

On this stanza, see J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 140.

467 An expression dedicated to excluding any modality of existence. It occurs in Kāśyapaparivarta, §143, cited in Madh. vr̥tti, p. 48, 2-3.
sanskṛtadharma$; he sees in them only simple metaphors (prajñaptimār) serving to guide worldly people; he recognizes their falsity, unreality, non-birth, inactivity and his mind does not becomes attached to them.

Furthermore, the saints (ārya) who do not grasp these sanskritadharma$ attain the fruits of the Path (mārgaphala). Considering the emptiness of the sanskritadharma$, their minds do not become attached to them.

Finally, outside of the sanskrta, there is no asamskrta. Why? Because the true nature (bhūtalakśaṇa) of the sanskritadharma$ is unconditioned and this unconditioned nature itself is not conditioned: it is but an imaginary expression created by the mistake (viparyāsa) of beings.

The natures (lakṣaṇa) of the sanskrta are production (utpāda), disappearance (vyaya) and duration-alteration (sthityanyathāva); the natures of the asamskrta are non-production, non-disappearance, non-duration and non-change: this is the first gateway of entry into the Buddhadharma. But if the asamskritadharma$ had such natures, they would be conditioned (samskrta).

The nature of production (utpādalakśaṇa) of the sanskritadharma$ constitutes the truth of the origin of suffering (samudayaśaṣya), and their nature of disappearance (vyayalakśaṇa) constitutes the truth of the cessation of suffering (nirodhasaṣya). But if really these sanskritadharma$ are not produced, they do not act, and if they do not act, they are not destroyed. Therefore they are asamskritadharma$, just like the true nature (bhūtalakśaṇa).

He who finds this true nature of dharmas no longer falls [into the error] concerning the natures of production, disappearance, duration or changeability. From this time on, he no longer sees relationship between conditioned and unconditioned dharmas or between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas. Not grasping any specific mark (nimitta) in conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is what the unconditioned consists of. Why? If one imagines conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, one comes up against

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468 For the Mahāyānists, there is a close parallelism between seeing the emptiness of the sanskrta and the penetration of the four noble truths involving three revolutions (parivarta) and twelve aspects (ākāra) due to four aspects for each of three revolutions (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 11, 1-32; Catusparisatsūtra, p. 142-152 or 445-446; Mahāvastu, III, p. 332, 13-333, 17; Lalitavistara, p. 417, 15-418, 21. Seeing the emptiness of the sanskrta corresponds to aspects 9 to 12 of the noble truths. This is what is explained in the Dhyāvītamaśīṣūtra cited in Madh. vr̥tti, p. 298: Yena maṇḍūṣir anutpannāḥ sarvasaṃskārā dṛṣṭāḥ tena duḥkhaṃ pariṇātaḥ / yenāsamutthitāḥ sarvadharmā dṛṣṭās tasya samudayaḥ pratiṣṭhāḥ / yenātuyntaparinirvātāḥ sarvadharmā dṛṣṭās tena niruddhaḥ sākṣātikaḥ / yenātuyntaparinirvātāḥ sarvadharmā dṛṣṭāstena mārgo bhūvitaḥ /

Transl. - Mahāujār, he who has seen that all the formations are unborn has recognized suffering. He who has seen that all things are non-produced has destroyed the origin (of suffering). He who has seen that all things are absolutely extinct has realized the cessation (of suffering). He who has seen that all things are absolutely empty has practiced the Path.

469 “After having gone to a lot of trouble to refute the conditioned and unconditioned as interdependent, here the author, in passing, suggests the unconditioned as a nirvāṇa universally and eternally acquired, incapable of being the object of any attachment. This method of denying and affirming an absolute reality at the same time is a characteristic step of the Madhyamaka.” (J. May)
Besides, some people, hearing about the defects of the themselves also are empty, for the two things are not different.

Question. – The first six emptinesses have each been treated separately. Why are the emptiness of the conditioned (saṃskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 7) and the [289b] emptiness of the unconditioned (asamkṛtaśūnyatā, no. 8) treated together here?

Answer. – Saṃkṛta and asamkṛta dharman are interdependently (anyonyāpekṣa): outside of the saṃkṛtas, there are no asaṃskṛtas, and outside of the asamkṛtas, there are no saṃskṛtas. These two categories include all dharman. The yogin who considers the faults (doṣa) of the saṃskṛtadharmas, impermanent (anītya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) etc., knows ipso facto the great benefits of the asamkṛtadharmas. That is why the two emptinesses are treated together here.

III. EMPTINESS OF THE UNCONDITIONED

Question. - It is quite possible that the saṃskṛtadharmas, coming from the complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyaśaṁmagri), are without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and therefore empty (śūnya). But the asamskṛtadharmas, which are themselves not dharman coming from causes and conditions, are indestructible (aṅgaya), inalterable (abhedya), eternal (nītya) and like space (ākāśasama). How would they be empty?

Answer. – As I have just said, outside of the saṃskṛtas, there are no asaṃskṛtas, and the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of the saṃskṛtas is exactly asaṃskṛta. The saṃskṛtas being empty, etc., the asamskṛtas themselves also are empty, for the two things are not different.

Besides, some people, hearing about the defects of the saṃskṛtadharmas, become attached (abhinivesante) to the asamskṛtadharmas and, as a result of this attachment, develop fetters.

Thus it is said in the Abhidharma:470 “Of the 98 anuṣayas ‘pernicious tendencies’], 89 have the saṃskṛtadharmas as object (ālambana), six have the asamskṛtadharmas as object, and for the other three, we must distinguish: the anuṣayas of ignorance (avidyā) belonging to the domain of the desire realm (kāmadhūtvacaccara) and to be destroyed by the truth of the cessation of suffering (nīrodhasatyāhaya) have as object sometimes the saṃskṛtas and sometimes the asaṃskṛtas.

“Which are the anuṣayas having the saṃskṛtas as object? They are the anuṣayas of ignorance (avidyā) to be destroyed by the truth of the cessation of suffering (nīrodhasatyāhaya) and associated with the anuṣayas having as object the conditioned dharman (saṃskṛtadharmālambanānuṣayasamprayukta).

470 Prakaraṇapāda, chap. V, Anuṣayavitthānagā, T 1541, k. 3, p. 638b7-11; T 1542, k. 3, p. 703b5-9. – This chapter is part of the last four chapters of the Prakaraṇapāda attributed by the Traité (p. 112F) to the Kashmirian arhats.

For the 98 anuṣayas, see also Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 46, p. 237c, 238a; Kośa, V, p. 13, 71.
“Which are the anuśayas having the asamkratas as object? They are the anuśayas of ignorance (avidyā) to be destroyed by the truth of the cessation of suffering (nirodhasatyahēya) and dissociated from the anuśayas having as object the conditioned dharmas (samskratadhamālambanaviprayukta).

“It is the same for the ignorances concerning the form realm (rūpadhātu) and the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu).”

Following these fetters (samyojana), one commits evil actions (akusālakarman) and because of these bad actions, one falls into the three unfortunate destinies (durgatī). This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra proclaims the emptiness of the unconditioned here.

The anuśayas having the asamskratadharmas as object are doubt (vicikitsā), wrong view (mithyārṣṭi) and ignorance (avidyā).

a. Doubt (vicikitsā) is to question whether nirvāṇa exists or does not exist.

b. Wrong view (mithyārṣṭi) is to form a judgment and declare that there definitely is no nirvāṇa.

c. Ignorance associated with this wrong view and this doubt (mithyārṣṭivicikitsā-samprayuktāvidyā) and independent ignorance (āvenikavidyā) 471 as well join together to form the anuśaya of ignorance.

IV. THE EMPTINESS OF THE UNCONDITIONED IS NOT WRONG VIEW 472

Question. – If that is so, how is the emptiness of unconditioned dharmas (asaṃkrtaśūnyatā) different from wrong view (mithyārṣṭi)?

471 Āvenikāvidyā, simply non-knowledge, not associated with the other anuśayas: cf. Kośa, III, p. 84, 88; V, p. 31.

472 The objection boils down to this: to profess the emptiness of the asamskratas is to deny nirvāṇa. But denying nirvāṇa is wrong view. Therefore to profess the emptiness of the asamskratas is wrong view.

- Objection. - If that is so, you are denying even nirvāṇa. In that case, this doctrine (or this thing) preached by the Blessed One in order that humanity might accede to nirvāṇa, is that not useless (or absurd)?

- Answer. – That would be so if some ‘dharma’ existed in the form of existence itself, if there were some beings to hear it and if, in order to preach it, there was a being in itself named “Buddha, the Blessed One.” But how could the fault with which you blame us touch us since:

  Quiescence of every grasping (of an object), quiescence of every discursive thought, [nirvāṇa] is blessedness;  

  Nowhere, to no one has any dharma whatsoever been preached by the Buddha.

- Commenting on this stanza, Candrakīrti explains that nirvāṇa thus conceived is the non-functioning of speech and of mind (vācāṃ cīttasyāpravṛttih) and that the absence of the object of knowledge (jñeya) and of the knowledge is happiness (śīva).
Answer. – The person with wrong view does not believe in nirvāṇa; then he formulates a judgment and declares that there definitely is no dharma ‘nirvāṇa’. The emptiness of the unconditioned does not grasp the characteristic of nirvāṇa (na nirvāṇasya nimittam udgrhnáti): that is the difference.

Moreover, the person who rejects the samskṛtas is attached (abhiniviśate) to the asamskṛtas [by attributing to them the characteristics of non-production (anupāda), etc.] and by the fact of this attachment transforming them into samaskṛtas. This is why destroying the asamskṛtas [by not grasping their characteristics] is not wrong view.

That is what is meant by the emptiness of the conditioned and the unconditioned.

Atyanyaśūnyatā

Seventh Section EMPTINESS 9: ABSOLUTE EMPTINESS

I. EVERYTHING IS COMPLETELY EMPTY

Absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā). –The emptiness of the conditioned (samskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 7) and the emptiness of the unconditioned (asamskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 8) destroy all the dharmas to the point where there is nothing left over (niravāśeṣam): that is absolute emptiness.

The arhat whose impurities are destroyed (kṣīṇāsrava) is absolutely pure (atyantaviśuddha), whereas the anāgamin who, however, has drawn back to the desires (rāga) of the sphere of nothing at all (ākīṃcanyāyatana) is not absolutely pure. It is the same here. There is the emptiness of inner dharmas (adhyātmasaṃśūnyatā, no. 1), emptiness of outer dharmas (bahirdhāsaṃśūnyatā, no. 2), emptiness of inner and outer dharmas (adhyātma bahirdhāsaṃśūnyatā, no. 3), emptiness of the ten directions (daśadikṣaṃśūnyatā, no. 5), emptiness of the absolute (paramārthaśūnyatā, no. 6), emptiness of the conditioned (samskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 7), emptiness of the unconditioned (asamskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 8) and in addition, the fact that there is no dharma that is not empty: this is what is called ‘absolute emptiness’ (atyantaśūnyatā, no. 9).

The person who, for seven lifetimes or for a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, a hundred thousand or incalculable lifetimes, belongs to a noble clan, is ‘absolutely noble’ and does not consider as really noble the fact of belonging to a noble clan for one, two or three lifetimes [only]. It is the same for absolute emptiness: since the very beginning (mūlata eva), there has never been anything that is not truly empty.

473 The anāgamin still remains attached to some categories of passion of bhavāgra or naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana: cf. Kośa, VI, p. 227.
Some say: “Although this is presently emptiness, it was not so originally: there was, for example, God as origin of creation (sarga), Darkness (tamas), subtle atoms (paramāṇu). No! All that is empty. Why? If the result (kārya) is empty, the cause (kāraṇa) was empty as well. Space itself is neither effect nor cause, and it is the same for God and the subtle atoms, etc. If they were eternal (nitya), they would not produce the transitory (anitya). If the past (atīta) has no defined nature (niyatalakṣaṇa), neither do the future (anāgata) and the present (pratytapanca); in the three times (tryadhvan) there is not a single dharma that is truly non-empty (aśūnya). That is absolute emptiness.

II. ABSOLUTE EMPTINESS DOES NOT LEAD TO RENOUNCING NIRVĀṆA

Question. - If everything in the three times is empty, including the subtle atoms (paramāṇu), if nothing has ever existed for the least moment, that is indeed very frightening (bhayasthāna). In view of the bliss of the trances (dhyāna) and the absorptions (samāpatti), the sages (prajñā) renounce mundane bliss (laukikasukha), and in view of the bliss of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasukha), they renounce the bliss of the trances and absorptions. If in this absolute emptiness there is not even the bliss of nirvāṇa, on what dharma would they then rely to renounce nirvāṇa?

Answer. – Some people attached to egotism (ahamkārabhiniviśta) distinguish the characteristics of unity (ekatva) and multiplicity (nānātva) in dharmas: it is these people who experience fear. Thus the Buddha said: “In foolish worldly people (bālapṛthagjana) the big subject of fear is the non-existence of the self (ātman) and the non-existence of the ‘mine’ (ātmīya).”

Furthermore, it is the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) dependent on the three times which, by the fact of their impurities (saṃsravadharma) constitute subjects (sthāna) that bring about attachment (abhiniveśa). Nirvāṇa itself is ‘the cessation of thirst’ (ṛṣṇāyāḥ prahāṇam). Why would one seek to renounce nirvāṇa?

Finally, the bhikṣu who violates the four grave offenses (atvantaduḥśīla) is ‘immoral absolutely’ (atyantaduḥśīla) and is incapable of attaining bodhi; the person who commits the five sins of immediate retribution (pañcānantarya) is closed ‘absolutely’ (atyantas) to the three good destinies (sugati); the person who takes

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474 Theist doctrines of the Śaiva and Vaishnava: cf. p. 137-143F and notes.
475 Tamas, darkness, the third guṇa of the Śāṅkhya, which at the beginning of time, constituted the world by itself: see P. Deussen, Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda, Leipzig, 1938, p. 329.
476 Paramāṇu, subtle atoms which, for the Vaishēṣika, were eternal: cf. p. 728-730F, 923F.
478 The four catasro mūlpattato guvyayaḥ of the Asaṅsāhasrikā, p. 777, 27 or maulī āpatti (or adhyāpatti) of the Kośabhāṣya, p. 223, 7 and 21, which are none other than the four patanīya of the Vinaya: abrahmacarya, adattādāna, manuṣyavadha and uttarimanaṣydharmaṃsāvāda.
the commitment of the śrāvakas cannot become Buddha ‘absolutely’. It is the same for absolute emptiness (atyaṇaśūnyatā): this absolute emptiness shows no exception (avaśēṣa) in all the dharmas.

III. ABSOLUTE EMPTINESS DOES NOT LEAD TO ANY REALITY

1. Falsity does not create truth

Question.479 – It is not correct that all dharmas are absolutely empty (atyaṇaśūnyatā). Why? The dharmas of the three times (tryadhvan) and the ten directions (daśadiś) lead to ‘a nature of things’ (dharmatā), a subsistence of things (dharmasthitatā);480 that necessarily must be true. It is because there is an emptiness of dharmas that the other dharmas are false. If there were no emptiness of dharmas, there would not be any false dharmas either. This [truth] is absolute emptiness.

Answer. – Nothing does not lead to a truth of dharmas. Why?

1) If such an emptiness existed, one of two things: it would either be i) conditioned (saṃskṛta) or ii) unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). – Suppose it were conditioned, this hypothesis has already been refuted in regard to the emptiness [290a] of the conditioned (saṃskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 7). – Suppose it were unconditioned, this hypothesis also has been refuted in regard to the emptiness of the unconditioned (asamskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 8).

This reality would be either i) mundane (laukika) or ii) supramundane (lokkottara). – Suppose it were mundane, this hypothesis has already been refuted by the emptiness of inner dharmas (adhyātmasūnyatā, no. 1), the emptiness of outer dharmas (bahirdhāsūnyatā, no. 2), the emptiness of inner and outer dharmas (adhyātma-bahirdhāsūnyatā, no. 3) and great emptiness (mahāsūnyatā, no. 4). – Suppose it were supramundane, this has been refuted by the emptiness of the absolute (paramārthaśūnyatā, no. 6). And

479 The objector is appealing to the law of interdependence of opposites (pratidvandvadhaṃśādharma) dear to the Mādhyamika but he has it backwards. The Mādhyamikas say: Without falsehood, no truth. The objector replies: Without truth, no falsehood.

480 The objector is claiming here to follow a canonical saying often cited by the adepts of both Vehicles (see references, p. 157F bottom of page):

Sāṃyutta, II, p. 25. – Uppādā vā tathāgatānām anupūḍā vā tathāgatānām thitā va sa dhātu dhammatthitatā dhammantiyāmatā idappaccayatā.

Nidānasāmyukta, p. 148, 164. – Uppādād vā tathāgatānān anupūḍād vā sthītā eveyam dharmatā dhammasthiyate dhātub.

The passage unquestionably depicts a reality but not necessarily a subsistent reality. In the canonical texts, it is none other than the co-dependent arising, pratītyasamutpāda (Sāmyutta, II, p. 25) or, which almost amounts to the same, the suffering of the sāṃskāras and the non-personality of dharmas (Anguttara, I, p. 286). For the Prajñāpāramitā, it is the true nature of dharmas including the absence of nature, emptiness.
dharmas of form (rūpin) or formless dharmas (arūpin), impure (sārava) or pure (anāsra) are likewise empty.

2) Moreover, dharmas being absolutely empty, this absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā) itself is empty. Emptiness being nothing whatsoever, there is no interdependence (anyonyāpekṣatā) between falsity and truth.

3) Finally, absolute emptiness destroys all dharmas to the point where there is nothing left over (avaśeṣa); that is why it is called absolute emptiness. If the least bit remained, it would not be called ‘absolute’. To claim [as you do] that something must exist because of interdependence [between falsity and truth] does not hold.

2. Dharmas are empty even in their causes and conditions.

Question. – Dharmas are not completely empty. Why? Dharmas coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyayasamutpanna) are empty, but their causes and conditions are not themselves empty. Thus, it is as a result of a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmargī), namely, the beams (phalaka), that there is a house (grha): the house is empty but the beams are not.

Answer. – 1) The causes and conditions also are empty because they are indeterminate (aniyata). Take, for example, the son of a father: insofar as he is born from a father, he is called ‘son’ (putra); insofar as he engenders a son, he is called ‘father’ (piṭr).

2) Furthermore, the ultimate (paścima) causes and conditions are without support (aprartiṣṭhita). Thus the mountains, rivers, trees and categories of beings rest upon the earth (prthivi), the earth rests upon the water (ap), the water rests upon the wind (āyu) and the wind rests upon space (ākāśa), but space does not rest on anything.481 If there is no point of support at the beginning, there is none at the end either. This is why we know that all dharmas are absolutely empty.

3. Magician and magical object likewise are empty

Question. – That is not so: dharmas must have a root. Thus in magical (rddhi) transformations (nirmāṇa), the fictitious object (nirmita) is false but the magician (nirmitā) is not empty.

Answer. – Foolish worldly people (bālaprthagjana), seeing that the fictitious object does not last for long, say that it is false, but as the magician lasts for a long time, they say that he is real. Saintly individuals

(āryapudgala) themselves see that indeed the magician is born from a complex of the karmic causes and conditions of his previous lives and by accumulating good dharmas in his present life, he has obtained a magical power (ṛddhibala) by means of which he makes fictitious creations.

In a later chapter of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, it is said: “There are three kinds of fictitious creation (nirmāṇa): fictitious creation of passion (kleśa), fictitious creation of action (karman) and fictitious creation of dharma.”482 This is why we know that the magician himself is empty as well.

4. Nothing is taken away from emptiness

Question. – 1) Things without solidity (asāra, adhruva) not being true, they are necessarily empty; but solid things and real dharmas cannot be empty. Thus the great earth (mahāprthivī) and Mount Sumeru, the water of the great ocean (mahāsamudraka), the sun and the moon (candrasūrya), the lightning bolt (vajra) and other substances are real solid dharmas and therefore cannot be empty. Why? a) The earth and Mount Sumeru last until the end of the kalpa. b) Whereas the rivers dry up, the ocean is always full. c) The sun and the moon revolve in the sky without ceasing.

2) The things seen by worldly people (prthagjana), being false and unreal, are certainly empty, but the things grasped by the saints (ārya), namely, suchness (tathatā), the fundamental element (dharmadhātu), the limit of reality (bhūtakoṭi) [290b] and nirvāṇa are certainly true dharmas. Why do you say they are absolutely empty? Besides, if conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma), as coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyayasamutpanna), are not true, unconditioned dharmas (asamkskradharma) which themselves do not come from causes and conditions must be true. Why do you say they are absolutely empty?

Answer. – Being indeterminate (aniyata) [notions], solidity (sāratā, dhruvatva) and non-solidity, are both completely empty. How is that? What one person considers to be solid, another person considers to be non-solid.

a) People consider lightning (vajra) to be solid, but Śakra Devendra who holds it in his hand like a man holding a stick (danḍa) does not consider it to be solid. Moreover, it is because we do not know how to break lightning that we think it is solid. But if we know that it is enough set it down on the shell of a tortoise (kūrmapṛṣṭha) and strike it with the horn of a wild sheep (hariṇaśṛnga) to break it, then we know that it is not solid.

b) A man, whose height is only seven feet, thinks that the great ocean is deep (gambhīra), but when Rāhu Asurarāja stands up in the great ocean, his knees come up out of the surface of the water.483 With his two

482 Pañcaviṃśati, chap. LXXXVII, entitled Jou houa (Nirmāṇopama?), T 223, k. 26, p. 415c26-27.
483 See the description of Rāhu in the Commentary of the Dīgha, II, p. 487-488. There it is said: Tassa mahāsamuddam otiṇṇassa yojanasaḥassamatte thāne gambhīrōdakaṃ jānuppamāṇaṃ hoti. So evam vadeyya: Ayaṃ mahāsamuddo gambhīro gambhīro ti vadanti, kutr’ assa gambhīrata?
hands he hides the summit of Sumeru, and he looks down on Sudarśana, the city of the Trāyastriṃśa gods. Rāhu clearly does not consider the sea as being deep.

c) A man, whose lifespan is short (alpāyuṣa), thinks that the earth (prthivyā) lasts for a long time and is solid, but beings of long life (dirghāyuṣa), [such as Sunetra], know well that it is neither eternal nor solid.

[Saptasāryodayasūtra]. See the Ts’i-je-yu king (Saptasāryopyamāsūtra) preached by the Buddha:

The Buddha said to the bhikṣus: All conditioned dharmas are impermanent, changing, and end up in destruction. When the kalpa reaches its end after a long period of aridity, the medicinal herbs and trees completely dry up. – With the appearance of the second sun, the water of the streams dries up. – With the appearance of the third sun, the water of the big rivers is completely exhausted. – With the appearance of the fourth sun, the great rivers of Jambudvīpa and lake Anavatapta become empty. – With the appearance of the fifth sun, the great earth, Mount Sumeru, etc., begin to smoke like a potter’s furnace. – With the appearance of the seventh sun, everything bursts into flames and there is no more smoke: the earth, Mount Sumeru and everything up to the palace of the Brahmā gods is burned up by the fire.

Then, seeing this fire, the gods who have recently been born into the Abhāsvara heaven, become frightened and say: “After they have burned the pace of the Brahmās, these flames will reach here.” But the gods who were born [in the Ābhāsrava heaven] a long time ago reassure the gods born subsequent to them and say: “Previously already, after having burned the palace of the Brahmās, this fire disappeared and has not yet come this far.”

When the trīśahasramahāsāhasralokadhātu has been burned up by the fire, there remain no ashes or charcoal.

The Buddha said to the bhikṣus: Who could believe such an enormous thing? Only a man who has seen it with his own eyes could believe that. O bhikṣus, in the past, there was a heretic teacher named Situ-nie-to-lo

484 Saptasāryodayasūtra: Anguttara, IV, p. 100-106; Madhyama, T 26 (no. 28), k. 2, p. 428c-429c; Ekottara, T 125., K. 34, p. 735b-738a; Saptasāryodaya, T 30, p. 811c-812c. – For the jātaka of Sunetra that forms the second part of the sūtra, see also the Dhammakasutta of Anguttara, III, p. 371-372 (cf. Magyama, T 26, k. 30, p. 619b-c), the Sunettasutta of Anguttara, IV, p. 135-136, and the references given above, p. 520F, note.

The sūtra of the seven suns is often cited by the authors of sūtras and sāstras: Dīgha, T 1, k. 21, p. 137c-138b; Ta-leou-t’an king, T 23, k. 5, p. 302c-303b; K’I che king, T 24, k. 9, p. 355; Pitṛputrasamāgama cited in Śikṣasamuccaya, p. 247, 5-18; Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 75, p. 386b5; k. 82, p. 424c-425a (passage translated above, p. 520F); k. 133, p. 690a14-24; Kośabhāṣya, p. 116, 17-22; Kośavyākyā, p. 710; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 32, p. 526c12; Kārikāvibhāṣā, T 1563, k. 17, p. 859a1-2; Yoṉācārabhūmi, T 1579, k. 34, p. 471a7.

(Sunetra) who had renounced desire and practiced the four four abodes of Brahma (brahmavihāra). His innumerable disciples also had renounced desire. Sunetra thought: “It is not fitting that I should be reborn in the same place as my disciples. Today I must therefore develop a mind of loving-kindness deeper than theirs.” Having meditated profoundly on loving-kindness, this man took rebirth in the heaven of the Ābhāsvaras. [290c]

The Buddha added: Sunetra was myself. At that time, I saw this great event [i.e., the burning of the palace of the Brahmās] with my own eyes. This is why we must know that even solid and real things all end up in destruction.

5. Difference between impermanence and absolute emptiness

Question. – But here you are dealing with absolute emptiness (atyantāśūnyatā); why then do you talk about impermanent things (anītyavastu)? Absolute emptiness is empty right now whereas impermanence is extistent now and empty later.

Answer. – Impermanence is the first doorway to emptiness. If one understands impermanence well, all dharmas are empty. This is why the saint (āryapudgala) first considers the impermanence of the world (lokānītyatā) under four aspects:

1) He sees that the things (vastu) to which he is attached are impermanent (anīta).

2) Impermanence gives rise to suffering (duḥkha): as a result of this suffering, the saint mentally experiences disgust (nirveda).

3) Having emptiness as nature (śūnyālakṣaṇa), impermanence cannot be grasped: it is like a magic show (māyopama), like a metamorphosis (nirmāṇopama); this is what is called emptiness (śūnya).

4) Outer things (bahirādhaṃvastu) being empty, their inner master (antarsvāmin) is also empty: this is what is called non-self (anāman).

Furthermore, absolute emptiness is the true emptiness. There are two kinds of beings (sattva): i) the one who is mainly sensual (ṛṣṇācarita); ii) the one who is mainly rationalist (dṛṣṭicarita).

i) The sensualist experiences attachment (āsaṅga) easily but, as the things to which he becomes attached are impermanent, he feels sorrow (daurmansaya) and suffering (duḥkha). To him, it is said: “The things to which you are attached are impermanent and precarious; it is on their account that you experience

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486 Cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 103: Bhūtapubbām bhikkhave Sunetto nāma satthā ahosi titthakaro kāmesu vārāgo.
487 Ibid., p. 104: Atha kho bhikkhave Sunettassa satthuno etad ahosi: na kho pañ’ etam patirīpaṃ yo ‘ham sāvakānaṃ samasamgatiyo assaṃ abhisamparāyam, yan nūnāhāṃ uttarin mettaṃ bhāveyyan ti.
488 The Saptasūryasūtra of Anguttara, IV, p. 105, does not identify Sunetra with the Bhagavat; on the other hand, the Kośa (l.c.) agrees with the Traité in making the comparison.
489 See Kośa, IV, p. 174, 208, and n.
suffering. If the things to which you are attached give rise to suffering, you should not become attached to them”; this is to preach the gate of liberation called wishlessness (apraṇihitavimokṣamukha).

ii) The rationalist seeks to analyze dharmas but, as he does not recognize the truth, he becomes attached to wrong views (mithyadṛṣṭi). It is to him that the absolute emptiness is preached directly.

Furthermore, all affirmations (vāda) are capable of being refuted and, being able to be refuted, they are empty. Visions are empty and the master of the vision is himself empty. This is what is called absolute emptiness.

You just said (p. 2090F) that “the things grasped by the saints are necessarily true dharmas”, but what is specific to the saints is to destroy the three poisons (triviṣa). It is not by means of mistakes (viparyāsa) and lies (mṛṣāvacana) that they are able to bring beings to escape from the sufferings of old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (maraṇa) and to lead them to nirvāṇa. The dharmas that you are calling true come from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasmamagraṇī); not existing previously, they exist now and, existing now, they will no longer exist in the future; they can be neither grasped nor adopted. Therefore they too are empty and without truth.

[Kolopamasūtra.]⁴⁹⁰ – This is what the Buddha said in the Fa-yu king (Kolopamasūtra): “Good dharmas should be destroyed and, a fortiori, the bad ones.”

Finally, for the saints, conditioned (saṃskṛta) and pure (anāśrava) dharmas arise from impure dharmas. These impure dharmas are false and arise from false conditions. How could they be true? Outside of conditioned dharmas, there are no unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas, as I have said above (p. 2081F). The true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of conditioned dharmas is to be unconditioned. Since all dharmas are non-existent (anupalabadha), this is why there is absolute emptiness.

Anagraśūnyatā

**Eight Section EMPTINESS 10: EMPTINESS OF DHARMAS WITHOUT BEGINNING⁴⁹¹**

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⁴⁹⁰ See references above, p. 64F, n. 1. The Kolopamasūtra will also be invoked later, k. 31, p. 295b29; k. 85, p. 657a2. In this saying, dharma is taken in the sense of ‘good teaching’, and adharma in that of ‘bad teaching’. The Buddha is not attached to the sublime teaching of the Prajñāpāramitā and does not want his disciples to love the Dharma or be attached to the Dharma. They seek only the cessation of suffering (duḥkhakṣaya), deliverance (vimukti), the true nature of dharmas beyond any vain discussion: cf. p. 65F.

⁴⁹¹ Whereas other Mahāyānists speak of an emptiness of dharma without beginning or end (anavarāgrasūnyatā, thog ma dān tha ma med pa ston pa niid), the Pañcaviṃśati, in its Chinese version executed by Kumārajīva, speaks here of an emptiness of dharmas without beginning (anagraśūnyatā). This is an intentional modification which the Traité will explain.
I. DHARMAS ARE WITHOUT BEGINNING

Emptiness of dharmas without beginning (anagraśūnyatā). – The world (loka, samsāra), whether it is beings (sattva) or things (dharma), has no beginning (agra).

The present birth (ihajanma) exists as as result of a previous existence (pūrvajanman); the previous existence, in turn, exists as a result of a preceding existence, and so on. Therefore there is no beginning for beings; and it is the same for dharmas. Why?

1. [Madhyamakaśāstra.] -

[291a] If birth preceded

And death followed,

Birth would not come from death
And one would be reborn without having died.

If death preceded
And birth followed
Death would be without cause.
And without being born, one would die.492

This is why all dharmas are without beginning.

2. [Anamataggasutta.] – As is said in the sūtras, the Buddha said to the bhikṣus: “Beings have no beginning; in these beings obsessed by ignorance, fettered by thirst and wandering in transmigration, no beginning can be discerned.”493

492 Madh, kārikā, XI, v. 3-4; madh. vṛtti, p. 221-222; T 1564, k. 2, p. 16a21-24.

Pūrvam jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam uttaram /
nirjarāmaraṇā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmurtah //
Paścāj bhavej jarāmaraṇam āditah /
ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmaraṇam katham //

“If birth preceded and old age and death followed, birth would exist without old age and death, and one would be born without being dead.
If birth followed and if old age and death came first, how could old age and death, without cause, affect someone who has not been born?” – Cf. J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 173-174.

The Madh. vṛtti, p. 221, explains: Samsāra has no beginning (ādi), no middle (madhye) and no end (avasāna), and since, therefore, it does not exist, there is, between birth and old age and death, etc., no relationship of anteriority (pūrva), posteriority (pārva), or simultaneity (sahakrama).
II. THE CONCEPT OF DHARMA WITHOUT BEGINNING IS ABSURD

However, it is in order to destroy these dharmas without beginning that the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra sets forth here the emptiness of dharmas without beginning (anagraśīnyatā).

Question. – Dharmas without beginning are true and cannot be refuted. Why? To claim that beings (sattva) and things (dharma) have a beginning is to fall into the wrong view of believing in extremes (antagrāhadrṣṭī) and also to fall into the wrong view of absence of causality (ahetukatvadrṣṭī). To avoid

This well-known saying occurs in two forms: in the older form, it denies the initial term (pūrvakoṭi) of samsāra and of beings; in its more recent form, it denies both the initial and final term (pūrva-parakoṭi).

1) Negation of the initial term, in the Pāli sources and the Sanskrit Āgamas:

Samyutta, II, p. 178-193 (Anamataggasamyutta); III, p. 149, 151; V, p. 226, 41; Cullaniddesa, p. 273;

Kathāvatthu, p. 29: Anamataggayam bhikkhave samsāro pubā koṭi na paññāyati avijjānīvaranānām sattānām
tanhaḥsamyojanānām sandhāvatam samsaratām. – Of unknown beginning, O monks, is samsāra; the initial term starting from which, loaded down by ignorance and fettered by thirst, beings wander by chance, is unknown.

Anamatāgga is analyzed as ana, double negation; mata, known; agga, beginning; and the commentaries explain it as avidiṭṭa ‘of unknown beginning’. From that the translations Unbekannten Anfangs ist Umlauf der Geburten (W. Geiger) or Incalculable is the beginning of this faring on (Mrs. Rhys Davids and F. H. Woodward).

Chinese translation of the Samyukta, T 99, k. 34, p. 241b13-14, and following pages: Beings, in the long night of samsāra without beginning (Wou che cheng sseu) wander by chance: the initial term (pen tsi) of suffering is unknown.

2) Negation of the initial term and the final term in most of the Sanskrit texts. The expression anavaraṅgra samsāra ‘samsāra without end or beginning’ is frequent in the Mahāvastu and the Lalitavistara (see Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 21), and the canonical saying is modified in the following way:

Dīvīyāvadana, p. 197: Anavarāgro bhikṣavah samsāro ‘vidyānīvaranānām sattvānām tryāsamyojanānām
tṛṣṇārgolabaddhānām dirgham adhvānṃ sandhāvatām samsaratāṃ purvā koṭir prajñāyate duḥkhasya. – Without end or beginning, O monks, is samsāra. Impossible to discover the initial term of suffering for the beings fettered by thirst, bound by the snares of thirst, travelling the long road and wandering by chance.

Madh, vṛtti, p. 218: Anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātijatāmarasasamsāra iti. avidyānīvaranānām sattvānām
tṛṣṇāsamyojanānām tṛṣṇāgaṇḍurabaddhānām samsaratāṃ sandhāvatāṃ pūrva koṭir na prajñāyata iti. – Without end or beginning, O monks, is samsāra, birth and old age and death. Impossible to discover the initial term of beings loaded down by ignorance, fettered by thirst, tied by the snares of thirst and wandering in samsāra.

The differences between the canonical sources perhaps explains the contrast between the anagraśīnyatā of the Chinese Pañcavīṃśati and most of the Sanskrit texts. The general meaning of the expression is not affected, for beings and things without beginning would not have an end or a middle and “to weigh the real, samsāra does not exist” (vastukacintāyāṃ tu samsāra eva nāstī). But perhaps it is a question of method. As the Traité is going to explain, the wrong and pernicious notion of ‘dharma with beginning’ must be destroyed by means of the beneficial notion of ‘dharma without beginning’ but, when the latter tends to be taken as conveying a reality in itself, it itself becomes a wrong view and must be uprooted by the emptiness of things without beginning (emptiness no. 10).
these mistakes (dośa), we must say that beings and things are without beginning.\[^{494}\] Here, in refuting dharmas without beginning by means of anagraśūnyatā, you are falling again into the wrong view that acknowledges the existence of a beginning.

**Answer.** – It is true that by means of anagraśūnyatā I destroy the wrong view of dharmas without beginning, but, nevertheless, I do not fall into the wrong view of acknowledging the existence of a beginning. In order to save a man from fire, it is not necessary to throw him into deep water. Here I am rejecting the dharmas without beginning but I do not, however, accept any dharma with beginning: by doing this, I am following the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad).

**Question.** – Why do you reject dharmas with beginning (anagra)?

**Answer.** – 1) Because they would be non-delimited (anavastha). Being non-delimited, they would not have an end (avara); non-delimited and without end, they would not have a middle (madhya).\[^{495}\]

2) The absence of a beginning would end up by eliminating the Omniscient one (sarvajñā). Why? If saṃsāra were non-delimited, one would not know the beginning and, if no one knew the beginning, there would not be any Omniscient one. If there really is an Omniscient one, there cannot be any question of dharma without beginning.

3) Moreover, some grasp the characteristics of a being (sattvanimittaṃ udgrhaṇanti) and grasp singularities (ekatva, prthaktva) and differences (anyatva) in dharmas.\[^{496}\] As a result of these singularities and differences, they deduce an earlier existence from the present existence and, from the earlier existence, they deduce a still earlier existence and so on. Unable to find a beginning either in beings or in things, they produce the view of dharmas without beginning; but that is a wrong view having singularities and differences as root, which consequently should be rejected.

The emptiness of conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 7) crushes conditioned dharmas. As this emptiness of conditioned dharmas still presents disadvantages, recourse is made to the emptiness of non-conditioned dharmas (asamskṛtaśūnyatā, no. 8) to crush non-conditioned dharmas. Here I have used dharmas without beginning (anagra) to crush dharmas with beginning but, as these dharmas without beginning still present disadvantages, I have again used the emptiness of dharmas without beginning (anagraśūnyatā, no. 10) to crush these dharmas without beginning: this is what is called ‘emptiness of dharmas without beginning’.

**III. FALSE IN ABSOLUTE TRUTH, THE NOTION OF DHARMA WITHOUT BEGINNING IS USED FOR SALVIFIC PURPOSES**

\[^{494}\] A being or a thing having itself a beginning would possess a limit (anavān lokaś cātmā ca) – which is a question to be denied (cf. 155F) – and could not be caused by another: it would arise at random, without cause.


\[^{496}\] For this problem, see J. May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 100, n. 242-243.
Question. – If that is so, why did the Buddha say that “the starting point of beings wandering in transmigration is unknown (sattvānāṃ sāṃsaratāṃ pūrvā koṭir na prajñāyate)”?

Answer. – The Buddha wants beings to know that the transmigration in which we have wandered for so long a time is great suffering (mahāduḥkha) and he wants us to feel a mind of disgust (nirvedacitta) towards it.

1. Sūtras mentioning dharmas without beginning

See what is said in the sūtras:497

[1. Lohitasūtra = Timsamattāsuttanta.] – One single man, transmigrating during one single kalpa, as long as he is taking on existences (ātmabhāva) and suffering torment (upadrava), has collected more blood (lohiṭa) than there is water in the sea.498

[2. Aśrusūtra = Assusuttanta.] – Similarly, while he was weeping, he has wept more tears (aśru) [than there is water in the sea].499

[3. Kṣirasūtra = Khīrasuttanta.] – Similarly, he has drunk more mother’s milk (kṣīra) [than there is water in the sea].500

497 Sūtras all borrowed from the Anamataggasāmyutta.


Taṃ kim maññatha bhikkhave, katamaṃ nu kho bahutaraṃ. yam vā vo iminā dighena addhinā sandhāvataṃ sāṃsaratāṃ sīsacchinnanāṃ lohitam pasannam paggharitaṃ. yam vā catūsu mahāsamuddesu udakam ti / ... etad eva bhante bahutaram yaṃ no ... lohitam pasannam paggharitam.

What do you think, O monks? Which is greater: would it be the blood that you have spilled and spread when you cut off heads whilst you were wandering in saṃsāra on this long road, or would it be the water contained in the four oceans? – Greater, O Lord, is the blood that we have spilled and spread.

499 Assu: Samyutta, II, p. 179-180; T 99, no. 938, k. 33, p. 240c25-241a17; T 100, no. 331, k. 16, p. 486a18-486b23:

Taṃ kim maññatha bhikkhave. katamaṃ nu kho bahutaraṃ. yam vā vo iminā dighena addhinā sandhāvataṃ sāṃsaratāṃ amanāpasamayogā manāpavippayogā kandantānāṃ rodantānaṃ assu pasannam paggharitaṃ. yam vā catūsu mahāsamuddesu udakam ti /... etad eva bhante. bahutaram yaṃ no ... assu pasannam paggharitam.

What do you think, O monks? Which is greater: would it be the tears that you have spilled and spread since you have been weeping in saṃsāra on this long road, crying and weeping at unpleasant things or at being separated from pleasant things, or would it be the water contained in the four oceans? – Greater, O Lord, are the tears we have wept and spread.

500 Khīra: Samyutta, II, p. 180-181; T 99, no. 939, k. 33, p. 241a18-241b8; T 100, no. 332, k. 16, p. 486b24-486c6:

Taṃ kim maññatha bhikkhave. katamaṃ nu kho bahutaraṃ. yam vā vo iminā dighena addhinā sadhāvataṃ

[5. Tiṇakaṭṭhasuttanta.] – If he has cut into two-inch pieces (dvyanīgulī ghatikā) all the shrubs (ṭṛṇa) and trees (kāṭṭhā) of this continent (dvipaka) and used them to count [his predecessors], his father, grandfather, great grandfather, etc., his forebears would be far from completely inventoried [at the time when the slips were completely used up].502

[6. Mrđgulikāsūtra = Pathavīsuttanta.] – If he completely formed the earth (prthivī) into balls of clay (mrđgulikā) and used them to count [his ancestors], his mothers, grandmothers, great grandmothers would be far from completely counted [at the time when the clay balls were completely used up].503

2. These sūtras pursue a salvific goal

samsaratan mātuthaññaṃ pīṭḍham. yam vā ca tiṣṭha mahāsamuddesu udakaṃ ti / ... etad eva bhante abhutaram yaṃ no ... mātuthaññaṃ pīṭḍham.

What do you think, O monks? Which is greater: would it be the mother’s milk that you have drunk while you were crying in samsāra on this long road, or would it be the water contained in the four oceans? – Much greater, O Lord, is the mother’s milk that we have drunk.


O monks, from one single individual who has wandered in samsāra for a kalpa there would come a structure of bones as high as Mount Vaipulya, assuming that these bones could be brought together and the structure not perish.

502 Tiṇakaṭṭha: Sāmyutta, II, p. 178; T 99, no. 940, k. 34, p. 241b12-20; T 100, no. 333, k. 16, p. 486c7-18: Seyyatāpi bhikkhave puriso yaṃ imaṃ jambudīpe tiṇakaṭṭhasaṅkalpāsaṃ tacchettvā ekajjhāṃ samharitvā caturāṅgulaṃ caturāṅgulaṃ ghatikāṃ karitvā nikkhippyeyya. ayamu mātā saṇṭhati me pitu ayam pitā ti. aparipānāna ca bhikkhau tassa purisassa mātā mātaro assa imaṃ jambudīpe tiṇakaṭṭhasaṅkalpāsaṃ parikkhayam pariyaḍānaṃ gaccheyya.

O monks, it is as if a man were to cut all the shrubs, trees, branches, leaves of this Jambudīpa, pile them into a heap, make them into pieces four inches square, then count them down, saying: “This slip is my mother, this next slip is my mother’s mother.” The grandmothers of this man would not be fully counted when the shrubs, trees, branches, and leaves of this Jambudīpa would be [long] used up.

503 Pathavī: Sāmyutta, II, p. 179; T 99, no. 941, k. 34, p. 241b21-c3; T 100, no. 334, k. 16, p. 486c19-28: Seyyatāpi bhikkhave puriso lāmaṃ mahāpaṭhāvihīṃ kolaṭṭhāmattāṃ kolaṭṭhāmattāṃ māttikāgukikāṃ katitvā nikkhippyeyya. ayamu kho me pitā saṇṭha me pitu ayam pīyā ti. aparipānāna ca bhikkhau tassa purisassa pitu pitaro assa. athāyaṃ mahāpaṭhāvi parikkhayam pariyaḍānaṃ gaccheyya.

O monks, it is as if a man changed this great earth into balls of clay the size of a jujube nut, then counted them down, saying: “This clay ball is my father, this next one is my father’s father.” The grandfathers of this man, O monks, would not be completely counted when the great earth would be [long] used up.
The starting point (pūrvā koṭi) of beings who, for innumerable kalpas of this kind, have been suffering the torments of saṃsāra is indiscernible (na prajñayate): this is why the mind feels frightened (bhasya) and cuts through the fetters (samyojana).

Although [the view] of impermanence (anityatādrṣṭi) is an extremist view (antagrāhadrṣṭi), the Buddha utilizes impermanence in order to save beings.504 It is the same with the theory of a beginningless (anagnatā) saṃsāra; even though it may be an extremist [view], the Buddha uses it to save beings. In order to save beings and inspire disgust (nirvedacitta) [for saṃsāra] in them, the Buddha posits [a saṃsāra] ‘without beginning’ (anagra) but it isn’t true. Why? Because if there were a saṃsāra without beginning, [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] would not be talking here about an ‘emptiness of things without beginning’ (anagraśūnyatā).505

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504 The eternalist point of view (sāśvata drṣṭi) and the nihilist point of view (uccheda drṣṭi) are extreme views (antadrṣṭi) opposed to the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad) followed by the Buddha.

Among the fourteen difficult questions (cf. p. 154F seq.) which he did not answer (avvākrtavastu), the Buddha put the question of knowing whether the world and the self are eternal (sāśvato lokaś cātāma ca) or non-eternal (aśāśvato lokaś cātāma ca), and he explained his silence by the uselessness of any reply from the viewpoint of salvation (Dīgha, I, p. 188-189; III, p. 136; Majjhima, I, p. 431; Samyutta, II, p. 223).

However, most people are fearful of nothingness and hope for an eternal world. In order to detach them from this world, the Buddha taught them the impermanence (aniyatā) of the world (see the Aniccavagga of the Samyutta, III, p. 21-25) and showed them how the formations coming from causes (saṅkhāra), untrustworthy (anassāsika): cf. Samyutta, II, p. 191.

That is a wrong view, or rather - as the Buddhas say nothing false – a provisional doctrine foreseeing the spiritual needs of beings to be converted. If the latter had been attached to a transitory and painful world, the Buddha would have taught them the eternity of the world!

In the Prajñāpāramitā and the other Mahāyāna sūtras, the Buddha, who is addressing emancipated listeners this time, sets these things aside: [according to the Mahāyāna] there is neither eternity nor non-eternity (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 240, l. 18; Śatsāhārikā, p. 1618, l. 22: naivaṁra nityan upalabhyaṁ nāniyam). The world is empty of the characteristics of permanence or impermanence.

We have here, in the absence of other qualities, a conclusive and authoritative solution to a problem that for a long time has bothered western exegetists (cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, p. 92-101).

505 Reasoning parallel to that just developed in regard to eternity and non-eternity. The Buddha declined to answer those who were questioning him on the ‘limits’ of the world and asking him if the world and the self do or do not have limits (antavān lokaś cātāma ca, anatavān lokaś cātāma ca).

However, noting the blindness and frenzy with which people go from migration to migration, he inspires in them a healthy fear for this saṃsāra by presenting it as not having any beginning (see Anamataggavagga of Samyutta, II, 178-193).

But here also in the Mahāyāna the necessary correction will be presented by teaching the emptiness of dhammas without beginning (anagraśūnyatā) and by rejecting as absurd the notions of beginning, middle and end (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 240, l. 4-5; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1618, l. 5-6: nāsyā yānasya pūrvānta upalabhyaṁ nāparānta upalabhyaṁ na madhyā upalabhyaṁ).
3. If it is useful, a false doctrine is justified

Question. – If things without beginning are not real dharmas, how can they be used to save people?

Answer. – In the real truth, there are no dharmas to be preached in order to save people: sermons and people to be saved are conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta) and false. It is by the use of his power of skillful means (upāyabala) that the Buddha speaks of dharmas without beginning, but he speaks of them with detachment (nirāsaṅgacitta). Those who hear him also obtain detachment and, by means of detachment, feel distaste (niṛveda) [for saṃsāra].

Moreover, if we use the knowledge of previous existences (pūrvanivāsajñāna), we see that the series of births and deaths (cyutupapādaprabandha) is limitless (anavastha) and at that moment it is true. But if we use the eye of wisdom (prajñācaksus), we see the absolute emptiness (atyaṁśūnyatā, no. 9) of beings (satva) and things (dharna). This is why [the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra] is preaching the emptiness of dharmas without beginning (anagraśūnyatā, no. 10) here.

It is said in the Prajñāpāramitā: “The vision of the eternal (nitya) is not true and the vision of the impermanent (anitya) is not true either: the vision of suffering (duḥkha) is not true and the vision of happiness (sukha) is not true either.” However, the Buddha said that “the eternal and happiness are errors (viparyāsa) whereas the impermanent and suffering are true (satya)” because beings are particularly attached to the eternal and to happiness whereas they are not attached to the impermanent and to suffering. Therefore the Buddha is using the truth of impermanence and suffering to destroy the error about the eternal and happiness: this is why he says that impermanence and suffering are true. But if beings were attached to impermanence and suffering, he would say that impermanence and suffering are empty.

It is the same here for dharmas with or without beginning. [The idea] of non-beginning destroys the error about beginning. But as beings are attached to things without beginning, [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] adds that these things without beginning are empty. This is what is called ‘emptiness of dharmas without beginning’ (anagraśūnyatā).

4. Why are dharmas with beginning not expressly refuted?

Question. – Dharmas with beginning also are wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) and should be refuted. Why does the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra refute only dharmas without beginning here?

The Buddha who so skillfully combines the cares of his apostolate with the exigencies of the truth cannot be accused of contradiction.

506 Pañcavimsati, p. 240, l. 18 (T 223, k. 6, p. 265a25-26); Śatasahasrikā, p. 1618, l. 22-1619, l. 1: Nāpy atra [mahāyāneo] nityam upalabhyate nānityam / na sukhām upalabhīyate na duḥkhām /

507 The second error consists of taking what is painful to be happy (duḥkhe sukhām iti viparyāsa) and the third is taking what is impermanent to be permanent (anitye nityam iti viparyāsa): see p. 1150F.
Answer. – Because dharmas with beginning are obvious errors ($mahābhrānti$). Why is that?

If saṃsāra had a beginning, from the very first existence ($prathamabhāva$), one would be born in good places or in bad places in the absence of any demeritorious or meritorious causes or conditions ($āpattipunyaḥetupratyaya$). - If the birth depended on demeritorious or meritorious cause and conditions, this birth could not be considered as an ‘initial birth’. Why? Because it is necessary to commit wrong-doings ($āpatti$) or gain merits ($puṇya$) in order to go from an earlier existence ($pūrvanivāsa$) to a later existence ($aparabhāva$). – But as saṃsāra has no beginning, these faults ($doṣa$) are avoided.

This is why the bodhisattva, removing at the start a view as coarse and as false [as that of saṃsāra with beginning], often cultivates that of saṃsāra without [291c] beginning and, in view of beings, declares saṃsāra without beginning. Meditating constantly on causes and conditions, he proclaims the non-beginning of these dharmas but, not having yet attained omniscience, it sometimes happens that he erroneously hypostatizes this absence of beginning. It is in order to [combat this error] that the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here of the ‘emptiness of dharmas without beginning’ ($anagraśūnyatā$).

Moreover, when the theory of ‘dharma with beginning’ has been refuted by means of that of ‘dharma without beginning’, there is no longer any need for an emptiness to destroy the ‘dharman with beginning’. And so, the Prajñāpāramitā, now wanting to destroy the theory of ‘dharma without beginning’, speaks here only of an emptiness of dharmas without beginning ($anagraśūnyatā$).

Question. – But if dharmas without beginning destroy the dharmas with beginning, the dharmas with beginning themselves destroy the dharmas without beginning. Then why do you resort here only to emptiness ($śūnyatā$ no. 10) to destroy the dharmas without beginning?

Answer. – Although the two theories [affirming the beginning and the non-beginning of things respectively] are both wrong views ($mithyādṛṣṭi$), there are differences ($viśeṣa$) between them.

Dharmas with beginning are causes and conditions ($hetupratyaya$) giving rise to passions ($kleśa$) and wrong views ($mithyādṛṣṭi$), whereas dharmas without beginning are causes and conditions giving rise to loving-kindness ($maitrī$), compassion ($karuṇā$) and right views ($samyakdṛṣṭi$). Why is that?

In thinking that beings undergo the torments of suffering throughout a beginningless saṃsāra, one experiences a mind of compassion. In knowing that a future lifetime will follow the present lifetime ($ihajanman$) and that the series ($saṃtāna$) of lifetimes will not be interrupted, by knowing that these lifetimes are the fruits of retribution ($vipākaphala$) of wrongdoings ($āpatti$) and merits ($puṇya$), one produces a right view ($samyakdṛṣṭi$).

If a person does not hypostatize this absence of beginning (yaḥ kaścit tām anagrataṁ nābhiviśate), it is a good dharma auxiliary to enlightenment ($bodhipāksikā kuśaladharma$) for him; but if he grasps the characteristic sign ($nimittam udgrhnāti$) and becomes attached to it, it becomes a wrong view.

It is like the view of eternity ($śāśvatadṛṣṭi$) and the view of non-eternity ($aśāśvatadṛṣṭi$): although the view of dharma with beginning destroys the view of dharma without beginning, it does not destroy absolutely (atyaṇtam) the dharmas without beginning, whereas the dharmas without beginning destroy absolutely the dharmas with beginning. That is why these dharmas without beginning are superior.
Similarly, the good (kuśala) destroys the bad (akuśala), and the bad destroys the good, but although they destroy one another mutually, the good alone destroys the bad absolutely (atyantām). Thus, the person who has attained the state of ārya is no longer subject to bad destinies (āpyika). Thus, the person who has committed the five sins of immediate retribution (pañcānantarya) and who has broken the roots of good (kuśalamūla), falls into hell (niraya), but does not stay there longer than one kalpa, after which he escapes from hell and finally realizes the fruits of the path (mārgaphala).

Dharmas without beginning and dharmas with beginning do not have the same strength. The strength of dharmas without beginning is so great that it is able to destroy the dharmas with beginning. That is why the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra does not speak of an ‘emptiness of dharmas with beginning’ [for, in order to destroy them, it is not necessary to have recourse to any emptiness whatsoever].

Avakāraśūnyatā

Ninth Section EMPTINESS 11: EMPTINESS OF DISPERSED DHARMAS

508 At the first moment of the darśanamārga, with the duhkhe dharmajñānakāntā, the ascetic abandons the state of worldly person (prthajana), penetrates into a position of salvation (samyaktvaniyama) and becomes an ārya, candidate for the first fruit, thus escaping from the bad destinies.

509 The person guilty of the five ānantaryas, and especially the fomenter of a schism, like Devadatta, is called to a miserable destiny (āpyika), condemned to hell (nerayika), imprisoned there for a kalpa (kapāṭṭha) and incurable (atekiccha): Vinaya, II, p. 202, 205; Majjhima, I, p. 393; Anguttara, III, p. 402-403; Itivuttaka, p. 11, 85. See above, p. 407F, 868-878F.

510 For the majority of the sources, the eleventh emptiness is anavakāraśūnyatā (dor ba med pa sto ni pa ŋid, wou san k’ong), “relativity of the points that are not to be rejected” (E. Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamayālāṅkāra, p. 134) from which “emptiness of non-repudiation” (E. Conze, Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, ed. 1961, p. 130; ed. 1975, p. 145). This would be the anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa.

But in the Chinese version of the Pañcaviṃśatī by Kumārajīva, it is just a question of a san k’ong, an avakāraśūnyatā, avakāra having the sense of ‘dispersal’ or more precisely, ‘dispersed’ (avakīrṇa), taken in the passive sense, in the same way that the word sanskāra is often taken in the sense of sanskṛta dharma.

It seems indeed that the avakāraśūnyatā is the emptiness of dispersed, divided, dharmas, in the sense that the avakīrṇa dharmas are empty of avakīrṇa dharmas. According to the Traité, these avakīrṇas would not be anything other than dharmas existing as an entity (dravyatas) in contrast to dharmas existing only as designation (prajñaptitas).

The chariot is a good example of prajñaptidharma (cf. Samyutta, I, p. 135; Milindapañha, p. 27): when the spokes, wheels, shaft, and axles are put together, one ‘speaks of the chariot’; when they are scattered (avakīrṇa), one does not speak of the chariot: the chariot has only nominal existence; only its components are real.

I. EMPTINESS OF ASSEMBLED DHARMAS

Some dharmas exist by virtue of an assemblage (saṃyoga), such as the chariot (ratha): when the spokes (ara), wheels (nemi), shaft (iṣā), axles (nābhi) are assembled, there is a chariot; but if they are scattered each in a different place, it loses its name of chariot. When the five aggregates (skandha) are brought together, we speak of a ‘man’ (pudgala), but if the five aggregates are dispersed, the man no longer exists.

II. EMPTINESS OF DISPERSED DHARMAS

Question. – By speaking in this way, you are destroying only the name (prajñapti) of man, but you are not destroying the form (rūpa). By scattering the spokes and wheels, you are destroying the name of chariot but you are not destroying the spokes and wheels. It is the same with your emptiness of the dispersed (avakāraśūnyatā): by dispersing the five aggregates, you are destroying only the man, but you are not destroying the five aggregates, form (rūpa) etc.

Answer. – [The aggregates], form (rūpa) etc., they too are pure denominations (prajñapti) and destroyed. Why? Because these are subtle agglomerated atoms (saṃghāta-paramāṇu) that are named ‘form.’

Except for the Vātsāputriya-Saṃmitīyas who adopt an ambiguous position, all Buddhists accept that the individual (the pudgala), as in the example of the chariot, exists as designation when its components, namely the five skandhas (form, sensation, notion, volition and consciousness), are brought together, but it is not the same question when the latter are separated. These skandhas, on the other hand, even in the scattered state, cannot be reduced and exist as entities (dravyatās) with an intrinsic nature and specific characteristics.

It is precisely against this irreducibility and this stability of the skandhas that the Prajñāpāramitā and the Traité rise up. Whether they are material like rūpa, or immaterial like vedanā, samjñā, the samskāras or viṇāna, the skandhas are decomposable and ruled by the process of causes and conditions. Quite like the pudgala which they are wrongly supposed to constitute, they are pure denominations (prajñapti) and, taken in isolation, these avakīrṇa dharmas are empty of avakīrṇa nature. This is what is called the emptiness of dispersal (avakīrṇaśūnyatā).

Moreover, canonical passages which deny them any reality are not lacking.

Form and the other four skandhas designated under the name of man (pudgala).

The Vaibhāṣikas distinguish two kinds of atoms: i) the monad in the strict sense, the dravyaparamāṇu, not capable of being broken (rūpāṇa) and never existing in the isolated state; ii) the molecule, the samghāṭaparamāṇu, the most subtle among the aggregates of form which, itself, is susceptible of deterioration and of resistance: see Kośa, I, p. 25; II, p. 144.
Question. – As for myself, I do not accept these subtle atoms: I consider what is visible to be matter. This matter is true and really exists. Why would it be dispersed (avakīraṇa) and empty (śūnya)?

Answer. – Even forgetting about (sthāpayitvā) subtle atoms, visible form (sanidāranam rūpam), coming from the assembling of the four great elements (mahābhūta), is itself but a simple name (prajñapti). Just as when the winds (vāyu) of the four directions, having come together, fan the water and produce balls of foam (phenapiṇḍa), so the four great elements, once they have come together, produce matter (rūpa). But if these four great elements are dispersed (avakīraṇa), there is no matter.

Moreover, this matter (rūpa) must be joined with smell (gandha), taste (rasa), touchable (sprāṣṭavya) and the four great elements (mahābhūta) for there to be visible form (rūpaṃ sanidāranam). Outside of this smell, taste, touchable, etc., there is no isolated matter. By means of cognition (jñāna), we distinguish these different constituents but, separately, in isolation, matter does not exist. If matter really existed, there would be, separate from these [constitutive] dharmas, a matter that existed separately; but there is no separate matter.

[Puṇṇamāsutta.] – This is why a sūtra says: “All form exists by the union of the four great elements.”

As it exists by virtue of a union, it is pure denomination (prajñapti); being only denomination, it is dispersible.

Question. – Form (rūpa), as denomination (prajñapti) is dispersible, but how would the other four aggregates (skandha) – [feeling (vedanā), concept (saṃjñā), volition (saṃskāra) and consciousness (vijñāna)] – which are non-material, be dispersible?

Answer. – These four aggregates are pure denomination (prajñapti) as well. In regard to their birth (jāti), their ageing (jarā), their duration (sthiti) and their impermanence (anīyatā), they are dispersed and empty. Why? Because the moment of birth is one, the moment of old age is different, the moment of duration is different and the moment of impermanence is different.

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513 In Kāmadhātu, the molecule involves at least eight substances: the four great elements (mahābhūta) and the four kinds of derived matter (bhautika), the visible, odor, taste and tangible: see Kośa, II, p. 145.


Rūpakāraṇananirmuktaṃ na rūpam upalabhya /
rupeṇa⊙ ni rūpam drśya⊙ rūpakāraṇam //
Rūpakāraṇananirmuktae rūpe rūpam prasajyate /
āhetu⊙ na cāstya atha⊙ kaścid āhetuka⊙ kvacit //

“Form is not perceived free from the cause of form; the cause of form does not appear free from form. – If form is free from the cause of form, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that it is without cause. But nothing exists anywhere without cause” (transl. J. May).

Moreover, in the course of the three times (tryadvan), we notice that these four aggregates are dispersed and perish as well.

Moreover, the mind (citta) follows its object (ālambana): when the object perishes, it perishes; when the object is destroyed, it is destroyed.

Moreover, these four aggregates are indeterminate (aniyata) because they arise as a result of conditions (pratityaya). Just as fire comes into question where there is fuel but does not appear where there is no fuel, so it is because of the eye (cakṣus) and color (rūpa) that visual consciousness (cakṣurviññāna) arises; but if it is separated from its object (ālambana), this consciousness does not exist. It is the same for the consciousnesses relevant to the other organs (indriya).

[Sattvasūtra.] – Thus, in a sūtra, the Buddha said to Lo-t’o (Rādha): “This form aggregate (rūpaskandha), O Rādha, break, destroy, disperse, eliminate it so that it exists no longer. Do the same with the other [four] aggregates. That is the emptiness of dispersion (avakāraṇaśānyatā). For example, look at these children (kumāraka) who are piling up earth and building castles, ramparts, villages, houses. They say that it is rice or wheat flour; they like it, they are attached to it, they keep it and they protect it. But when evening comes, they are no longer interested in them, they tread them underfoot, they break them, destroy them, disperse them and eliminate them. Foolish worldly people (bālaprthagjana) do the same: as long as they do not renounce desire (avītarāga), they have feelings of love (ṛṣṇā) and attachment (saṅga) for dharmas; but as soon as they have renounced desire and see the dharmas, they disperse them (vikiranti), destroy them and reject them.”

[Kātyāyanāvavāda.] – This is what the Kia-chen-yen king (Kātyāyanasūtra) says: “In the person who sees the truth of the origin (samudayasatya), there is no view of non-existence (nāstitāḍṛṣṭi); in the person who sees the truth of cessation (nirodhasatya), there is no view of existence (astitāḍṛṣṭi).”

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516 Sattvasūtra (Tchong-cheng king) of Saṃyutta, T 99, no. 122, k. 6, p. 40a4-18, having as correspondent in Pāli the Sattasutta (from the root saññ?) of the Saṃyutta, III, p. 189-190. As usual, the Traité uses the Sanskrit version which differs slightly in detail from the Pāli version.

Transl. – Similarly, O Rādha, scatter the rūpa, break it, smash it, stop playing with it, and apply yourself to eliminating thirst. [And do the same with vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra and viññāna]. It is like little boys or girls playing with sand castles. As long as they have not lost their passion, desire, fondness, attraction, fever, thirst for these little sand castles, they love them, play with them, save them and claim ownership of them. But, O Rādha, as soon as these little boys and girls have lost their passion, desire, fondness, attraction, fever and thirst for these sandcastles, they immediately break them up with their hands and feet, they smash them and no longer play with them.

- The Traité often calls upon the Rādhasūtra to demonstrate the precariousness and unreality of dharmas: see above, p. 343-345F, and below, p. 2143F.

517 Kaccāyanagotta of Saṃyutta, II, p. 16-17; Kātyāyana of Nidānasamīyukta, p. 167-170 (T 99, no, 301, k. 12, p. 85c17-86a3). Sūtra also called Kātyāyanāvavāda (Madh. vr̥tti, p. 43, 269).

518 Saṃyutta, II, p. 17: Lokasamudayāh kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke naṭhitā sā na hoti / lokanirodham kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passto yā loke atithitā sā na hoti /
For these various reasons, we speak of the ‘emptiness of dispersion’.

Prakṛtiśūnyatā

Tenth Section EMPTINESS 12: EMPTINESS OF ESSENCES

I. THE CONCEPT OF PRAKṛTĪ

Nidānasamuykta, p. 169: Lokasamudayāṃ Kātyāyana yathābhūtaṃ samyakprajñāyā paśyato yā loke nāstītā sā na bhavati / lokanirodham yathābhūtaṃ samyakprajñāyā paśyato yā loke 'stītā sā na bhavati /

519 Taken in the philosophical sense of essence, the word prakṛti, in Pāli, pakati, appears rather rarely in the canonical scriptures of Buddhism. On the other hand, it appears frequently in the Mahāyāna sūtras and above all in the Prajñāpāramitā: Āṣṭasāhasrika, p. 38, 443, 542, 601, 723, 897-898; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 38, 2; 195, 10; 198, 10; 239. 12-240, 3; 253. 18-22; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 118, 17;1407, 4-1412, 7; 1586 seq. The Chinese and the Tibetans render prakṛti by sing (sometimes pen sing) and raṅb€in, terms usually used to translate svabhāva, intrinsic nature or being in itself.

The expressions dharmāṇāṃ dharmac (dharma nature of the dharmas), svarūpa (own form), svabhāva (intrinsic nature), prakṛti (essence), are usually used to designate a non-artifical way of beings (akṛtrina), independent of other (paranirapekṣa), immutable (avyabhicārin).

Victims of an optical illusion which is none other than ignorance (avidyātimira), worldly people (prthagjana) perceive in things the prakṛti thus conceived, and they speak of shared essences, specific essences, etc. The āryas, on the other hand, in this case Buddhists, cured of this optical illusion, cognize them by not seeing them (adarśanayoga). It is actually clear that the assembly of things of becoming, the sarvam, circumscribed by the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana), organs and objects, come from causes and conditions, and neither constitute nor possess at any level any ‘non-artifical essences, independent of other and immutable’. How then to characterize them?

The śrāvakas saw that dharmas coming from causes and conditions (praśyayanupanna) are non-eternal (anitya) and, consequently, painful (duḥkha) and without self (anātman). They declare that conditioned dharmas are ‘empty of me and mine’ (śūnyā ātmānā vātmīyena vā): this is the emptiness of the living being (sattviśūnyatā) which, although refusing any personality to things, recognizes some reality in them.

Following the critique to its ultimate limits, the Madhyamika adds that dharmas, being empty of me and mine, do not exist in themselves, do not exist by themselves and are ‘empty of essence, of the intrinsic nature of dharma’: this is the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).

This is what makes Candrakīrti say (Madh. vr̥ti, p. 265: Sa caiva bhāvānām anutpādeśmahā svabhāvo ‘kincittvenābhāvamātratvād asvabhāvo etet kṛtvā nāsti bhāvavasvabhāv iti vijnayeṣa: “This intrinsic nature of things consists of their non-production; not being anything at all, being only non-being, it is an intrinsic non-nature; therefore the intrinsic nature of things is not” (transl. by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamaka, MCB, II, 1932, p. 41).
Emptiness of essences (prakṛtiśūnyatā). – The prakṛti of dharmas is eternally empty (śūnya) but, borrowing the karmic series (karmaprabandha), it seems not to be empty.

Thus the prakṛti of water (udaka) by itself is cold (śīta); if one brings it close to fire (agni), it becomes hot (uṣṇa); if one puts out the fire, it becomes cold again. [292b] It is the same with the prakṛti of dharmas: a long as the [karmic] conditions are not present, it is empty (śūnya), non-existent (anupaladya), like the prakṛti of water, eternally cold; when the conditions come together, the dharmas exist like the water that becomes hot near the fire; if the conditions become rare or disappear, there are no more dharmas, like the boiling water that becomes cold again when the fire is extinguished.

According to the Madh. vṛtti (l.c.), svabhāva, prakṛti and śūnyatā are synonymous terms signifying a continuous non-production (sarvadānutpāda). The concept – for it is in no way a reality – is ‘inexpressible’ (anakṣara, yi ge med), and not ‘Unwandelbar’ as S. Schayer understands it (Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā, p. 63). It can be neither learned nor taught; it supports neither affirmation nor negation and escapes any expression:

Śūnyam iti na vaktvyam aśīnyaṃ iti vā bhavet /
ubhavyāṃ no bhavyāṃ ceti prajñaptyartham tu kathyate //

“One cannot say that it is empty, or non-empty, or both empty and non-empty, or neither empty nor non-empty. But one is speaking of it in a manner of speaking.” (Madh. vṛtti, p. 264, 444).

The relative truth (samvrtisatya) which sees essences (prakṛti) or intrinsic natures (svabhāva) in things and which multiplies the spurious attributions (adhyāropa) is unable to extinguish the passions. The real truth (paramārthasatya) which sees nothing and which has as definition the non-perception of any dharma (sarvadarmānupalambhaksya) is the only one that can cause the passions to be abandoned and that assures detachment from the world (vīrāga), serenity of mind, ultimate aspiration of all Buddhists whatever Vehicle they belong to.

Here we are touching upon the central point of the Madhyamaka over which the philologists, philosophers and historians of religion clash: a polemic all the more inopportune in that it concerns a realm where there is nothing to be seen or to be conceived. The bibliography of the subject may be found in the list of works cited by J. May, Candrakīrti, Paris, 1959, p. 23-45. For the following years, a mass of information may be found in the recent bibliographic collections where the enormous Japanese production is taken into account: P. Beautrix, Bibliographie du bouddhisme, vol. I: Éditions de Textes, Bruxelles, 1970; Bibliographie de la Littérature Prajñāpāramitā, Bruxelles, 1971; R. A. Gard, Buddhist Text Information (BTI), New York, six sections between Nov. 1974 and March 1976.

The important results to which the research of E. Conze has led are found in a collection of articles published by the author himself: Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, Oxford, 1967.

It is said in a sūtra: “The eye (cakṣus) is empty (śūnya), without ‘me’ (anātman) or ‘mine’ (anātmīya). Why? Because that is its essence (prakṛtisvayā). The ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihvā), body (kāya) and mind (manas), color (rūpa), sound (śabda), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), touch (spṛṣṭavaya) and dharmanas are also like that.”

Samṛddhisūtra of Samyukta (T 99, no. 232, k. 9, p. 56b21-c1), to be compared, as C. Akanuma, Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas, p. 223, would have it, with the Suñnasutta of Samyutta, IV, p. 54. Consisting of well-known stock phrases, the Sanskrit Samṛddhisūtra is easily restored to the original on the basis of the Chinese translation.

Translation of the Sanskrit: Here is what I have heard. Once the Blessed One was dwelling at Śrāvastī, in the Jeta forest, in the garden of Anāthapiṇḍada. Then a monk named Samṛdhhi went to find the Blessed One and having approached him, he bowed to the feet of the Blessed One and sat down at one side. Having seated himself, he said to the Blessed One: It is said, O Lord: “The world is empty.” In what way, O Lord, is it said that the world is empty? Thus questioned, the Blessed One said to Samṛdhhi: The eye is empty, it is empty of permanence and unchangeability; it is empty of ‘mine’. Why? Because that is its essence. The visible, the eye consciousness and also this sensation, unpleasant, pleasant or neither unpleasant nor pleasant, which arises from the contact of the eye as condition, that also is empty, empty of permanence and unchangeability, is empty of ‘mine’. Why? Because that is its essence. It is the same for the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. This is why it is said that the world is empty. Thus spoke the Blessed One; the monk Samṛdhhi rejoiced at the words of the Blessed One and went away.

- The Samṛddhisūtra is cited in the Catuḥsatakajīkā by Candrakīrti, chap. IX, Nityārthapratīṣedho nāma navamaṃ prakaranāṃ (note provided by J. May).


Tibetan: Tib. Trip, 98, 5266, 235.3.7.

J. May comments: Three citations without references. The first is related to Samṛdhhi by the Sanskrit text, to Subhuti (= rab ḷbyor) by the Tibetan version. The second is exactly Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, p. 195, 13-14; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1410, 11-12. The third is a phrase current of common usage.

- Comparison between the Sanskrit Samṛddhisūtra (S) and the Pāli Suññasutta (P).

In S, the interlocutor of the Buddha is Samṛdhhi; in P, it is Ānanda.

The Pāli sources, in P, look for the proof of the non-existence of the ātman (cf. Mahāniddesa, II, p. 439; Cullaniddesa, p. 279; Kathāvatthu, p. 67; Visuddhimagga, ed. H. C. Warren, p. 561). In contrast, the Traité and Candrakīrti resort to S to prove prakṛtisūnyatā. The textual differences between P and S explain this twofold interpretation.

The short formula suñṇam attena vā attaniyena vā which appears in P is very frequent: cf. Majjhima, I, p. 297; II, p. 263; Samyutta, IV, p. 296; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 36; Kathāvatthu, p. 579. – S substitutues for it a longer phrase, in three points: sāsvatenaṃvipariṇāmadhammena śīṇyam āṭiṇyena śīṇyam, in the Chinese translation of the Samyukta, but in six points according to the āṭkā of Candrakīrti: śīṇyam āṭmanā āṭiṭyena ca niṣyena dhruveṇa sāsvatenaṃvipariṇāmadhammena ‘empty of me, empty of mine, eternity, solidity, perpetuity and unchangeability.’

This formula of six points is not known to the Pāli sources (Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 109; II, p. 178; Mahāniddesa, I, p. 222; Cullaniddesa, p. 279; Visuddhimagga, p. 561) which word it as follows: suñṇam attena vā attaniyena vā niccena vā dhuvena vā sasstenā vā avipariṇāmadhammena vā.

According to the Cullaniddesa, p. 278-280, and the Visuddhimagga, p. 561-562, emptiness may be taken under two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve or forty-two aspects. The Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 178, adds that suñṇasuñṇam

520 Samṛddhisūtra of Samyukta (T 99, no. 232, k. 9, p. 56b21-c1), to be compared, as C. Akanuma, Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas, p. 223, would have it, with the Suñnasutta of Samyutta, IV, p. 54.
Moreover, if there is neither ‘me’ nor ‘mine’, one automatically is itself empty [of prakṛti]. Why do you see in it a proof of the emptiness of the prakṛti?

Answer. – In the sūtra, it is merely a question of the emptiness of the prakṛti; it does not speak of the emptiness of beings or of the emptiness of things.

Prakṛtiśūnyatā is of two kinds:

1) In the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana), there is no ‘me’ (ātman) and no ‘mine’ (ātmīya). The emptiness belonging to the twelve bases of consciousness consists of the absence of ‘me’ (anātman) and the absence of ‘mine’ (anātmīya). This is what is said in the system of the śrāvakas.

2) The Mahāyāna system, however, says: i) the twelve bases of consciousness having neither ‘me’ nor ‘mine’ are empty (śūnya); ii) the prakṛti ‘essence’ of the twelve bases of consciousness, being non-existent, is itself empty [of prakṛti].

Moreover, if there is neither ‘me’ nor ‘mine’, one automatically (svarasena) ends up in the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā). Because people are specially attached to their ‘me’ and ‘mine’, the Buddha says only that there is no ‘me’ or ‘mine’. From that we necessarily will know the emptiness of all the dharmas (sarvadharmaśūnyatā, no. 14). To be detached from the dharmas of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ is to be detached from other dharmas a fortiori. This is why the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā) and the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā) finally end up in the same sense (ekārtha) called emptiness of essence (prakṛtiśūnyatā, no. 12) here.

Finally, what is called prakṛti is to exist by itself (svayaṃbhū), independent of causes and conditions (hetupratyayanirapekṣam). That which depends on causes and conditions is a ‘formation’ (saṃskāra) and not a ‘prakṛti’, and in no dharma is there a prakṛti. Why? Because all conditioned dharmas arise from causes and conditions and, since they arise from causes and conditions, they are formations (saṃskāra). If they did not arise from causes and conditions, they would not be ‘dharma’. Therefore it is the absence (anupalabdhitam) of prakṛti in every dharma which is called ‘emptiness of prakṛti’.

‘the emptiness of emptiness’ is precisely the emptiness in six points just discussed. According to the Commentary of the Pañcasambhidā, III, p. 632, the emptiness formed by emptiness which is stated by another accessory word is suññasaññatā (suññasañkhātātāt suññat, na aññena upapadena visesitan ti suññat suññam).

The phrase tat kasya hetoh, prakṛtr asya asaśāt which appears in the Samṛddhīśītra does not occur in the correspondent Suññasutta, but appears frequently in the Mahāyāna sūtras. It plays the role of refrain in the definitions of the sixteen, eighteen or twenty śūnyatā proposed by the long Prajñāpāramitā sūtras: cf. Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā (Tib.Trip., XIX, no. 732, p. 260, fol. 135a8-137b5: T 220, vol. VII, k. 488, p. 480b6-481a1); Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, p. 195, 12-197, 20; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1407, 10-1411, 14. I [Lamotte] would like to think that the phrase in question has been introduced into the Samṛddhīśītra of the Samyuktāgama by a Mahāyānist interpolator. The canonical Tripiṭaka was often the victim of similar manipulations.

Evidently the writer of the response is not reading the same text as that of the objector; see the preceding note.
II. EMPTINESS OF PRAKṚTI AND ABSOLUTE EMPTINESS

Question. – But absolute emptiness (*atyantaśūnya*, no. 9), being nothing at all, is identical with the emptiness of prakṛti. Why do you repeat yourself?

Answer. – Absolute emptiness is [the destruction of dharmas] without any residue (cf. p. 2086F), whereas emptiness of prakṛti consists of being originally and eternally [empty]. The latter is like water which, cold by essence, becomes hot when it is brought to the fire and becomes cold again when the fire is extinguished. Absolute emptiness, however, is like space (*ākāśasama*), ever without production (*anutpāda*), without destruction (*anirodha*), without taints (*asamkleśa*) and without purification (*avyavādāna*). Why do you claim that they are identical?

Furthermore, dharmas are absolutely empty (*atyantaśūnya*). Why? Because their prakṛti is non-existent (*anupalabdha*). – Dharmas are empty of essence (*prakṛtiśūnya*). Why? Because they are absolutely empty.

Finally, the emptiness of prakṛti is particularly cultivated by the bodhisattvas whereas absolute emptiness is particularly cultivated by the Buddhas. Why? In the emptiness of prakṛti there is only a complex of causes and conditions (*hetupratyasāmagraṇī*) but there is no real essence (*bhūtapraṇī*); absolute emptiness itself is pure in the three times (*tryadhvapariṣuddha*): those are the differences.

III. SHARED PRAKṚTIS AND SPECIFIC PRAKṚTIS

The essences (*prakṛti*) of all dharmas are of two kinds (*dvividha*), i) shared [292c] essences (*sāmānyaprakṛti*) and ii) specific essences (*svaprakṛti*).

i) Shared prakṛtis are impermanence (*anityatā*), suffering (*duḥkha*), emptiness (*śūnya*), non-self (*anātman*), non-production (*anutpāda*), non-destruction (*anirodha*), non-coming (*anāgama*), non-going (*anirgama*), non-entering (*apravesa*), non-leaving (*anihsaraṇa*), etc.

ii) Specific prakṛtis are, e.g., the hot essence (*uṣṇatva*) of fire (*tejas*), the moist essence (*dravatva*) of water (*ap*), the intelligent essence (*vijñanatva*) of the mind (*citta*). The man who rejoices in doing evil is said to be ‘of bad essence’; the one who loves to accumulate good things is said to be ‘of good essence’.

As it is said in the Che-li king (*Daśabalasūtra*), “the Buddha knows the world with its many essential dispositions”. 522.

As these prakṛtis are empty, we speak here of the ‘emptiness of the prakṛtis’.

IV. ABSURDITY OF THE SHARED PRAKṚTIS523

522 See above, p. 1507F, the sixth tathāgatabala: Tathāgato anekadhātunādhdhātulokam yathābhūtam praṇānīti.
1. Absurdity of an impermanent prakṛti (anityaprakṛti). – If an impermanent prakṛti really existed, it would ruin the retribution of actions (karmavipāka). Why? Because productions (utpāda), destructions (vyaya) and the past (atīta) would be without duration (sthitī), the six organs (indriya) would not seize their objects (visaya) and there would not be any accumulated causes and conditions (saṃcitahetupratyaya). This accumulation being absent, recitation of the sūtras (sūtraddeśa), meditation (pratisamlayana), etc., would be impossible. This is how we know that an impermanent prakṛti does not exist.

2. Absurdity of a permanent prakṛti (nityaprakṛti). – If an impermanent prakṛti does not exist, what could be said then (kaḥ punarvādaḥ) about a permanent prakṛti?

3. Absurdity of a painful prakṛti (duḥkhaprakṛti).] – Furthermore, a painful prakṛti does not itself exist either. If it were really painful, one would never experience a feeling of attachment (saṅgacitta). The person filled with distaste for and fear of suffering would feel the same distaste and the same fear towards happiness (sukha).

If everything were essentially painful, the Buddha would not have mentioned three kinds of sensations, unpleasant sensation (duḥkhavedanā), pleasant sensation (sukhavedanā) and neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation (adhuhkhāsukhavedanā).

If everything were essentially painful, there would not be the occasion to feel hatred (dveṣa) for suffering, love (rāga) for happiness, worry (moha) towards what is neither painful nor happy. If everything boiled down to a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa) – [that of suffering] – one would feel hatred for happiness and love for suffering, which is absurd.

4. Absurdity of a happy prakṛti (sukhaprakṛti). – If this painful prakṛti is non-existent, what can be said of a happy prakṛti except again that it is false?

5-6. – Absurdity of an empty prakṛti (śūnyaprakṛti) and a real prakṛti (bhūtraprakṛti).] – Moreover, an empty prakṛti does not itself exist either. Why? If there were emptiness (śūnyalakṣaṇa), there would be neither sin (āpatti) nor merit (punya) and, in the absence of sin and merit, there would be no previous existence (pūrvajanman) and no later existence (aparajanman).

Moreover, dharmas exist in interdependence (āpekṣika). Why is that? If there were emptiness, there must be reality, and if there is reality, there must be emptiness. Since the empty prakṛti does not exist, how could there be a reality?

523 To expose the realist conceptions of his adversaries, the author resorts here to a series of ad hominem arguments: he evokes the process of retribution of actions, establishes distinctions between suffering and happiness, between sin and merit, and goes so far as to cite an existent and transmigrating ātman. For all that, he does not accept the pertinence of his argument for non-arising (anutpāda) and non-destruction (anirodha), otherwise called absence of any nature, which for him constitute the true nature of things.

524 See Kośa, IV, p. 242.
7–8. Absurdity of an impersonal prakṛti (anātmakapraṇāti) and of a personl prakṛti. If there were no ātman, there would be neither bondage (bandhana) nor deliverance (mokṣa), one would not go from the present lifetime (iḥajanman) to the future lifetime (aparajanman) to gather [the fruit] of sin (āpatti) and merit (punya), and there would be no fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) caused by actions (karman).

For these reasons we know that an impersonal prakṛti does not exist nor, a fortiori, a personal prakṛti.

9–10. Absurdity of a prakṛti without arising (utpāda) or destruction (nirodha) and a prakṛti with arising and destruction. A prakṛti without arising or destruction is not real either. Why? If it really existed, one would fall into the view of eternalism (sāśvatadṛṣṭi). If all dharmas were eternal, there would be no sin (āpatti) and no merit (puṇya); that which is would exist eternally, and that which is not would never exist; that which is not would not arise, and that which is would not disappear.

If a prakṛti without rising or destruction does not exist, what then can be said of a prakṛti with arising and destruction?

It is the same for the prakṛtis without coming (anāgama) or going (anirgama), without entering (apraveṣa) or leaving (aniḥsaraṇa), and other shared prakṛtis.

V. ABSURDITY OF SPECIFIC PRAKṛTIS

Furthermore, the specific prakṛtis (svaprakṛtis) are also absurd. How is that?

Take, for example, fire (agni): it burns its material of appropriation (upādāyarūpa) and it illuminates. When two dharmas are brought together, we [293a] say there is fire. If outside of these two dharmas there existed a ‘fire’, it would possess separately (prthak) a distinct function (vyāpāra); but actually there is no distinct function. This is how we know that fire is just a designation (prajñapti) and has no reality.

If truly there is no fire-dharma, why do you say that heat (uṣṇatva) is the essence (prakṛti) of fire?

525 The author here is dealing with sūtras and śāstras that attribute to things a well determined mode of being (bhāva) or a specific nature (laksana) which, for example, allocate solidity (khakkhaṭatva) to the element earth (prthivīḥḥatu), moistness (dravatva) to the element water (abdḥātu), heat (uṣṇatva) to the element fire (tejodhātu), lightness-mobility (laghusamudṛṣṭva) to the element wind, etc. (cf. Majjhima, I, p. 185-189; 421-424; III, p. 240-241; Vibhaṅga, p. 82-84; Visuddhimagga, p. 290-293; Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 1, p. 692c11-12; k. 2, p. 699c4-5; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 75, p. 387c-388a; Kośa, I, p. 22). Actually, the specific natures attributed to these elements come from causes and are modified according to circumstances. Consequently the elements are without a true prakṛti ‘existing in itself, independently of other’: they are empty of this unchangeable prakṛti.

526 The Traité summarizes chap. X of Madh, kārikā (Madh. vr̥tti, p. 202-217) in a few lines: there is no element fire having heat (uṣṇatva) as its eternal and immutable essence. Every combustion results from a coming together of a fuel (indhana), the wood to be burned (dāhyam kāṣṭham), and a combustive agent (dagdhā karte), the fire (agni).

But the fire cannot be identical with the fuel nor different from it, as kārikās, x, st. 1-3, explain:

Yad indhanam sa ced aṅgir ekatvam kartrkarmanah/
Moreover, the ‘heat’ essence (usṣṇatvaprakṛti) arises from conditions (pratyaya): inwardly (adhyātmam) there is the body organ (kāyendriya) and outwardly (bahirdhā) there is tangible form (sprastvaya): together they give rise to a tactile consciousness (kāyavijñāna) that perceives the presence of warmth. If [the organ and the tangible] are not brought together, there is no ‘heat’ essence. This is why we know that there is no fixed heat constituting the essence (prakṛti) of fire.

Moreover,\(^{527}\) if fire really had a ‘heat’ essence, how do you explain: first, that some people on entering fire are not burned; secondly, that the fire present in the human body\(^{528}\) does not burn the body; thirdly, that water cannot destroy the fire present in space (variant: in the clouds)? It is because fire does not have as essence (prakṛti) a fixed heat (niyatoṣṇatva): i) by the power of the superknowledges (abhijñā), fire does not burn the body [of some ascetics]; ii) as a result of actions (karman), fire does not burn the five internal organs\(^{529}\) of the human body; iii) by the power of the celestial dragon (nāga), water does not destroy the fire [of space].

Finally, if the ‘heat’ essence (usṣṇatvaprakṛti) were different from fire, fire would not be hot; and if heat were the same as fire, why claim that this heat is the essence of fire?

It is the same with the other prakṛtis. As the shared prakṛtis (sāmanyaprakṛti) and the specific prakṛtis (svaprakṛti) do not exist, the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra proclaims the ‘emptiness of the prakṛtis’ here.

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\(^{527}\) Here the author is setting forth arguments that do not appear in the Madh. kārikā. He shows that in some circumstances fire, external (bāhira) as well as internal (ajjhattika) - i.e., present in the human body – does not burn and consequently does not have fixed nature (nityatalakṣana).

\(^{528}\) Fire is one of the six elements (dhātu) entering into the composition of a human being.

\(^{529}\) See p. 1302F, n. 2.
VI. LONG DURATION IS NOT ETERNITY

Moreover, the emptiness of the prakṛtis is empty from the very beginning (ādīta eva śūnya). But worldly people tell us: “That which is false and does not last for a long time is empty (śūnya); by contrast, Sumeru and diamond (vajra) [which last for a long time], the things known by the saints (āryapudgala) [which are not false], we hold them to be real (bhūta) and not empty.” – In order to cut through this error, the Buddha said: “Even solid things (dhruva) forming series (saṃtāna, prabandha) and lasting for a long time are empty of essence (prakṛtisūnya) and, although the wisdom (prajñā) of the saints saves beings and destroys the passions, the prakṛtis [of which they speak] are non-existent (anupalabdha) and consequently empty.”

People still say: “The five aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana) and the eighteen elements (dhātu) are all empty. Only suchness (tathatā), the fundamental element (dharmadhātu), the highest culminating point of the truth (bhūtakoṣṭi) are true essences (bhūtaprakṛtī).” – In order to cut through this error, the Buddha simply said: “The five aggregates (skandha), but also suchness, the fundamental element and the culminating point of the truth are empty.” This is called the emptiness of the essences (prakṛtiśūnyatā).

Finally the prakṛtis of conditioned dharmas (saṃkṛta) have three characteristics (lakṣaṇa): production (upāda), duration (sthiti) and disappearance (vyaya).530 The prakṛtis of unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta) also have three characteristics: non-arising, non-duration and non-disappearance. If the conditioned prakṛtis are empty, what can be said then (kāḥ punarvādaḥ) about the conditioned dharmas? And if the non-conditioned prakṛtis are empty, what can be said then of the non-conditioned dharmas?

For these many reasons, the prakṛtis are non-existent (anupalabdha), and this is what is called ‘emptiness of the prakṛtis’.

Svalaṅkaṇaśūnyatā

Eleventh Section EMPTINESS 13: EMPTINESS OF SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS

I. THE TWO TYPES OF CHARACTERISTICS

Emptiness of specific characteristics (svalaṅkaṇaśūnyatā). – All dharmas have two kinds of characteristics (lakṣaṇa), i) shared characteristics (sāmānakālaṃskaṇa) and ii) specific characteristics (svalaṅkaṇa). These

530 Cf. p. 36-37F, 1163F.
two kinds of characteristics being empty, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here of the ‘emptiness of characteristics’ (lakṣanaśūnyatā).

Question. – What are the shared characteristics and what are the specific characteristics?

Answer. – The shared characteristics are impermanence (anityatā), etc., for example. The specific characteristics, in the sense that dharmas, although they are impermanent, each possess their own specific characteristic. Thus, for the earth (prthivī), it is solidity (khakkhaṭatva), for fire, it is heat (uṣṇatva).

II. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS AND ESSENCES

Question. – Above you have already spoken about essences (prakṛti) and here you are speaking about characteristics (lakṣana). Are essences and [293b] characteristics the same or different?

Answer. – 1) Some say that their reality (tattva) is not different but that their names (nāman) show differences (viśeṣa). To talk about essence (prakṛti) is to talk about characteristic, and to talk about characteristic is to talk about essence. For example, we say that the essence of fire (tejaḥprakṛti) is the characteristic of heat (uṣṇatvalakṣana) and that the characteristic of heat is the essence of fire.

2) Others say that between essence (prakṛti) and characteristic (lakṣana) there are slight differences: the essence concerns the very nature (kāya) of the thing, whereas the characteristic is its indication or sign (vijñeya).

Thus, in the follower of the Buddha (Śākyaputrīya), the taking of the precepts (śīlamādāna) constitutes the essence whereas the shaving of the head (muṇḍana) and the wearing of the yellow robe (kāṣāyavastra) constitute the characteristics. In a brahmačārin, the religious vows (dharmasamādāna) constitute the essence whereas the tuft of hair at the top of the head (cūḍā) and the carrying of the staff (tridāṇḍa) constitute the characteristics. Fire (tejas) has heat as its essence and smoke (dhūma) as its characteristic. Proximity is essence while distance is characteristic.

The characteristics are not fixed (aniyata) and leave the body; the essence expresses the reality (tattva) of the thing. Thus when one sees a yellow (pīṇa) substance, one thinks it is gold (suvarṇa), but in itself it is copper (tāmra): in melting it or rubbing it with a stone, one recognizes that it does not have gold as its essence. The person who shows respect (gurukāra) and veneration (satkāra) seems to be an honest man, but that is only a superficial characteristic: abuse, criticism, anger and rage are his true essence.

531 Adopting the variant san k’i tchang, utensil belonging to the tridāṇḍin parivrājakas, in Pāli tedāṇika. Jātaka, II, p. 317, defines the tedāṇika: kunḍikam thapanathāya tidāṇḍam gahetvā caranto “who walks carrying a triple rod to fasten his water-pot onto” (ref. A. Foucher, AgbG, II, p. 262, n. 1). Illustrations of this staff, ibid, I, fig. 277, 279, 281, 282; II, fig. 437.
These are the differences (viśeṣa) between essence and characteristic, interior and exterior, distance and proximity, anteriority and posteriority. All these characteristics beings empty, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here about ‘emptiness of characteristics’ (lakṣaṇaśūnyatā).

III. SHARED CHARACTERISTICS

1. Impermanence

As it is said, “all conditioned dharmas have an impermanent characteristic (anityalakṣaṇa).” Why?

1) Because they arise, perish and do not last.

2) Because, not existing previously, they exist now and, after having existed, they will return to non-existence.

3) Because they depend on causes and conditions (hetupratyāyāpekṣa).

4) Because they are deceptive and dishonest.

5) Because they arise from impermanent causes and conditions.

6) Because they come from associated causes and conditions.

For these reasons, all conditioned dharmas have an impermanent characteristic.

2. Suffering

Arousing bodily and mental torments, they are a mass of suffering (dukhkasandha).

1) Because the four postures (īryāpatha) are never without suffering.532

2) Because the holy truth of suffering (dukhāryasatya) [proclaims them to be suffering].

3) Because the saints (āryapudgala) reject them and do not accept them.

4) Because they never stop tormenting.

5) Because they are impermanent (anitya).

For these reasons, they have the characteristic of suffering (dukhkalaksāna).

3. Empty

532 Every position, when it is prolonged, because painful: see p. 584F.
1) Not belonging to the ‘me’ (anātmiya), they are empty (śūnya).

2) Coming from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyahasmagri), they are empty.

3) Being impermanent (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and impersonal (anātman), they are empty.

4) Because there is neither beginning nor end in them, they are empty.

5) Because they deceive the mind, they are empty.

6) Because the saints are not attached to any of them, they are empty.

7) By virtue of the two gates of deliverance (vimokṣasamukha), namely, signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apraṇihita), they are empty.

8) Because the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas is immense (apramāṇa) and incalculable (asamkhyeya), they are empty.

9) Because [this true nature] cuts all the paths of speech (sarvadārga), they are empty.

10) Because [this true nature] destroys all functioning of the mind (sarvacittapravṛtti), they are empty.

11) Because the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas and arhats who penetrate [into this true nature] do not come out of it, they are empty.

For these reasons, they have the empty characteristic (śūnyalakṣaṇa).

4. Without self

Being impermanent (anitya) suffering (duḥkha) and empty (śūnya), these dharmas are without self (anātman).

1) Not being autonomous (asvatantra), they are without self.

2) Without master (asvāmika), they are without self.

3) None of them is born without causes and conditions but they all come from causes and conditions; therefore they are without self.

4) By virtue [of the two gates of deliverance], namely, signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apraṇihita), they are without self.

5) Being only simple designations (prajñapti), they are without self.

[293c] 6) Belief in the person (satkāyadṛṣṭi) being an error (viparyāsa), they are without self.

7) Because bodhi is found by destroying the idea of self (ātmacittā), they are without self.
For these many reasons, conditioned dharmas are without self. All this has dealt with the shared characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa).

IV. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS

Earth (prthivi) has as characteristic solidity (khakkhatvatva); fire (tejas) has as characteristic heat (uṣṇatva); water has as characteristic moistness (dravatva); wind (vāyu) has as characteristic motion (īraṇa).

The eye (cakṣus) has as characteristic being the support of the visual consciousness (cakusurvijñāna); and [mutates mutandis] it is the same for the ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihva) and body (kāya).

Consciousness (vijñāna) has as characteristic investigation (vitarka); knowledge (jñāna) has as characteristic wisdom (prajñā); generosity (dāna) has as characteristic renunciation (parityāga); morality (śīla) has as characteristic absence of regret (akaukṛtya) and absence of violence (avihiṃsā); patience (kṣānti) has as characteristic absence of irritation (akopana); exertion (vīrya) has as characteristic effort (abhyutsaha); trance (dhyāna) has as characteristic concentration of the mind (cittasamgraha); wisdom (prajñā) has as characteristic mental detachment (asanīga), skillful means (upāya) has as characteristic the creation of objects (vastusampādana); samsāra has as characteristic the weaving of births and deaths (cyutypapāda); nirvāṇa has as characteristic non-weaving.533

Such dharmas each has its own specific characteristic and we should know that these characteristics are empty: this is what is called ‘emptiness of specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā). For other meanings, refer to what has been said about the emptiness of essences (prakṛtiśūnyatā, no. 12) since essence (prakṛti) and characteristic (lakṣaṇa) are synonyms.

V. WHY INSIST ON THE EMPTINESS OF ‘SPECIFIC’ CHARACTERISTICS?

Question. – Why does [the Prajñāpāramitāśutra] not simply say ‘emptiness of characteristics’ (lakṣaṇaśūnyatā) but says ‘emptiness of specific characteristics’ (svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā)?

Answer. – To say just emptiness of characteristics is to pass over in silence the fundamental emptiness of dharmas; to speak of the emptiness of specific characteristics is to deal with the fundamental emptiness of dharmas.533

533 In these two lines, adopt the variant tche ‘to weave’ (in Sanskrit, vā) in place of che ‘to cognize’. It is one of the very imaginative etymologies for the word nir-vāna, ‘the non-weaving of births and deaths’ in opposition to samsāra which weaves them. It has already appeared in the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 32, p. 163b4-6: Vāna means ‘weaving’, nir is negative: the threads of the passions and actions are absolutely absent in it; one does not weave the cloth that has births and deaths as fruit of retribution.

For other etymologies, see references in L. de La Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, p. 54, n. 4.
Moreover, every dharma, arising from a group of causes and conditions, is an empty dharma and thus each dharma taken individually is empty. The grouped causes and conditions forming a succession of dharmas (dharmaparamparā) is itself empty as well. Thus all dharmas are each empty of specific characteristic. This is why the emptiness of specific characteristics is spoken of here.\textsuperscript{534}

\section*{VI. WHY CARRY ON ABOUT EMPTY DHARMAS?}

Question. – If all dharmas are each empty of intrinsic characteristics, why talk about it again?

Answer. – As a result of mistakes (viparyāsa), beings become attached (abhiniviśante) to these dharmas by finding in them characteristics of identity (ekatva) or difference (anyatva), shared characteristics (sāmānyalaksana) or specific characteristics (svalaksana). It is in order to destroy them that we speak of them here. For all these reasons, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra asserts an emptiness of specific characteristics.

\textbf{Sarvadharmaśūnyatā}

\textbf{Twelfth Section EMPTINESS 14: EMPTINESS OF ALL DHARMAS}

Emptiness of all dharmas (sarvadharmaśūnyatā). – By ‘all dharmas’ we mean the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana) and the eighteen elements (dhātu).

\section*{I. UNITARY CATEGORIES IN EVERY DHARMA}

Throughout, these dharmas belong to many categories (mukha),\textsuperscript{535} in the sense that all dharmas have: 1) a characteristic of existence (bhāvalaksana); 2) a characteristic of knowledge (jñānalaksana); 3) a characteristic of consciousness (vijñānalaksana); 4) a characteristic of object (ālabanalamakṣaṇa); 5) a characteristic of dominance (adhipatilaksana); 6) a characteristic of cause (hetulaksana) and a characteristic of effect (phalalaksana); 7) a shared characteristic (sāmānyalaksana) and a specific characteristic (svalaksana); 8) a characteristic of support (āśrayalaksana).

\textsuperscript{534} Obscure passage; the general sense seems to be as follows. Taken in isolation, every dharma to which scholasticism attributes a specific characteristic is empty of this characteristic for it is the result of a complex of causes and conditions. The latter, which contribute to its formation, are empty themselves as well, for in their turn they are dependent on other (paratantra).

\textsuperscript{535} Conditioned dharmas (sāmkṛta) constituting the ‘All’ are capable of diverse classifications that have been detailed several times already: see above, p. 642-646F, 1095-1104F, 1748-1751F.
1) How do all dharmas have a characteristic of existence (bhāvalakṣaṇa)? Among all these dharmas, there are some beautiful (suvarṇa) and some ugly (duvrṇa), there are some internal (ādhyātmika) and some external (bāhya). All dharmas, being [a place] of arising for the mind, are said to be existent.\footnote{For the Sarvāstivādins, only existing dharmas can be objects of consciousness; on the other hand, the Sautrāntikas think that the existing and the non-existing (bhāva, abhāva) can both be object of the consciousness: see Kośa, V, p. 60-62.}

Question. – How could a characteristic of existence be attributed to an adharma?

Answer. – The adharma is not a 'dharma': only because it is counter to existence (bhāva) is it called adharma. If it were really an adharma, it would be 'existent'. This is why it is said that all dharmas have a characteristic of existence.

2) They have a characteristic of knowledge (jñānalakṣaṇa).

a. The knowledge of suffering (duḥkhe dharma) and the subsequent knowledge of suffering (duḥkke 'navayajñāna) cognize the truth of suffering (duḥkhsatya).

b. The knowledge of the origin (samudaye dharma) and the subsequent knowledge of the origin (samudaye 'nvayajñāna) cognize the truth of the origin (samudayasatya).

c. The knowledge of the destruction (nirodhe dharma) and the subsequent knowledge of the destruction (nirodhe 'nvayajñāna) cognize the truth of the destruction (nirodhasatya).

d. The knowledge of the Path (mārga dharma) and the subsequent knowledge of the Path (mārga 'nvayadharmajñāna) cognize the truth of the Path (mārgasatya).\footnote{In all, eight knowledges (jñāna), preceded by ksānti, and acquired during the Darśanamārga.}

e. The good conventional knowledge (samvr̥ti dharma) cognizes suffering (duḥkha), the origin (samudaya), the destruction (nirodha), the Path (mārga), and also cognizes space (ākāśa) and cessation not due to wisdom (apratisamkhyānirodha).

Therefore it is said that all dharmas have a characteristic of knowledge and, by means of this characteristic of knowledge, embrace (samgrhaṇanti) all dharmas.

3) They have a characteristic of consciousness (vijñānalakṣaṇa):

a. The eye consciousness (cakṣuviṣayāna) perceives color (rūpa).

b. The ear consciousness (śrotra viṣayāna) perceives sound (śabda).

c. The nose consciousness (ghrāṇaviṣayāna) perceives odor (gandha).

d. The tongue consciousness (jihvāviṣayāna) perceives taste (rasa).

e. The body consciousness (kāya viṣayāna) perceives the tangible (prasāṭavya).

f. The mental consciousness (manaviṣayāna) perceives dharmas and [consequently] the eye, color and the eye consciousness; the ear, sound and the ear consciousness; the nose, smell and the nose consciousness;
the tongue, taste and the tongue consciousness; the body, touch and the body consciousness; the mind 
\((\text{manas})\), dharmas and the mental consciousness.\(^{538}\) Therefore it is said that all dharmas have a characteristic of consciousness.

4) They have a characteristic of object \((\text{ālambanalakṣaṇa})\).

\(a\). The eye consciousness \((\text{cakṣurūjñāna})\) and the dharmas associated with the eye consciousness \((\text{cakṣurūjñānasamprayuktadharma})\) seize \((\text{ālambante})\) color \((\text{rūpa})\).

\(b\). The ear consciousness \((\text{śrūtrūjñāna})\) and the dharmas associated with the ear consciousness seize sound \((\text{śabda})\).

\(c\). The nose consciousness \((\text{ghrāṇavijñāna})\) and the dharmas associated with the nose consciousness seize smell \((\text{gandha})\).

\(d\). The tongue consciousness \((\text{jihvāvijñāna})\) and the dharmas associated with the tongue consciousness seize taste \((\text{rasa})\).

\(e\). The body consciousness \((\text{kāyavijñāna})\) and the dharmas associated with the body consciousness seize the tangible \((\text{spraṣṭaya})\).

\(f\). The mental consciousness \((\text{manovijñāna})\) and the dharmas associated with the mental consciousness seize dharmas, and [consequently] the eye, color and the eye consciousness; the ear, sound and the ear consciousness; the nose, smell and the nose consciousness; the tongue, taste and the tongue consciousness; the body, touch and the body consciousness; the mind \((\text{manas})\), dharmas and the mental consciousness.

Therefore it is said that all dharmas have a characteristic of object.

5) They have a characteristic of dominance \((\text{adhipatilakṣaṇa})\).

\(a\). All conditioned dharmas \((\text{saṃskṛta})\) are, each separately, dominant.\(^{539}\)

\(b\). Unconditioned dharmas \((\text{asaṃskṛta})\) also are dominant in respect to conditioned dharmas.

Therefore it is said that all dharmas have a characteristic of dominance.

6) They have characteristics of cause and effect \((\text{hetuphalalakṣaṇa})\): all dharmas are each both cause and effect.

Therefore it is said that all dharmas have the characteristics of cause and effect.

7) They have a shared characteristic \((\text{sāmānyalakṣaṇa})\) and a specific characteristic \((\text{svalakṣaṇa})\).

In every dharma, there is a shared and a specific characteristic for each. For example, the horse is a shared characteristic, but its whiteness is a specific characteristic. The man is a shared characteristic, but the fact

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\(^{538}\) Whereas the first five consciousnesses are strictly limited to their own object, the mental consciousness applies, in addition, to the objects of the other five consciousnesses: see above, p. 643F and note.

\(^{539}\) All dharmas are dominant \((\text{adhipati})\) as raison d’être \((\text{kāraṇahetu})\) in regard to all, themselves excepted \((\text{svato ‘nye kāraṇahetu})\): cf. Kośa, II, p. 246.
that he has lost an ear is a specific characteristic. Thus for each series (paramparā) there is a generic and a specific characteristic.

Therefore it is said that all dharmas have a shared and a specific characteristic.

8) They have a characteristic of support (āśrayalaksana).

Taken separately and together, dharmas rely upon one another (anyo ‘nyāśrita). For example, the plants, the trees, the mountains and the rivers rest on the earth (prthivī) and the earth rests on the water (ap). Thus, as all things rest one upon the other, it is said that all dharmas have a characteristic of support, and that this characteristic of support embraces (sāṃgrhnati) all dharmas.

These unitary categories of dharma are applicable to every dharma.

II. GROUPS OF SEVERAL DHARMAS

Moreover, groups of two dharmas include all dharmas: material (rūpin) dharmas and immaterial (arūpin) dharmas; visible (sanidrśana) and invisible (anidrśana), resistant (sapratiḥga) and non-resistant (apratiḥga), impure [294b] (sāsrava) and pure (anāsrava), conditioned (samskṛta) and unconditioned (aṃskskṛta), inner (adhyāma) and outer (bahirdrāḥ), vision-dharma and object-object, existence-dharma and nonexistence-dharma, and many other binary groups of this kind.

Groups of three, four, five, six and even an infinity of dharmas include all dharmas.

These dharmas are all empty (śūnya) as I have said above (p. 2086F): this is what is called the ‘emptiness of all dharmas’ (sarvadharmaśūnyatā).

III. WHAT IS THE USE OF MAKING LISTS OF EMPTY DHARMAS?

Question. – If dharmas are all empty, why give them different names (nānāvidhanāman)?

Answer. – Out of ignorance (avidyā) or error (viparyūsa), worldly people seize characteristics (nimittāny udgrhnanti) in empty dharmas and thus give rise to the conflicting emotions, such as desire (trṣnādikleśa). As a result of these passions, they carry out all kinds of actions (karman). Carrying out all kinds of actions, they enter into all sorts of destinies (gati). Entering into all sorts of destinies, they take up all kinds of existences (gati). Taking up all kinds of existences, they suffer all kinds of suffering (duḥkha) and happiness (sukha). They are like the silk-worm (kośakāra) that, emitting silk (kausēya) without any reason,
becomes rolled up (pariveṣṭayati) within this silk that came out of itself and undergoes the torments of cooking (pacana) or boiling water. By the power of his pure wisdom (viśuddhaprajñā), the saint analyzed all these dharmas which, from beginning to end, are empty, Wanting to save beings, he speaks to them of these places of attachment (abhinivīśāsthāna) that are the five skandhas, the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana) and the eighteen elements (dhātu) and says to them: “You others, it is only out of ignorance (avidyā) that you give rise to the five aggregates, etc.; and you become attached to what you yourselves have made.”

If the saint spoke only about emptiness, beings would not find bodhi, for this emptiness, being caused by nothing, would not call forth disgust (nirveda).

IV. NEW CONTROVERSY IN REGARD TO EMPTINESS

1. The specific characteristics of conditioned dharmas are empty and indeterminate

542 Cf. H. Lamasse, Sin kouo wen or New manual of the written Chinese language, 2nd ed., Hong Kong, 1922, p. 212-213: The eggs of the silk-worm (ts'an) begin to hatch between spring and summer; they crawl about like black ants; after having grown somewhat, they moult their skin, four times in all; after 30 to 40 days, they spin a cocoon (kien) by emitting silk (sseu) from their mouths. When their thread is ended, they change into a chrysalis (yong), nestled in the center of the cocoon, without eating and motionless; ten days later, having transformed into a butterfly (ngo), they break their cocoon and escape…Once the silk-worm has finished its cocoon, the silk (sao sseu) may be unwound. Here is the method: the cocoons are boiled in a pot in order to dissolve the viscous substance with which they are covered; then someone searches for the end (siu) to unwind it (tch ’eou) and it is unraveled onto the skein winder (sseu kiu). If the cocoons are too numerous, they cannot be unwound, so first of all they are dried near a fire (hong) in order to kill the chrysalis so that it will no longer change into a butterfly; in these conditions, it is possible to keep them for a long time without spoiling.

In the words of the Vinayas, the bhikṣus cannot ask the silk manufacturer to cook or to boil the cocoons so as to make mats mixed with silk (kosiyaṃsaka santhata), for such a measure involves the destruction of numberless small creatures (khuddaka pāṇa). Violating this precept constitutes a naiḥsargikapāṭayantika, a fault involving confiscation: cf. Pāli Vinaya, III, p. 224; Mahāsāsaka Vin., T 1421, k. 5, p. 35a; Mahāsāṃghika Vin., T 1425, k. 9, p. 307c (cf. Prātimokṣasūtra of the Mahāsāṃghika, ed. W. Pachow, 1956, p. 17, 25-26); Dharmaguptaka Vin., T 1428, k. 7, p. 613c; Sarvāstivādin Vin., T 1435, k. 7, p. 47c (cf. V Rosen, Der Vinayavinbhanga der Sarvāstivādīn, p. 90); Mulasarvāstivādin Vin, T 1442, k. 20. p. 735c.

In the Buddhist texts, the foolish worldly folk who get entangled in their imaginations and their wrong views are often compared to the silkworms that surround themselves with their own thread (Laṅkāvatāra, p. 162, 2-4: kausyevakrīmaya iva sūrenātmānam parām ca pariveṣṭavantī). See also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 48, p. 247c13-14; Abhidharmāvatāra, T 1554, k. 2, p. 985a6-7; Nairṛtmyapariścchā, T 1643, p. 172b29 (but the original Sanskrit says only veṣṭita); Catuḥṣatyaśāstra, T 1647, k. 1, p. 376b5; Ratnakūta, T 310, k. 83, p. 482e11; k. 109, p. 612a27-28; k. 110, p. 617a8, 622b17; k. 120, p. 680c11; Northern Mahāparinirvāṇ, T 374, k. 2, p. 373b10; k. 9, p. 419b6; Traité, k. 90, p. 697a16-17.a

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Question. – You say that all dharmas are empty, but that is not correct. Why? Because all dharmas are integrated (saṃgrhita) each within their own specific characteristic (svālakṣaṇa). Earth (prthīvī) has as characteristic solidity (khakkhaṭatva), water (ap) has as characteristic moistness (dravatva), fire (tejas) has as characteristic heat (uṣṇatva); wind has as characteristic motion (īrāna), the mind (citta) has as characteristic discernment (prativijñapti), wisdom (prajñā) has as characteristic knowledge (jñāna). All these dharmas reside each in its own characteristic. Why do you say they are empty?

Answer. – I have already refuted that in connection with the emptiness of essences (prakṛtiśūnyatā, no. 12) and the emptiness of specific characteristics (svālakṣaṇaśūnyatā, no. 13), but I must repeat myself here.

1) Since the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) are not determinate (aniyata), they are not real characteristics. Thus, cheese (sarpis), honey (madhu), glue (gavyadrīḍha), wax (lākṣa), etc., have the characteristic of earth (prthiṭalakṣaṇa), [namely, solidity]; but if they are brought near fire (agnī), they lose their own characteristic and take on the characteristic of moistness (dravatva) [which is that of water]. If gold (suvarṇa), silver (rajata), copper (tāmra) and iron (ayas)  are brought to the fire, they also lose their own characteristic and take on that of water [namely, moistness]. Water (ap) in cold weather, becomes ice (hima) and takes on the characteristic of earth, [namely solidity]. A man who is drunk (unmada), or asleep (supta) or a man who is in the absorption without mind (asamjñisamāpatti), a frozen fish (matsya), have neither mind (citta) nor consciousness (vijñāna); they lose their characteristic of thinking and no longer have any discernment (prativijñapti). Wisdom (prajñā), which has knowledge (jñāna) as characteristic, as soon as it penetrates the empty nature (bhūtālakṣaṇa) of dharmas, no longer has discernment and loses its characteristic of knowledge.543 This is why the dharmas have no determined characteristic.

2) Moreover, it is not correct that dharmas have a determined characteristic (niyatalakṣaṇa). Why? The characteristic of future (anāgata) dharma cannot come into the present (pratyutpanna) for, if it did come into the present, it would lose its character of future. If it came into the present without losing its characteristic of future, the future would be the present, and there would no longer be any fruit of retribution (vipakaphala) in the future. – If the present (pratyutpanna) entered [294c] into the past (atīta), it would lose its character of present. If it entered into the past without losing its characteristic of present, the past would be the present.544 From all these faults (doṣā), we know that dharmas have no fixed characteristic.

2. Unconditioned dharmas are without characteristics

543 The author touches the very depths of the autocritique. His perfection of wisdom is the absence of any knowledge.

544 From the non-existence of the three times follows not only the subjective nature of dharmas but also their non-production: cf. above, p. 76-79F, 377F, 1690-1696F, 1086F.
Moreover, if as you assert, unconditioned (asamskṛta) dharmas exist in a definite way, they would each separately have a specific characteristic (svālakṣaṇa), in the same way that fire (tejas) has the characteristic of heat (uṣṇatva-lakṣaṇa). But [by definition], it is the fact of not depending on a foreign cause (aparahaṇa) that constitutes their nature. This is why we know that unconditioned dharmas, having no characteristic, are really non-existent.

If you say that the cessation not due to knowledge (apratisamkhyānirodha) takes place in the future existence (anāgatajanmante), it would be a conditioned dharma (samskṛta) whereas, [by definition], there is no conditioned dharma there.

If you say that the cessation not due to knowledge (apratisamkhyānirodha) has ‘cessation’ (nirodha) as characteristic, that also is not correct. Why? Because here it is a matter of the characteristic of cessation due to impermanence (anityatā) and not the characteristic of the cessation not due to knowledge (apratisamkhyā).  

For these many reasons, there is no determinate characteristic. If dharmas had a determinate characteristic, they would be real (aśūnya). Outside of determinate characteristic, there can be no real dharma.

3. Even the dharmas known by the saints are empty

Question. – There really must be some non-empty (aśūnya) dharmas. Why? Because there are differences between the things known by worldly people (prthagjana) and the things known by the saints (āryapudgala): the things known by worldly people are false, those known by the saints are true. One depends on the true knowledge of the saints to reject false dharmas; one cannot rely on lies to destroy lies.

Answer. – Destroying the things known by worldly people, that is the knowledge of the saints. But in the absence of worldly people, there are no dharmas of the saints, just as in the absence of illness (vyādhi), there is no medicine (bhaṣajya). This is why a sūtra says: “Without the dharmas of worldly people, there

Apart from the ākāśa, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, along with some other schools, assert two unconditioned or asamskṛtas: 1) The cessation of desire is acquired by a pure knowledge, the comprehension of the truths, to which the name of pratisamkhyā ‘discriminative consciousness’ is given: it is therefore called pratisamkhyānirodha (= pratisamkhyāya nirodha): cessation obtained by knowledge; 2) At the death of the saint, the future lifetime or rebirth is destroyed. This cessation which presuposes knowledge is not its result: it consists of the absolute prevention of arising (upādyatvayantavighna: Kośa, I, p. 20): it is therefore called apratisamkhyānirodha, cessation not due to knowledge.

In the words of the Traité, the Sarvāstivādins are wrong to place the efficacy of what they consider to be a cessation ‘in itself’ in the future. An entity undergoing the process of time and impermanence (anityatā) presents characteristics directly opposite to those of an asamskṛta which, by definition, is without production, without cessation and without duration-change. Thus the asamskṛtas as well have no fixed characteristic.
are no dharmas of the saints. The true nature of the dharmas of worldly people, that is the dharmas of the saints."

Moreover, saints do not seize any characteristic (nīmitta) in dharmas and do not become attached to them (nābhavinivīśante); that is why the dharmas of the saints are really true. By contrast, worldly people seize characteristics in dharmas and are attached to them: that is why the dharmas of worldly people are false.

Although the saints use [empty dharmas], they do not seize any characteristics in them and, if they do not seize any characteristics, it is because these dharmas are without determinate characteristics (niyatalakṣaṇa). Thus there is no objection to be removed.

In the stages of the worldly people (prthagjanabhūmi), one is attached to the dharmas and makes distinctions between what is worldly dharma and what is saintly dharma. In the stages of the saints (āryabhūmi), one does not make any distinctions (vibhaṅga) and it is only in order to destroy the sicknnesses of beings that one says that such and such a thing is false and such and such another thing is true. Thus it is said: “The word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) is neither false nor true, neither bondage (bandhana) nor deliverance (mokṣa), neither sameness (ekatva) nor difference (anyatva); this is why it is free of imagination (nirvikalpa) and pure like space (ākāśasama).”

Finally, if dharmas were not entirely empty, it could not be said: “Absence of idle chatter (nīḥprapañca) is appropriate for the saints.” Neither could one say: “Indifference (anadhyavasāna), detachment (asaṅga) and groundlessness (apratiṣṭhāna), emptiness (śūnya), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apraṇihita) are the true teaching.”

4. Emptiness itself is empty

Question. – If the emptiness of all dharmas (sarvadharmaśūnyatā) is true, why do you say that it is not?

Answer. – Supposing there were dharmas into which it could penetrate, this emptiness of all dharmas would destroy them, but since there is no dharma, the problem does not exist.

5. In the Tripiṭika, the Buddha taught the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of dharmas

Question. – If the emptiness of all dharmas (sarvadharmaśūnyatā) is really [295a] true, why did the Buddha, in the Tripiṭaka, speak especially of impermanent (anitya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) dharmas without self (anātman)?

546 On the identity of worldly people and saints, see Vimalakīrti., transl., p. 143-144 and note, 156-57, 235; Hībbhirin, p. 135, s.v. Bonshī.
[Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra.]\(^548\) – See the sūtra where the Buddha says to the bhikṣus: “I will explain to you
the discourse of the Dharma (dharmaprayāya) called Ti-yi-yi-k’ong (Paramārthaśūnyatā). What is this

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\(^{547}\) Anityaṃ dukkhaṃ śūnyam anātman is the formula most frequent in the Sanskrit Āgamas: cf. Saṃyuktā, T 99, k. 1, p. 1a1; k. 5, p. 35a6; K. 10, p. 65b28, 68c16;k. 12, p. 82c13; k. 21, p. 153a8. – In the corresponding passages of
the Pāli Nikāyas, śūnyam does not appear:

Aniccaṃ...dukkhaṃ... yam panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallam nu tam samanupassītum:
etam mama eso ham asmi eso me atāti: Vinaya, I, p. 14; Majjhima, III, p. 19-20, 271-273; Saṃyutta, II, p. 124-125, 244-245; III, p. 88-89, 94.

Aniccaṃ... yad aniccaṃ tam dukkhaṃ yam dukkhaṃ tad anattā tad anattā tam netam mama nesmo bhagavatāṃ atāti

When suñña is mentioned in the Pāli suttas, it is most often given by two complements suñña attena vā
attaniyena vā expressing that it is an emptiness of being and not of thing: Majjhima, I, p. 297; II, p. 263;Saṃyutta, IV, p. 54, 296-297.

\(^{548}\) Entitled Ti-yi-yi-k’ong king in the Chinese version of the Saṃyukta-āgama made between 436 and 443 by
Guṇabhadra, T 99, no. 335, k. 13, p. 92c12-26, and reproduced, not without some variants, at the beginning of a
sūtra appearing in the Chinese version of the Ekottara-āgama, T 125, k. 30, p. 713c12-714a3. There is no
correspondent in the Pāli Nikāyas but the Abhidharma masters, who see in it an affirmation of anātman or
sattvasūnyatāt, have transmitted some extracts to us in the original Sanskrit text: Kośabhasya, p. 129, 9-11; 299, 12-
14; 468, 20-22; Kośavyākhyā, p. 707, 13-16; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 267, 1-2 and 12; Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 474,
15-17; 582, 1-3; Mahāyānasūtraśāstra, p. 158, 21-22. The remainder of the sūtra is limited to repeating stock
scriptural phrases, all identified in my [Lamotte] article, Trois Sūtra du Saṃyukta sur la Vacuité, BSOAS, XXXVI,
1973, p. 314-317. Under these conditions, the complete original text can readily be restored:

1. evaṃ mayaḥ śrūtam / ekasmin samayā bhagavān kuruṣu viharati kalmāsadanye nigame /
2. tatra bhagavān bhikṣuṃ āmantryaṭi.
3. dharmanaṃ vo desāyisyādyau ...
11. idam avocad bhagaṇāttamanasas te bhikṣavo bhagavato bhāṣitaṃ abhyanandan. /

Here is a translation of the restored text:

1) Thus have I heard. Once the Blessed One was dwelling among the Kurus in the village of
Kalmāsadanya.

2) Then the Blessed One addressed the monks.

3) I shall teach you the Dharma good at the beginning, good in the middle good at the end, whose meaning
is good, whose letter is good, unique of its kind, complete; I shall explain to you the very pure and proper brahmic
conduct, namely, the sūtra on emptiness in the supreme meaning of the word. Listen then; reflect well appropriately.
I will speak.

4) What is the sūtra on emptinessss in the supreme meaning of the word? The eye, O monks, when it is
born, does not come from any place, and when it perishes, does not go anyplace.

5) [Translation modeled on the Chinese version, T 99, p. 92c17-18]: Thus, the eye is not real and
nevertheless is born; being born, it perishes. – [Another translation]: Thus the eye exists after having been non-
existent and, after having existed, it disappears.

6) There is action, there is retribution, but there is no agent who rejects these aggregates and assumes other
aggregates, except that that is a metaphor to designate the law [of pratītyasamutpāda in direct order].
paramārthaśūnyatā, ‘absolute emptiness’? The eye (cakṣus), when it is born, does not come from anywhere; when it perishes, it does not go anywhere. There is only action (karman) and retribution of action (karmavipāka); the agent (kāraka) does not exist. It is the same for the ear (śrotra), the nose (ghrāṇa), the tongue (jihvā), the body (kāya) and the mind (manas).”

Here, to affirm that by arising [the dharmas] come from nowhere and by perishing they go nowhere is to say that there are no eternal dharmas and that they are impermanent (anitya); there is only action and the retribution of action, but the agent does not exist. In the śrāvaka system, that is absolute emptiness (paramārthaśūnyatā). Why are you telling us about an ‘emptiness of all dharmas’ (sarvadharmaśūnyatā)?

Answer. – 1) The self (ātman) is the root (mūla) of all the passions (kleśā). First, one is attached to the five aggregates (skandha) as if they were the self (ātman); then, one is attached to outer things (bāhyavastu) as if they were ‘mine’ (ātmīya). Tied (baddha) by the ‘mine’, one produces love (rāga) and hatred (dveṣa) and as a result of this love and hatred, one carries out actions (karman). When the Buddha says [in the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra cited above] that "the agent does not exist" (kārakas tu nopalabhyate), he destroys the ātman in every dharma. When he says: “The eye, at the moment when it arises, does not come from anywhere and, at the moment when it perishes, it goes nowhere” he is affirming the impermanence of the eye, etc. But “that which is impermanent is suffering (yad anityaṃ tad duḥkham) and that which is suffering is without ‘me’ (ātman) and ‘mine’ (ātmīya).” The ‘me’ and the ‘mine’ not existing, the mind is not attached to any dharma, and the mind, not being attached to any dharma, no longer gives rise to any fetter (saṃyojana). Since it does not give rise to any fetters, what is the good of preaching emptiness? This is why, in the Tripitāka, the Buddha above all speaks of impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnya) and non-self (anātman), but speaks much less of the ‘emptiness of all dharmas’.

2) However, some beings, even though they hear the Buddha talking about impermanence, suffering, emptiness and non-self, continue to chatter uselessly about dharmas. To these people, the Buddha preaches the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā). If there is no self, neither is there any ‘mine’ and this absence of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ leads into the doctrine of emptiness.

7) The same must be said of the ear, the nose, the tongue and the mind.
8) I said: “Except that that is a metaphor to designate the law.” Here this metaphor is about the law that is expressed thus: “This being, that is; from the production of this, that is produced, i.e., the formations have as condition ignorance, consciousness has for condition the formations; etc., up to: “Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.”
9) Moreover: “This not being, that is not; by the destruction of this, that is destroyed, i.e., from the destruction of ignorance the destruction of the formations results; from the destruction of the formations the destruction of consciousness results”, etc., up to: “Such is the destruction of this entire mass of suffering.”
10) That, O monks, is the sermon called ‘emptiness in the supreme sense of the word’.
11) Thus spoke the Blessed One; the monks’ minds were delighted and they rejoiced, praising the words of the Blessed One.

549 See paragraphs 4, 5, and 7 of the preceding note.
6. The non-self leads logically to emptiness of dharmas

Question. – Then why does the Buddha say [in the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra cited above]: “There is action and there is retribution of action (asti karma, asti karmavipākaḥ)? This action and this retribution of action are not empty (śūnya).

Answer. – 1) The Buddha’s sermon (dharmadeśanā) is twofold: i) he is preaching the non-self (anātman); ii) he is preaching the non-dharma (adharma).

To those who believe in an eternal ātman, he says that “the agent does not exist (kārakas tu nopalabhyate); to those who are attached to the view of nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭyabhiniviṣṭa) he says that “there is action and the retribution of action (asti karmāsti karmavipākaḥ)”.

If a person hears it said that the agent does not exist, he ends up by falling into the view of nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭi) and it is for him that the Buddha says that “there is action and retribution of action”.

Actually, the five aggregates [of the present existence (aihikaskandha)] carry out actions (karman) but do not go into the future lifetime (aparajanman): as a result of the five skandhas [of the present lifetime], there arises a new series (saṃtāna, prabandha) of five skandhas which itself undergoes the retribution of actions (karmavipāka). This is why the Buddha says that one suffers the retribution of actions.

Thus, the mother and the baby, although their bodies are different, constitute a causal series; also, when the mother takes a medicine, her sick baby is cured. In the same way, although the five skandhas of the present lifetime and the five skandhas of the future lifetime are different, between them there is a continuity having as cause and condition the sinful or meritorious actions [of the present lifetime], although as a result of the five aggregates of the present lifetime, one takes on the five aggregates of the next lifetime as retribution.

2) Moreover, there are people who, looking for the nature of things (dharmatā), are attached to one single thing: existence (astiī), non-existence (nāstiī), the eternal (śāśvata), impermanence (anitya), etc. Attached to this one thing, they have love (tṛṣnā) for their own system and hatred (dveṣa) for others’ systems; then they commit evil actions. It is for these people that the Buddha preaches the ‘emptiness of all dharmas’ (sarvadharmaśūnyatā), for no system is possible when all dharmas are empty. Any system that one loves produces fetters (saṃyojana) and, producing fetters, it is cause and condition for ignorance (avidyā). If it produces ignorance, how could it be true? That is the emptiness of dharmas.

7. The Buddha adapts his teaching to the preferences and capacities of beings

Moreover, there are two kinds of beings: i) those who are attached to the world (lokāsakta); ii) those who seek the supramundane (lokottaraparyēsin). Among those who seek the supramundane, there are the superior (agra), the middling (madhyā) and the inferior (avara).
The superior beings are the beings with sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya), who are of great mind and who seek the bodhi of the Buddhas. The middling beings are beings of medium faculties (madhyendriya) who seek the bodhi of the pratyekabuddhas. The inferior beings are beings of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) who seek the bodhi of the śrāvakas.\footnote{551}

To those who seek the bodhi of the Buddhas, the Buddha preaches the six perfections (pāramitā) and the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).

To those who seek the bodhi of the pratyekabuddhas, he preaches the twelve causes (dvādaśanidāna) \footnote{552} [of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)] and the conduct of the hermit (ekacārin).

To those who seek the bodhi of the śrāvakas, he preached the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā) and the four noble truths (āryasatya).

[Prosopopeia of the deer, the rhinoceros and the elephant.] – 1) The śrāvakas fear saṃsāra and, hearing about the emptiness of beings, the four noble truths, impermanence, suffering, emptiness and non-self, they abstain from proliferation (prapañca) about dharmas. Example: in a park, the deer (mṛga), struck by a poisoned arrow (viṣesu), seeks only its own safety without thinking about others.

2) Completely disgusted as they are by old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (maraṇa), the pratyekabuddhas consider somewhat the profound dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and save a few beings. Example: the rhinoceros (khadgaviśāna) in a park which, although struck by a poisoned arrow, still busies itself with its children.

3) Completely disgusted as they are with old age, sickness nd death, the bodhisattvas completely sink into the twelve-membered dependent origination, penetrate the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā) and enter into the immense fundamental element (dharmadhātu). Example: The king of the white elephants in rut (śvetagandhahastin) in a hunting park: although struck by a poisoned arrow, he cares about the hunter (vyādha), has no fear (bhaya) and, at the head of his troupe, walks away with slow steps.

This is why not much is said in the Tripiṭaka about the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).

8. Canonical sūtras teaching the emptiness of dharmas\footnote{553}

However, sometimes thre are brahmaćārins with keen faculties (tīkṣṇendriya) who, while seeking the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas, are not disgusted with old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death

\footnote{551} The bodhi or prajñā of the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddhas and the bodhisattva-buddhas has been fully studied above, p. 1066-1079F.

\footnote{552} On the two kinds of pratyekabuddhas, living in groups (vargacārin) or living alone (ekacārin) like the rhinoceros (khadgaviśānakalpa), see above, p. 1069F, n. 1.

\footnote{553} See above, p. 1079-1081F and n.
(marana) and are attached to all kinds of dharmatā. It is for them that [in a few sutras of the Tripiṭaka] the emptiness of dharmas (dharmasāññyatā) is preached:

[1. Śrenikaparivrājakasūtra.]554 – Thus the brahmaćarin Sien-ni (Śreniika) [who had faith in the Buddha’s words], denied that the five aggregates (skandha) were a reality (tattva) and denied that there was a reality outside of the five aggregates.

554 Śrenikaparivrājakasūtra of the Samyukta, T 99, no. 105, k. 5, p. 31c15-32c1, related in some places to several suttas of the Samyutta: Kutūhala Sutta, IV, p. 398-400; Yamaka, III, p. 111-112, Anurādhā, IV, p. 383-384. Later, the Traité (k. 42, p. 368b20-c25) will give a free version of this sūtra in the following words: - Śreniika, uncle [of the brāhmaṇa Sañjaya], old, wise and possessing great fame, went forth from home and studied vastly all the texts. He cultivated his mind, sat in meditation and practiced the Path. One day, in search of wisdom, he went to the Kutūhalaśāla. There the brahmaćarins said to him: Six teachers claim omniscience (sarvajñā). Puraṇa Kāśyapa has great renown (yaśasvin) and commands a large group (gaṇacārya). When one of his disciples dies, great or small, Puraṇa does not reveal the place where he will take rebirth. The other five teachers, when one of their disciples dies, great or small, do reveal the place where he has taken rebirth. The Buddha also is a great teacher and possesses great renown. When one of his disciples dies, if this disciple is minor, the Buddha reveals the place where he has taken rebirth; but if this disciple is great, the Buddha does not reveal the place where he has been reborn.

Another time, Śreniika went to the Buddha and, having exchanged pleasantries, sat down at one side and asked the Buddha: Will the Buddha allow me to ask a question? The Buddha gave him permission, and Śreniika said to him: Once I went to the Kutūhalaśāla where I talked to people. And Śreniika reported to the Buddha what he had then heard. Then he continued: At this moment I had the following thought: It is a rule for the Buddha to affirm that if his disciple is minor, he will take rebirth, but if he is great, he does not take rebirth. Is that correct?

The Buddha said to Śreniika: My Dharma is very profound, subtle and difficult to understand. During the long night, you have shared other views (dṛṣṭi), other desires (rāga), other systems (dharma). By yourself you cannot see my Dharma. The brahmaćarin Śreniika said to the Buddha: As for myself, I sincerely honor the Buddha and I would like him to teach me the Holy Dharma out of his great pity, so that right here I would find the ‘Eye’ (cakṣus).

The Buddha said to the brahmaćarin: What do you think (tat kim manyase)? Do you consider the rūpa to be tathāgata (rupam tathāgatha iti samanupāsyasi)? – No! [Note that Kumārījīva here renders tathāgata by jou k’iu instead of the usual jou lai.]

Do you consider vedanā, samjñā, samśkāra and vijnāna to be tathāgata? – No!
Do you consider that the tathāgata is in the rūpa (rūpe tathāgata iti samanupāsyasi)? – No!
Do you consider that the tathāgata is in the vedanā, samjñā, samśkāra or vijnāna? - No!
Do you consider that the tathāgata is elsewhere than in the rūpa (anyatra rūpā)? – No!
Do you consider that the tathāgata is elsewhere than in the vedanā, samjñā, samśkāra and vijnāna? – No!
Do you consider the tathāgata as free of rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, samśkāra and vijnāna? – No!

Since you do not consider the tathāgata in any way, should you feel any doubt and ask yourself exactly what is the Buddha’s Dharma about? – No!

The Buddha said to Śreniika: To my disciples who have not understood my Dharma well, I say that there is a rebirth (punarbhava) for they retain traces (avaśesa) of the original egotism (asmināna); to my disciples who have
[2. Dīrghaṇkaḥsastra.]555 – To a powerful brahmacārin scholar, the Buddha answered: “In my system, I accept neither existence (astițā) nor non-existence (nāstițā). Why do you take part in this idle chatter (prapațca)? Existence and non-existence are mere idle gossip and birth-places (upapattisthāna) for the fetters (samyojana).”

[3. Mahāsūnyatāsastra.]556 – In the Tsa-a-han (Saṃyuktāgama), the Ta-k’ong king (Mahāsūnyatāsastra) speaks of two kinds of emptiness: the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā) and the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).

[4. Sattvasūtra.]557 – In the Lo-t’o king (Kolopamasūtras), it is said: “The aggregate of form (rūpaskandha), O Radha, destroy it, break it reduce it to nothing.”

understood the meaning well, I deny that there is a place where they take rebirth, for they have eliminated the original egotism without a trace.

At these words, Śrenika found the Way and, having found the Way, he arose from his seat and said to the Buddha: I would like to obtain the going-forth (pravrajyā) to follow the Path. At once, his beard and his hair fell off by themselves and he became a sramana. Shortly afterwards, he obtained the fruit of arhat, for he had received from the Buddha the Dharma eye which is undeceived.

This sūtra master, Śrenika, was [at first] one convinced by faith (adhimukta): he was convinced that the Buddha could make him find the Way, but that was only a beginner’s faith. Later when he had heard the Buddha, he destroyed egotism (ahamkāra) and understood that, from the beginning (ādita eva) there never was an ātman. The ātman being non-existent, there are no dharmas that depend on it: they are like a magic show (māyā), a dream (svapna), deceivers, false and non-existent. From then on, in possession of the power of faith (śraddhābāla), Śrenika entered into the true nature of dharmas (dhammatā) and no longer grasped the rūpa as tathāgata, etc., nor the vijñāna as tathāgata.

- From the earliest Prajñāpāramitāśūtras, the wandering mendicant Śrenika appears as the prototype of the Mahāyānist saint. By letting himself be guided by faith and by taking as criterion the nature of things as it appeared in the knowledge of the Omniscient One, he no longer kept any dharma. He no longer seized any dharma that might be taken or let go, including nirvāṇa. Cf. Astasaśasrikā, p. 51: So ‘tra sarvatra śraddhānusārī sarvajñajñāne dhammatām pramāṇātyayavam adhimukta iti tena na kaścid dharmah parighrāte nāpi sa kaścid dharmo ya upalabdho yam sa gṛhyād muñced vā sa nirvānam api na manvate. – For more details, see also Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, p. 134-135 (T 223, K. 3, p. 236a; T 220, vol. VII, k. 409, p. 48b); Astādaśasāhasrikā, T 220, vol. VII, k. 485, p. 460b; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 633 (T 220, vol. V, k. 37, p. 209b).

In the Viṣṇūsa, T 1545, k. 1, p. 3a8, Śrenika is transcribed as Si-ni-kia.

555 Dīrghaṇkaḥsastra according to the version established above (p. 1688F) by the Traité. Cf. the Dīghaṇkaḥsautta of Majjhima, I, p. 497-501 (Tsa-a-han, T 99, no. 969, k. 34, p. 249a-250a; Pic-yi-tsa-a-han, T 100, no. 203, k. 11, p. 449a-b) partly having its Sanskrit correspondent in the Avadānasataka, II, p. 187 foll.


557 Sattvasūtra of the Saṃyutta, III, p. 190: Evam eva kho Rādha tumhe rūpaṃ vikiratha vidhamata viddhamṣetha vikīlanikaṃ karotha tathākhyāyā patipajjatha.
[5. Kolopamasūtra.]

– In the Fa-yu king (Kolopamasūtra), it is said: “Good dharmas should be abandoned and a fortiori bad dharmas (adharma).”

[6. Pārīyaṇasūtra and Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi.]

– In the Po-lo-yen king (Pārīyaṇasūtra) and the Li-tingh king (Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi), it is said:

  The sage does not accept or retain any dharma.

  Accepting and retaining dharmas is to produce idle chatter.

  If there is nothing on which to lean,

  There is no idle chatter.

  The saints who have attained bodhi

  Neither take nor reject dharmas.

  Free of taking or rejecting,

  They eliminate all wrong views.

Thus, in many places in the Tripiṭaka, the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā) is spoken of.

That is the ‘emptiness of all dharmas’ (sarvadharmaśūnyatā).

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558 Short extract from Majjhima, I, p. 135: Kullāpamaṇaṃ vo bhikkhave ājānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātabbā pag eva adhammā. Text already cited above, p. 64F, 2094F and later k. 85, p. 657a2. Here dhamma and adhamma are taken in the sense of good and bad teachings.

559 Pārīyaṇasūtra is just a simple title here not accompanied by any citation. But above (p. 237F), the Traité has referred to the Upasīvaparipṛcchā of Pārīyaṇa and gave two stanzas corresponding to verses 1075 and 1076 of the Suttanipāta.

Transl: “When the saint has disappeared, must it be said that he is no longer, must it be said that he is forever free of pain? Explain that to me, O Sage, for you know this. – About the one who has disappeared, there is no measure; there is nothing of him that allows speaking about it; all the things that constituted him are abolished; do you so abolish all ways of speech.”

- The ‘abolition of all ways of speech’ is very close to ‘elimination of all speech and all practice’ (sarvavādacaryoccheda), the last word of the Mādhyamika philosophy: see p. 45F.

560 The two stanzas of the Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi cited here correspond in some places to a stanza of the Duṭṭhashakasutta of the Pāli Āṭṭhakavagga: Suttanipāta, verse 787.

Transl. – “The committed person undergoes various criticisms, but what to say about an emancipated person? In him nothing is accepted or rejected. He has shaken off all philosophical views here below.”

- For the Prajñās, this ideal of emancipation is fulfilled by the parivrajaka Sreṇika who took dharmatā as his sole criterion by basing himself on the non-existence of all dharmas (sarvadhammānapaladhitām upādāya), the non-taking and the non-rejection of all the teachings (sarvadharmānam aparigrahānusargam upādāya); cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 134-125.
Anupalambhaśūnyatā

**Thirteenth Section EMPTINESS 15: EMPTINESS CONSISTING OF NON-PERCEPTION**

I. VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF NON-PERCEPTION

Emptiness consisting of non-perception (*anupalambhaśūnyatā*). –

1. Some say: In the aggregates (*skandha*), the elements (*dhātu*) and the bases of consciousness (*āyatana*), no self (*ātman*), no eternal dharma (*nityadharma*) is to be perceived (*nopalabhyate*): that is emptiness of non-perception.

2. Others say: If one looks for some dharma in causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*), it is never perceived, just as the fist (*muṣṭi*) is not perceived in the five fingers (*aṅguli*),

3. Others say: All dharmas and their causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) are absolutely non-perceived (*atyantānapalabdha*): that is what emptiness of non-perception is.

II. IF DHARMAS ARE NOT PERCEIVED, IT IS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT EXIST

Question. – Why do you assert this emptiness of non-perception? If dharmas are not perceived, is this due to weakness of knowledge (*jñānadaurbalya*) or because they do not truly exist?

Answer. – It is because dharmas really do not exist that they are not perceived, and not due to weakness of knowledge.

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561 For the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras (above, p. 2035F) it is *anupalambhaśūnyatā* when neither past, present nor duration of the present are perceived. In other words, dharmas are situated outside of time and by that very fact are shielded from becoming. Here the Traité is proposing a series of other explanations and seems to end up with the following: *Anupalambhaśūnyatā* is an emptiness consisting of non-perception, in the sense that all dharmas, coarse (*sthūla*) or subtle (*sukṣma*), up to and including nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning, elude perception (*upalabdhi*), gain (*lābha*), not that the knowledge is too weak to grasp them, but because ‘dharmas do not really exist’. As the objector will note, no. 15 is almost mixed up with absolute emptiness (*atyantaśūnyatā*, no. 9). In practice, the real yogin does not perceive bad (*akusala*) or impure (*āsrava*) dharmas such as the three poisons and, if he still perceives the good qualities, such as the dharmas of the Path, it is only from the point of view of the absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*) for which the true nature of dharmas is the absence of characteristic.

562 The first explanation cites the *sattvaśūnyatā* (emptiness of ‘me’ and ‘mine’) professed by the two Vehicles; the two other explanations refer to the *dharmaśūnyatā* (emptiness of things even in their causes and conditions) put forth in the Greater Vehicle.
III. USEFULNESS OF THE EMPTINESS OF NON-PERCEPTION

Question. – If that is so, [the emptiness of non-perception, anupalambhaśūnyatā, no. 15) is not different from absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā, no.13). Why add one more emptiness of non-perception?

Answer. – Hearing that emptinesses no. 9 and 13, which were discussed above, are nothing at all (akīṃcid), people are frightened (bhaya), hesitate and wonder: “If they tell us now about an emptiness of non-perception, it is because the search for a reality (dravyaparyēṣaṇa) has not succeeded.” In order to cut short this hesitation (kāṅkṣā) and fear (bhaya), the Buddha speaks about the emptiness of non-perception. How?

The Buddha said: “From my first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittotpāda) to the moment when I became Buddha, a Buddha of the ten powers, I have looked for a reality in dharmas, but without ever finding it.”

IV. THE NON-PERCEPTION OF DHARMAS

Question. – What is the non-perception of things (vastvanupalambha)?

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563 This is why, despite the criticisms addressed to me [Lamotte] from the other side of the Atlantic, I have often translated and will continue to translate nopalababhyate (pou k'o tß) by ‘does not exist’. Here also I have had the pleasure of coming up against I. B. Horner, who in her Middle Length Sayings, I, p. 177, n. 3, explains anupalabhyamāne as either ‘not to be known’ or ‘not existing’.

564 Cf. Aṣṭādaśasāh., II, ed. E. Conze, p. 33: Na me Subhute pūrvam bodhisattvacārikāṃ caratā kasyacid dharmasya svabhāva upalabdho rūpam iti vā vedanei vā... yāvat bodhir iti vā. Evaṃ khalu Subhute bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām carati prathamacittotpādam upādāya yāvat anuttaraṃ samyaksāṃbodhim abhisambhotsyate nupalabhayogena sarvadhammānāṃ ca svabhāvavakṣāleṇa bhavitayam. – Long ago when I was practicing the career of Bodhisattva, O Subhuti, I never perceived the intrinsic nature of any dharma, whether it was form, feeling…. or even bodhi. Therefore, O Subhuti, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva practices the perfection of wisdom by a method of non-perceiving from his first production of the mind of bodhi until the moment when he awakens into supreme perfect enlightenment; he should practice competency in self nature of all dharmas.”
Moreover, the yogin who acquires this emptiness of non-perception does not perceive (Being non-perceived, there is the emptiness consisting of non-perception (the three poisons (viṣa), the four torrents (ogha) or the four attachments (yoga), the five obstacles (nīvaraṇa), the six thirsts (trṣṇā), the seven perverse latent tendencies (anuṣaya), the eight perditions (mithyāvāṭa), the nine fetters (saṃyojana), the ten bad paths of action (akusālakarmapatha). All these bad vile bonds (bandhana) being non-perceived, the emptiness of non-perception is spoken of.

Question. – If that is so, what benefits are there in cultivating this emptiness of non-perception?

Answer. – [The yogin] perceives (upalabhāte) morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā); he perceives the four fruits of the religious life (śrāmānayaphala), the five spiritual faculties (indriya), the five elements constituting the saint (āsaiṅkṣaskandha), the six discriminations of equanimity (upekṣopavicāra), the seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyānga), the nine successive absorptions (anupūrvasamāpatti), the ten qualities of the saint (āsaiṅkṣadharma), and other ‘qualities of the śrāvaka’ of this type. If, in addition, he perceives the prajñāpāramitā, he fulfills completely

565 Upalabhāte taken here in the sense of perceiving and acquiring.
567 The five nīvaraṇa: kāmacchanda, vyāḍa, styānamiddha, auddhatyakaukṛtya, vicikitsā: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 278;
Koša, V, p. 98.
568 Six trṣṇā related respectively to rūpa, sabda, gandha, rasa, spraṣṭavaya, dharma; cf. Dīgha, II, p. 58.
569 Seven anuṣaya: kāmarāga, pratigha, bhavarāga, māṇa, aviḍyā, drṣṭi, vicikitsā: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 254, 282;
Koša, V, p. 3.
570 Eight mithyāvāṭa: mithyādrṣṭi, mithyāsaṃkalpa, mithyāvāc, mithyākarmānta, mithyājīva, mithyāvāyāma,
572 Ten aksālakarmapatha, prañātipāta, etc.; cf. Dīgha, III, p. 269; Koša, IV, p. 137.
573 Śīla, samādhi and prajñā are the three elements constituting the Noble Path: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 81, 84; Itivuttaka, p. 51.
574 Srotāpattipalha, etc.
575 See p. 1125-1127F.
576 The five anāsravaskandha, morality, etc.; cf. p. 1233F, n.1; 1349-1359F.
577 The six upeksopavicāra, discriminations of equanimity relative to rūpa, sabda, gandha, rasa, spraṣṭavaya and dharma; cf. Dīgha, p. 245; Majjhima, III, p. 239-240; Koša, III, p. 108.
578 See p. 1128-1129F
579 See p. 1308F.
580 The ten aṣaiṅkṣānga, namely, the eight factors of the Path described as ‘aṣaiṅkṣa’ plus the perfect deliverance belonging to the arhats (aṣaiṅkṣi samayagvimukti) and the knowledge of acquisition of this deliverance (aṣaiṅkṣa samayagjñāna); cf. the ten asekhiyā dharmā in Anguttara, V, p. 222; and Koša, VI, p. 295.

1764
(paripūrayati) the six perfections (pāramitā) and the qualities (guna) of the ten bhumis [of the bodhisattva].

[296a]

Question. – But above you said that “all the dharmas up to and including nirvāṇa are not perceived”; why do you now say that the yogin “perceives morality, concentration, wisdom and up to the ten qualities of the saint”?581

Answer. – Although these dharmas are ‘perceived’ (upalabdha), they all promote the emptiness of non-perception and to this extent, they are also said to be ‘non-perceived’ (anupalabdha). Moreover, as [the yogin] does not take them up (nādadāti) and is not attached (nābhiniśate) to them, they are not perceived; as unconditioned dharmas (asamskṛta), they are not perceived; as noble truths (āryasatya), they are not perceived; as absolute truth (paramārthasatya), they are not perceived.

Although they have attained these qualities (guna), the saints who enter into nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning (nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa) do not regard them as acquired (labdha); it is ordinary people (prthagjana) who regard them as great acquisitions (mahālabha). Thus the lion (simha), even when he has feats to his credit, does not consider them as marvelous (āścarya); it is the other beings who, on seeing them, consider them to be extraordinary (adbhuta).

It is in this sense that [the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra] asserts an ‘emptiness of non-perception’ [or of non-existence] here.

Abhāvadiśūnyatā

Fourteenth Section EMPTINNESSES 16 TO 18: EMPTINESS OF NON-EXISTENCE, OF EXISTENCE ITSELF, OF BOTH NON-EXISTENCE AND EXISTENCE ITSELF582

I. FIRST EXPLANATION

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581 For these ‘ten qualities of the saint’ (p. 296a2), one variant substitutes the ‘qualities of the bhūmis’.

582 These three emptinesses summarize, in a condensed form, the proof of universal emptiness. The Prajñāpāramitāśūtra which mentions them three times defines only the third, the abhāvasvabhāvasūnyatā (see above, p. 1035F, §16). In the following explanations, the Traité establishes a parallel between these last three emptinesses and the preceding fifteen. Actually, as the author has pointed out at the start of this chapter, the emptinesses all concern one and the same absence of self nature and of characteristics and are unequivocal and interchangeable.

Here Kumārajīva resorts to some rather unusual expressions to render emptinesses 16 to 18: he translates abhāvasvabhāvasūnyatā by wou fa k’ong, svabhāvasūnyatā by yeou fa k’ong and abhāvasvabhāvasūnyatā by wou fa yeou fa k’ong.
1. Emptiness of non-existence (abhāvaśūnyatā). – Some say that non-existence (abhāva) is the destruction (nirodha) of dharmas, but as this destruction does not exist, [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] speaks here of ‘emptiness of non-existence’.

2. Emptiness of existence itself (svabhāvaśūnyatā). – Dharmas arising from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagraṇyutpanna), they have no self existence (svabhāva). As existence itself does not exist, [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] speaks here of ‘emptiness of existence itself’.

3. Emptiness of non-existence and of existence itself (abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā). – Since it is impossible to grasp the mark of non-existence (abhāvanimitta) and the mark of existence itself (svabhāvanimitta), there is ‘emptiness of non-existence and existence itself’. Moreover, the consideration of non-existence and existence itself as empty has the name ‘emptiness of non-existence and existence itself’. Finally, the yogin who considers (samanupasyati) the arising (upāda) and cessation (nirodha) of dharmas looks at it alternately from the viewpoint of existence itself (svabhāvamukha) and the viewpoint of non-existence (abhāvamukha). When he considers the arising (upāda), he feels joy (saumanasa) and when he considers the cessation, he feels sad (daurmanasa). But if this yogin discovers the emptiness of arising (upādāśūnyatā), he destroys the mind of joy (saumanasyacitta), and if he discovers the emptiness of cessation (nirodhaśūnyatā), he destroys the mind of sadness (daurmanasyacitta). Why? [Because he sees that, on the one hand], arising is not a gain (lābha) and on the other hand, cessation (nirodha) is not a loss (alābha). As he thus eliminates these mundane (laukika) thoughts of joy and sadness, there is ‘emptiness of non-existence and of existence itself’.

Of the eighteen emptinesses, the first three, [namely, adhyātmaśūnyatā, bhāhirdhāśūnyatā and adhyātmabahirhēśāśūnyatā] destroy all the dharmas; the last three also destroy all the dharmas. Actually,

1. the emptiness of existence itself (svabhāvaśūnyatā, no. 17) destroys the time of production (upāda) and the time of duration (sthiti) of all the dharmas.

2. the emptiness of non-existence (abhāvaśūnyatā, no. 16) destroys the time of disappearance (vyaya) of all the dharmas.

3. the emptiness of non-existence and of existence itself (abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā, no. 18) destroys production (upāda) and disappearance (vyaya) at the same time and together.

II. SECOND EXPLANATION

Some say:

1-2. The emptiness of past (atīta) and future (anāgata) dharmas is called emptiness of non-existence (abhāvaśūnyatā, no. 16); the emptiness of present dharmas is called emptiness of existence itself (svabhābasūnyatā, no. 17). Why?

The disappearance (vyaya) and change (anyathātva) of past (atīta) dharmas leads to non-existence (abhāva); future (anāgata) dharmas, the causes and conditions for which have not come together, are
without arising, without existence, without exit and without production; this is why they are ‘non-existence’ (abhāva). – As for present (pratityupanna) dharmas and unconditioned dharmas (asamskṛta), by the very fact that they presently exist, they are called ‘existence itself’ (svabhāva).

3. The two, [namely, non-existence (abhāva) and existence itself (svabhāva)], together being empty, they are called ‘emptiness of non-existence and of existence itself (abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā, no. 18).

III. THIRD EXPLANATION

Finally, others say:

1. Unconditioned dharmas (asamskṛta), being without production (utpāda), without duration (sthitī) and without disappearance (vyaya), are called ‘non-existence’ (abhāva).

2. Conditioned dharmas, having production, duration and disappearance, are called ‘existence itself’ (svabhāva).

[196b] 3. These [two categories of dharmas] being likewise empty, there is ‘emptiness of non-existence and of existence itself’.

Therefore the bodhisattva who wishes to become established [in the eighteen emptinesses], from the emptiness of inner dharmas (adhyātmaśūnyatā) up to the emptiness of non-existence and of existence itself (abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā), should practice the Prajñāpāramitā.